The Greek Anatolian Adventure

Territorial concessions in Anatolia were promised to the Greeks during the First World War but, writes Cyril Falls, hope of fulfilment was defeated by the resurgent republicans of Turkey.

The Graeco-Turkish war, which may be said to have been begun when Greek troops landed at Smyrna (now known as Izmir) in May 1919, was an aftercrop of the First World War. The first step is to be found in Sir Edward Grey’s offer to Greece in 1915, as an inducement to enter the war, of “large concessions on the coast of Asia Minor”.1

This was followed by pacts tied together by the Treaty of Sevres, signed by the accredited representatives of the Porte in August 1920, but repudiated by the Turkish National Party in Anatolia and in the end abortive, though for the time being reducing Turkey to a Sultanate in central Anatolia.

Italy had been bitterly disappointed by the miscarriage of the Agreement of Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne, which was to have given her wide liberty of action on the Adriatic seaboard; while her allies, Britain and France, had complained of her military policy in Albania, which they regarded as selfish. France, however, had been a first-class partner in Eastern Europe until the war was over, when the troops she had landed to support the Whites in southern Russia had to be hurriedly re-embarked in March and April 1919 because they were behaving badly and halfway on the road to becoming Bolshe-vized. To cut a long story short, it became apparent that, if Greece were to be supported in her Anatolian venture, it must be by Britain alone.

Even so, British policy was divided. The supreme exponent was the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, whereas the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, was more than doubtful. Another member of the Government, Winston Churchill, put it that the latter’s aim was “a not unhelpful policy to Greece and a friendly peace with Turkey, but she must be expelled from Europe”.2

The military authorities warned the Prime Minister that a Greek advance might well end ill, and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Henry Wilson, said later—but before the Greek retreat—of a talk with Venizelos: “I told him straight that he had ruined his country and himself by going to Smyrna”.3

The British Prime Minister had played a remarkable part in the war, though his attempts to dictate military policy and fight anywhere but on the Western Front had been frustrated — rightly, it is now generally agreed, because the Germans could nearly always get there first — by his Tory Ministers in the Coalition Government. The Greek Prime Minister, Eleutherios Venizelos, had, on the contrary, dictated his country’s policy and, with the aid of France, sent into exile King Constantine, to the embarrassment of Britain, though she too had a great deal to complain of in his behaviour.

As regards the French, it is not possible to say whether their representative, Franklin-Bouillon, sometimes went beyond his brief, but it is clear that he was a detestable figure and did everything in his power after the fall of Venizelos to give comfort to the Turks, his country’s foes in the recent Great War, and overthrow the Greeks, his country’s friends. We shall see that he was instrumental in betraying their much more formidable British allies when we come to the affair of Chanaq.

There were to be two rival rulers of Turkey and originally they had been on outwardly friendly terms. The Sultan Mahmoud VI had appointed Kemal to command the Seventh Army in Palestine, where, until Allenby’s victorious campaign was all but over, he had been somewhat disappointing because of his morbid hatred of his German allies. Now they were at daggers drawn, and Mahmoud was fast becoming the puppet of Britain, France, and Italy, while Kemal was building up a force to oppose their policy and often recovering the breech-blocks and rifle bolts he had handed in, to reunite them with the cannon and rifles that had remained in his hands.

S. P. Cosmetatos, well known in this country and a friend of the writer of these lines, feels that Venizelos was playing into the hands of Kemal by purging the Greek Army, persecuting his political opponents, and making use of agents provocateurs and informers.

The Balkan Wars had begun in 1912, so that by early 1920 the Greek Army had been under arms for upwards of eight years. During the campaigns in Macedonia, Milne, the British Commander-in-Chief, and his subordinate, Biggs, who had many Greek divisions under his command from time to time, had come to the conclusion that Greek troops could be brought to their excellent best only if kept out of politics nobody could stop them, any more than all Greeks, from talking politics, but they might be confined to that stage.

Yet the Army was now soaked in the subject for some time to come, without any ill results, despite terrible sufferings in a campaign always tough and occasionally taking the form of a desert war. It had to be, to stand up as long as it did against the equally tough Turks, fighting from nearer their base, almost on it, in fact, at the end of the Greek advance. The Greek Army, about 200,000 strong, was for its size one of the best in Europe. An advance force landed at Smyrna in May 1919.

