Toil and Technology in Britain and America
Martin Daunton explores 19th century production on both sides of the Atlantic.
‘The factory system’ is not a term which hints at an elusive ambiguity. On the contrary, it is redolent of the obvious and mundane: a building containing a source of power to drive machinery, to which the workforce was subordinated. But this mechanistic view of factories and machine technology misses vital aspects of the process of industrialisation; the factory was a social organisation as well as a physical construct. Of course, the factory system and machine technology complemented rather than competed with the domestic system and hand technology, so that the process of industrialisation did not involve the replacement of a 'traditional' by a 'modern' productive organisation, but rather had a dual character. This perception needs to be taken a stage further, for the factory system itself did not emerge in a standardised manner, but varied between countries and changed over time.
The question which is usually posed is why Britain was the first industrial nation, with the implication that there was a diffusion of British experience to other countries. But this misses an important point. The technology which developed in British industry might be appropriate to a particular social structure, and might be modified and adapted in the process of diffusion. Even when the basic machinery was the same, the social organisation of production might diverge. The mills of Lancashire and New England used the same technique of spinning cotton, but with a radically different structuring of the workforce. The nature of the machinery might also develop in different directions. By the 1850s, the technology in the metal trades in Britain and America had diverged in important respects. These points of contrast should not be viewed as a demonstration of the onset of British conservatism in the face of a superior American technology; it is more useful to enquire why a particular technology was appropriate in one country and not the other. Indeed, the adoption of American machine technology in British factories might prove to be less rather than more efficient. The important question is not so much why Britain had the first cottonmills, as why it utilised the machine technology and factory system in one particular way.
'Capitalism in its early stages expands and to some extent operates', remarks Eric Hobsbawm, 'not so much by directly subordinating large bodies of workers to employers, but by subcontracting exploitation and management.' This applied within the factory as well as in the domestic system, so that the social relations which arose from work, in the case of both the technology of steam power and hand labour, had much in common until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This holds true even of the archetype of the modern factory, the cotton-spinning mills of Lancashire. Mule spinning was invented in the 1770s. At first it was only partially mechanised, but from about 1830 it became fully mechanised or 'self-acting'. A fixed bank of bobbins containing the unspun cotton fibre extended across the floor of the mill; parallel to the bobbins was a bank of spindles mounted on a moveable carriage. When this mule carriage moved away from the bobbins, the yarn was stretched and spun. The mule then returned to its original position whilst the yarn was wound on to the spindle.
The machinery was housed in factories, and powered by steam engines. However, the workforce was not an undifferentiated class of machine minders immediately answerable to the mill owner. Each pair of mules had a team of three workers. The minder was in overall charge and was paid by the owner according to the output of his pair of mules. He was assisted by two assistants: a big piecer who was usually a young adult; and a little piecer who was a youth. The piecers were essentially employees of the minder rather than the mill-owner, and the division of the proceeds from a given output was a matter for the operatives themselves. The minder was, in effect, a subcontractor. The differentials in income were wide, although the big piecer was perfectly capable of undertaking the tasks of the minder. In Oldham in 1906, for example, the big piecer earned only 46.3 per cent and the little piecer only 33.5 per cent of the earnings of the minder. There was nothing inherent in the technique of mule spinning to create such a pattern of social relations which was based upon what may be termed an 'internal subcontract'. Indeed, the same technology in New England produced a different pattern of employment.
The internal subcontract did not develop in the mills of New England. The managers of the American mills had complete control over work organisation. A separate grade of supervisors had authority over the spinners, who were equivalent to the big piecers in Lancashire. The same technology had produced different social relations of production in the two areas: in the one a system of internal subcontract and in the other a system of hierarchical control. The Lancashire system meant that the burden of labour management was passed onto a grade of the workforce. Recruitment was a responsibility of the minders, as was supervision. The minder had a vested interest in increasing the output of his mules, for he was paid by the piece; he would enforce a swifter pace of work upon the piecers who were paid on a time rate. The minders developed a strong craft identity which was institutionalised in trade unions and in wage agreements with the employers, which built the established pattern of social relations into the machinery of collective bargaining. The craft status of the minders rested less upon a firm technical basis than upon their ability to keep the piecers in a subordinate position. The employers were willing to accept this rather than attempt to overturn the existing system, for it would involve the immediate cost of strikes and the creation of an alternative managerial style. The minder-piecer system had proved to be an effective method of labour management.
