The Hebrew Insurgency in Palestine

In the years between 1945 and the formation of the State of Israel in 1948, the British struggled to rule Palestine. At the centre of their problems were four highly active Zionist insurgent groups: Haganah and the Palmach, Irgun and Lehi.

Before the onset of the 1947 civil war that culminated in the creation of Israel, the Zionists’ opponents were, as well as Palestinian Arabs, the British forces who had been given a mandate to govern Palestine by the League of Nations in 1920. During this period the British placed strict restrictions on the number of Jewish refugees allowed to settle in Palestine. In 1939 a White Paper limited that number to 75,000 for the following five years, a period in which many Jews sought escape from Nazi Germany and war-torn Europe. The mandate also placed severe restrictions on Jewish land ownership.   

Yet the British government had not always been so hostile and unsympathetic towards the Jewish cause. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 was an unstinting endorsement for the establishment of a homeland for the Jewish people. The end of the Second World War signalled a major U-turn in British policy. Having secured victory in the 1945 general election, Clement Attlee’s new Labour government showed itself to be an enemy of Jewish self-determination, despite a manifesto pledge that the administration would be pro-Zionist.

Defend and strike

The Jewish paramilitary organisation Haganah was formed in Palestine in 1920. Originally known as Irgun Haganah (‘Defence Organisation’), it was established to defend Jewish settlements from Arab attacks and, later, to resist British efforts to prevent the immigration of Jews to the Holy Land. 

Haganah’s creation was the result of meticulous planning in the aftermath of the First World War. To begin with, it survived on a meagre budget and was composed of volunteers, bringing together a network of smaller militias sympathetic to Zionist values. Comprised primarily of men in their early twenties who trained during weekends and holidays, by 1947 the organisation had around 32,000 members.

Initially the Haganah sought to persuade the other underground Zionist militias to eschew extreme violence and show restraint. By 1931, however, a significant number of Haganah activists had become impatient with the organisation’s policy of containment. Seeking a more aggressive stance, a breakaway group known as Irgun was created, becoming an independent force in its own right. Its leader, Menachem Begin, later became a politician and was Israel’s sixth prime minister. Together with the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, he would receive the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1978 for his role in improving relations between Israel and Egypt.

The Lehi, or ‘Stern Gang’, was a terrorist group (referring to itself as such) that split from Irgun in 1940. More extreme than both Haganah and Irgun, it was founded by Avraham Stern, who had previously been a member of both groups before creating his own militia with the explicit aim of fighting the British; ‘Lehi’ was an acronym for ‘Fighters for the Freedom of Israel’. During the Second World War, Stern went as far as to seek an alliance with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in his battle to create a ‘new totalitarian Hebrew republic’ free of the British.

Finally, the Palmach (‘strike force’) was an elite fighting corps recruited from within, and under the control of, Haganah. Established in May 1941 it consisted of approximately 2,000 men and women. The Palmach’s objective was to engage in swift offensive operations against the British, as well as to continue the war of attrition with the Palestinian population. On 10 October 1945 Palmach insurgents raided the British-run Atlit detention camp, just south of Haifa, releasing over 200 illegal immigrants from captivity and killing a British policeman. In the period that followed, the Haganah embarked on small-scale skirmishes, seizing arms, explosives and bridges and attacking the British railway network. The group sought to pick up armaments that had been abandoned in vast quantities on battlefields across the Middle East.

When it became clear in late 1945 that the British would continue to prevent Jewish immigration to Palestine by force, an informal pact was made between Haganah, Irgun and Lehi. Haganah leaders Moshe Sneh and Yisrael Galili met Menachem Begin and a representative of Lehi, Nathan Yellin-Mor, in October (Avraham Stern had been killed by British police during a raid in Tel Aviv in 1942) and the Jewish Resistance Movement was formed. Informed by the fear of reprisals and respect for the sanctity of life outlined in the Torah, the movement’s official aim was simply to defend Hebrew communities, rather than embark on full military action. 

Despite this, on 1 November 1945 the Haganah and Palmach, in league with Irgun and Lehi, attacked British railways across Palestine in what became known as the ‘Night of the Trains’. A petrol carrier and stationmaster’s office were destroyed; three British guard boats were also blown up. It was the first time the groups had worked together and came to be seen as the foundation event of the united resistance movement. 

