Please note: this article is from a 1955 issue of History Today, and its language contains outdated terms and descriptions. Articles in our archive remain as they were printed, and do not reflect the current values of the magazine.
It is a pity that the word Indo-China, which Europe first gave to the South-East Asian peninsula, has recently been dismissed in favour of the purely geographical and strategic term now hallowed in the South-East Asia treaty; for Indo-China was a reminder of the two very different cultures that have moulded this region. Indeed, the external influence in the lands that came to be known as French Indo-China was more than cultural, since they were originally settled by peoples who had moved southwards from China. Chief among them were the Vietnamese and the Thais. Later there appeared tribes of south-west China (also often of Thai origin), who were still drifting into Indo-China as little as half a century ago.
Indian, as well as Chinese influence had been powerfully at work in the territories embraced by France, but the Indian influence had long been on the wane when the French arrived. By then the industrious, sinicized Vietnamese were everywhere predominant, expanding southwards and westwards into the effete kingdoms of the Khmers and the Chams. French Indo-China, therefore, has had no more unity than that given it by France; in fact, this corner of colonial empire has straddled the cultural border between India and China, between the passive world of Buddhism and the rational cosmology of the Chinese. It has been one of Asia’s crossroads.
If we want to understand what may happen to this jigsaw now that the French are departing, it is as well to take the pieces of the puzzle apart and consider how they had been shaped before the French came upon the scene. The Vietnamese, who settled some centuries before Christ in what are now known as the provinces of Tongking and Annam, had been brought under Chinese rule in the third century BC by Ch’in Shih Huang Ti, China’s first unifier. With short intervals, they remained a part of that empire until the Tang dynasty lost its grip in the ninth century AD. This period lasted for nearly a thousand years, quite long enough to bring the Vietnamese firmly into the Chinese fold. Though, ever since, they have stoutly resisted Chinese rule, apart from a quarter of a century when the Ming dynasty reasserted it, they have at the same time remained almost wholly Chinese in outlook and in culture. To the Chinese, the country had always been Annam – the ‘pacified south’ – and this name has survived to describe the people, their language and the imperial house, with its seat at Hué, modelled on the Forbidden City in Peking. But, because of the memories it evokes of alien rule, the name of Annam has never been acceptable to the Vietnamese, who have now substituted for it the old word for their country – Vietnam.
Long settled in Tongking and Annam, the Vietnamese were spreading southwards during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the lands of the Mekong delta, later known as Cochin-China. Here the inhabitants had been the Chams, a people of Malayo-Polynesian origin and almost wholly Indian in culture. For a time they held their own, but gradually the Vietnamese drove them back and overran the river delta. Today, only a few Cham villages survive: 20,000 or so wistful people subsisting on the legends of their past. Besides the Chams there were also the Khmers, and they too were pushed aside by the Vietnamese; given time, they might have gone the way of the kingdom of Champa, but the long arm of Europe was by then stretching out into the Far East, and French influence, though perhaps at first unwittingly, put an end to Vietnamese aggression. Even in our times a considerable Cambodian minority dwells in the western part of Cochin-China.
The Vietnamese are not only the most active and best educated of Indo-Chinese peoples – and with traditions long rooted in Chinese civilization – they are also by far the most numerous. Today, 23 million of them are co centrated in the Red River delta in the north and the Mekong delta in the south, joined by a thin strip of coastal plain settled by peasants. But, whereas they have occupied the north for two thousand years, they are newcomers of only two or three hundred years in the southern delta. Their traditions and stability lie all in the north.
The Khmers have an entirely different history. India was as much their parent culture as China was for the Vietnamese. Their heyday, which the immense ruins of Angkor survive to proclaim, endured from the ninth to the twelfth centuries. In their decay, their kingdom was gnawed from two sides, by the Thais and by the Vietnamese. For the Thais had migrated from their original home in south-west China into what is now Siam, and for two or three centuries before the Vietnamese came upon the scene they had been gradually absorbing the weakening Khmers. Buddhism triumphed and Hinduism withdrew. Twentieth-century Cambodians may like to resume their old name of Khmer, but in language, religion and culture they have been profoundly changed since the days when an Indian totalitarian state flourished at Angkor. Though there is not a little Chinese and Vietnamese mixture in the present Cambodian stock, it is to the Siamese they chiefly look, and to the Buddhist world they definitely belong. They number now some three or four millions.
