Sterling Identities

David Blaazer traces rival nationalisms within the British Isles from banknotes.

While most nations of the European Union accustom themselves to their new, transnational coins and banknotes, the continuing debate over whether and when Britain should follow suit demonstrates its capacity to arouse passions out of all proportion to the possible economic merits or demerits of the proposal.

The pound appears to be intimately bound up with many British people’s sense of who they are, and of their place in the world. While such feelings are not unique, the national currency appears to have a visceral importance in Britain (or, more accurately, in England) which is largely absent in most continental European countries. Indeed, were English attitudes more widespread, it is unlikely that Europe would currently be witnessing the simultaneous disappearance of eleven national currencies.

Remarkably in English polemics on the euro, the complex, multinational history of the pound itself is almost always overlooked, and it is often forgotten that the symbolic and emotional aspects of the question look quite different in the different kingdoms of the Union. Evidence of those differences can be found in an obvious place: on the money itself, where diverse ideas about nationhood and national identity have appeared regularly since the late eighteenth century. Images from English, Scottish and Irish paper money show not only how their national rhetoric has reflected competing ideas about the relationships between the components of the United Kingdom, but also how paper money has both reflected and shaped the divergent roles money has played in the nations’ respective histories.

While the four state-controlled note-issuing bodies have routinely made reference to national themes, most of the thousand or more private banks that have issued paper money in Britain and Ireland have  been content to depict allegories of commerce, dead local worthies, local landmarks, the sources of local prosperity, or the bank’s own principal building. Frequently adapted from the bank’s seal, the purpose of such vignettes was to emphasise the bank’s solidity, probity and local roots. Such visual conventions, which continue today in the notes of some Scottish and Northern Irish banks, were also dominant in England until the 1950s. Most notes circulating outside London before the mid-nineteenth century were issued by provincial banks until their licences to issue progressively lapsed in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Even the Bank of England’s notes – which did not completely supplant the provincial notes until 1921 – were in this tradition until well after its nationalisation in 1946. Their various vignettes of Britannia were all adapted from the bank’s seal, which in turn was intended merely to assert the scope of the first bank with pretensions to a national presence and a national role. It was not until 1957 that the Bank made a decisive stylistic break to produce notes with an unmistakably nationalistic visual rhetoric, including a warlike Britannia of emphatically Anglo-Saxon countenance.

Ironically, the Bank of England was late on the scene. A significant minority of private banks had used their notes to articulate a variety of ideas about nationhood and national identity since the late eighteenth century. Such use raised an inescapable question: which nation was to be depicted, the United Kingdom, or the constituent nation in which the bank resided? If both, then how was the relationship between the two – or between all the nations of the United Kingdom – to be represented? This question called forth a variety of answers, many of which have clearly been the product of the divergent nationalisms of England, Scotland and Ireland.

The First World War was the first occasion on which paper money was produced expressly for circulation throughout the four nations of the United Kingdom. To meet the financial emergency created by the outbreak of the war, the Treasury hastily began to produce ‘currency notes’ using paper originally intended for postage stamps. They were crude affairs, which bore a small portrait of the reigning monarch as their only pictorial feature. The second series, produced a few months later, was slightly more sophisticated. But it was not until the third series, issued in 1917 and 1918, that the notes developed a full-blown and complex rhetoric of a nation united and mobilised for total war. While these notes attempted to incorporate all the nations of the union within their pictorial forms, the attempt was ill-considered, and the results far from convincing.

Like their predecessors, the third series of notes used written text to proclaim their legal tender status throughout the United Kingdom. Like the second series they incorporated into the watermark the floral emblems of the four nations – rose, shamrock, daffodil and thistle. In the one-pound note, as in the earlier notes, this was as far as explicit reference to the multinational nature of the UK went, leaving aside the King’s head. The one-pound note of the third series also followed the one-pound and ten-shilling notes of the second series by featuring a representation of St George – a purely English patron. The government thus chose to disregard the St Andrew’s Society, which  in 1917 had denounced the issue of notes with a design ‘appropriate to only one country in the United Kingdom’ as ‘an act which is in essence unconstitutional’.

In the third series ten-shilling note, however, we see the first pictorial reference in the printing (as opposed to the watermark) to the United Kingdom, and it is richly ambiguous. The Union Flag on Britannia’s shield, while it shows the crosses of the patron saints of the three kingdoms, is being held by Britannia, who by the
twentieth century had become so heavily associated with the figure of Boadicea that she was never regarded as anything but an English allegory, and had certainly never been an Irish one. In this figure, the United Kingdom, symbolised by the Union Flag, shields England, personified by Britannia; the inequality of the United Kingdom’s constituent nations is manifest.

