Turncoats and Treachery: The British Civil Wars

Changing sides during the British Civil Wars was more common than once thought, claims Andrew Hopper, and played an important part in determining the outcome of the conflict.

A pamphlet illustration of the execution of Browne Bushell for betraying Scarborough Castle to the royalists in March 1643On February 2nd,1659 Major Lewis Audley was summoned before the House of Commons for abusing two MPs. He was charged with having called one a ‘base rascal’ and the other ‘a base stinking Fellow and a Shit-breech’. In his defence Audley maintained he was provoked, because someone had goaded him: ‘That he was no Gentleman; had no Arms; and that he was a Turncoat.’ Denial of gentility had long been considered a grievous insult for a gentleman and provocative of violence, but Audley explained that being denounced as a turncoat was to him still more insufferable. He was judged guilty and committed to the Tower, but protested further: ‘I have faithfully served you these 18 years and was never guilty of being a turncoat. That sticks with me.’ Such an insult cut deep and reflects how the Civil Wars had politicised the vocabulary of insult, widening spheres of political discussion and participation. Alongside ‘Roundhead rogue’ and ‘popish Cavalier’ stood ‘turncoat’, a term in use since the 1560s but employed increasingly during the 1640s to denigrate those who changed sides. It penetrated into everyday conversations throughout the land as activists on both sides sought to blast those who no longer shared their loyalties.

Though we can never be sure of a precise figure, changing sides during the Civil Wars was a much more widespread and complicated phenomenon than has previously been thought. A variety of side-changers can be identified, ranging from unprincipled opportunists to those compelled by shifting political circumstances and a reconsideration of their duty. Side-changing was a phenomenon that rankled with contemporaries, yet was engaged in by many. It attracted widespread condemnation, yet was encouraged and connived at. On occasions in specific circumstances it might be praised, honoured and welcomed. It brought many to the scaffold but crowned others with prosperity and success. It is a subject fraught with complication and contradiction, but given the weight of historical narratives examining allegiance, side-changing demands a detailed investigation.

The peerage was particularly susceptible to side-changing. More nobles changed sides during the 1640s than those commoners who remained at Parliament, leading the Leveller John Lilburne to denigrate the peerage as a ‘turncoat Lordly interest’ rather than natural royalists. Contemporaries invested huge significance in aristocratic allegiance because it was expected that their decisions would be exemplary: the defection of the six peers – the Earls of Holland, Bedford and Clare, Viscounts Conway and Portland and Lord Lovelace – from Westminster to Oxford in August 1643 deepened the perceived decline of Parliament’s cause. Yet the king’s reluctance to show these renegade peers royal favour failed to exploit this political success, so five of the six eventually returned to Westminster. From spring 1644 a crumbling of aristocratic royalism can be observed in the wake of Parliament’s military recovery as numerous peers abandoned the king and tried to make their own peace terms with Parliament.

In the House of Commons side-changing influenced factional definitions of what constituted ‘the cause’. The act of denouncing comrades as turncoats underlined one’s own legitimacy, constancy and service. In this way identity and allegiance came to be culturally constructed, with individuals labelled as turncoats when they were perceived as such by hostile contemporaries. In all at least 27 MPs were excluded by the House of Commons for defecting to the royalists, mostly during 1643. These defections reflected Parliament’s declining military fortunes that year. They also demonstrated alienation from its increasingly radical rhetoric and punitive wartime administrative measures, which made the defensive war initially envisaged in 1642 seem increasingly distant. In contrast, Westminster never attracted the number of royalist MPs it might have done once it gained the military ascendancy, despite the early defections of Sir Edward Dering and Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper in February 1644. MPs defecting from the king were never comparable in number to those who abandoned Westminster in 1643. Part of the explanation lies in the contrast between the king’s free pardon and Parliament’s refusal to readmit royalist MPs into the Commons.

Both sides, but especially the royalists, benefitted from the defection of military professionals, career army officers possessed of overseas experience. These individuals were highly valued at the outbreak of war, but many parliamentarians grew suspicious of them after so many defected from the Earl of Essex’s army to the king during 1642-43. Their defections often resulted from a sense of slighted honour or frustrated ambition rather than mercenary opportunism or hopes of personal advancement. Military professionals tended to constitute different kinds of turncoats from peers and MPs, with military fortunes and professional considerations exerting a stronger influence upon them than changing political circumstances. Their defections were often long-planned and facilitated by friends and contacts among the enemy. Some of Parliament’s officers had originally enlisted for the army to be sent against the Irish rebels and so could plausibly claim that they never intended to serve against the king’s person in England. Prominent examples include Sir Faithful Fortescue, James Chudleigh and the Scotsman John Urry; the latter changed sides so many times that he was later commonly described as of ‘turncoat memory’.

