In the era of the early modern ‘secret state’, two notorious brothers set up an elaborate intelligence network, managing a vast array of spies and informers watchful for Jacobite plots against Britain.
The events which led to the deposition of James II and VII in November 1688 were not deemed ‘Glorious’ at the time. Fears surrounding James’ Catholicism were exacerbated by the king’s personal blunders in promoting his religion in a strongly Protestant nation, by his politics, and by the birth of a (Catholic) son and heir. During his reign James had also ominously bolstered his army and navy. Deliberately or not, he seemed to threaten the English political nation by emphasising the rights of his crown over the traditional framework of government. Consequently, his contemporaries believed his rule would simply become an absolutist monarchy. Yet in the face of William of Orange’s invasion in November 1688 the Stuart regime disintegrated and James was forced into exile in France. Following much political argument, a new revolutionary settlement emerged under the joint monarchy of William III and Mary II. Celebrated in Whig history (at least) as a ‘bloodless revolution’ it was actually rather more bloody than it seemed, especially in Ireland and Scotland.
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In the era of the early modern ‘secret state’, two notorious brothers set up an elaborate intelligence network, managing a vast array of spies and informers watchful for Jacobite plots against Britain.
The events which led to the deposition of James II and VII in November 1688 were not deemed ‘Glorious’ at the time. Fears surrounding James’ Catholicism were exacerbated by the king’s personal blunders in promoting his religion in a strongly Protestant nation, by his politics, and by the birth of a (Catholic) son and heir. During his reign James had also ominously bolstered his army and navy. Deliberately or not, he seemed to threaten the English political nation by emphasising the rights of his crown over the traditional framework of government. Consequently, his contemporaries believed his rule would simply become an absolutist monarchy. Yet in the face of William of Orange’s invasion in November 1688 the Stuart regime disintegrated and James was forced into exile in France. Following much political argument, a new revolutionary settlement emerged under the joint monarchy of William III and Mary II. Celebrated in Whig history (at least) as a ‘bloodless revolution’ it was actually rather more bloody than it seemed, especially in Ireland and Scotland.
While searching for stability the new regime had to contend with party politics and squabbles between Whig and Tory ministers vying for power, as well as a major European war with Louis XIV’s France. Meanwhile the exiled court of James II also engendered numerous political plots, some real, others imagined, all seeking a Jacobite restoration. As such, the unsettled 1690s saw a rising fear of plotters and agents provocateurs in the body politic. To combat this, the new regime needed spies of its own.
The covert use of secret agents to counter foreign enemies, Jacobites and other foes was nothing new. It had a long history dating back at least to the reign of Elizabeth I. But the 1690s was a particularly hot time for espionage where, as one contemporary remarked, in government one must always think ‘of Spys and Intelligence, where needful Abroad; and the like more especially at Home’. But while the regime’s secret intelligence system would, like its predecessors, mostly centre upon the government’s office of the secretaries of state, there was also space for others to take up the slack. Their work can reveal how this shady aspect of political life functioned and thrived.
Edg’d tools
That secret intelligence matters were, by the 1690s, seen as a fundamental part of the duties of government can be observed in the various secret memorials that were written for the Williamite regime on such matters. In May 1692 one such memo was created by Hans Willem Bentinck, Earl of Portland, William’s favourite. Portland was not inexperienced in the world of espionage, having previously managed a secret intelligence network on the eve of the Dutch invasion in 1688 and later maintained a network of agents both in Paris and the Low Countries. He also took to employing informers on the English domestic front against both Jacobite plotters and many others whom he considered hostile to his master. This contemporary clandestine trade consisted of the usual elements: secret intelligence networks, spies, invisible inks and so on – the ‘edg’d tools’ of government, as they were called – which had proved invaluable both before and after the 1688 invasion. Consequently, Portland’s direct recommendations in a 1692 memorial for the ‘convenience [of] compleat intelligence’ may well have carried some weight in the new regime. Certainly, if his ideas had been fully carried out, they would have taken the Williamite regime far further than any English government had ever previously gone in the intelligence world and would in effect have created an incipient police state.
Hans Willem Bentinck, Earl of Portland, engraving by Jacob Houbraken after Simon Dubois, 1749-59. Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.
