The Blair Government in Historical Perspective
In his recent Colin Matthew Memorial Lecture to the Royal Historical Society, Peter Hennessy analyses the power relationships within New Labour
The weeks before and after the general election of June 2001 were revealing of the way Tony Blair saw his first term. At the last Cabinet meeting before the contest, he warned ministers not to expect an easy time when they returned. Despite the 167-seat margin of victory, Blair did not return to No.10 with any overt signs that, in Disraeli’s phrase in Tancred, ‘[a] majority is always the best repartee’. Quite the reverse.
Broadcaster Jim Naughtie caught this well in his study of Blair and Brown, The Rivals (2001): ‘Euphoria had been banned at the moment of victory. Any repeat of the 1997 frolics at the Royal Festival Hall risked looking arrogant ... Behind the controlled facade ... the feeling that was struggling to find a way out was one of ... deep frustration. Blair was impatient with his Cabinet and with Whitehall, and Brown was impatient with Blair.’
It had been rather a scratchy year for the Prime Minister. One of Blair’s more endearing characteristics is his willingness to talk publicly about the human side of his job – a capacity to acknowledge anxiety which is rare amongst top politicians. In the spring of 2000, he had agreed that most political lives ended in failure. Why? ‘It’s because the public is always encouraged to be cynical about people. And ... in the end ... whatever the expectations are, you can’t meet all of them.’ Blair is a command and control premier with a sense of political mortality.
That sense, I suspect, had been his dominant emotion for a few fraught days in September 2000, when a curious coalition of the semi-organised effectively closed down much of the UK’s oil and petrol distribution system. From the morning of September 12th, when the Prime Minister was warned by the Cabinet Office that ‘the situation is near breaking point’, an autumn of fretfulness began to afflict the government. None of those around the Prime Minister knew what the petrol scare meant. The normally phlegmatic Jack Straw declared privately: ‘This is our poll tax’.
The problem had arisen partly because Whitehall’s capacity for contingency planning had been dispersed beyond the Cabinet Office into several departments and allowed to lose its sharpness. Top civil servants Sir Richard Wilson and Sir David Omand set about reviewing this in the wake of ‘petrol September’, only for its shortcomings to be shown up in still more acute fashion when Foot and Mouth began to bite in late February 2001.
It looked briefly as if the events of September 2000 had fuelled a mini-revival of collective government. ‘There is more challenge to the PM,’ an insider explained; ‘they realise that they are not going to win an election just on his face.’ This impression of mildly waxing collegiality was reinforced by two other factors. As the preoccupation with winning a second term grew, there appeared a little more space at the centre in which the career civil servants could operate. This included the Prime Minister’s Department-that-will-not-speak-its-name, as the regulars in the No. 10 Private Office began to take over more of the day-to-day running of business from the special advisers. Secondly, there was a small burst of Cabinet committee activity, though a Cabinet minister privately said in October 2000 that greater collegiality was not apparent on Thursday mornings – the full Cabinet could neither tackle difficult issues on which there might be disagreement nor go on much beyond an hour for fear of the press reporting splits.
his preoccupation with the media’s obsession for personality stories has, in the view of another Cabinet minister, stymied what might have been a natural growth in collegiality as ministers became more experienced. But a senior Whitehall figure thought a more profound factor had been at work: ‘The PM doesn’t like argument. Cabinet these days is just a series of self-congratulatory remarks.’
When Jim Callaghan saw Blair in the early months of his premiership he urged the Prime Minister to find about six really good ministers on whom he could rely. This was not an ‘inner cabinet’, in which Callaghan never believed, but a version of a collective apex nonetheless. Blair would have none of it. As he later told a journalist:
I remember Roy Jenkins telling me about the 1960s Labour Cabinets, when they would have Cabinet for two days. Can you imagine trying to conduct business today like that? The Government would go into freefall! I think a lot of the things that I’ve done – a strong centre, making sure that the writ of the Prime Minister runs throughout – I think that’s just an inevitable part of modem government. I don’t apologise for it at all.
‘Making sure that the writ of the Prime Minister runs throughout’ – the aspiration was plain enough. But this had never entirely happened since May 1997 because of the twin peak of the Blair administration, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, a great crag standing in the way of a thoroughly monocratic government.