Clampdown

On 13 November, the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin gave a speech in Parliament in which he reiterated that restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine would continue. Britain, he declared, would support a ‘homeland status’ for Jews in Palestine, rather than the creation of a Jewish state. In Bevin’s view, the majority of Holocaust survivors were to remain where they could contribute to ‘rebuilding the prosperity of Europe’. Riots broke out in Tel Aviv. The British reacted to the unrest by imposing a curfew, but this did not stop the mob going on the rampage. In the clashes that ensued five Jewish men were killed and more than 50 were injured. 

Relative peace was restored but, towards the end of the month, the Palmach unleashed further attacks on the British in Hadera. The British responded by raiding Jewish settlements, notably Rishpon. Further uprisings took place in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, with fatalities and injuries on both sides. The British persisted in enforcing curfews and searches and those accused of insurgency were often detained without trial. Almost half of the Palmach were arrested.

As the largest insurgent group, Haganah was of prime interest to the British, whose intelligence – as files from the National Archives show – was often in the hands of double agents. Top secret memos written by the Soviet spy Kim Philby in June 1946 articulate his suspicions that Jewish militias were planning to assassinate Bevin. The danger to which Philby referred was common knowledge within the British intelligence services. Bevin was uncomfortable with accusations of his being an ‘anti-Semite’ or ‘Jew hater’ and uncomfortable, too, about the possibility of his assassination. 

Since late 1944 Joseph Stalin had made no secret about his support for the Zionist agenda. The Soviet dictator was convinced that an independent Jewish state would be likely to proclaim the virtues of, and ally itself to, socialism, thereby undermining the presence of the British in the Middle East. Philby and his co-conspirators were, therefore, of one mind with the Jewish paramilitaries.

Bombing King David

The feared scenario was that Bevin would be targeted for assassination during a planned visit to Egypt in 1946, where he might fall victim to a plot by either Jews or Arabs. Concerns were heightened when, on 22 July 1946, Irgun militias bombed the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, where the British administrative headquarters was based. The attack was an act of retaliation for Operation Agatha, also known as ‘Black Sabbath’. On 29 June 1946 British forces conducted raids in a number of Jewish settlements, arresting close to 3,000 people in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa. The Jewish Agency, a Zionist organisation founded in 1908, was among the targets. The official line was that the raids were to counter ‘the state of anarchy’ evident in Palestine. Some reports claimed that British soldiers antagonised the Jewish population by drawing swastikas on the walls of their residences and shouting ‘Heil Hitler!’

The bombing of the King David Hotel was part of a plan masterminded by Haganah. However, whether for religious or moral reasons or in fear of reprisals, the group eventually decided against going through with the attack. This decision was not communicated to Irgun whose members took up the mantle and placed a bomb in the basement of the hotel’s main building. At 12.37pm, an explosion destroyed the southern wing of the hotel (Haganah had planned for the detonation to be later in the day, when fewer people would be in the building). As well as retaliation, the bombing was motivated by a desire to destroy a set of documents which exposed Haganah’s role in the Jewish resistance. Those documents had been taken by the British from the headquarters of the Jewish Agency during Operation Agatha. In total the bombing resulted in 91 fatalities, including civilians wholly unconnected to the war effort.

Mandate at all costs?

The bombing put the British secret service into disarray. Matters were made worse when the Egyptian authorities declared that they felt unable to protect the British Secretary of State against any Jewish assault during his proposed trip. This was partly a problem of identity: eastern Jews, who could easily pass as Arabs, were able to avoid the strict frontier controls in the Suez area. Where Jewish terrorists had been reported in Cairo, lacklustre investigations revealed that the assailants quickly seemed to have ‘disappeared’. 

An element of concern also set in over the attendance of the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, due to begin on 29 July. The British, Chinese and Brazilian delegations were housed at the Hotel George V. MI5 feared a repeat of the King David attack, with Jewish insurgents infiltrating security arrangements. On 25 July 1946 a small team of secret agents, including two members of Special Branch, travelled to Paris to assess the situation. The visit was a response to intelligence indicating that the British delegation might be targeted in Paris, but other reports indicated that members of the Jewish militias were being trained to travel to Britain to assassinate members of the government. 

