Kashmir: Prisoner of History?

Kashmir, a small valley in the Himalayas, plays an outsized role in the national imaginations of both India and Pakistan. Formed by the river Jhelum and its tributaries, and measuring a mere 89 by 25 miles, the Kashmir Valley has historically been a crossroads between Central and South Asia. The region has been an independent kingdom, a province within the Mughal, Afghan, and Sikh empires, a princely state within British India, and, latterly, a state within India.

The Kashmir Valley’s strategic location, physical beauty, and distinct religious culture have been of critical importance to the political entities of which it has been a part. But its special status has intensified dramatically with the conflict between India and Pakistan over the region since 1947, in which each state has placed Kashmir at the heart of its nationalist aspirations. The moment and process of decolonisation casts a longer shadow in Kashmir than perhaps anywhere else in the Indian subcontinent.

Princes and politics

The modern history of Kashmir begins with its incorporation as a province into the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, which came into existence in 1846 through a treaty between a Dogra Hindu potentate from Jammu, Gulab Singh, and the British East India Company. Gulab Singh, who had helped the Company defeat the Sikh Empire, assumed the title of maharaja, thus claiming sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir as well as the frontier districts of Ladakh and Gilgit. As was the case with other princely rulers, he did so while accepting the paramountcy of the British Crown.

Not only did Singh’s Dogra dynasty derive its political authority from Jammu as opposed to Kashmir, his successor, Ranbir Singh, who took the throne in 1857, further tied the dynasty’s legitimacy to Hinduism by reviving the law banning cow slaughter, constructing temples, and patronising the collection and translation of Hindu religious texts from Kashmir into Urdu and Persian. Ranbir Singh also undertook a policy of importing non-Kashmiris – usually Hindus from the Jammu and Punjab region – to run the administration of his state.

These policies had the effect of alienating the Kashmiri population, over 90 per cent of whom were Muslim. In the 1930s the discontent took the shape of a political movement led by Sheikh Abdullah, a Kashmiri Muslim from a modest background who emerged as a charismatic and fearless leader, able to speak the language of socio-economic justice in the Islamic idiom. Seeking to represent a generation of Kashmiris eager for political change, Abdullah founded the Muslim Conference (MC) in 1932 to demand rights for Kashmiri Muslims.

By 1938, under Abdullah’s direction, the organisation had changed its name to the National Conference (NC), now making demands on behalf of all Kashmiris, regardless of religion, class, or sect. This was primarily a result of the alignment of the movement with the philosophy of plural, secular nationalism espoused by the Indian National Congress in British India. Much as the Congress sought to represent an Indian nation, the NC sought to represent a Kashmiri nation. Abdullah espoused a vision of the Kashmir nation (which for him was synonymous with the valley) that encompassed Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs.

The movement was only able to extract minimal concessions from the Dogra state, but was successful in outlining a comprehensive agenda for the future of Kashmir within an independent India. By the mid-1940s the NC was flagging due to the Dogra state’s repressive policies and attempts to subvert the loyalty of its leadership. The revival of the MC by a group of Muslims from Jammu, who took inspiration from Muslim organisations in British India such as the All-India Muslim League, further divided the movement. In an attempt to breathe fresh life into the NC, Abdullah launched the ‘Quit Kashmir’ agitation in May 1946, which demanded that the ruler – now Maharaja Hari Singh – abdicate the throne and transfer sovereignty to the people. Soon thereafter, Abdullah was imprisoned and would remain absent from the political scene during a crucial period of the subcontinent’s history as negotiations for independence gathered pace.

Jammu and Kashmir’s choice

When the British quit India in August 1947, they left behind two dominions, India and Pakistan, the latter formed through the partitioning of the provinces of Punjab and Bengal. Since paramountcy was set to lapse at the moment of independence, the princely states had a choice on which state to join. Most reluctantly chose based on their location. As such, the state of Jodhpur joined India, while Bahawalpur joined Pakistan. In Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh vacillated, in part because the state’s location made it possible for it to accede to either India or Pakistan – but also because he nurtured the impossible dream of Jammu and Kashmir’s independence. Within the state, the revived MC favoured accession to Pakistan, while the NC favoured India.