Laos is not strictly the name of a country but the name of a people. The Lao are a branch of the Thai race who came southwards from Yunnan like the rest. There are not only Laos in what is now called Laos, but many – and probably many more – across the Mekong in north-east Siam. The Shans of Burma belong to the same family, as do the Thais still left in their old home in Yunnan, who are now undergoing the rigours of Marxist rejuvenation as an autonomous minority in the great Chinese family. The exact course of these Thai migrations has been only vaguely charted, but we may regard the Laos as the poor cousins of the Thai family. In times past, they were frequently taken off as slaves to the Siamese court, or were conscribed for labour, and so they have naturally tried to maintain what independence they could. Within the present territory of Laos three kingdoms were once contained. Today, as formerly, it is the proximity of Siam that matters; for the Mekong offers no division of religion, language, culture or race.
These were the three states that formed the French Indo-Chinese federation-or rather, since they each had a somewhat different status, there were the three Vietnamese provinces of Tongking, Annam and Cochin-China, together with Laos and Cambodia. Scattered about the country, however, were many other peoples at more primitive levels of civilization. The Vietnamese, the Cambodians and the Laos lived on the plains. One has to climb to find the tribes. First in historical importance are the Mois, a Malayo-Polynesian race who were the country’s earliest inhabitants. They sacrifice buffaloes, drink heavily, and live mostly in the central plateaux of Annam. In Tongking the Thais are most numerous, classified as white, black or red according to the dress affected by the women; they are, of course, part of the larger Thai family, but they have lived for so long in their own isolated pockets that they must be regarded as a separate group. Higher up still are the Meos (or Miaos as they are known in China), a robust, primitive and feckless people, still in great numbers in south-west China; they, too, in linguistic origin at least, form a branch of the Thai family. There are many other tribes in the mountains of northern Laos and north-west Tongking – the Kha, Nung, Tho, Man, Muong-all recognized by ethnologists as separate little islands of primitive culture in these inhospitable hills. None of them is peculiar to Indo-China ; they may also be found scattered about the high ground in the corners of Burma, Siam, and China; perhaps for the first time, those within the Chinese border are now beginning to discover what a national border means.
Finally, one must mention the Chinese, as numerous here as elsewhere in south-east Asia. There are about a million or more, thicker on the ground in Cochin-China and Cambodia than in Tongking or Laos. They have been coming for several centuries, and it is interesting to note that some of the defeated and retreating Ming armies, who came southwards to settle in the seventeenth century, have become much more assimilated and are quite distinct from the immigrants of later times. In Vietnam, the Chinese are naturally more at home than elsewhere, and intermarriage among all groups is fairly common.
In 1787 one of the lesser known treaties of Versailles was signed between Nguyen Anh, the claimant to the Nguyen dynasty’s throne, and Louis XVI, under which France agreed to support the dynasty against the rebel movement then threatening it. Nothing came of this bold move, initiated by the Apostolic vicar in Cochin-China, Mgr. Pigneau de Behaine; for the Bourbon dynasty was collapsing in France as the other re-established itself. It was not for half a century that France returned effectively to the religious and commercial assault on Indo-China for which Pigneau de Behaine had hoped.
The first of many missionaries from Europe had reached Cambodia as early as 1550, but it was the Jesuit, Alexandre de Rhodes, who really laid the foundations of Christian en- deavour in Indo-China. In the seventeenth century he established in Paris the Société des Missions Etrangères. It was Rhodes, too, introduced a Romanized form of the Vietnamese language to replace the Chinese characters, form that is still in general use. Traders came in the wake of the missionaries, and by the time that Pigneau de Behaine was urging Louis XVI’s support for Nguyen Anh, French interests seemed secure. But Nguyen Anh, emerging as the Emperor Gia Long, proved far from malleable, and the recognized position of the Church, for which his sponsors had looked, was not attained. His son, Minh Mang (1820-40), and grandson, Thieu Tri (1841-47), turned against Europe and slew or expelled the missionaries and the French advisers to the imperial court. In a very short time, it seemed as if western influence might be entirely extinguished. Meanwhile, the British had established themselves in Hongkong and French imperial ardour and jealousy were awakened in Paris. Naval forces were despatched and brought into action against the anti-western emperor, Tu Duc (1848-83). Upon the excuse of rescuing persecuted Christians, Tourane was occupied by a fleet under the command of Admiral Rigault de Genouilly. After an attempt to march northwards on the imperial capital at Hué had failed, a fresh expedition was mounted in 1859 and Saigon taken.
The French did not immediately make any further headway, and even the Vietnamese Christians gave them little support, but to the west the threatened Cambodians extended a welcome. To them the appeal of French protection against Vietnamese incursion and Siamese aggression seemed to outweigh the partial loss of sovereign rights, and in 1863 Cambodia signed a treaty installing a French resident adviser. The country was relieved of conducting its own foreign relations, and special rights were granted to missionaries and traders.