This is to suggest that skill and craft status could be socially constructed rather than technologically determined. The system of the internal subcontract was not confined to cotton spinning. In ship-building, for example, the platers received a piece-rate and then paid a time-rate to their helpers. The platers could earn at least three times as much as the helpers. Neither was this relationship confined to manufacturing. The trimmers who stowed coal on board ships in the ports of South Wales formed gangs of eight to twelve men who were were paid according to the number of tons of coal tipped into the hold of a ship. When the pressure of work was too great for the gang to cope, assistance was hired from a group of men known as 'hobblers' who were paid on a time rate. The hobblers might in fact undertake the bulk of the work of stowing the coal, but would receive only a small proportion of the earnings. This was a clear example of a group maintaining a high wage and craft status by a social process rather than technological imperatives. A comment of 1885 on the relationship between the platers and their helpers did perhaps exaggerate, but it did encapsulate this structure of work in a stark manner: 'They are nominally fellow-workmen, but they are actually task-master and serf.'
Such a pattern of employment was not unknown in the United States, but as a broad and sweeping generalisation American industry developed both a different technology and a different structure of social relations of production. Hierarchical or bureaucratic control rather than the internal subcontract; standardised production by machine technology rather than differentiated production by hand technology, characterised American industry at an earlier date than British industry. A good example of this divergence can be seen in the light metal trades in the West Midlands and in southern New England.
The small metal trades of Birmingham and the Black Country continued to use manual skills to produce a wide variety of product and design, with little opportunity for standardisation and mechanisation. The trades consisted of a few firms employing between 100 and 200 workers, a larger number employing up to 50, and a vast fringe of small workshops. Production was based upon both internal and external subcontracts. In the case of external subcontracting, a merchant would finance, co-ordinate and distribute the output of the many small workshop owners. The relationship was between merchant, dependent small master, and his labourers. In the case of internal subcontracting, the factory employed a piece-master who was paid by his output, and who made his own arrangements with his underhands on a time-rate. The relationships were essentially the same in both cases,although the small master with his own workshop did have a greater sense of independence as an apparently self-employed producer.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the gun trade relied upon skilled handicraft, with mechanical assistance confined to a few areas such as the boring of barrels. The master gunmaker usually had no factory or workshop, but purchased the components from the separate specialised handicraftsmen who worked at home or in workshops. His role was to provide co-ordination and finance. When all the parts had been acquired, the gun could be made up. However, in the absence of standardisation, the assembly of the gun required a complex process of setting-up. Indeed, in the mid-1850s there were 3,920 setters-up to 3,420 material makers. The file was the crucial tool of the trade as parts were modified to fit together.
Locks were manufactured in much the same way as guns, for 'the shaping, finishing and fitting of the whole of the special mechanism of the lock, even in the establishments of such large makers as the Messrs Chubb, is conducted by hand-labour, with the aid of shears, the file and the punch'.
The technology in the small metal trades of New England was different. The contrast between the methods used by Chubb and the American Alfred C. Hobbs in the manufacture of locks was striking. Hobbs attempted to introduce the American system to England, with its emphasis upon standardisation and interchangeability of parts which was made possible by the use of specialised machinery. The aim was to produce large numbers of each part by mechanical methods rather than by hand labour; each part would be made to such a high standard of precision that it would fit any other part without the need for skilled setters-up. The contrast applied equally to the manufacture of guns, for Colt's repeating pistol used the same process. The general point was well made by Hobbs:
the advantage of the machine or factory mode of producing such articles is this, that they can be made in large numbers at one time, whenever the steam-engine is at work; and that when so made, the pieces are shaped so exactly alike, the screws have threads so identical, and the holes are bored so equal in diameter, that any of a hundred copies would act precisely like all the others, thereby giving great advantages to the men employed in putting the lock together.