The situation was further complicated in mid-October 1947, two months after independence. Muslims in two regions of Jammu and Kashmir (Poonch and Gilgit) had begun separate revolts against Hari Singh, each of which ultimately declared for Pakistan. By late October, Pashtun tribesmen from the Northwest Frontier Province in Pakistan, with the tacit support of the new Pakistani government, had crossed into Kashmir to help the Poonchi rebels in their revolt against the Dogra dynasty. Seeing no other recourse, Hari Singh turned to India for help. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s interim prime minister, reluctantly agreed to deploy the Indian military – but not before Hari Singh had signed a document of accession to India.

But by the time Hari Singh signed the document of accession in late October 1947, portions of the state had already broken from it. Lord Mountbatten, Governor General of India, noted that, since the accession had taken place in ‘special circumstances’, ‘as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people’. This statement has provided the basis for subsequent demands by Kashmiris and the international community for a plebiscite to settle the issue.

The Indian army entered Kashmir on 27 October 1947 and eventually pushed back the Pashtun raiders, preventing them from taking Srinagar, the state capital and the heart of the Kashmir Valley. The situation soon escalated into a full-scale war between India and Pakistan. The regional pro-India movement, led by the NC under Sheikh Abdullah (who was released from prison in September 1947), took over the reins of government as the maharaja left the state, now in smouldering ruins. Hari Singh remained the titular head of state until his abdication in June 1949.

At the end of 1947 Nehru took the issue of Kashmir to the United Nations in the hope that it would agree that Pakistan was the aggressor and force it to withdraw its troops. Instead, the UN – the Anglo-American bloc of which was convinced by Pakistan’s argument – gave equal weight to the claims of both countries, thus converting Kashmir into the issue that it remains today: a bilateral dispute between India and Pakistan. But the UN also brokered a ceasefire, effectively partitioning the state between the two countries. The agreement, which went into effect on 1 January 1949, gave India control over the Kashmir Valley, a sizeable portion of Jammu, and Ladakh. Pakistan assumed control over Azad Kashmir (carved out of the Punjabi-speaking areas of Jammu province, including Poonch, Mirpur, and Muzaffarabad) and the Northern Areas (Gilgit-Baltistan).

This division of the state made it almost impossible for the UN to bring the two sides to agree to a framework for a plebiscite that would settle the issue. India demanded a withdrawal of Pakistani forces, and Pakistan demanded the removal of the NC government that was now in power on the Indian side, to ensure a free and fair referendum. Neither was willing to acquiesce to the other’s demands despite repeated negotiations and the intervention of several UN-led commissions. The Kashmir issue was at a stalemate.

Democracy denied

As India and Pakistan took over their portions of the erstwhile state, both countries created particular narratives that legitimised their claim over the area. For India, which presented itself as a secular state despite its Hindu majority, the fact that Jammu and Kashmir had a Muslim majority provided evidence of India’s secularity. Pakistan, which presented itself as a homeland for the subcontinent’s Muslims, portrayed itself as incomplete without the entire state.

Meanwhile, the people of the region – who had distinct demands and aspirations – were given short shrift, not just by India and Pakistan, but also the international community. India and Pakistan set about managing their respective regions of Kashmir by carefully putting in place governments that toed their official lines. In both cases, this was done through an ostensibly democratic electoral process, but one in which each state supported certain candidates, pumping large amounts of financial aid into the regions for development purposes – funds that usually ended up in the hands of those very candidates and their organisations.

In the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, for instance, India supported the NC government with Sheikh Abdullah as prime minister, which had come to power in late 1947, despite its many abuses of power and widespread corruption. It did so because Abdullah, who had always been a vocal supporter of the Indian National Congress and believed in the promise of India, was seen as capable of delivering the state to India in the event of a plebiscite. In November 1949 India adopted its constitution, which included Article 370. This Article defined Jammu and Kashmir’s relationship to India, granting it some autonomy to frame its own constitution and set its own course towards integration with India.

