A Third Encounter of the Close Kind

Akbar Ahmed, one of Pakistan's leading scholars, reflects on the links - past, present and future - of the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds.

Gibbon recounts a chilling Muslim story in Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. When the first Muslims erupted from the Arabian peninsula in the seventh century and reached Alexandria, they sent a message to the caliph asking for instructions regarding the famous central library. 'If the books are in accordance with the Quran, they are unnecessary and may be destroyed; if they contradict the Quran, they are dangerous and should certainly be destroyed', replied the caliph.

This is, of course, an untrue story. But it suggests the formation of the negative images of Islam early in its history. It tells us how non-Muslims saw Muslims; also how Muslims are not able to see how the world sees them. The blind spot of Muslims, the incapacity to see how others see them, has historically created a false sense of self-sufficiency in Muslim society.

But the pictures of Muslims, throats hoarse and death in their eyes, burning books in Bradford are not a figment of the imagination. Others reinforce the Bradford ones: Libyans killing policewomen in London, Palestinians hijacking passenger planes, Iranians seizing foreign embassies and Indonesians blowing up the Borobudur temple in Java. It is V.S. Naipaul's vision of Islam and Muslims: 'Rage was what I saw... Muslims crazed by their confused faith' (Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey, 1981).

These images, I maintain, stem partly from a lack of understanding of Islam among non-Muslims and partly from the failure of Muslims to explain themselves. The results of the failure in communication are predictable: hatred feeding on hatred. I saw 'kill a Muslim for Christmas' written in the London underground stations. Many of the negative images of Islam are not based on fact or reason. But as Johnson said: 'Prejudice not being founded on reason cannot be removed by argument'.

The burning of books brought into the open the present encounter between Islam and Western civilisation, as it exposed the great gaps in understanding between them, the violent passion on one side, the wall of incomprehension on the other. On the surface both civilisations appear vigorous and confident. Take Islam: forty-four nations, and about a billion people. France has about 1,000 mosques, Britain half that number. There are about six million Muslims in West Europe alone (over one million in the UK). These numbers exaggerate Islam's importance in Europe. Apart from small groups of local converts most Muslims are immigrants. But the important point is that they are here to stay. In that sense they are Europeans.

The present encounter is coloured by two earlier encounters, the first lasting centuries. It began with the rise of Islam, the arrival of its armies into Sicily and France, the duration of the Crusades and ended in the seventeenth century when the Ottomans were stopped at Vienna. It created in Europe an image of an aggressive and threatening Islamic world. It is also interesting to note that, conversely, the encounter had little impact outside the Muslim areas of the Middle East. From Mughal India or Indonesia, for instance, Western civilisation was seen as distant and benign, represented by traders and sailors. It was in the second encounter, in the last century, that the entire Muslim world would be included in the colonial grip of European powers.

The brevity of the second encounter was matched by its ferocity. Lasting perhaps a century the consequences of this encounter were devastating, and in many ways are still with us. The spectacle of Muslim tribesmen recklessly charging armed and disciplined European regiments formed into squares, symbolised the encounter. From the Sudan, where the Mahdi led the resistance, to Swat, where the Akhund symbolised it, the Muslim response was similar. These hold, passionate – if futile – responses created romantic images of the Muslim tribesman, the noble savage, the Bedouin among the Arabs or the Pathans in North India. At the end of the second encounter, after the Second World War, when Muslim nations began to emerge as independent powers, the difference between a triumphant Western civilisation surging forward and a Muslim civilisation racked with loss of intellectual confidence and direction was apparent. Burning books is just one symptom and response; it is the symbolic equivalent of the nineteenth-century charge on horse-hack.

The Western perception of the revivalism, rediscovery or resurgence of Islam is faulty, as it is linked to Arab oil, PLO guerrillas and lmam Khomeini. This is a mistake. The phenomenon has been in motion since the seventh century, continually emphasising the drive to return to the Golden Age, the ideal times of the Prophet. Non-Muslims would usefully understand the return in the context of striving for the early ideal and its values, not a turning back of the clock to remote times.

There are two traditional methods of interpreting Muslim history. In the first, Ibn Khaldun proposes a cyclical theory, attractive in its simplicity: hardy tribesmen, fresh from the hills, invaded towns in the plains, and over time, succumbed to city ways and lost their tribal cohesion. Becoming effete, they were vulnerable to a fresher wave from the hills. The cycle repeated itself every three or four generations.

In the second, Islamic history is depicted as a rapid, dramatic, rise in seventh-century Arabia and a tortuous – inevitable – decline. Conservative Muslim scholars date the downfall from the time of Ali's assassination in 660, after the period of the four ideal caliphs. The more orthodox scholars of this school go back earlier. Shah Waliullah of India, for instance, places the downfall after the reign of the first two caliphs (632-644) calling it Khalifit-e-Khass, or the special caliphate. The decline continued to the middle of the thirteenth century in the Middle East. The Mongols in 1258 captured and sacked Baghdad. That year is seen as the cut-off point, the end, of Islamic history: the rest is despair and decline. From then on, it is argued, Muslims faced a steady decline, making European colonisation almost inevitable. This is not only a Eurocentric view of history – Spengler, Toynbee and Bernard Lewis subscribe to it – but also an Arabcentric one.

Both schools have one main strand in common. They believe in the theory of the rapid rise and equally rapid downfall of Islam. They take the easy way out, blaming 'outside' forces, Mongols or Europeans. It is tempting to view history in this light. For an Arab, 1258 truly marks the end of world domination; for Europeans, it establishes the arguments for a disintegrating, decadent, corrupt Muslim Orient waiting for reform and a superior, Western, civilisation, these theories are part of established wisdom; they are also a substitute for thought and inquiry.