‘King Tony’ has to be seen in the context of a dual monarchy, with rivalry and sustained malice between the two courts. The first-term Blair administration was ‘bi-polar’ to a degree not experienced in modern times. Probably the best way to depict the Blair and Brown domains up to the 2001 election is to map the policy fiefdoms, or special interests, where an individual dominance could be discerned, even though such dominance was nowhere absolute. For the Prime Minister the main such interests were schools; health; crime; transport; Northern Ireland; foreign and defence; intelligence. The Cabinet Office, once a resource shared by the Cabinet as a whole, was in a feudal relationship with the overlord next door. For Brown, though, the preoccupations were pensions; child and youth policy; welfare to work; enterprise; science and technology transfer; structural change and regional development. Here Treasury policy pervaded and, through the comprehensive spending reviews and the public service agreements which underpin them, the Chancellor exerted a sway over colleagues no predecessor ever matched. He ‘stuffs their mouths with gold if they do things on his agenda’, as an admiring insider put it.
All this subverted what is supposed to be a government of departments which adhere to collective responsibility in return for a shared say in serious decision-taking. The Prime Minister’s people blame the Chancellor for some of the absence of procedural collegiality. ‘Tony is not a particularly command-and-control person,’ it has been put to me. ‘He is bugger-all interested in the detail. That’s Brown ... Gordon hates collective discussion. As a result, they tend to have to be bilaterals, not just with Gordon Brown but with other ministers too.’
The consequences of Blair’s lack of feel for what Clem Attlee called the ‘architectonics’ of state, have been captured by two businessmen brought in to help him in 1997. Chris Haskins, who headed the Regulatory Impact Unit in the Cabinet Office, said in the autumn of 2000 that the Government was ‘in the worst of all worlds now where we’ve sort of abandoned the Cabinet committee. We’ve got a sort of Prime Minister’s Office, including the Cabinet Office, which really hasn’t got the teeth to deliver what the Prime Minister wants. And I’m not too sure that it’s the institution that should be delivering.’ David Simon, who advises Blair on his modernising government agenda, was even more candid earlier in 2000: ‘The process by which Cabinet Government develops effective policy, and the civil service and executive agencies work to achieve improving results, is both complex and currently inadequately co-ordinated and reviewed.’
Haskins explained that Blair is a lawyer: ‘so he never actually ran anything before he became Prime Minister. I think he’s learnt reasonably quickly that running government is pretty complicated’. One observer of Blair’s inner circle underscored the analysis. ‘The PM,’ he said, ‘has never run a department. That shows through and in the people around him. They have no real sense of how departments think things through and the brokerages they have to operate and implement. He and the Policy Unit always want instant action.’ And it is not always plain, when Tony’s people say ‘Tony wants’, whether Tony really does want it rather than his Policy Unit people wishing it to be so.
The Blair style had aroused some resistances by the time the first term approached its end. The Commons Select Committee on Public Administration (PAC) urged the Government to draw up a separate ‘Code of Conduct for Special Advisers’ and that Parliament should control the overall number of special advisers an administration can appoint. The select committee also persisted with its inquiry into the Ministerial Code despite disdainful remarks from the Prime Minister during the summer of 2000. In its February 2001 report, The Ministerial Code: Improving the Rule Book, the select committee recognised the increasing centrality of the Code to the country’s constitutional arrangements and the centrality of the Prime Minister to its proper administration. The Committee reminded Mr Blair directly of what they regarded as a first-order prime ministerial concern: ‘The Code is the Prime Minister’s document – and it is with the Prime Minister that the buck must finally stop. This closes the accountability gap.’ Such a closing of the gap did not appeal to Blair, who twice refused to give evidence to the PAC on the Code of which he was custodian-in-chief.
The Cabinet Office defended this refusal on the grounds that, since premiers have long since ceased to be leaders of the House of Commons, select committees have lost the power to summon them. The last premier to appear, Neville Chamberlain, had gone as leader of the House not prime minister. This argument ignored the changed world of select committeedom since 1979 and that it was Mrs Thatcher who simply invented the convention that premiers do not attend, as she wished to avoid giving evidence to the Defence Select Committee on the Westland Affair in 1986.
Blair’s final comment on the issue was a collector’s item, coming as it did from the prime minister who has given less space to his individual ministerial colleagues than any other since 1945:
It is right of course that the House of Commons should have an opportunity to question me as the Head of the Government, and it does of course have that opportunity in weekly Prime Minister’s Questions. More detailed questioning … would, however, inevitably mean trespassing on other ministers’ responsibilities and would, I believe, risk obscuring the present lines of accountability in our system where statutory powers are conferred directly on Secretaries of State and other Departmental Ministers, and not on the Prime Minister.