In the meantime, the three provinces adjacent to Saigon had been ceded to the French, and steady pressure thereafter brought all of Cochin-China under French rule by 1867. In the north a French naval expedition assaulted Tongking in 1873, against orders from Paris, and a year later the viceroy of Tongking was forced to sign a treaty agreeing to French protection of the Red River delta. By now the Emperor of Annam survived only by French favour. But the issues in Tongking were not so simple, for that territory still owed nominal allegiance to China. Troops were sent from China to harass the French garrisons, and after haphazard fighting, in which the French met with some reverses, they were forced to mount a new and powerful expedition which included a blockade of the Yangtse. In 1886 the Chinese gave way, renouncing their sovereignty over Tongking and their nominal overlordship of the Emperor of Annam. Finally Laos, which was then merely a territory disputed between Vietnam and Siam, accepted French protection in 1893.
These accomplishments were very largely the work of the French navy, and much of the initiative had come from commanders on the spot. For the first two decades it was the navy that took charge of the newly won territories, administering them creditably, with little direction from Paris. This task was not easy, since thee ruling mandarinate had fled and a French inspector of native affairs had to be appointed. The history of the country might well have been different if the study of Vietnamese on the part of French officials, which this system enforced, had been continued. In fact, there was a conflict at this time between two attitudes towards colonies-the assimilationist and the associationist. According to the first view, the Vietnamese civilization was inferior in every way, and it was only necessary to demonstrate the superiority of the French language, French culture, French education, the Christian religion, and western technical skills, for the populace to welcome and adopt them all. It would then only be a matter of time before the new colonies were transformed into overseas departments of France.
This view was in the ascendant when the rough justice of the Admirais' rule-Bonard, Charner, Dupré, Lagrandière, they are all commemorated in the boulevards of Saigon-was brought to an end by the appointment of the first civil governor. Arriving laden with the gifts of French civilization, the civil governor hoped that the Vietnamese would gratefully accept his dispensations. One disastrous result of this theory-since the Vietnamese would now all wish to learn French-was that administrative officers were no longer obliged to speak the language. Affairs were conducted through interpreters, and the usual corruption followed when power in the east is given to a middleman. ‘The lack of contact between French and
Annamites,’ writes Virginia Thompson, ‘per-mitted the former to live for long in blissful ignorance of the resentment which their conquest had inspired in the latter.’ Fortunately, the last years of the century saw the arrival of some able administrators who broke away from the assimilationist policy. Paul Bert, who came as resident-general of Annam and Tongking, tried to restore some system of local administration by Vietnamese, and formed a Council of notables as an advisory body. Direct administration persisted, however, in Cochin-China, and the power of the colons steadily asserted itself. The situation today is, indeed, a reflection of the early colonial days. The best of both countries was then in the north; the worst, the most corrupt and the most unstable, in the south. Just as the Vietnamese were comparative newcomers in Cochin-China, their traditions not yet fully transplanted and their allegiances not deeply rooted, so the incoming French regarded this territory as theirs to exploit and develop as a home for colonial nouveaux riches. Only in the north could the nobler forms of imperialism be clearly demonstrated. Cochin-China was the home of the fonctionnaire and the colon – of whom Corsica produced the largest number.
In 1887 all three provinces of Vietnam, together with Laos and Cambodia, were brought under the administration of a single governor-general, though each territory stood in a different relationship to France. The end of the century saw the arrival of one of the most powerful of Proconsuls, Paul Doumer, who laid the first real foundations for economic development. For the next thirty years the country enjoyed relative peace and progress, and French administration could compare favourably with European rule in other Asian countries.
Under Doumer’s leadership, the railway from Saigon to Hanoi was begun, and also the line from Hanoi up the Red River valley to Kunming (then Yunnanfu) in China. The rich anthracite mines at Hongay, north of Haiphong, were modernized and expanded. Haiphong was developed as a port. Main roads were built all over the country; irrigation canals aided rice production, and the success of rubber in Malaya persuaded Frenchmen to try rubber in Indo-China. The plantations spread over the red lands of southern Annam, but labour supplies were difficult, Recruitment was started in the over-populated Red River delta, but the employment of Vietnamese labour contractors led to serious abuses, and the unwillingness of the recruits to remain on the plantations often prompted cruelty and even torture, which was condoned by some French planters. The usual struggle ensued between an administration anxious to carry out progressive legislation and greedy immigrant capitalists determined to evade it.