We view Islamic history not as the rise and fall of the Arab dynasties. Instead we discover a rhythm, a flux and reflux, a rise and fall, peaks and troughs, in Muslim society attempting to live by the Islamic ideal. The ideal is constantly renewed by groups and individuals in different places and in different times. The further from the ideal, the greater the tension in society. Muslims would interpret success in worldly endeavours as a sign of divine approval.

The West today is the crucible of what is emerging as a universal culture. We call this Western civilisation in that the USA and Europe – predominantly white – are at its core, providing the ideas and technological discoveries that fire it. Geographically it includes non-Western nations like Australia and a non-Western people like Japan. Other civilisations, distinct and rich in their traditions, like India or South-East Asia, are partly and happily seduced.

Although defined by consumerism – Coke and jeans are superficial symbols only – central to this civilisation are the beliefs in capitalism, democracy and, linked to it, the equality of women. High standards of living and education are presupposed. A positive attitude to life, the trust in science, the urge always to find solutions, optimism, a sense of possibility are engendered. Western civilisation is now the dominant, universal expression of humanity.

Within the context of this culture and its values instant celebrities, whether princess or prostitute, obsess the media and become universal figures overnight. Television allows the unthinkable, defying all racial stereotypes of a generation ago: pop-star hysteria around a Russian leader – leading to a neologism, 'Gorbamania'; an Indian, Pamella Bordes, sells her sexual secrets to the British press and within weeks is a media star, Bombay planning feature films on her. The universal culture is thus not defined by race or colour.

But there are strands in Western civilisation which tend to be ethnocentric and arrogant. It is intolerant with those that do not match its standards or conform to its values. Consider, for example, the all pervasive and all dominating Western news media with its explicit moral assumptions. If developments do not take place in accordance with current Western thinking they are to be denigrated and denounced.

Underneath the Western glitter uneasy questions lurk. The random violence and celebrity killing confirm an undercurrent of irrationality. The strain of anarchy, the nihilism – an extreme reaction against the authoritarian and stifling pre-War European social structures – are now a cause of general concern. The morbid obsession with longevity and physical fitness are guaranteed to create neurosis. Also, colonisation is only a generation away, racial feelings are not entirely a thing of the past.

In the main, Muslim civilisation appears to be at variance with Western civilisation. In its attitude to the deepest values – democracy and the position towards women – Muslim societies have been sharply faulted. In particular, Muslim politics are in flux. Most of the Muslim nations are ruled by authoritarian figures in or out of uniform, often employing an Islamic idiom to support their rule. The picture for Muslim education is also bleak. A barren, stifling mediocrity hangs over intellectual endeavour. No incentives for innovative work, bureaucratic interference, low salaries, political pressure and departmental jealousies discourage movement toward excellence. But these are Muslim lapses, a sign of social decay, not Islamic features.

Most of these ills of Muslim society are self-created. The average person in Western civilisation lives about one third longer than his Muslim counterpart, his life is healthier and free of tyrannical rulers and political instability. The scientific discoveries, the Nobel Prizes, are to be found in Western civilisation. And when a Muslim learns science and technology, he is usually lured by the more congenial environment to live in the West, and no longer contributes to his own society.

In its uncontrolled population growth – at 3 per cent the highest in the world – its appalling education standards, its general poverty, its horrifying treatment of political prisoners, its coups and its intolerance of academic excellence, the Muslim world appears to have little to offer. It is no wonder that one of the great Arab reformers, Abduh, lamented, 'in Europe I saw no Islam but many Muslims' and, at home, he declared, 'I saw Islam but no Muslims'.

The present encounter, with its universal culture and pervasive technology, is perhaps the most forceful of onslaughts on Muslim civilisation yet. Precisely because it is so amorphous and because it appears in the most unexpected forms in the most unexpected places, Islam appears so threatened and vulnerable. The VCR needs no passport or visa; it invades every home and its films challenge every value. Nonetheless, let us not forget that Islam has in the past proved its capacity to withdraw into itself, blocking out the world – as we saw in the nineteenth century. The costs are heavy hut it can be done. Hence dialogue and understanding are critical.

On the threshold of the twenty-first century, what can Islamic civilisation contribute to the world? The answer is it can provide a balance and a check to the materialism that characterises much of contemporary civilisation, offering instead compassion, piety and a sense of humility. These underline the moral content of human existence, they suggest security and stability in family life, in marriage and in the care for the aged. Recent signs in Western societies indicate that perhaps the time is ripe to re-admit care and compassion into human relations.

In its abjuration of materialism 'Sufism provides a balance to the dominant values of Western civilisation. Especially in the Sufistic messages of sulh-i-kul, peace with all, Islam has a positive message of peace and brotherhood to preach. This message is irrespective of colour or creed and has stood the test of time. Not surprisingly Sufistic Islam has made significant inroads in the west.

Book burning is fundamentally against the spirit of a religion which places knowledge at the highest level of human endeavour. Repeatedly the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet urge the acquisition of knowledge. Indeed the word knowledge, ilm, is the most used after the name of God in the Quran. The Prophet urged his followers to 'seek knowledge, even unto China’. Human beings are asked in the Quran to think of and marvel at the variety confronting them: 'And among His signs are the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the variations in your languages and your colours' (Surah 30).

As an example of Islamic scholarship, let us take the historian Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406). Ibn Khaldun's Kitab al-Ibar, world history, for Arnold Toynbee is ‘undoubtedly the greatest work of its kind that has ever yet been created by any mind in any time or place'. He was jurist, historian, scholar, traveller and statesman, and for us today, the father of sociology, to which he gave the name Ilm al-imran, the science of society. