California's Tsarist Colony
The Russians are coming... not the fantasy of a Cold War movie, but the 19th-century attempt at incorporating the West Coast of America peacefully into the bear's domain. Jeffrey Miller tells the story of how it happened and why it failed.
Americans always have loved a bargain, if only in hindsight. And as bargains go, the 1867 purchase of Alaska from the Russians for a mere $7.2 million (or two cents per acre) was one of the biggest of them all.
For the Russians, however, the sale was merely the last step in a retreat from North America that began on January 1st, 1842. On that day the Russian American Company abandoned its thirty-year-old settlement 'krepost Ross', eighty miles north of San Francisco, and sailed its employees back to Alaska.
Since that time, Ross and its sister settlements in the North Pacific have been at the heart of Russia's 'Wild East' saga. This saga of discovery, courage, cunning, misfortune, misdeed and missed opportunities resembles that of other European ventures in the New World. Yet there is something so paradoxical about the Russian colonial experience – and the government policies that propelled and ultimately undermined it – that it stands apart.
Nowhere did these paradoxes appear more starkly than at the Ross colony in California. As the southern-most base of the Russian American Company (RAC), it was intended that Ross be the breadbasket for Alaskan and Aleutian fur-hunting outposts. Yet it was built on a site notorious for cold, foggy weather and limited arable land. Created as an important hunting outpost, its skilful hunters virtually eliminated the region's sea otter – its main source of profits – in under ten years.
Ross was the embodiment of a dream to make the Pacific ocean the Tsar's 'inland sea'. Yet it was the victim of a policy that refused to send the large number of colonists who might have made it so. Indeed, at the height of the RAC's influence in 1819, the whole North American 'empire' of twelve settlements contained barely 6,000 people, of whom just 10 per cent were either Russian or half-Russian.
Russia's peaceful legacy in California also differed from its European counterparts elsewhere in the New World – and its own experience in Alaska. Rather than conquer, or claim, Spanish California, the Russians chose instead to occupy an 'uninhabited' area, demonstrate their peaceful and industrious intent and then seek diplomatic approval for their beneficence. As a result, no Indians were enslaved at Ross and no cannons ever fired in anger. The local Kashaya Pomo Indians were even courted and befriended by treaty, the only one of its kind in California's pre-American period. As 'Allies of Russia', the Indians were guaranteed protection against attack, especially by the hated Spanish. In return they donated the land for Ross, land they called Metini, and agreed to help the Russians defend it if necessary.
The composition and concord of' Ross' population was another rarity for the frontier. Baidarka (kayak) – hunting Aleuts and Koniags, Russian administrators, Siberian trappers, Pomo and Coast Miwok labourers all lived, worked and intermarried under the Tsar's double eagle flag.
Even the hostility of the Spanish, and later Mexican, governments in Alta California, was often more pose than threat. Indeed, when the Spanish decided to build two new missions north of San Francisco as a defence against presumed Russian incursions, they traded at Ross for some of the materials needed to build them.
Ironically, such accord ensured that Russia's footprints in California would become mere footnotes in the state's history. But thanks to recent archaeological efforts, reconstruction of the Ross site and diligent scholarship in both Russia and the United States, Russian designs and impacts on California are being explained as never before. As it turns out, more than one Russian dreamed of making the Golden State a tsarist possession.
One such example was the Siberian merchant Grigory Ivanovich Shelikhov. As early as 1784, while establishing the first permanent fur-hunting base on Kodiak Island off the Alaskan coast, he longed for Russian dominion as far south as California. Such dreams mixed easily in his mind with personal profit. For despite an unforgiving climate, the constant threat of scurvy and malnutrition, problems of resupply, and fierce resistance from some Alaskan lndian tribes, Shelikhov had found great success in the fur-hunting trade of the North Pacific.
Other merchants also prospered. From 1747 to 1791, millions of rubles- worth of furs and pelts were traded in the lucrative Chinese markets. Commercial success was, of course, important to St. Petersburg. But for most of this period, the imperial government was content to control events indirectly by lending money to some of the more than forty competing Russian merchants and companies and sponsoring 'high-profile' scientific discovery expeditions of its own.
Shelikhov considered this arm's length policy unwise. British and Spanish ships had begun appearing in Alaskan waters as early as the 1770s. And while the Aleutian natives had been made Russian subjects (and made to pay the iasak or fur tribute for the privilege), there was no single, governing company in the region representing imperial interests.