Recent studies by Charles Carlton and Barbara Donagan have shown that thousands of common soldiers became side-changers at some point, too. High rates of desertion, particularly among pressed men, and the widespread practice of re-enlisting prisoners in the armies of their captors led to a large turnover of personnel. Carlton argued that so many served on both sides that it suggests many ‘had very little ideological commitment to either side in the first place’. His argument that apathy minimised atrocities has been taken up by Donagan, who has advanced the theory that an ‘ameliorating and reconciling element in side-changing resulted from the prevalence of the practice’. Most rank-and-file soldiers changed sides readily because their prime concerns were food, shelter and survival. This was recognised by contemporaries, who consistently suspected that soldiers would change sides for better pay, billets or even fresh shirts and footwear. Most rank-and-file defections were therefore unlikely to be heartfelt political conversions. Instead they were led into defecting by their officers or were required to do so when captured by the enemy.

Yet despite this being frequent, it was by no means universal. Demonstrating soldiers’ inner motives remains problematic in the absence of explicit evidence. While pay was no doubt a consideration, historians should be careful about over-emphasising it, as common soldiers’ wages were pitiful. Likewise we cannot assume that all were involuntarily forced, pressed or led into changing sides. A minority, especially among the cavalry, actively chose to defect. Some displayed conspicuous loyalty in the face of treacherous officers. Suggesting that all soldiers lacked political motivation panders to stereotypes espoused by contemporary elites. While soldiers maintained a front of obedience and submission, some plotted to desert, defect or even turn on their commanders. In 1640 the Earl of Northumberland considered that those English who had not already deserted were ‘readier to draw their swords upon their officers than against the Scots’. He was proved correct that summer when two Catholic officers, William Mohun and Compton Evers, were murdered by common soldiers. In February 1644 Lord Byron lamented that two of his officers were forced to yield one garrison after their own soldiers threatened to kill them unless they surrendered. When Richard Browne disputed with his mutinous soldiers after the battle of Cropredy Bridge in June 1644 they struck him in the face. There were several attempts on Lieutenant-General John Hotham’s life, while the prosecution witnesses at his trial included his own family servants. In Leinster, it was claimed that Sir Charles Coote had been shot by one of his own men while one parliamentarian musketeer, apprehended for trying to shoot Sir William Waller, merely replied ‘that he was sorry for nothing but that he had not killed him’.

Turncoats were not marginal to the war’s outcome. Rather, fear of treachery frequently determined the strategy of both sides, along with the hope or expectation of winning converts from among the enemy. The failure of the king’s strategy in 1643, in tying his armies down to the unsuccessful sieges of Plymouth, Gloucester and Hull, was prompted on each occasion by misplaced hopes that the garrisons could be undermined by treachery from within. In contrast, Parliament’s success in winning the first civil war had much to do with its capture through treachery of key royalist garrisons in Wales and the Marches during 1644 and 1645. The fall of towns such as Shrewsbury, Hereford and Monmouth undermined the morale and functional capacity of the royalist war effort, frustrating attempts to rebuild after the battle of Naseby on June 14th, 1645. Parliament’s Scoutmaster-General, Sir Samuel Luke, reported that the royalists had grown accustomed to losing places in this fashion and that Prince Maurice’s letters to the king ‘certified the taking of Shrewsbury by Parliament’s old and ordinary way, which they term a golden bridge’.

By 1648 and the rekindling of hostilities in the Second Civil War the political circumstances changed completely. Parliament came close to imploding through self-doubt, witnessing so many of its former adherents joining royalist insurrections. The Prince of Wales promised such converts a full pardon and their pay arrears. Those parliamentarians who rode out the storm grew radicalised, embittered and more anxious than ever about their men’s allegiance. Colonel George Twisleton complained in July 1648 that, despite having discharged 60 soldiers who had formerly been royalists, ‘no providence nor care can fence against treachery’. He bemoaned that the traitors in his ranks were men ‘seduced who had served in these parts above four years, and never was of the enemy’s party’.

So 1648 witnessed the harsh punishment of defectors becoming routine. Parliament was readier to use martial law against its former servants who had ‘betrayed their trust’ and joined the enemy. Some, such as Colonel John Poyer, were tried and shot, while others, such as Colonel John Dalbier and Major Henry Lilburne, were never brought to trial, but instead hacked to pieces or decapitated by Parliament’s vengeful soldiers. The realisation grew that, if the king’s life was spared, parliamentarians would continue to face treachery and backsliding from their comrades. Even from 1642 Parliament had argued that the king was guilty of a breach of trust, maintaining that he had violated his coronation oath. The king’s judges used this language of treachery against him during his trial, claiming that he had ‘traitorously and maliciously declared war’ on his subjects. In this way arguments of breach of trust were extended from turncoats onto the king himself and became central to justifying the regicide.