During the Peace Conference, no new occupants were allowed into the George V unless they had special police clearance; visitors to its restaurant were restricted; French police in plain clothes intermingled with hotel staff; cleaners were vetted and the lounge at the foot of the main stairway was closed. Intelligence reports revealed that the Stern Group was undertaking bespoke training in a bid to attack the British but, in the event, no assassinations occurred either in England, Egypt or France. Perhaps the insurgents thought that the security forces were in too great a state of alert to justify any bombing.

There were, however, still concerns about future acts of violence. General Evelyn Barker, a British Army officer who served with distinction in both the First and Second World Wars, got wind of a move by terrorists to assassinate him on a brief journey between his home and the British headquarters in Jerusalem. He chose another route and the danger was avoided. The supposed plot against him was just one among many cases where the British authorities considered themselves to be at risk. At times the British were at a loss as to what to do. Their soldiers, numbering about 100,000, were unable to see a clear way out of the situation and were not easily convinced the mandate should be enforced at all costs, a view shared by much of Britain’s press. 

During this period Zionist militias were responsible for the death of over 5,000 Palestinians and dozens of British troops. The prime objective of the Jewish militias was to make life for the British as difficult as possible. Yet by 1947 the British had become adept at discovering clandestine munition arsenals, which considerably set back the Jewish war effort. Furthermore, the British had begun to supply weapons to neighbouring Middle Eastern states hostile towards the prospect of a Jewish state. On the occasions where Arabs murdered Jews, the British often chose to look the other way. As the struggle intensified, a split between the hawks and doves in the Jewish Resistance Movement was imminent.

British withdrawal

In July 1947 the mantle of violent insurgency was taken up by Irgun and Lehi. The British were uncertain how to proceed next, concerned by public worry about the growing casualty toll coming from the disputed occupancy in Palestine. In September 1947 the Cabinet decided to throw in the towel and order a full evacuation.

The decision to withdraw was not accompanied by a corresponding abandonment of British and American intelligence activity. Harry Levine was an American Zionist, who sought to construct and illicitly transport submachine guns to Palestine. In January 1948 Levine came under suspicion by the Metropolitan Police when he visited London, ostensibly to meet colleagues in the plastics industry. During his visit Levine made clandestine contact with Dr Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organization. A discreet search of Levine’s effects by HM Customs gave the police no immediate cause for concern, but further secret communiqués revealed that Levine was heavily implicated in arms deals negotiated by the Jewish Agency with a view to shipping armaments to Haganah.

The situation in Palestine also prompted the United Nations to recommend a partition of two separate states – one Jewish and one Arab. The collapse of the British Mandate had resulted in a bitter civil war. With the British gone, the resistance movement was finally able to unleash unhindered the full force of its organisation, but internal differences remained. On 9 April 1948 forces from the Irgun and Lehi murdered more than 100 Palestinians in the village of Deir Yassin, a massacre condemned by Haganah.

On 26 May 1948 Israel’s first prime minister David Ben-Gurion created the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), a conscript army formed from Haganah, Irgun and Lehi members. Irgun officially joined the IDF on 1 June. Despite this, it continued to act independently, resulting in a direct confrontation with IDF forces later that month. A cargo ship, the Altalena, carrying weapons for Irgun arrived off the Israeli coast on 20 June. When Ben-Gurion and the IDF demanded that the weapons be handed over to the newly formed army, fighting broke out between Irgun and the IDF, some of whose members defected back to Irgun, resulting in fatalities and the arrest of more than 200 Irgun soldiers. Even after the creation of the State of Israel and their assimilation into the IDF, both Irgun and Lehi acted independently in Jerusalem, where Lehi forces killed the Swedish diplomat and UN Envoy for Peace, Folke Bernadotte, in September 1948. After forces from the IDF surrounded an Irgun camp on 22 September, the group officially disbanded. From 1980 former members of Lehi who served in the IDF were awarded the Lehi Ribbon, worn on their uniform in recognition of their group’s contribution to the creation of Israel. 

As for the British, their failings and humiliating withdrawal were astutely summed up in November 1947 by William James Fitzgerald, the Chief Justice of Palestine:

I find myself a participant in what I can only regard as a retreat we may find it somewhat hard to justify in history. There is no doubt about it – we are going. The decision undoubtedly has the concurrence of 99% of the British people … it is the manner of our leaving that worries me … Whatever one may think of the rights and wrongs of either side, it surely is a new technique in our imperial mission to walk out and leave the pot we placed on the fire to boil over.

Richard Willis is Visiting Professor at the University of Sussex.