In 1928, the currency notes were replaced by new one pound and ten shilling notes of the Bank of England, which, unlike other Bank of England notes, were legal tender in Scotland and Ireland. The Bank evidently felt no obligation to acknowledge this in the designs. The fronts of the notes, which were deliberately similar in their key design elements to the Bank’s previous (English only) notes, featured a Britannia whose shield bore only the cross of St George. Neither in the 1920s, nor during the two redesigns that followed before one-pound and ten- shilling notes were phased out in 1984, is there evidence to suggest that the Bank found the slightest incongruity in using an English device for banknotes intended to circulate throughout the United Kingdom. Indeed, the occasional letters of complaint from irate Scots were given short shrift, with the Bank pointing out that the device on the shield was that which appeared on ‘the flag’ (whose flag was not specified) at the time of the Bank’s foundation in 1694, that its failure to refer to the rest of the Union was therefore unavoidable, and should not be construed as a slight on Scotland.

Oddly, many banks whose notes have had only local circulation have done more than the Bank of England to acknowledge the existence of the other nations of the Union. The generic Britannia figure produced by the printing firm of Perkins, Farman and Heath, which appeared on the notes of many banks throughout the nineteenth century, clearly shows all three crosses of the Union. Some banks, however, have acknowledged only two of those nations. On many notes in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the flag appears in its pre-1801 form, before the Act of Union with Ireland necessitated the inclusion of St Patrick’s Cross. Predictably, no Irish banks used this form of the flag, which is more frequently encountered on Scottish than on English notes. This may be explained partly by the greater longevity of Scottish banks: it was a common practice in both countries for a bank to emphasise its durability with visual references to its own past. Some, for example, included a portrait of the monarch reigning at the time of the bank’s foundation. Nonetheless, the Scottish banks’ fondness for the pre-1801 flag can be seen as a desire to emphasise the antiquity not just of the banks themselves but of the special relationship between England and Scotland – whose parliamentary Union with England preceded Ireland’s by almost a century. The exclusion of St Patrick’s cross from Scottish notes served to group England and Scotland as Britain, while simultaneously distancing Britain from a problematic newcomer to the Union.

In some contexts, however, Ireland’s inclusion on the banknotes can be read as an implicit repudiation of the national aspirations of the majority of Ireland’s people. The British Linen Bank, a Scottish firm founded in the aftermath of the 1745 rebellion, whose very name clearly indicated its attachment to the Union, chose to incorporate St Patrick’s cross in its Union Flag only in 1905, in a note which otherwise scarcely differed from its immediate predecessor. By then, the fundamental line of cleavage in British parliamentary politics was between those who wished to preserve the Irish Act of Union, and those who accepted the demand of the overwhelming majority of Irish voters that it be repealed.

Similarly, Ireland’s inferior status, and the supremacy of England within the Union, was often proclaimed by the arrangement of the national allegories: Britannia, Scotia and Hibernia. In another Perkins vignette used by a number of English banks, the relative places of the three kingdoms were clearly spelt out. Britannia gazes at the viewer from the centre of the group: an armed, helmeted, full-breasted warrior-matriarch. Scotia is younger, unarmed, and slightly shorter. But while Scotia sits beside Britannia fully clad, Hibernia sits bareheaded at Britannia’s knee, a pubescent breast exposed to the viewer, while she gazes up at Britannia, presumably for guidance. Supporters of the Union were fond of speaking of the relationship between its ‘sister’ nations, but this image clearly depicts a mother with her daughters: one a young woman, the other still a child. Astoundingly, this tutelary relationship between Britannia and Hibernia was represented on the notes of two Irish banks in the nineteenth century. The Provident Bank of Ireland adopted this Perkins vignette while the Provincial Bank of Ireland used a vignette of a garland-headed Hibernia bowed to a taller, helmeted Britannia.