With both sides perennially anxious about maintaining their support, printed treatments of side-changers used a rich vocabulary of insult to satisfy a popular appetite for salacious stories of turncoats and treachery. To ruin an individual’s name propagandists drew upon images of treachery from the Bible, literature or the stage. Terms such as ‘base’, ‘rogue’ and ‘knave’ were used to deny gentility, while fictitious material was propagated for popular consumption to turn particular individuals into hate-figures. Baseness, lying, irreligion and cowardice were the most frequent themes, while occasionally sexual incontinence was implied. Enduringly derisive nicknames were coined for side-changers. For example, Sir George Chudleigh was dubbed ‘the Grand Ambo-dexter’, while Sir Hugh Cholmley was derided as ‘Judas Cholmley’, and Colonel John Poyer was scorned as the father of bastards, an indiscriminate plunderer, the leader of a lawless rabble, ‘a great swearer and quarreller’, but above all as having been ‘born to nothing, sprung up from a turn-spit to a glover’.

Stripping turncoats of their gentility ejected them from the community of honour and in theory rendered them incapable of further public trust. The most elaborate and fulsome denial of gentility was reserved for Sir Richard Grenville. After his former professions of loyalty, Parliament found his betrayal especially galling. A week after his defection in March 1644 two gibbets were erected at the Royal Exchange and at Palace-Yard, Westminster, where he was proclaimed the ‘grand Apostate and Renegado of England’. This proclamation envisaged his death as a common felon, dubbing him ‘skellum’, a Dutch term denoting particular contempt, signifying a rascal, scamp, scoundrel or villain. The strength of this denunciation was exceptional and even startled some royalists.

Predictably, the most common Biblical allusion was to Judas Iscariot. Judas was a commonplace insult while its use extended far down the social scale. By comparing treacherous backsliders to the betrayer of Christ, propagandists implied that the injured party was on God’s side. The appellation was applied to Cholmley, Grenville and many others, including in May 1649 the mutineer, cornet Henry Denne for agreeing to side with the generals against his former comrades. After the king’s execution, royalists commonly compared the trial commissioners and regicides to Jews, Caiaphas and also to Judas to emphasise their treachery.

The press were keen to print stories illustrating the ghastly ends suffered by turncoats in order to deter others from following their path. When Grenville was wounded the London press trumpeted this as a sign of divine providence, rejoicing that he had received ‘a brace of bullets in his groin’ as a ‘just judgement of God’, because he was ‘a notable whoremaster’ and ‘a notable prophaner of the Lord’s day’. The matter was conceived especially providential because he ‘received this wound on the Lord’s day and in the West Country, where he hath hanged and murdered so many men’.

Another tract warning against the dangers of backsliding was William Prynne’s The Doome of Cowardize and Treachery, written in October 1643 to orchestrate support for the forthcoming prosecution of Nathaniel Fiennes for having prematurely surrendered Bristol. This was a cheap and mass-produced tract hoping to reach a large audience of soldiers. In it Prynne conflated the adjectives cowardly, mercenary and treacherous, writing that this was ‘an age of timidity and treachery’. He concluded that exemplary capital justice was required for those who betrayed their trusts for the purpose of deterrence and to make Parliament’s officers and soldiers more diligent and incorruptible.

Given the barrage of abuse ‘turncoats’ could expect to receive in the press, the more streetwise side-changers prepared careful self-defences in advance. Changing sides was deemed objectionable because it smacked of putting personal interests before those of the public at a time when gentlemanly concepts of honour stressed constancy. Therefore side-changers usually sought to portray themselves as having remained constant. It was not they, but others, or even the cause itself that had changed. While they may well have acted to protect family, estates and themselves and to profit from victory most denied self-interested motives because they frequently faced accusations that they sought to side with the strongest. Consequently many sought to ‘spin’ narratives of their past actions to support self-images of loyalty, reliability and un-tarnished honour. These could take various forms. Narratives employed by royalists in trying to come to terms with Parliament tend to minimise their ‘delinquency’ and allege their faithfulness to the parliamentary cause from the outset. Propaganda conversion narratives focused on the alienating features of their former employers. Memoirs and autobiographies, written with posterity in mind, were inclined to stress sacrifice, principle and constancy.