One reason for the difference was the nature of demand in the two economies. The report of 1853 by George Wallis on American industry stressed that the demand for homogeneous, low-quality goods with a short life-expectancy favoured the introduction of mechanised methods of production:
The consideration of that sterling quality in make, which always forms so important an element in the judgement of the European consumer, is comparatively unattended to by the Americans. If the article looks well, and is of such a quality as to stand ordinary wear and use for a period, even a slight advance in the price for a better quality of equal appearance only, will scarcely be obtained by the dealer. This habit of almost constant change is said to run through every class of society, and has, of course, a great influence upon the character of goods generally in demand.
In Britain, consumer preference was for differentiated, hand-produced goods. When the manufacture of frying-pans in Bilston went over to machine-stamping around 1900, the producers were well aware of this point. 'The knowing housewife still looks for the marks of the hammer, so they are added afterwards.' In Britain, the demand for a standardised gun was confined to the Army, and the Board of Ordnance imported American technology in the 1850s as a conscious act of policy. Standardised, interchangeable parts allowed the cheap production of a large output of a uniform quality, which facilitated repair and maintenance in the field. Demand from private consumers was rather for a highly differentiated product: a gentleman had the same relationship with his gunmaker as with his tailor. Handicraft methods of production suited the heterogeneity of English consumer preference, with its need for short production runs or unique items. Raphael Samuel has remarked that
in consumer durables there was a well-established preference for hand-made goods, not only because of their better quality, but also because of their superior finish, and of those additional embellishments which manufacturers were apt to call 'artistic'. The preference for hand-made goods was particularly marked in mid-Victorian times, when the bourgeoisie, in one or other of its manifestations, not only dominated public taste, but very often consituted the bulk of effective demand.
It was not only that demand in Britain was heterogenous; it was also unstable. In part this was a matter of cause and effect, for it was not possible to stockpile a non-standardised good which was made to a specific order. It was the increase in real wages of working-class consumers in the last quarter of the nineteenth century which changed the nature of demand for standardised consumer goods and so made regular production by mechanised methods feasible. The virtue of handicraft methods of production, both for high-cost luxury items such as guns, and low-cost necessities such as boots for the working class, was that it eased the process of adjustment of output to a demand which fluctuated according to the dictates of fashion and seasonality. Labour-intensive handicraft production allowed the adjustment of output by laying-off labour rather than by allowing expensive machinery to lie idle.
This behaviour was most apparent in London, which remained the largest industrial centre during the nineteenth century. The metropolis was dominated by non-factory, handicraft production of consumer goods, both for Society and the Season, and for the local working-class market. Both were, for very different reasons, subject to fluctuation and discouraged production of standardised commodities on a regular basis. The social cost of instability in handicraft production was shifted onto the workers, who experienced irregular employment, which in turn helped to create instability of demand from working-class consumers.
Perhaps more significant were constraints on the side of supply. British industry, unlike that of the United States, had an abundance of skilled craftsmen. The United States might have an abundant supply of immigrants from Europe, but they tended not to have appropriate industrial skills. Machinery in America might therefore be a substitute not so much for labour in general as for skill in particular. In the Birmingham metal trades there was less of a barrier to the expansion of output by existing labour-intensive methods than in New England, where handicraft methods would soon result in a mounting wage bill and an erosion of profit. The nature of the labour market permitted technical conservatism in Britain, but encouraged technical dynamism in the United States. The direction of American technical development might be inappropriate for Britain for, with abundant natural resources, American industrialists could substitute cheap raw materials for expensive capital and labour. American technology was pushed in directions which were labour saving and resource using, whereas British technology was more likely to save resources and use labour. Industrialists in both countries were behaving rationally in the face of the relative prices of factors of production.
