What Did They Know of Empire?

Bernard Porter argues that, through most of the nineteenth century, most Britons knew little and cared less about the spread of the Empire.

The idea that British society was thoroughly infused with ‘imperialism’ in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has gained broad currency in recent years. Influential here have been John MacKenzie’s works on the wide spread of imperial propaganda in the later part of this period, at least; and the late Edward Said’s exposure of the hidden imperial content of much of the ‘high’ culture of the earlier nineteenth century. Some have taken these findings much further to justify imperialist readings of just about every feature of modern British society before the 1960s. Travel, science, exhibitions, zoos, boys’ adventure stories, even nude paintings (Empire as rape), were all essentially imperialist activities. Modern film and TV adaptations of Victorian novels and documentaries about nineteenth and early twentieth-century subjects regularly interpolate imperial references, even when they do not appear in the original texts, on the ground, presumably, that the Victorians must have been thinking about their Empire even when they did not talk or write about it, rather like sex, and that this needs to be brought out for a modern audience. (An example is Sarah Curtis’s 1999 film version of Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park of 1814.) The impression given is that almost everyone was an imperialist of one kind or another. They must have been, seems to be the assumption behind this; the Empire was so vast and great and vital to them. It also must have needed their commitment; otherwise how could it have survived?

Of course the Empire left its marks on British society. This is especially so materially. It provided work for Britons, for example, manufacturing things for colonial markets; or – another way of looking at it – helped keep their wages low. It may also have contributed to Britain’s long-term industrial decline, by masking it for so long. It furnished an escape route for the poor and disaffected, through emigration, thus possibly defusing civil unrest. It kept the British supplied with much of their ubiquitous tea and sugar (and so helped rot their teeth). It had an input into domestic social reform, the ‘woman question’, the public schools, and the development of policing in the UK. It puffed up the monarchy. It was responsible for the violent early deaths of many Britons, mostly men, especially if we believe that its existence was partly to blame for the outbreak of the First World War. Latterly, it made a terrific show: celebrations, processions, lots of dressing up in silly clothes. This is quite apart from its repercussions on the wider world it served or tyrannised (according to one’s point of view), which is not under discussion here. The Empire’s huge impact on Britain is undeniable. So is the fact that it left its footprints in many areas of British culture, including even Mansfield Park, though far more lightly in the novel than Sarah Curtis implies on screen. Influence, however, is something else. The Empire could have impacted on Britons without their really noticing it, let alone enthusing over it. Surprisingly, to a great extent this seems to have been the case.

There are several reasons for thinking this. One is empirical. There are vast areas of British society and culture, especially during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, where the most remarkable fact is how relatively bereft of obvious imperial references or allusions they are. This is especially true of ‘high’ culture; which is why our post-colonial cultural theorists – followers of Said – have to tease them out. Not a single ‘canonical’ novel of the nineteenth century features the Empire significantly. The same applies to all the other arts. One would have thought that opera composers, at least, would have relished Indian or African settings; but not in Britain’s case. There is no empirical evidence to suggest that nudes were meant as metaphors for colonial conquest; that is simply a modern construction placed upon them. If painters yearned for the exotic, they usually found it in the English Middle Ages, not the colonised East. The taste for ‘oriental’ architecture hardly survived the death of George IV, and very few of London’s public buildings were as ‘imperial’ in other ways – grandiose and Roman, for example – as in many other capital cities of the world, including republican Washington. Imperialists used to complain of this. London was just not worthy of the Empire. In 1904 a couple of patriotic architects mooted a new project to remedy this: an ‘Imperial Monumental Halls and Tower’, dwarfing the adjacent Houses of Parliament and Westminster Abbey – state and church – symbolically. It was never built, of course. London did not even have many statues of imperialists, and none who were not soldiers as well. More popular forms of culture were equally bereft of imperial content. The people’s favourite novels, plays and songs were on other themes entirely; shows of the Empire’s ‘savage’ subjects, though they did exist, were few and far between. Why was this great, apparently overwhelming Empire not celebrated more openly in the literary and artistic culture of the time? France, after all, had no qualms about celebrating hers.