In some sense a conflict of French interests was involved. France had paid heavily for her conquest of Indo-China, and many Frenchmen were insistent that she should profitably recoup her outlays. The local economy was geared to that of France. High tarifs kept out virtually all but French manufactured goods, and little native industry could be established. It was frankly a colonial economy, though in many ways a flourishing one. In 1880, for example, 280,000 tons of rice was exported from Saigon; by 1900 the figure had reached 747,000, and before the war in 1937 it was as high as 1,548,000 tons. This had been achieved by the cutting of new irrigation canals and by new drainage schemes across the Mekong delta. But the land thus brought into cultivation could be farmed only by the big landowner. A landless class grew up in the south and, while rice production mounted, the evils of absentee landlordism sowed new seeds of instability.
Nor was the genuine economic development of these years matched by administrative vision. True, the assimilationist policy had at last been officially replaced in 1909 by the associationist attitude, and Albert Sarraut, who was soon afterwards appointed Governor-General, was the first man to make himself popular, or even well known, among the peoples he was ruling. There were the beginnings of administrative councils; local representation in the colonial council was increased, and under Alexandre Varenne, a socialist who became Governor-General in 1925, even bigger steps were planned. But Varenne proved too much for the colons he was obliged to make way for Pierre Pasquier, who remained for seven years until 1934, aware of few of the troubles that were boiling up under his feet.
One of the troubles was that, even from the earliest days, opposition to French rule had persisted. Beneath the network of economic and apparent social progress, the decay of Vietnamese society went on almost unnoticed; the mandarins and the notables, who had been the rulers of the tightly organized Tongking villages, had withdrawn into non-cooperation; thirty years later, when some attempt was made to bring them back into association, corruption had spread too far. Numerous minor revolts broke out, which, inspected with our present hindsight, foretold only too clearly what was to come. But for many years it was customary to play down or conceal these civil disturbances, lest military control should once again be substituted for civil rule.
As the economy developed, it was the rich who got richer, and the problems of poverty and over-population in the Red River delta remained unsolved. The Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 fanned the embers of nationalism, and the recruitment of Vietnamese as soldiers and labourers in France during the first world war made for contacts with the European Left which were eagerly nursed and built up. The nationalist movement grew and, after Varenne’s departure in 1927, repression was increasingly used against it. In 1930 the Indo-Chinese communist party was formed, and throughout the 20’s and 30’s relations between Vietnamese and Chinese revolutionaries (though more often the Kuomintang than the Communists) were extremely close. Thus two worlds were drawing apart from each other, and the chances of a clash were becoming ever more likely. Even without the second world war, it is doubtful if France could have come to terms peace fully with Vietnamese nationalism. For the French stake had expanded, and it was more often than not local in character. By 1937 there were 42,000 residents classed as Europeans (though many of them were of mixed blood). Saigon and Hanoi had been rebuilt as French towns, with tree-lined avenues, pavement cafés, fountains, boulevards and municipal theatres – the scene-shifters did their work very well indeed.
Culturally, as might he expected, France was supreme. If primary schools were not as numerous, even in the thirties, as one could have hoped, at least an educated Vietnamese class had emerged, wholly brought up in a French context. The University in Hanoi produced French-trained lawyers and scientists, and the tone had been finally set with the return from a university education in France in 1932 of the Emperor’s young son Bao Dai. The lycées in towns such as Hanoi and Saigon were filled, half and half, by French and Vietnamese students. The result was a small class sometimes totally French in thought and outlook, and certainly completely divorced from its own culture and traditions.
Meanwhile, Indo-China had entered powerfully into the French imagination. Scholars from France were plentiful, and the Ecole D'Extreme Orient established at Hanoi (and still there-it opened an exhibition of Sino-Vietnamese art the day Viet-Minh troops entered last October) was a busy centre of research. Hundreds of books about Indo-China were published in France, many of them, oddly enough, being novels. No British colony has ever inspired the metropolitan writer to the degree that Indo-China has done in France.
Such was the situation when war broke out in 1939. The next few years were confused indeed. When the French collapsed in 1940, the French administration in Indo-China opted for Vichy, and a new Governor-General, Admiral Decoux, was appointed by Petain. The Japanese, who had by then engulfed much of China, began to make demands on Indo-China, and a weakened France was obliged to yield. By the time of Pearl Harbour, the Japanese were well entrenched; as the price for allowing French rule to continue, they exacted the bases they needed for their attack on Malaya. Earlier in 1941, in a brief, spasmodic war with the Siamese, the French had been compelled to cede those provinces of Laos and Cambodia which the Siamese had given up half a century before.