It is important, however, to view labour not merely in passive terms as a factor of production with a particular cost. The example of cotton-spinning should have indicated that the social structure of the workplace is also of importance. A change in the technology of cotton-spinning would upset a pattern of labour relations based upon a division within the workforce, and would involve the employers in breaking the hold of the exclusive union of the minders. The social structure created by one technology could act as a barrier to future technical change, and the employer faced a complex economic equation to determine when the ultimate advantage in improved productivity would justify the present cost of changing the relations of production. This was to be a crucial issue in British industry in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
The British worker might well view machinery as a threat, whereas his American counterpart viewed it as an ally. Alfred Hobbs in 1857 remarked upon the difference of his experience on both sides of the Atlantic. The initial step in Britain was, he argued,
to reform the minds of the workmen. In America they might set to work to invent a machine, and all the workmen in the establishment would, if possible, lend a helping hand. If they saw any error they would mention it, and in every possible way they would aid in carrying out the idea. But in England it was quite the reverse. If the workmen could do anything to make a machine go wrong, they would do it, and if the same amount of ingenuity on the part of the English workmen were exercised in producing labour-saving machinery as he had seen displayed in producing the least amount of work in the longest possible time, England need never fear that other nations would go ahead of her in this respect.
The divergence was explicable for two reasons. One was that employers in the United States were mechanising in order to avoid an erosion of profits caused by a rising wage bill created by a shortage of labour. There was no pressure on working-class standards of living. In Britain, use of machinery with an abundant labour supply would threaten unemployment and wage cuts. The second reason is that in Britain, much more than in America, mechanisation would contradict the craft exclusiveness of the 'aristocracy of labour' which had developed from the existing pattern of labour relations and technology. This would not, of course, be welcomed by the workers themselves, but neither might it be sought by employers who would be forced to develop new styles of hierarchical control.
It was not only that the social structure which arose from one technology acted as a barrier to further technological change. The same point applied to industrial structure. The fragmentation of production among many small firms in the Birmingham gun trade made the standardisation of production difficult, for this demanded the co-ordination of manufacture in a much more rigorous manner. The point has been well-put by Nathan Rosenberg. Craft skills were dead-ends, 'at the same time the basic limitation of the Birmingham trades as well as their glory'. They resulted in a preoccupation with quality rather than productivity, and acted as a barrier to the acquisition of fundamentally different techniques. The adoption of mechanical engineering technology may have been easier without a prior well-developed handicraft technology.
The Birmingham metal trades were superbly successful in exploiting human skills. They lacked the capacity, however, for incorporating these skills in machinery. Moreover, the highly self-contained nature of the organisation of these trades tended to cut them off from contacts with other industries - particularly the producers of capital goods - from whom they might have learned or borrowed. These trades, by the middle of the nineteenth century, had gone about as far as possible given their reliance upon the speed, strength, precision and dexterity of the human hand. Further technical progress involved a recourse to completely different techniques for ways of achieving form and precision in the shaping of materials. But Birmingham's industrial history had left it ill-prepared in the novel engineering techniques and the broader range of mechanical skills upon which further technical progress started.
The movement away from the pattern of technology and work relations outlined there was a long-drawn-out process. In the late nineteenth century, improved real wages started to transform the market for basic consumer goods; outwork and workshop production declined as the manufacture of clothes or shoes moved into factories serving a national market. The decline in the profit margin during the price deflation of 1873 to 1896 impelled employers towards the creation of formal hierarchies of control, the erosion of traditional work practices, and the loss of autonomy by the workforce. The internal subcontract gave way to supervisory systems based upon directly-employed foremen. 'These men,' a manager of the shipbuilding firm of John Brown and Co. pointed out in 1903, 'are our non-commissioned officers'.
It is arguable that the transformation was not complete until the interwar years with the increased concentration of industrial ownership, the collapse of the old staple industries, and the expansion of trades such as motor manufacture based upon mass production techniques. The factories of the industrial revolution had a very different pattern of authority and work practice from those of modern Britain. Indeed, the industrial revolution did not mark a sharp discontinuity in the experience of work, for the early factories tended to utilise the managerial practices of the preceding workshop and outwork forms of production. The extension of factories to the bulk of the economy, and the creation of new systems of control within them, was a product of the late rather than the early nineteenth century.