What next happened is the subject of controversy. The best authority on the purely military side is a French officer, favouring the Greeks and obviously ashamed of his Government s policy, who writes that they were received with enthusiasm by the townspeople, but that there was some fighting, organized by the Young Turks.4

The weight of opinion, however, inclines to the belief that they behaved very badly and that this brought about increased enthusiasm for the cause of Mustapha Kemal. He was finally invited to send a mission to Moscow, which returned with a million gold roubles. The Greeks eventually mustered six divisions under the command of General Paraskevopoulos, who had commanded a corps under Lieutenant-General Biggs. Forces were pushed out to reconnoitre the country ahead and secure a hold on suitable bases, which they did after some skirmishing with Kemal’s outposts.

It took a long time to transport artillery, ammunition, and warlike stores with limited) shipping, and the real campaign did not begin until the following year, when it was conducted with great skill and determination by two forces which fanned out until they were separated by the better part of 150 miles; the left capturing Panderma, on the shore of the Sea of Marmora, and Brusa, 45 miles to the south-east, the former invaluable because a railway ran from it to Smyrna; the right winning a fine success about Philadelphia, on the line from Smyrna to Adana.

There followed what at first appeared a comedy, but developed into a grave tragedy. When the French forced Constantine to leave his country they had insisted that he should be accompanied by the Diadoch (Crown Prince) and that the throne should pass to the second son, the young Prince Alexander. In October the King, playing in his garden with two pet monkeys, was bitten by one of them.

At first the bite was considered a trifle, even something of a joke, but the victim died. Churchill declared that it might not be an exaggeration “to remark that a quarter of a million persons died of this monkey’s bite”. It was, of course, rhetoric, since a great many thousand, Turks as well as Greeks, would have died anyhow. Venizelos, after some two years mostly in Paris and London, had lost his grip on public opinion.

He decided on a general election and felt certain to win, so certain that he allowed the royalists to vote if they so wished for Constantine’s restoration. They did so and were supported by many who had not been considered royalists. He was heavily defeated—and the King came back in triumph. He had, on his departure, taken care not to abdicate, so that he was now clearly the legitimate King of the Hellenes.

One result was the removal of General Paraskevopoulos from his command, to be replaced by Papoulos. Prince Andrew of Greece, who served under him as division and corps commander and was his friend, considered him competent but weak. However this might be, his appointment heightened the dismay of the British Government. It may also have been a factor in the decision of France to make an end of such commitments to Greece as she still acknowledged, though she would sooner or later have done so in any case after the return of Constantine. Italy did not take long to follow her example.

The King could not take over command in the field immediately after his return to Greece because he had political as well as military affairs to deal with. He was to be reproached in some quarters for remaining so long as he did in Smyrna after he moved there, but he considered that he ought to oversee a much-needed reorganization and confine himself to occasional visits to headquarters in the field.

It may be added that Kemal was following the same course. His commander in the field at this stage was Ismet Pasha, who had served against the British in Palestine. A little later the front was to be divided into two commands, Refet Pasha taking over the left wing. He also had commanded a corps in Palestine and, when the front was smashed in Allenby’s final offensive, made an almost miraculous escape.

He moved by night for nearly a week, with his aide-de-camp and two orderlies, through the ground captured by the British, answering challenges by saluting—since he did not know a word of English—and riding on at a walk. In fact, Kemal never established a permanent headquarters near the front and, as we shall see, later in the war placed Ismet in command of the whole. There is perhaps no need to say anything about his future career, except that he is now regarded in his own country as almost as great a statesman and soldier as Kemal and that he fostered a friendship with Greece that endured until the unhappy clash over Cyprus.

During January, 1921, the Greeks launched their second offensive, its object being to anticipate one by the enemy, which Papoulos had been told by his intelligence service was brewing. The first thrust was delivered against Afion Karahisar, of importance as the junction of the Smyma-Adana railway with that from Scutari. One division lived up to the fame of Greek troops as marchers by covering some 63 miles over very bad roads and in heavy snow and country in which shelters were few and far between.

A thrust on the left, however, against Eskishehir having failed, it was decided to be content with Afion Karahisar for the time being and try again in better weather. Papoulos justly congratulated his troops for what was on balance a victory—though the Turks naturally claimed it as a defeat because they had held on to Eskishehir—even if only a partial one. But he sinned in pretending that he had got all he wanted and concealed his losses, believed to have been about 8,000. Bujac5 winds up with a rhetorical question: “Were the generals of the Greek Army fit to win battles?”

He answers by saying that, with certain reservations, the generals and senior officers to whom the leadership of brave troops had been assigned had revealed themselves as incapable, one reason being that on the eve of the offensive there had been too many (three to four hundred) replacements of well-proved and experienced officers, suspected by the new regime, by orthodox but inexperienced officers, to command divisions, regiments, and battalions. He particularly condemns the replacement of Paraskevopoulos.