There are special explanations in the case of the ‘higher’ forms of art. Serious artists and the literati were atypical of British society as a whole. They regarded themselves as ‘above’ it, and were likely to avoid topics regarded as ‘popular’ for that reason alone. Colonies were a particular anathema because they represented rude action rather than refined feeling and thought. Imperialists returned the compliment, being generally unsympathetic to ‘art’. Men of action regarded art as ‘effeminate’. Britain did not need to paint or sculpt or carol her Empire, wrote Thomas Carlyle:

Audience gave the impression of suspicion, of hostility to the subject and of considerable indifference to the conditions prevailing in the colonies, was the Victoria League executive committee’s note on one awkward attempt to reach a ‘lower-class’ audience, through the Workers’ Educational Association, in 1911.

Imperial propaganda was at its most successful when there was plenty of sugar to cover the pill; as with Empire Day (a half-holiday), all those imperial stories for boys by Henty and co. (the derring-do), Scouting (the games and the camping out), Empire exhibitions (the fun-fairs), and so-called music-hall imperialism (the tunes). (In fact only a very tiny number of music hall songs even during the Boer war years were unambiguously imperialist. Most longed for sweethearts left at home, worried about fathers at the front, or bemoaned the ordinary squaddie’s lot.) How much of the pill went down with the sugar is hard to say. Jeffrey Richards thinks the workers were too ‘unintellectual’ to resist it. Many working-class autobiographers claim to have resisted it nonetheless; but they were certainly unrepresentative – ‘intellectual’ almost by definition. There are no objective measures of public opinion from this time. (The first systematic government  survey, in 1948, revealed an amazing ignorance of and lack of commitment to the coloniesthen.) In any case people could have imbibed Empire-related attitudes unconsciously, without realising their implications. Racism is an obvious example, although the connection between this and imperialism is not at all straightforward. So we cannot know for certain.

What seems likely, however, is that imperialism in a strict, or narrow, sense of the term did not permeate British society very much more in the early twentieth century than it had in the nineteenth. This was for some of the same reasons, though not all. Society was still divided by class. This still determined people’s main interests and priorities, as we can see from the major domestic events of the time: the General Strike, the depression, the rise of Labour and so on. So were the schools. Great efforts were made to bolster imperial education after the 1880s – free distribution of the maps was one – but there continued to be obstacles here. A Salford schoolboy called Robert Roberts recalled in his memoir being indoctrinated with imperialism at school in the 1900s, and is often quoted as evidence of this; but he is almost the only such example. A problem with elementary schools at the time was supposed to be their teachers, who generally came from the pupils’ own class and had the reputation of being dangerously left-wing. There is little solid evidence that any substantial degree of ‘imperialism’ got through to girls and boys in these schools before the First World War. Working- and middle-class autobiographies (apart from Roberts’) suggest the same with respect to people’s adult lives.

Certainly the dominant values of British society, apart from its highest reaches, were not particularly Empire-related. Some of those values seemed to fly in the face of imperialism: British ‘freedom’, for example, which was still the main message of the history books even after 1900. It is noticeable that this did not give rise to any very widespread anti-imperial feeling (though there was some); but it cannot be inferred from this that people necessarily supported the Empire. Most appear to have been apathetic to it, or too busy with their lives to care much about it.

The way in which it was presented was also important. Here the propaganda may have had an effect. After the First World War, in particular, both school textbooks and imperial propaganda in general radically shifted their ground. The Empire was pictured differently from before: no longer as a matter of conquest and glory, but as a ‘family’, peacefully acquired and lovingly nurtured in liberalism; an example, if you like, of ‘internationalism’, the new buzz-word of these League of Nations years. The new term ‘Commonwealth’ expressed this. It was mainly a travesty, but it was a significant one. It suggests that imperialism pur – in the usual meaning of the word, implying subjection and control – was still not widely acceptable in Britain. The thing had to be disguised to make it so. Even most Britons who were imperialists, therefore, may not have been so for strictly imperialistic reasons. Other ‘discourses’ were far more powerful.

It is a mistake, therefore, in studying the social history of Britain in this period, to focus on imperialism too much. It existed, but was thinly spread, patchily distributed, and never dominant. Britain was an imperial nation, but never a truly imperial society. It is important to bear this in mind, and not be too misled by the footprints. The relative lack of imperial commitment could, after all, have been a factor behind the Empire’s eventual fall.

Bernard Porter is Professor of Modern History at the University of Newcastle. He is author of The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism (4th ed. 2004) and of The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society and Culture in Britain (Oxford UP, forthcoming).