In this memorial Portland suggested that the regime should keep an account of all the streets and lanes in central London, and within ten miles of the city, in ‘an alphabeticall manner’. Divided into eight parts, with an agent ‘of prudence and good affection’ in each, this intelligence organisation would then provide detailed lists of suspicious people, inns and livery stables and all of their visitors, and especially note the numbers of horses currently in their area. They would then send such information directly to the secretary of state. As horses were a potential cavalry arm in any rebellion, they loomed large in the document. Smithfield Market and other horse fairs around the country were to be closely monitored, while local gunsmiths and powder-makers were to be forced to make reports to the central government of their sales of weapons. Further places in which the disaffected might gather in crowds were also to be keenly watched. The areas of main concern that Portland noted were the many crowded ‘cock fights [and] bowling-greenes’ in London, which could be used as a cover for plotting. In fact, one Denis de Lafuye was eventually hired to obtain information about criticisms of the government by lurking in such ‘public places’.
Portland also thought that state propaganda was an important part of the government’s duties. This, he suggested, should be turned over to a ‘good penn’. It proved an idea that prefigured the novelist and journalist Daniel Defoe’s later employment under secretary of state Robert Harley. One particular individual, remarked Portland, could be employed to proclaim, ‘in a concise manner’, the government’s case, with free prints being sent out to the great towns. Enquiries were to be regularly made of lodgers in private dwellings, as well as of political and social clubs. Meanwhile, the local Justices of the Peace were also to be drawn into this system via a correspondence network and were to be told to keep a careful eye on any ‘disaffected persons’ in their area, especially near the Scottish border, where the roads were to be closely watched. Portland’s 1692 memorial gives us a flavour of a potential Williamite police regime, but the reality behind it can be further probed by the actual espionage work of two brothers employed in covert activities in the late 17th century: James and Alexander Johnston.
The Johnston Brothers
James Johnston, ‘a tall fair man’, was one of the most notable early Scottish secretaries of state of the era. ‘Honest’ to some but considered a ‘knave’ by others, James was the son of Archibald Johnston of Wariston, who had served the Covenant and Cromwellian governments and had ended on the scaffold at the Restoration as a result. James proved a staunch supporter of William III and the revolution, and he won his intelligence spurs when he was placed in Berlin in 1689 as a diplomat. There he set up a strategic intelligence network that enabled him to be one of the best informed of all of William’s ambassadors. It was also noted that Johnston had much better ‘intelligence from France than any about King William’ at this time; naturally this gave him great credit with the king, leading to other opportunities at the Williamite court. William at least was sensible enough to realise the value of Johnston’s work. In 1692 James Johnston was appointed as one of the two secretaries of state for Scotland with orders to begin to create intelligence networks. He would eventually fall from office in 1696 after his somewhat over-zealous investigation into the massacre at Glencoe – although, it was alleged, he was compensated by a gift of £4,000, a second marriage and a return to his beloved gardening, in which, as one contemporary noted, ‘he had very good taste’.
Not that James found much money to go around for such secret affairs. When, in 1695, he was accused by several people of giving money to informers, he responded that: ‘I own that I am sorry I have it [money] not to give.’ He admitted that in Berlin he had had far more money, but now, ‘I despaired of getting that money again’. This lack of funding, he went on to argue, was a real shame, given that he was placed in a post ‘whose chief business at such times as these should be to discover and prevent bad designes’.
Cryptography used to protect secret messages, from A new method of cryptography, humbly presented to the most serene Majesty of Charles the II, by Samuel Morland, 1666. akg-images/Science Source.
James Johnston’s wariness in the world of intelligence was evident, although any moral qualms about such underhand business were refreshingly absent. Even so, he remained enough of a gentleman to have some social misgivings about the covert tasks assigned to him. Nonetheless, he was aware that such illicit work was now simply too important for the government to neglect: gentleman or not, ‘We in the post of secretary must do such businesses’. Above all, James was lucky: he had a brother, Alexander, who was willing to do most of the actual dirty work.