Constantine accounted his partial check as no worse than a mishap, for which he considered Georgy largely responsible, but suitable for the post of Chief-of-Staff. His next offensive was carried out in July and took the form of a frontal attack followed by a double envelopment. It began well with the capture of Kataya, on the Pursak river, on the 17th, with a haul of nearly five thousand prisoners and 168 guns. Kemal, who had come to the front when the enemy’s offensive began, remained in the town until the last moment, then went to Ismet’s headquarters to order a deep retreat, before returning to Angora.

He decided to make his final stand in defence of his capital on a strong position north of the Sakaria. The Greeks had gained a great success and the enemy’s retreat gave them control of the railway to within a short distance of Angora. They did brilliant work in repairing the permanent way, which the enemy had demolished at several points.

Prince Andrew, who had taken over command of a division on his kinsman’s return to the throne, and shortly afterwards of a corps, balances military and political problems in a long book and reveals the cross-currents in the planning that now took place: for example, Constantine favoured an advance to Angora and was supported by the Prime Minister, M. Goumaris, while Papoulos and he himself were against it, though he thought that with reinforcements, including the strengthening of divisions which had suffered heavily, it might be practicable.6

The country differed greatly, so that it was not easy to decide which lines of advance to follow. North of the Sakaria it was mountainous and almost impassable; between the Pursak and Sakaria reasonably good; and south of the Sakaria waterless desert. When it was clear that the Turkish main body was concentrating to the east, it was decided to cross the Pursak.

The town of Eskishehir, of considerable strategic importance, had not been secured, and it was decided not to attempt a deep advance until it was. Rightly, a further pause for reorganization and reinforcement was decided upon, though this would of course give the Turks time to do the same thing.

The Greek Government had also to consider a collective note, in which Britain, France, and Italy offered to mediate between the combatants. Baltatzis, the Foreign Minister, refused and claimed that Greece was defending the rights of the civilized world in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Straits—very much the role for which Lloyd George had originally cast her!

The dying Turkish Government in Constantinople was prepared to send representatives to the London Conference which had made this decision, but Kemal replied, very reasonably, that he would not send a representative unless he received a direct invitation. Naturally, it all came to nothing when the Turkish delegation demanded the evacuation of Anatolia as a first step. While they were on their way home the Greeks launched a new offensive.7

Constantine, who had come to Smyrna to assume the supreme command on June 12th, issued a proclamation in which he said that, confident in divine aid and in the dash of his heroic army, he had arrived to carry out the supreme national aspirations of Greece. After some diversionary thrusts, the attack was launched on the same day. It is not clear whether or not the Greek command was aware from the first that Kemal had brought up four more divisions, which he held in reserve for counterattacks.

Afion Karahisar, captured, as we have seen, but since abandoned, was now re-occupied without opposition and the fighting did not become intense until the 15th, when the Greeks made good progress on the right and in the centre; in fact, the Turkish left was completely broken by next day and General Papoulos thought he saw an opportunity to make the result decisive by a swift pursuit.

So far, the tactics had been sound and successful, but the exploitation might have been bettered, though progress continued until the latter part of the month. Constantine was well satisfied with the result and proclaimed that the way to Angora was open. Kemal had to admit that the withdrawal of the Turkish Army was unhappy, but he was in no way discouraged. Hitherto he had only been nominally Chief-of-Staff, but he was now proclaimed Commander-in-Chief de facto as well as de jure.

The Greeks deployed for the renewed offensive on August 24th. They have time after time been charged with over-confidence, but on this occasion the General Staff made it clear that, if matters did not go as well as was expected, they would renounce their aim, that of crushing the enemy’s main body, substitute for it tactics of attrition, and resign themselves, at least for the time being, to harrying the enemy and destroying targets such as bridges, the Angora and Adana railways, and dumps of ammunition and warlike stores. Kemal made a thorough reconnaissance on which to base his first plan of resistance, in the course of which he fell from his horse, broke several ribs, and had to return to Angora for treatment, but went straight back to the front, to direct the fighting from an armchair.8

Between August 27th and 31st the Turks were driven back to their second and stronger line of resistance, when their right wing rested on Polati, beyond the Sakaria and about 37 miles from Angora. The battle named after the river began with the defence superior in numbers. The Greek plan was to turn the Turkish left, but the assault shifted to the centre when this was reinforced. In ten days the enemy was driven back as many miles, but his front had nowhere been broken and the Greek effort was nearly exhausted. On September 10th Kemal, having shifted troops to his right, launched a counter-offensive that achieved little of the success generally attributed to it, but brought about the decision of the Greek command to withdraw. The Turks were too weary to pursue.