In the last days of the 1997-2001 Parliament, the Committee declared: ‘Our preference is for a model which strengthens Cabinet government as a whole, rather than for one which supplants it with something else, although the case for a Prime Minister’s Department needs to be properly assessed.’
As the ink dried on this, the first stories were appearing about how ‘Blair plots revenge on the Civil Service’. Neither top civil servants nor traditional departmental boundaries were to get in the way of delivery after the election. On May 31st, 2001, the Prime Minister said:
I want to focus the centre of government on delivery particularly. I will establish what will in effect be a ... specific policy delivery Unit in the Cabinet Office but the head of it will report directly to me and we will use that in order to make sure that across the public service areas, we’re driving through the change and reform that is necessary and, in particular, that we are refocusing the Civil Service on what I think is their task today which is less to do with detailed day-to-day policy advice and more to do with project management and delivery.
Did this mean that Washington really would come to Whitehall – that politically appointed special advisers would dominate policy advice, with senior officials more and more becoming managers and executors?
One Whitehall veteran judged that ‘the public may not like the civil service very much but they like the idea of “Tony’s cronies” even less’. He was sympathetic to the predicament in which Sir Richard Wilson had found himself, as a defender of Northcote-Trevelyan notions of a Civil Service inoculated against politicisation. If Blair alters the basics of what one permanent secretary calls ‘the arranged marriages between permanent secretaries and ministers’, transgressing what another calls ‘the thin golden line that must not be crossed’, his second term could be significant in a hotly disputed fashion.
Mr Blair won his second term with an extraordinary majority. He rejigged Whitehall instantly and substantially in boundary terms, and the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office went into ever-tighter yet even untidier fusion. No.10 was reconfigured, with a merged Policy Unit and Private Office in the shape of a government and policy division; Alastair Campbell overseeing Communications and strategy; and Anji Hunter leading ‘government relations’ liaising with the devolved administrations, the Labour Party and business. A Policy Delivery Unit appeared in the Cabinet Office, while John Prescott moved into a new Office of the Deputy Prime Minister to head up the clutch of ministers in the Cabinet Office.
The Cabinet Office, already groaning with overlapping functions and units, acquired still more in a way which suggested Mr Prescott and the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Richard Wilson, would be stretched to co-ordinate it, let alone the rest of Whitehall. Yet Gordon Brown resisted any Cabinet Office encroachment on his conduits of money and power – the public service agreements. The Treasury made it plain in the first days of the second term that the Policy Delivery Unit would report to Mr Blair but it would answer also to the PSX Cabinet Committee, Gordon Brown’s public spending instrument.
It was now possible to ponder more fully the kind of political animal who was exerting such sway from Downing Street. Mr Blair has confided in his mentor, Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, his ‘regret that he read Law and not History at Oxford’, and, in Jenkins’ words, that he ‘has become a considerable addict of political biography’. The Prime Minister plainly cares about his place and that of his administration in the ‘big picture’ of political history. So, on the evidence of the bulk of his first premiership, what kind of political animal are we dealing with? For one well-placed observer, it’s quite simple:
Blair is the best Liberal Prime Minister the country has had since Lloyd George but he doesn’t lead the Liberal Party. He leads a party that is not Marxist, not socialist, not even Croslandite ... The problem is that very few Cabinet ministers understand this. They were building their careers in Michael Foot’s time. Tony built his career at that time too, but he never believed a word of it ... He’s basically leading a party which is very disconcerted. It doesn’t know what to believe in. It can never quite decide if he’s one of them. He isn’t one of them. He’s a younger version of Roy Jenkins and all of Roy’s agenda items are the Liberal ones.
One must, however, be a touch careful of treating Blair as early twentieth-century New Liberalism freshly spun. Michael Young, author of the 1945 Labour manifesto, once described its contents as ‘Beveridge plus Keynes plus socialism’: in other words, developed New Liberalism plus a dash of public ownership. But Blair goes neither for nationalisation, demand management, nor a universalist welfare state. Gordon Brown, however, is more ‘a man of 1945’ in instinct, emotion and rhetoric, and the wider Labour Party has a real sense of this.
One element of the older tradition of British politics about Tony Blair is religion. Another, which links him with both Mrs Thatcher and Harold Wilson, is his espousal of ‘meritocracy’. The word had been invented in the mid-1950s by the same Michael Young. Mr Blair made it the centrepiece of a speech he delivered in his Sedgefield constituency in May 2001:
We are not crypto-Thatcherites. We are not old-style socialists ... We are meritocrats. We believe in empowering all our people. We should celebrate not just those who are born well, but those who do well.