With characteristic self-confidence, Shelikhov proposed just such a mono- poly scheme to Empress Catherine II in 1788. She refused. A decade later, however, Shelikov's widow presented the government, now headed by the sympathetic Paul I, with a fait accompli. Before his death in 1795, Shelikhov had created a powerful trading company by merging with competitors, electing directors and issuing shares. On July 8th, 1799, Paul I not only recognised the formation and monopoly rights of this 'Russian American Company' (renewable every twenty years), but he urged it to explore, exploit resources, occupy and colonise:
newly discovered lands in the name of Russia... provided these lands are not already occupied by some other nation and have not become their dependents.
In return the RAC was to report all business to the Tsar and represent his interests – and that of the aristocratic enthusiasts who would soon begin buying shares – in North America.
Such a mandate fitted well with the plans of the RAC's legendary manager, Alexander Baranov, who had become Shelikov's chief representative in Alaska nearly a decade before. In that time, Baranov had established Shelikov's capital of Russian North America at Yew Archangel (present-day Sitka), fought Indian opponents to a bloody standoff, shipped thousands of pelts, built churches, wharves and workshops and, in general, attempted to 'civilise' the tiny population of the Russian frontier with little direction or assistance.
But for all his success, Baranov could not change geography or climate, Problems of re-supply and the constant threat of starvation remained. The declining number of sea otter and fur seals further complicated the enterprise. From 1799 to 1804, not one Russian ship arrived from the Siberian re-supply port, forcing Baranov to rely on foreign ships for aid and trade and sometimes for joint hunting ventures as far south as San Diego. The California ventures were particularly successful, a fact not lost on either Baranov or the company's St. Petershurg representative, Nikolai Rezanov.
When Rezanov, an imperial chamberlain and one-time son-in-law of Shelikhov, arrived at New Archangel in 1804, he found the colony near collapse. Re-supplying it from California seemed the only hope and with that in mind, Rezanov sailed for the Spanish possession in early 1806.
Was re-supply all that Rezanov planned? Probably not. He already had been given secret orders to force open Japanese markets by disrupting the Japanese settlement on Hokkaido. And in his correspondence to company directors, he lamented that the Vitus Bering/Alexei Chirikov expeditions of 1740-41, had not resulted in a Russian claim on California as they had on the Aleutian Islands and Alaska. He also regretted that the Tsar had not simply taken California in 1798 when relations between Russia and Spain were already strained.
Rezanov knew, too, that the Spanish occupation, even this late in the colonising game, was still feeble. As he wrote:
The Spanish, on account of their shiftlessness, have hardly made any use of their lands and have advanced toward the north only to secure the boundary ... Even now there is an unoccupied interval fully as rich and very necessary to us and if we let it escape us what will posterity say? I at least will not he arraigned before it in judgement.
While New Spain's claim on all land as far north as the Columbia River – the boundary between the present day states of Oregon and Washington – was in dispute, there was no disputing Rezanov's point. Russian activity in the North Pacific had forced Spain, after a gap of almost 160 years, to finally colonise and fortify Upper California. The task fell to Jose de Galvez, Charles III's expansionist inspector general, who led an expedition north from Baja, California, in 1768.
By the time of Rezanov's visit four decades later, the Spanish had built four presidios, or forts, including one at the capital of Monterey and another at San Francisco. These were linked by nineteen mission settlements stretching from San Diego to the Golden Gate.
The missions operated as mini-agricultural fiefdoms thanks to the labour of native Indians, most of whom were forcibly Christianised and made to work the land. The 3,000 Spanish-speaking colonists imposed their will on the estimated 20,000 Indians with the help of presidio militias, which dealt harshly with any offence. European diseases further demoralised and decimated the native population.
For all of its supposed charms, life for Spanish Californians was still life in a provincial backwater. Trade with other nations was forbidden, and the supply of goods from other parts of Spanish America slow and undependable. The result was a flourishing black market along the California coast in which mission grain surpluses were traded for everything from linen and blankets to axes and hammers.
Rezanov, emboldened by these economic facts and flouting the ban on foreign vessels in San Francisco Bay, sailed into the harbour in April 1806. In his first meeting with the serape-draped Commandante Luis Arguello – a meeting carried on in Latin through interpreters – Rezanov declared himself the commander of all the Russian colonies and ready to start a permanent trading relationship. Arguello was cautious and deferred any decision to the governor in nearby Monterey.
While waiting for word, Rezanov distributed gifts to all the important people in the district, hoping to influence the governor's decision and refute rumours that the Russian colonies were impoverished. He and his officers also went every afternoon to the 'small and mean' Arguello home for music and dancing. It was during these afternoon gatherings that he met one of the commandante's daughters, the fifteen-year-old Maria Concepcion, reportedly one of the most beautiful women in California.