The present writer ventures to quote his commentary on the battle:

The Battle of the Sakaria has been dramatized until the truth can scarcely be recognized in the story current in Western Europe. The picture of a sudden and complete reversal of fortune comparable to that of the Vistula is false. The Greeks had to withdraw because their effort to smash the Turkish defence had ended in deadlock and their communications had broken down, so that it was out of the question for them to attempt to winter on the Sakaria.

Yet, if the Turkish victory was not decisive in the military sense, it was in the moral and political. Greek prestige and spirit sank; those of the Kemalists rose proportionately. Constantine’s stock dropped to zero. Papoulos, a competent soldier, was removed and replaced by Hadjianestis, eccentric and unbalanced. The story, possibly apocryphal, goes that his mind finally gave way and that he imagined his legs were made of glass, a serious handicap for a commander.9

It has been necessary to compress the story of the battle very sharply, but what followed must be dealt with even more drastically. The Greeks fell back to the familiar front, Afion Karahisar-Eskishehir, where Kemal let them sit for almost a year, during which the troops became more and more homesick and dejected. Their reaction to politics, already mentioned, was at its height.

In a conversation with Marshal Papagos, Chief-of-Staff of the Cavalry Division in this war, he gave it as his opinion that this was now very serious and that its effects were far graver than absence from home and loved ones or extreme discomfort. At all events they made little resistance and were hurled back on Smyrna where, before enough shipping could be assembled, some fifty thousand were made prisoner and a large section of the city was sacked and burnt.

The Turks pressed on for Constantinople, to come up against an allied force of British, French, and Italian troops under the command of General Sir Charles Harrington, holding Chanaq, on the eastern side of the Dardanelles. When it is related that the French Government was represented by Franklin-Bouillon it can be expected that he would bring about the withdrawal of the French contingent, which he did.

The Italians followed suit, some of their officers coming to say farewell to Harrington with tears running down their faces. The commander is considered by some observers to have been bluffed on at least one occasion; but he succeeded in preventing the advance of the Turks without fighting until the future had been decided in political quarters.

The affair was to end in horror. A number of officers, headed by Colonel Plastiras—who had repeatedly baulked Prince Andrew when commanding a body of Evzones—had taken refuge on the island of Chios and got together a large force, now threatened to bring it to Athens.10 Though there were loyal troops prepared to fight for him, King Constantine, to avoid a fratricidal struggle, abdicated and left the country. Goumaris had resigned office earlier in the year, but remained in a Coalition Cabinet.

 

Now a revolutionary committee decided that three former Prime Ministers, two ex-Mimsters, and General Hadjianestis should be tried by court-martial, which sentenced them to execution. Goumaris was too ill to plead his cause and was dragged out of bed, carried with the others in trucks outside the city, and shot.

A British naval officer, Commander Sir Gerald Talbot, sent to save him if possible arrived too late; but he was in time to save Prince Andrew, who was to have faced a trial that would have had the same result, and to escort him abroad. Britain then broke off diplomatic relations with Greece. An able writer with an intimate knowledge of Greek history, who does not take sides, wrote that “if Venizelos had felt in a position to make an earlier and a more vigorous protest, he might perhaps have prevented a pitiful tragedy.”11

Despite many successes, the whole war was a tragedy for Greece, as it was a triumph for Mustapha Kemal.

1 Lord Kinross: Ataturk, The Rebirth of a Nation, p. 140.

2 Winston S. Churchill: The World Crisis—The Aftermath, p. 392.

3 S. P. P. Cosmetatos: The Tragedy of Greece, p, 314.

4 Colonel Bujac: Les Campagnes de l'Armée Hellénique, p. 231.

5 Bujac, op. cit, pp. 260-71.

6 Prince Andrew of Greece: Towards Disaster pp. 93, 97, 112, 116.

7 Turkish National Commission for Unesco, 1963: Ataturk pp. 91-2.

8 Turkish National Commission, op. cit., p. 100.

9 Cyril Falls: A Hundred Years of War, p. 233.

10 It may be recalled that Churchill, then Prime Minister, on returning from his visit to Greece at the end of 1944, reported in a speech that “General Plaster-Arse” had become Prime Minister and that he hoped he would not be proved to have feet of clay. One might say that the Devil’s hooves would have become him better.

11 Edward S. Forster: A Short History of Modern Greece (3rd ed,), p. 147.