The Prime Minister, it seemed, had no conception that Young’s The Rise of the Meritocracy was both a satire on such attitudes and a warning of the consequences if Labour turned its back on Tawney-style notions of equality in favour of the principle IQ+Effort=Merit. It would be ironic if the meritocrat in No.10 diluted the principle of a politically neutral career civil service in the name of efficiency.
Civil service reform is not the greatest of the Prime Minister’s current preoccupations. Military action has absorbed the lion’s share of his fabled gifts as a focuser. On that shining morning of his first landslide victory, neither Mr Blair nor anyone else could have foreseen the degree to which he would mutate into a war prime minister during the first four-and-a-half years of his premiership. At such moments he remains a conviction politician and a commanding premier, but his style of operation is noticeably different – more collegial within Whitehall and more sensitive to Parliament without.
Gulf War II, the four days of concentrated military action against Iraq in December 1998, set the pattern. To his credit Blair sought and received the approval of the House of Commons in February 1998 for the use of military force against Iraq should the need arise (to the conspicuous approbation of Tony Benn who pointed out that no previous post-1945 premier had done this). Before the RAF Tornados flew against Iraq in December, the Cabinet’s Defence and Overseas Policy Committee met more than once and approved the use of force.
There was also ‘the Prime Minister’s Group on Iraq’. Though not officially a sub-group of Cabinet’s Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (as Thatcher’s Falklands ‘War Cabinet’ and Major’s during Gulf War I had been), the Cabinet Secretariat, led by the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Richard Wilson, and the head of the Overseas and Defence Secretariat, Michael Pakenham, serviced it and took the minutes, thereby cladding the Blair style in the traditional masonry of collective processes. One insider suggested: ‘You can say it was a mini version of a War Cabinet. Only the people who needed to be there were there but with a proper organic link to the Cabinet. Everything was properly minuted and all the proper processes were followed.’
Blair’s Balkans War machine in the spring of 1999 was another version of this hybrid. The Cabinet’s Defence and Overseas Policy Committee met more than once in the weeks before the air raids began, to approve a British contribution to the use of NATO force against Serbia. The full Cabinet was reported to before the first air strikes on March 24th. As one Cabinet minister ruefully commented: ‘We have had far more opportunity for discussion in Cabinet on Kosovo than on the Budget.’
The Balkans War underlined Blair’s blend of custom and practice and desire for smaller, leaner decision-taking patterns. After September 11th, 2001, Blair’s initial ministerial group was again like the 1998-99 manifestations. On October 8th, however, it was announced that a proper ‘War Cabinet’ had been established as a genuine Cabinet committee known as DOP (IT) – Defence and Overseas Policy (International Terrorism). So serious and protracted is this conflict likely to be that the PM – commendably – has suppressed his preference for bilateral meetings or informal groups.
Two other aspects of Mr Blair’s conduct of affairs since last September may be noted. He has tolerated Clare Short taking a different line from him, and he has been sensitive towards Parliament. Both Houses were recalled for an emergency debate, on September 14th and on October 4th. Mr Blair also took the unprecedented step of inviting the members of three Commons Select Committees (Defence, Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs) plus the Commons and Lords Intelligence and Security Committee to a special briefing on September 24th. What one might call Mr Blair’s post-Black Tuesday apparatus – its integration, its efficiency, relative collegiality and sensitivity towards Parliament – is in stark contrast to other aspects of the new centre. This is difficult to map even for insiders. As a candid No.10 spokesman said in early September 2001: ‘I honestly don’t know how many units we have. Some of these changes are still being worked through.’
The latest fusions – of private secretaries and special advisers in No.10 and, even more, of the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office – form an uneasy stand-off between a Cabinet Secretary devoted to preserving the notion of a career, non-partisan Civil Service and a Prime Minister who would prefer a British adaptation of the White House. I suspect that what the PM’s people really want may become apparent when Sir Richard retires next year. I fear the next Cabinet Secretary will be required, before appointment, to agree to be the civil service head of a merged Cabinet Office and No.10. And if an insider cannot be found who is prepared to be less fastidious than Sir Richard Wilson, the PM may look outside Whitehall. I hope the Civil Service Commissioners and the House of Commons Public Administration Committee will be ready to resist, for Mr Blair will have put a match to any sustainable notion of a Northcote-Trevelyan style career public service – all in the name of efficiency, delivery and meritocracy.
- Peter Hennessy is Attlee Professor of Contemporary British History at Queen Mary, University of London.