It is perhaps malicious to assume that Rezanov's intentions were all geopolitical, But in wooing Dona Concepcion with tales of life at the Russian court, he was securing an important ally in his plans to bring Russian America and Spanish California into a close commercial and political alliance.
Of more immediate concern was the fate of the Russian colony at New Archangel. Rezanov decided to force the governor's hand:
My [marriage] proposal created consternation in [Concepcion's] parents who had been reared in fanaticism... They ran to the missionaries who did not know what to do. They hustled poor Dona Concepcion to the church, confessed her and urged her to refuse me, but her resolution finally overcame them all.'
The engagement – marriage would have to wait for a papal dispensation and his return from St. Petersburg – made Rezanov part of the family. Predictably, the governor relented and Rezanov's ship, the Juno, soon filled with wheat, flour, barley, peas, beans, tallow and dried meat.
The food saved New Archangel and cemented prospects for a California colony. But the future shape and nature of that colony changed forever when Rezanov died in Siberia the following spring. So, too, did the life of Maria Concepcion, who did not learn of Rezanov's death for two years and perhaps longer. She devoted the rest of her life to religious works, never married and died fifty years later in a convent in nearby Benicia.
Baranov, meanwhile, continued making plans for the RAC's southern colony. In 1808, the Russian ship Kodiak sailed to Californian waters and returned with more than 2,000 sea otter pelts. Such success prompted the RAC board to ask Tsar Alexander I for permission to establish a permanent California settlement and for military protection if such proved necessary.
The emperor's reply was carefully phrased. The RAC could establish a colony, but at its own expense. No imperial funds would be forthcoming. (A loan of 150,000 rubles had been made just five years before). And although the government did promise to give all other assistance possible, it chose not to specify what form that assistance might take.
How much this lukewarm endorsement influenced the site of krepost Ross is impossible to know. But when Ivan Kuskov, leader of the founding expedition of 1811, rejected the port of Rumiantsev (present day Bodega Bay), he did so apparently out of concern for its lack of natural defences. The Ross site, on the other hand, was on a bluff 115 feet above sea level and protected from land attack by steep and heavily forested coastal mountains. That it contained neither a good harbour nor a good roadstead worried the RAC directors. They also complained that Ross was too far from the Slavianka (Russian) River and that its position could never command the surrounding territory.
Nonetheless, the decision stood and with the help of eighty Aleuts and twenty-five Russians, the redwood stockade was completed in time for Tsar Alesander's name day in August 1812. In time, the interior of the stockade contained a manager's house, barracks, storehouses and a chapel. Outside the walls were the dwellings of the Aleuts, to which were added over the next two decades barracks for the Indian labourers, a windmill, cattleyard, bakery, threshing floor and bath houses. By 1833, there were fifty-nine buildings in all.
For the first few years, hunting was the chief enterprise at Ross and its outpost on the Farallon Islands, thirty miles from San Francisco. Aleuts in their speedy and manoeuvrable kayaks, made of hide stretched over a light wooden frame, used harpoons and arrows to net thousands of otters and fur seals annually. Thousands of sea lions also were shot or clubbed to death. So successful were the Aleuts in depleting the otters that in 1825, only forty-three were killed in the vicinity of Ross. This was far from the 200 per cent return the RAC estimated was necessary to stay in the fur business.
The response to this decline was to diversify. Shipbuilding was begun in earnest. Small herds of cattle were enlarged and company plots cultivated. Each employee also was encouraged to start a private plot. The results were mixed. Ships built of native oak in Ross' moist climate could not season properly, filling them with wood rot after only a few years. Wheat and barley yields sometimes resulted in an exportable surplus, but just as often Ross had to buy grain from Spanish California to supplement its meagre stores. Again, the moist climate was mostly to blame. But the many moles, gophers and mice played a destructive role as well, raiding the harvests of potatoes, pumpkins, beets, cabbage, turnips, radishes, peas and beans.
Moving farm plots to sunnier areas – where the Indians wisely had established their villages – forced the livestock to graze farther from the settlement. Once in the hills, cattle often got lost or fell prey to bears and mountain lions. Complicating matters was the Russians' inexperience with crop rotation and fertilisation and the tendency to shunt the more taxing work onto the even less knowledgeable Aleuts and Pomo.