The letters of Sir John Hotham and his son, Lieutenant-General John Hotham, recently published by the Camden Society, do much to reveal the temperamental nature of gentleman turncoats. The Hothams were Parliament’s governors of Hull and had been instrumental in advancing Parliament’s war effort in 1642, but thereafter both harboured doubts. The younger Hotham engaged in a lengthy correspondence with the royalist general, William Cavendish, Earl of Newcastle. His letters held out the prospect to Newcastle that he and his father would change sides and in so doing deliver Hull, Beverley and Lincoln to the royalist cause. The repeated self-justificatory references to his honour in Hotham’s letters strung Newcastle along and were intended to protect the Hotham estates from royalist soldiers until, prepared with strong arguments against having broken their trust, his family were ready to defect. Yet they procrastinated too long and were arrested on suspicion of conspiracy. They were condemned by Parliament in December 1644. A chorus of abuse in the press greeted their eventual executions.

The royalist historian the Earl of Clarendon (1609-74) was not alone in gloating that such turncoats never prospered, depicting them as widely reproached and never trusted by the side to which they turned. Yet he also regretted that more had not been done by the royalists to favour the Earls of Holland and Bedford in 1643 in order to encourage more defections from Parliament. This is indicative of the partisan double-standard at the heart of the phenomenon, where notions of honour and service clashed with pragmatism and political advantage. Side-changing was not always considered reprehensible, especially by those who sought advantage from it. Turncoats such as James Chudleigh, Bussy Mansell and George Monck (who was to prove the principal agent of the Restoration) became highly valued by their new comrades. Those able to persuade themselves and enough others that they changed sides out of conscience might retain their sense of honour and public reputation, despite the condemnations from those they had deserted.

Side-changers who faced trial and execution sought to promote their reputations and the cause for which they suffered through their deportment in court and on the scaffold. The meanings of their scaffold speeches, behaviour and gestures were vigorously contested in print. From 1649 side-changers such as John Morris and Browne Bushell used the scaffold to defy the regime in a bid to die as royalist heroes, yet they were largely expunged from royalist martyrologies thereafter because of the difficulty of explaining their former parliamentarianism. Royalists preferred more straightforward martyrs such as Lord Capel, Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lisle. Those whose loyalties shifted to navigate the troubled 1640s and 1650s with success aroused resentment among those less fortunate. Three such Pembrokeshire gentlemen were ridiculed after the Restoration:

Roger Lort: of any principle or religion to acquire wealth. Sampson Lort: he can pray as long as there is profit. James Lewis: forced from a Royalist to act as a Colonel for King and Parliament … loved more for doing no wrong than for doing any good.

By the later 17th century a more widespread and cynical acceptance of the necessity of shifting one’s political affiliations had emerged as a consequence of the Civil Wars. Individuals became more adept at repositioning themselves. Prominent politicians in the generations following the Restoration acquired nicknames that scornfully revelled in their inconstancy. The Earl of Shaftesbury was dubbed ‘the Dorsetshire eel’, while John Erskine, the Jacobite Duke of Mar, was nicknamed ‘Bobbing John’ for his double-dealing.

Side-changing is still expected to play a decisive role in current world conflicts, where political strategies have continually been adopted and incentives brokered in attempts to stimulate the practice among enemy forces in North Africa, the Middle East and Afghanistan. In modern British politics the occasions when MPs change their political party still attract excited speculation, as pundits attempt to unpick the wider significance of these episodes particularly when they play out around general elections. Likewise, the claims of side-changers are often revisited in the justificatory narratives offered by today’s MPs that their parties had shifted and left them rather than the other way round.

Far from being a marginal activity with little impact on the Civil Wars’ outcome, a bewildering number of contemporaries can be identified for whom side-changing became a critical issue. The concept of a ‘turncoat’ was culturally constructed and highly contested, as a double standard emerged over the circumstances in which changing sides was acceptable.

Side-changing shaped the wars’ outcome, accelerating royalist decline and radicalising elements of the parliamentarian coalition in 1648. Notions of treachery became central to defining ‘the cause’, while discrediting comrades as turncoats deepened infighting within both coalitions. While side-changing could have a benign effect in making divisions less absolute, the opposite sometimes occurred when particular defectors provoked extreme reactions. The concept of breach of trust, first applied to side-changers, was turned on the king himself to justify the regicide and the regimes that followed it.

Far from side-changing being the dubious practice of a handful of aberrant individuals, during the 1640s it became a necessary survival strategy for thousands as they navigated their way through revolutionary events. It shaped the course of the English Revolution and remains an important political legacy to the English-speaking peoples

Andrew Hopper is a lecturer in the Centre for English Local History at the University of Leicester. His book Turncoats and Renegadoes: Changing Sides during the English Civil Wars will be published by Oxford University Press in November.