Alexander Johnston had previously undertaken covert work for James in Berlin, where he had first set up various intelligence networks. He had also been responsible for the interrogation of agents and informers. Though reluctant at first, Alexander seems to have found a real talent for clandestine operations. While he was to later remark that he had never made a penny out of it – and certainly the brothers regularly used their own funds to supplement the government’s deficiencies – so effective did Alexander’s reputation in this field become in the 1690s that, despite his desire to retire from the business altogether and to get himself a legitimate post, the king instructed that he should be kept in his place.
Alexander Johnston’s personal motivation for engaging in secret work was partly religious – ‘leaving the event to God’ – and partly to prove his loyalty to the new monarchy. It was certainly a costly business to engage in, and not just financially, for as Alexander observed:
I have no estate to support such expence I have been at; besides by following this way I have lost and destroyed the way I could comfortably have lived on my profession … But I hope God will find out an expedient, or teach me patience to bear it, without repining, the hurry of public affairs forcing the best and greatest of men to delay the considering of private affairs.
In any case Alexander had also made money in part by ‘buying and selling tallys [debts] at the treasury, exchequer, the sick and wounded, the victuallers, the cofferers, the pay masters, the Master of his Majesty’s works, and other offices’.
Cock fight, engraving after William Hogarth, 1759. Yale University Museum of Art.
Because Alexander wrote frequently to the king’s confidential secretary William Carstares, we know much about his espionage techniques. Thus in June 1694, when Alexander sought some reimbursement from the government for his secret expenditures since 1692, the documents he submitted (one entitled ‘Mony laid out by me since the beginning of the year 1692 to people imployed in Secret Services’) give a unique insight into this intelligence work and its financial – and other – costs.
Covert costs
Alexander remained something of a lone wolf when running his intelligence networks as he considered secrecy in such matters vitally important: ‘I think (modestly enough) I am the only private man that carried on such a chain of services in this way since this happy revolution.’ Yet aside from gathering secret intelligence, his other main task was to undermine the continual stream of domestic Jacobite plots. He proved obliging, when needed, to raid the lodgings of potential plotters in search of papers and to arrest the ‘usual suspects’ for interrogation. By so doing he could then provide, and hold onto, the many witnesses he uncovered from among the Jacobites and take them to court. This in itself seems an endless task; he bemoaned the fact that such individuals were always prone to disappearing given half a chance, which generally led to the collapse of such cases.
In June 1694 Alexander made a claim directly to Queen Mary for some compensation for his work. Mary was by her own admission puzzled as to how to proceed in such secret state matters, and so she instructed the Duke of Shrewsbury to obtain further particulars about the claim through an interview and then to contact Portland for additional information on Johnston’s secret work. What followed was a detailed written explanation by Alexander Johnston himself. This Shrewsbury gravely passed on to Portland, noting that ‘nobody but the king or yourself has any knowledge’ of these secret matters.
William III being presented with a list of the conspirators involved in the plot to assassinate him in 1696, from A New and Complete History of England, by Temple Sydney, after Samuel Wale, 1773. The Print Collector/Heritage Images/Getty Images.
It is from this document that we can learn that much of Alexander Johnston’s work was highly secret indeed, for as he remarked: ‘There is another business in which I acted by order, and succeeded to their Majesty’s mynd, as to my share in it, but I cannot well name it without leave; it cost a good deal of mony.’ In the rest of this document, however, Johnston was less obscure. Various agents had plainly come under his personal command and he had subsequently given money to ‘above 30 men and more women whom I have employed’. Mostly this was ‘to engage them’. Once Johnston had hooked them in with money, he certainly held them close.
The grand total of sums paid out by Alexander Johnston over the period came to the sizeable total of £668 5s. He paid out £15 for intelligence from three people about a particular plot against Jersey. For the discovery of suspects who were located in the regiments of the Guards a sum of £32 was handed over, while his attempt to trace some French officers who were reportedly skulking in London cost him £5 10s. Tracking the threads of an invasion scare in 1692 cost him some £180 altogether, of which one man alone in London accepted the hefty sum of £160, although Johnston insisted on having his receipts for all of his outgoings.