Yet this policy of giving way to Japan had its counterpart; it forced the French administration into closer contact with the Vietnamese. Hostility to nationalists was as violent as ever and, even in 1941, some ten thousand Vietnamese were political prisoners; but those who had acquired a French background, and whose conservatism prevented them from joining the nationalist ranks, found themselves cultivated and brought more frequently into councils of state. On the other hand, by the circumstances of the war, the French in Indo-China were for five years largely cut off from the rest of the world; shutting their eyes to the rising nationalism in their midst, they remained uninfuenced by changing opinions elsewhere. When the war ended, and a wounded France sent its emissaries to re-establish control in Indo-China, one of the biggest stumbling blocks was a French population (especially in Cochin-China) that was in outlook years behind the times.
The end of the administration of Admiral Decoux came in March 1945 when the Japanese, perturbed by the growing resistance both within and without, decided that they must assume direct rule. An ultimatum presented on March 9th led to an attack on French forces, few of whom had much chance to resist; even fewer were able to escape in order to join their compatriots in south-west China. When the Japanese collapsed, the situation had radically changed. All the forces that for years had been repressed or concealed came out into the open, and successive French governments found themselves always about three moves behind the facts. Indeed, much of the tragedy of the last eight years in Indo-China might have been avoided if any of the governments in Paris had survived long enough to be adequately informed upon the real course of events. In the vital year and a-half that elapsed between the end of the world war and December 1946, when fighting began in Vietnam, this was never so.
The Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh, or League for the Independence of Vietnam, had been formed at a conference in China in 1941, attended by both centre and left-wing nationalists. Within two years, the movement – which came to be known to short as Viet-Minh – had begun to infiltrate its agents and armed guerillas back across the border. Under the able leadership of Vo Nguyen Giap, a guerilla force was built up in the mountains of Tongking; and the political leader of the movement, who had adopted the alias of Ho Chiminh while in China, was soon accepted as the leader of Vietnamese nationalism. After the Japanese coup of March 1945, Vietnamese nationalists were free to act with Japanese connivance. A Japanese-sponsored nationalist government in the north was quickly swept aside by the active and more broadly based Viet-Minh. When the Japanese surrendered, the Viet-Minh were in almost complete control in the north and were rapidly extending their influence in the south.
With the approval of the British forces sent to supervise the repatriation of the Japanese from the south, French control in CochinChina was successfully re-established. In the north, Chinese Kuomintang troops would have none of the French, and only by negotiating with the Viet-Minh was the door opened to a French return. The substance of the agreement reached in March 1946 between Jean Sainteny, the French delegate in the north, and Ho Chi-minh was that French troops would be allowed into the country for a maximum period of five years. In the meantime, negotiations were to be concluded providing for an independent Vietnam. This agreement was followed by many acts of bad faith on both sides, and the conference that met at Fontainebleau in July of that year broke down amid exacerbated feelings. The gulf between both sides was now too great. Few responsible Frenchmen at the time were aware of the forces they were trying to control. The autumn of 1946 saw a steady deterioration and, after a particularly brutal assault on Haiphong by gunfire from French warships, the Viet-Minh themselves attacked on the night of December 19th, 1946. The war then begun ended only with the Geneva agreement in July last year.
Indo-China is still very much a land of uncertainties; and mutual suspicions have by no means been expunged by the Geneva agreement. Moreover, the conflict which started as a struggle between France and Vietnamese nationalism has become overlaid – perhaps too readily – with the hard features of the cold war. Laos and Cambodia, too, have been affected. Yet, now that the war cries have for the moment been stilled, we may see how the shape of this corner of the world is re-emerging; and we may consider how it has been affected by the century-long colonial episode that has at last drawn to its close. The end of foreign rule has revealed, but not solved, a number of important problems. Among them are these: Can Laos survive as an independent state? Are the present borders of both Laos and Cambodia to remain permanent, or will new ethnic boundaries be drawn? Will a united Vietnam, communist or not, return to its old associations with China? For it is a fact that the border between Vietnam and the neighbouring Buddhist world of Laos and Cambodia is one of Asia’s sharp dividing lines. Vietnam looks back for its culture, its cosmology and its ordering of society to the example of China, set more than two thousand years ago. In Laos and Cambodia, on the other hand, religion and society look the other way; their cultural roots and the flavour of thought derive from the world of Siam, of Burma and of India. Will the elections due to be held in Vietnam, and the powers who met at Geneva, agree to draw a political line which the concept of ‘French Indo-China’ has for a century obliterated?
Richard Harris: attached to the British Embassy in China, 1947-50. Correspondent of The Times, formerly at Hong Kong, now Singapore.