Once the possibility of a plebiscite dwindled, however, and Abdullah became increasingly vocal in pressing for greater autonomy for the state, he was removed from office through an internal party coup in 1953 with the approval of the Indian government, and placed under arrest. Thereafter, successive governments headed by the NC set about attenuating Article 370 and forcibly integrating the state into the Indian union. Behind bars, Abdullah launched the Plebiscite Front, to demand the vote that would allow the people of the state to determine its future.

By the 1960s deep disillusionment had set in as a young generation of Kashmiris realised that their aspirations for economic advancement and political representation were unattainable. They took to the streets, and although Abdullah – who was still under house arrest outside Kashmir – remained the face of their movement, new radical organisations emerged to represent their frustrations. Kashmiri nationalism of the Abdullah variety, with its emphasis on plurality and secularity (thus following the lead of Congress in New Delhi), was seen as having failed to live up to its promise.

In December 1963 the disappearance of a holy relic from Hazratbal Shrine, the holiest Muslim shrine in the valley, led to widespread riots and demonstrations against the NC government that eventually ended in Abdullah’s release in 1964. Abdullah was seen as the only individual capable of keeping the increasingly radical, pro-Pakistan elements in check. With Nehru’s blessings, he travelled to Pakistan in May 1964 in an attempt to broker a solution to the Kashmir issue. But before he could make any headway, Nehru died. Abdullah returned to India a disappointed man.

The new NC government chipped away at the remaining features of Article 370 and merged the NC into the Congress, bringing Jammu and Kashmir ever deeper into India’s ambit. Increasingly frustrated at this turn of events, Abdullah left India to go on the hajj pilgrimage in early 1965. His trip included visits to various European capitals, including London, to make the case for the Kashmiris. On his return, he was again placed under house arrest, even as India and Pakistan fought a new war over the territory that summer.

Despite a few thousand deaths on each side, the result was another stalemate. In 1971 India and Pakistan fought yet another war, as India helped East Pakistan declare its independence from West Pakistan, leading to the creation of Bangladesh. Seeing that Pakistan had been cut to size, an ageing Abdullah moved towards a rapprochement with India, signing an accord with prime minister Indira Gandhi in 1975. The Indira-Sheikh Accord, as it became known, reaffirmed Jammu and Kashmir’s relationship with India as delineated under Article 370, effectively ending any possibility of self-determination for Kashmiris. Under the Accord, Abdullah was freed and allowed to re-enter Kashmiri politics as chief minister.

The road to insurgency

Sheikh Abdullah served as chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir until his death in 1982. Although he incessantly defied New Delhi in an attempt to make up for his betrayal of Kashmir’s cause, his tenure was marred by charges of nepotism, corruption, and the courting of extremes. He incited Kashmiri Muslim youth to agitate for self-determination while also suppressing their protests against the misgovernance of his own administration.

At his death, Kashmir was a tinderbox which his son and chosen successor, Farooq Abdullah, was unable to manage. By the mid-1980s opposition to the NC had coalesced into the Muslim United Front, which ran for state assembly elections in 1987 and won. But New Delhi would not allow it to form a government; instead its leaders were arrested, and the NC came back to power backed by the Indian government. This provided the proximate cause for a full-scale uprising against the government, represented by the NC and its brand of Kashmiri nationalism, as well as the government of India. Kashmiri nationalism took a new turn, defined increasingly by an Islamist narrative in opposition to the ostensible secularism espoused by India and the NC. By 1989 the Kashmir insurgency was in full swing.

In its early years the insurgency was marked by an enthusiastic fervour as people took to the streets demanding freedom from misrule, political interference – and India. Young men in their thousands slipped across the border into the Pakistani part of Kashmir for arms and training. Despite political assassinations and the kidnappings of prominent NC and pro-India figures and their relatives, there was genuine mass sympathy for the insurgent organisations, the pro-independence Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and the pro-Pakistan Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). The Indian government responded to the movement with the full force of its military, converting the Kashmir Valley into an occupied zone.

By the mid-1990s, the young men who had slipped back into India after training in Pakistan – now known in Indian security parlance as ‘militants’ – were being hunted and gunned down in ‘encounters’ with the Indian forces. Pakistan took the opportunity to hijack the movement, funding organisations such as Jaish-e-Muhammad – which were more interested in global jihad than the grievances of Kashmiris – to destabilise Kashmir and, by extension, India. Kashmiris had grown increasingly weary by the late 1990s as Kashmir became awash with violence, arms and criminality. Seeing this, the Indian government began to turn its attention to re-opening the electoral arena – even as it continued to engage in counter-insurgency measures.