Nor do reports suggest much co- ordination. As Kiril Khlebnikov, a keen observer and RAC agent, reported in one of his many journal entries, 'the workers were from all parts of Russia and each one made tools of his own liking... There were Finnish plows, Little Russian plows, Great Russian plows, Siberian plows and California plows'. Ross' fledgling tallow industry suffered from similar loose management. As Khlebnikov reports, animals were not slaughtered when fat but when they were needed for food or to replenish ship provisions. Pigs proved inedible because they fed on shellfish.
Not that anyone among the 200-300 residents of Ross was complaining. Fish from the nearby Slavianka River were plentiful. And sea birds from the Farallones were a dependable diet staple. A small fruit orchard also kept the fort supplied with apples, peaches, cherries and pears.
The Aleuts found kinship among the Kashaya Pomo as is well evidenced by the many marriages and loan-words from three distinct Alaskan languages that crept into the Indian tongue. The Russians took common-law Indian wives too, in part because Russian women were not recruited for the colonies. Although these relationships were not sanctioned by the Eastern Orthodox clergy, any offspring – called creoles – were recognised by the company, educated and exempted from taxes.
Racial mixing and the absence of proselytising gave Ross a far different character than the Spanish possessions to the south. But racial mixing did not prevent racism. Khlebnikov wrote in his Travel Notes of 1824 that:
the Indians here are so stupid that it is impossible to suggest any principles for your relations with them... they are like animals that you always have to he wary of. They work at the fort because they are indigent and hungry; when they work, they must not only be fed but also sometimes paid, to give them clothing... Indians that wear clothing will feel a need for it and will be more eager to work.
Over time, low pay and bad food drove the Indian labourers away. The company then rounded them up and forcibly returned them to the fort. Each abuse seems to have been rectified by a reform, however, ensuring overall peaceful relations.
Relations between Russians and Aleuts were more balanced, although here too, Khlebnikov recommends that Aleuts he used for hunting – the most dangerous occupation of all – and spared from doing specialised work around the fort, for which he considered them unsuited. This recommendation seems to have been ignored, primarily because the Aleuts excelled at the heavy labour Russians sometimes shunned. Ignored, too, was the charge by the government inspector Vasily M. Golovnin in his 1820 report on colonial working conditions. 'One of the first crimes for which company management is accused is the extermination of the Aleuts by difficult and dangerous work.'
The Russians, on the other hand, were expected to begin work at 6 am, break for two hours at 11 am, and then continue working until 6 pm. Daily tasks ranged from logging and fishing to herding and blacksmithing. No work was done on Sundays or holidays, which included the Tsar's birthday and day of coronation. A cup of rum was also doled out to all employees on these special occasions. Any semblance of equality dimmed if food supplies ran short, however. Khlebnikov's solution was to 'supply everyone equally, leaving out nobody (this applies only to Russians)'.
As one expert on Ross has written, 'All in all, everyday life was active, peaceful and pastoral'. But it was still life on the frontier, far from the decision makers in St. Petersburg, who increasingly viewed Ross as a pawn in an international diplomatic game.
Ross and its sister outposts in North America had passed into direct government control in 1820 after Baranov had been recalled due to failing health. (He died in 1819.) A series of Russian naval commanders then took over management of the Russian American Company and began reforms – one of the most important involving employee compensation.
After 1820, employees were no longer paid in company shares but by salary. Base pay was 350 rubles per year, equal to $175 at the time. This salary was expected to cover all clothing and footwear, any old and new
debts and all rural and district taxes in the mother country. More important perhaps than the pledge against bad credit and drunkenness was the attitude that colonial service was temporary. Contracts lasted seven years and were renewable. But permanent 'out of contract' settlement in North America was not encouraged and in certain cases, forbidden for fear that colonists would no longer be liable for 'provincial and civic duties and recruitment in their former place of residence'. (A limited colonial citizenship was not created until 1835.) The company's naval managers, some of whom proved very capable, also viewed colonial assignment as a brief career stint. As a result, political concerns sometimes subordinated business ones.
And business was suffering. From 1795 to 1819, the number of furs exported from Russian America was truly staggering: 1,200,000 fur seals, 73,000 sea otters, 60,000 sea otter tails, 36,000 blue fox and 35,000 river beavers, valued at 17 million rubles. But fur-bearing animals were a finite resource as the hunters at Ross were learning. Not surprisingly, from 1825-1829, Ross had a deficit of 7,000 rubles. (Ten years later, the deficit had grown to 64,000 rubles.)
Trade with Mexican California, which had thrown off Spanish dominion in the early 1820s, also was less profitable. Foreign merchant ships, especially those from America and Britain, now were allowed to trade freely in Alta California, undercutting Russian prices in the process.