Like many Irish banks, the Provincial’s capital was overwhelmingly English. Moreover, the bank’s clientele was composed almost entirely of members of the Anglo-Irish ascendancy, who in the nineteenth century would have largely endorsed such a view of the Union. Indeed, it was a privileged subset of this class – a group of Irish Members of Parliament – who had founded the bank in 1824. The Provident’s choice is less easily understood, but probably had little to do with the directors’ views of national questions. Unlike the Provincial, the Provident was a short-lived affair with little paid-up capital, much of which originated in Ireland. It was frequently alleged that its notes had been designed deliberately to resemble the Provincial’s, for obvious commercial reasons. The vignette was in all likelihood the closest in appearance to that of the Provincial that the cash-strapped Provident Bank could find ready-made in the printer’s catalogue.

Among Irish banknotes of the Union period with national references – and it is noteworthy that no such references were to be found in notes issued in Ulster – only the notes of the National Bank of Ireland used explicitly nationalist symbolism to repudiate the idea of Irish subordination. While the harp itself was a common enough device on Irish notes; taken together with the legend ‘Erin go Bragh’, ‘Ireland for Ever’, this is an unmistakably anti-Union note. While much of the National’s capital was raised in London, its founders had made an effort to attract small Irish shareholders, in an attempt to promote Irish self-reliance by harnessing the dispersed financial power of Irish Catholics. The driving force behind the bank was Daniel O’Connell (1775-1847), ‘the Liberator’, who had successfully led the struggle for the removal of legal discrimination against Roman Catholics in 1829. This ‘Catholic Emancipation’ campaign had derived much of its strength from small, weekly cash donations from the Catholic masses, which had generated among them a powerful sense of their capacity to shape their own destiny. The founding of ‘the Liberator’s bank’ in 1835 was a conscious attempt to imitate in finance a strategy that had already produced such spectacular success in politics.

The Bank of Ireland’s notes from 1801 tell a different story. They are instantly familiar as imitations of the contemporary notes of the Bank of England. While a lone Hibernia has replaced the Bank of England’s Britannia, her identical place in a near-identical note encapsulates the problematic national status of the men who founded the bank in 1782. Engaged at that time in a struggle to assert greater independence from Britain for their exclusively Protestant parliament, these Irish-born descendants of colonists saw the foundation of a bank equivalent to the Bank of England as an essential step in the attainment of an independent national dignity. That this process was to exclude the native masses was made clear by a provision for a set of oaths which effectively debarred Roman Catholics from directorships in the bank – a prohibition retained even after such bans were generally lifted by the Catholic Relief Act of 1793. The Bank of Ireland’s was a settler note, featuring a settler Britannia-Hibernia.

An entirely different conception of Irish independence was represented in the $100 bonds issued in the 1860s by the Fenian Brotherhood to fund its insurrectionary activities. Here, under the gaze of nationalist martyrs Wolfe Tone and Robert Emmett, Hibernia points the Irishman to a sword, which is to be his means of arriving at the distant but reachable dawn of national independence.

Such symbolism was eschewed on the first notes of the Irish Free State in the 1920s. Nevertheless, the image which the Irish Currency Commission chose for its consolidated banknotes in 1928 articulates a concept of national identity which was clearly a product of its historical context. Its repudiation of Fenian symbolism signifies both the limited nature of the Free State’s independence and the fact that its monetary system remained officially interlocked with that of the United Kingdom. More importantly, however, it signifies a clear rejection of those nationalists who, claiming the Fenian tradition as their mandate, had insisted upon nothing less than an independent Irish republic, and dragged the Free State into civil war within a year of its founding. The  tranquillity of the image is a proclamation of Ireland’s return to peace after long years of armed conflict, first with the British and then with its own intransigents. But it is a very particular vision of Ireland whose peace is proclaimed: an Ireland built on a vision of the Irish peasant which lay at the centre of the blood-and-soil myths promoted by theorists of the Gaelic revival of the turn of the century: a movement which inspired both the leaders of the Free State and their Republican enemies.

While Irish notes proclaimed their issuers’ respective stances on national questions in fairly straightforward ways, Scottish banks had the more complex task of articulating their  loyalty to the Union, while representing a distinctive Scottish identity. Scottish notes made much earlier and wider use of visual imagery than their counterparts in England and Ireland, and from very early on that visual imagery took a national turn. As early as 1797 the Royal Bank of Scotland was issuing one-pound notes with images of thistles and crowns, while in 1803 the newly-established Falkirk Union Bank proclaimed its loyalty in its name, while simultaneously festooning its notes with thistles to signify its Scottish identity.