Elections and intifada

The turn of the 21st century saw the re-emergence of electoral politics in Jammu and Kashmir. This allowed mainstream parties such as the NC to campaign on the promise of good governance, while the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), which emerged in 1998, acknowledged the demands of separatist groups and reached out to Kashmiris with a ‘healing touch’ agenda. Separatist groups, too, moderated their stances and there was a real possibility of rapprochement for the first time since the start of the insurgency. But as many scholars have cautioned, the participation of Kashmiris in electoral politics should not be conflated with an acceptance of India. Kashmiris continued to support separatist political organisations while also voting for mainstream parties in the hope that they would provide a modicum of good governance after years of tumult and the breakdown of state machinery.

This turned out to be too much to hope for. Successive PDP and NC governments made some superficial moves to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of Kashmiris, but the state remained steeped in corruption, nepotism, and cronyism. Most importantly, grievances against the impunity and human rights violations by Indian security forces aimed at Kashmiri Muslims remained unaddressed by the elected governments that claimed to represent them. In a few well-known incidents, such as the rape and murder of two young Kashmiri women allegedly by Indian security forces in 2009, the government seemed complicit in a cover-up.

Public anger bubbled up, especially among young Kashmiris born and raised during the insurgency, suffering missing fathers, disruptions to their education due to endless curfews, strikes, and internet blackouts, as well as the untimely deaths of their friends. They took to the streets in the summer of 2010, pelting stones at security forces in what became known as the ‘Kashmiri intifada’. While street protests continued sporadically, the following decade saw resistance blossom on social media in the form of protest poetry and artistic expressions, and through participation at the funerals and commemorations of slain militants and ordinary Kashmiris. Kashmiri youth felt deeply alienated, not simply from India but also from the mainstream and separatist politics that had brought Kashmiris no closer to realising their political aspirations; rather, it had only intensified their subjugation.

The ascent of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India in 2014 further radicalised public discourse on Kashmir. When it was re-elected in 2019 with a large majority in parliament, the BJP set about delivering on its long-standing campaign promise regarding Kashmir. In August 2019 it abrogated Article 370 via a presidential order. In addition, it pushed through – with overwhelming majorities in both houses of the Indian parliament – a bill that stripped Jammu and Kashmir of its status as a state, partitioning it into two union territories – Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh – to be ruled directly by the central government.

It seemed that the secular, federal consensus upon which India came into being in 1947 was being whittled away, but the consensus had never quite been applicable in the case of Jammu and Kashmir. As far as the BJP was concerned, the Kashmir dispute was now over: India had claimed its part, and Pakistan was left with its part to do with it as it liked.

Pakistan vociferously protested the move, reiterating its claim to the entire region. But Pakistan’s record in the parts of Kashmir within its borders has not been particularly stellar. Neither of its two territories, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, are constitutionally recognised provinces of Pakistan. The Pakistani government has played kingmaker in both cases, managing local governments through a patron-client relationship to ensure that they do not stray from its official position. Both regions have demanded a complete integration into Pakistan to ensure their political rights, while also demanding more autonomy to manage their own economic and social affairs.

Freedom denied

Kashmir has been a casualty of the nature of the decolonisation of the subcontinent. The possibility of an autonomous Jammu and Kashmir state within a united India died the moment the leadership of Congress and the Muslim League accepted the partition plan that gave birth to two antagonistic states. Both states claimed sovereignty over this Muslim-majority princely state with its strategic location that they felt was critical to their survival in the post-independence era.

As a result, even as they have battled over the region and much else, India and Pakistan do have a single point of agreement when it comes to the Kashmir issue: neither wants an independent Jammu and Kashmir state on its borders. A region divided between them gives both a much greater degree of control over its destiny. In the meantime, the lives of the inhabitants of the region hang in limbo.

Chitralekha Zutshi is Professor of History at William & Mary and the author of Sheikh Abdullah: The Caged Lion of Kashmir (Yale University Press, 2024).