Without affordable and attractive products to trade for California grain, Ross was dependent upon its own questionable harvests. Such uncertainty finally forced the Russians to begin some modern farms and vineyards inland. But better agricultural yields could not alter a political course begun in 1824-25.
During that final period before his death, Alexander I gave the Americans and British access to Russian territory in North America in return for their acknowledgement of Russian rights and borders on that continent. But possession without flourishing colonies was not ownership. And as the failure to include Ross in either agreement clearly indicates, the imperial government remained ready to abandon the California settlement in return for concessions elsewhere. Golovnin presaged the government attitude in 1820 when he wrote, 'These territories bring no profit... and any European power can take them away from us without too much trouble or expense'.
The Spanish and later the Mexicans, certainly seemed interested in doing so. Soon after Ross was built, the Spanish governor sent emissaries to protest against the permanent nature of the settlement. But little came of it – perhaps because he sent gifts of horses and cattle as well. What soldiers and cannons the governor had at his disposal were, in any case, scattered across 600 miles. And even if he had been equipped to act, at that moment Russia and Spain were allied against Napoleon.
Until instructions arrived from Mad- rid, the Spanish Californians (called Californios) were left to make their own policy. And that remained generally true for the next thirty years. Not surprisingly, the policy varied from partnership to hostility depending on the circumstances. From 1815 on, for example, the Spanish, and after 1821, the Mexicans, routinely demanded that the Russians leave. There is even evidence that a military move against Ross was planned before the revolution against Spain distracted the Californios' attention. In the meantime, those Aleuts and Russians caught hunting illegally were sent to work at the missions. Some were brutalised and killed for refusing to convert. Others were eventually set free after being ransomed. Still others integrated into the Hispanicised community. A runaway Ross promyshlennik (hunter) even led a brief Indian revolt near Santa Barbara in 1824 before being killed. Yet through it all, the two sides continued to trade without serious disruption.
Whether some of the Russians considered the Spanish 'lazy and cruel' or whether the Spanish believed the Russians to be 'semi-barbarous', did not
seem to matter. By the 1830s, Ross had assumed the role of an uninvited relative, unwelcome but tolerated.
For company directors, however, Ross was becoming a bad investment. Between 1826-33, Ross' wheat and barley exports to New Archangel averaged only 27,000 pounds per year. Herds of sheep, horses and cows had increased, but so had the political pressures. Trapped between the Russian government's tepid support and the lack of any clear title to the land Ross occupied, the RAC was reluctant to pour more money into a losing enterprise. Men like Khlebnikov, who still hoped that the Russians could somehow obtain San Francisco, had not lost faith. They continued pressing company managers for more colonists, especially tradesmen, and more money. Yet looming on the horizon were the Americans, who had wrested Texas from Mexico in 1836 and whose California settlements were, in one written account, 'springing up like mushrooms after a heavy rain'.
Unlike the Russians twenty-five years before, the Americans travelled in large parties of well-armed hunters accompanied by their wives and children. And their intentions were clear, if not always diplomatic. In one company report, the Ross office manager was incredulous at the audacity of an American shipbuilder who started a farm along the Slavianka River 'without asking anyone's permission'.
In one last effort to legalise Russian occupation, former RAC manager Ferdinand Petrovich Wrangell travelled to Mexico in 1836. Wrangell had dreamt of an agreement between Russia and Mexico that would preserve California as a Mexican possession and recognise Russian primacy near the Slavianka River and beyond. But Tsar Nicholas I feared that recognising revolutionary Mexico would anger Britain. Unfortunately for Wrangell, Britain recognised Mexico first, leaving him without any diplomatic cards to play.
Ross' fate was sealed. On April 15th, 1839, Nicholas agreed to its eventual sale. The Hudson Bay Company was approached but declined. So, too, did the French. The Mexicans, who still considered themselves the rightful owners of the real estate, refused as well. In 1841, the Swiss entrepreneur John Sutter – soon to be famous for his role in the California gold rush – agreed to pay $30,000 for Ross. Herds were removed and some of the buildings dismantled for reconstruction in what would eventually become Sacramento.
News of the Russian's departure set off fiestas in Monterey. Some of the celebrants, like General Mariano Vallejo, seemed to sense their own shaky future as well. In his journal, Vallejo – who had traded at Ross many times – wrote, 'Benevolence and loyalty were the inseparable motto of the Russians stationed at Ross and Bodega, just as honour was their guiding star. I wish I could say as much of the North Americans...' Events confirmed his suspicions. Five years later, the Californios were swept from power in an American revolt. And in 1850, California became America's thirty-first state.