More complex were the Leith Banking company’s notes of the 1820s, which collectively presented a narrative of George IV’s arrival in Leith at the beginning of his visit to Scotland in 1822. The visit itself was carefully choreographed to symbolise its organisers’ view of Scotland’s place in the Union. The King was welcomed with much enthusiasm, signifying Scots’ loyalty to the Union. But on key occasions George wore Highland dress, as did the members of the elite who feted him, whether Highlanders or not. Scots thus demonstrated their loyalty to a union of equals in which the King, to make good his claim to Scotland, must appear as a Scot.

It is ironic that this glorification of the sentimental equality of the Union, commemorated on a banknote, should be followed within four years by an affront to Scotland’s national rights by an Anglocentric British government, in the form of an attempt to ban the issue of one pound notes in Scotland. It was the stage-manager of George IV’s visit, Sir Walter Scott, who was to lead Scottish public opinion in its fight against the proposals. Under the transparent pseudonym of Malachi Malagrowther, Scott, in a stunning series of letters to the Edinburgh Weekly Journal, helped raise a chorus of outrage. Scott held that while a similar measure had been widely applauded and economically beneficial in England, Scotland’s monetary circumstances were so different that it would bring economic ruin. To Scott, the whole episode was an example of a pathological English desire for uniformity, and a growing contempt for Scotland’s ancient rights and usages. Largely as a result of his brilliant propaganda, the ensuing outcry was so powerful that the government was forced to withdraw.

It is probably not an exaggeration to say that the small notes scare was the most sharply contested issue of Scottish national rights of the entire nineteenth century. The very act of issuing banknotes in Scotland thus became charged with a unique national significance. But it was to be more than a century before the full representational possibilities of the small note scare were realised. In 1960, the Bank of England issued one-pound and ten-shilling notes for circulation throughout the United Kingdom,  which for the first time featured a portrait of the reigning monarch. By then, the use of the reigning monarch’s portrait on a note was a privilege open only to the Bank of England, which despite being brought into the ownership of the United Kingdom state in 1946, retained its exclusively English name. Two years after the Queen’s appearance on these notes, the British Linen Bank produced a  series of notes which featured a similarly-sized portrait in the same position. It was of Sir Walter Scott – Malachi Malagrowther himself – the man who had led something like a nationalist revolt to preserve the object on which he now appeared in the monarchical place. When the Bank of Scotland took over the Linen Bank in 1970, it retained the portrait on its new notes. The analogy was thus complete. Like the Queen, Scott/Malagrowther gazes out of the notes, embodying the nation and guarding its fortunes by insisting on Scotland’s place as an equally privileged member of the Union.

Few banknotes have articulated a more ingenious, witty or sophisticated response than this to the problem of how to depict the relationships between the nations. It is in its own way an unequivocal answer: ‘Britain and Scotland; Scotland and Britain’; for Scott, as is well known, and as is shown by his role in George IV’s visit, was a staunch advocate of Union who wished Scotland to assert its rights, in Malachi Malagrowther’s words, ‘with every feeling of respect and amity towards England’.

While for Scott, and for the Scots, a strenuous watchfulness for Scotland’s national rights could co-exist with a more or less grudging acceptance of English political and economic hegemony, such an attitude was far more difficult for the Irish, whose choices lay – after 1800 – between acceptance of English dominance and outright rejection of the Union. The question for them, it appears, was ‘Britain or Ireland’. For the English, in the matter of notes as in much else, the question was simpler still. English patriotism was identical to Union patriotism, and the other nations of the Union were either to be carelessly subordinated, or simply disregarded.

Further Reading:
  • D. Blaazer, ‘Reading the Notes: Thoughts on the Meanings of English Paper Money’, Humanities Research 1, 1999
  • D. Byatt, Promises to Pay: The First Three Hundred Years of Bank of England Notes (Spink & Son, 1994)
  • G. L. Barrow, The Emergence of the Irish Banking System 1820-45 (Gill and MacMillan, 1975)
  • S. Gibbons, Scottish Banknotes (Stanley Gibbons, 1975)
  • G. L. Grant, The Standard Catalogue of Provincial Banks and Banknotes (Spink & Son, 1977)
  • V. Hewitt, Beauty and the Bank Note: Images of Women on Paper Money (British Museum, 1994)
  • V. Hewitt & J. Keyworth, As Good as Gold: 300 Years of British Bank Note Design (British Museum, 1987)
  • Sir Walter Scott, Thoughts on the Proposed Change of Currency (Irish University Press, 1972)

David Blaazer is a Lecturer in the School of History at the University of New South Wales at ADFA.