Without mittens
Other themes in Alexander Johnston’s work also stand out. He used both men and women as secret agents, and he kept their names a closely guarded secret even from his superiors – and certainly from one another – aware of the likelihood of leaks: ‘I faithfully promised’, he noted of one female agent in his employ, ‘to conceal her name, and the road she intended to take thither, and back again to me.’ Failure or betrayal would lead to severe consequences for them if he discovered it. Johnston was never above using harsh methods when needed, even admitting that he much preferred to work ‘without mittens (as we say)’ in such matters. Such tough methods seem to have given him more scope in his work. A former ensign in James II’s army, for instance, was tasked with spying on a fellow officer, Cornet Chambers, but when the man began to express concerns about giving ‘evidence’ against Chambers in court Johnston menacingly noted that: ‘His humours shall be suffered to evaporate and every opportunity shall be laid hold on to bring him to tell the whole truth.’
Alexander Johnston used the full range of techniques that were available to the intelligencer of the period. He and his servants were pressed to work very long hours and they had very little sleep when on a job; this was also true of his spies. Johnston made use of some of the king’s messengers as his special police force when arrests or seizures of papers and property were to be made. At the same time, he often raged against the apparent easiness of the passage of purported Jacobite agents from France into England, and the laxity of the state laws on treason, as well as the open corruption that generally occurred among public officials. This allowed regular prison breaks and pay offs to be made to hard-won witnesses who then absconded with their money, causing the collapse of trials of suspects.
Cryptographic tables, from A new method of cryptography, 1666. akg-images/Science Source.
The examination of suspects frequently led to their incarceration or, if they were ‘ingenuous’ with him, Alexander Johnston could be ‘persuaded’ to let them go about their business and have them covertly watched while they did so. This enabled him to get leads on others who were involved in their convoluted schemes. In this way Johnston acquired intelligence on quite a few Scots officers who were prowling about in London, as well as several disguised French officers who came into London with ‘the French king’s Commission in their pockets’. By such means eight Catholic and Protestant soldiers in the Guards regiment were picked up and sent into Scotland, where the looser judicial methods – namely, torture – could be more easily applied.
Of course, in this underground war, some of his targets proved too crafty. One ‘Jones’ (alias Sympson) was apparently on the move and collecting arms and Johnston, being ordered by his superiors to ‘spare no mony to catch him’, took to raiding Jones’ various lodgings in London, but in this case ‘the Messengers after having oft missed him, had him in sight, but cused to follow him to his lodgings that they might get his papers’. Unfortunately (for Johnston) they were spotted, and Jones ‘was too quick for them’. He was aided, noted Johnston, by the fact that ‘he uses often women’s clothes, and as such had a pass the last time he went to France’.
In August 1694 Johnston described another raid. Having received information on his suspect he sent for his trusted agent Mr Morice. Johnston gave Morice his orders and a warrant to raid a house some 12 miles out of London. Morice gathered his men and that night they surrounded the house, keeping strict watch until four o’clock in the morning. When the door finally opened, they rushed the building and captured all the inhabitants for Johnston to interrogate. Though Alexander described Morice as having ‘done many services’ and being abler than most, he also believed that some of the king’s messengers were merely ‘villains’ and needed to be watched themselves.
Broadside satirising the failed plot to assassinate William III and invade England, from The Triumphs of Providence over Hell, France & Rome, engraving, 1696.Trustees of the British Museum, London.
Another technique was to pay the debts of the potential agent in order to persuade them to become useful. On one such occasion he caught a man named Telford, ‘a surgeon to Colonel Cunningham’s regiment of dragoons’. Alexander paid off the man’s debts and got him out of prison. The surgeon subsequently proved successful ‘in some things’ and Johnston later recommended him for further employment as ‘he can do much’ for the state.
Inglorious
All of this work was undertaken by Johnston as very much a ‘free-will offering’ to the state. Yet, besides the personal danger, the brutality, the time and the cost, Johnston was often frustrated by the constraints he was under: ‘What I have done, I did it as it were in fetters, caused by narrow circumstances.’ Nevertheless, James and Alexander Johnston fought hard to provide security for William III’s regime. While in the familiar Whig historical tradition the Revolution might have been ‘Glorious’, in reality it resorted to some rather inglorious methods to sustain itself.
Alan Marshall is Emeritus Professor of History at Bath Spa University and the author of Intelligence and Espionage in the English Republic, c. 1600-60 (Manchester University Press, 2023).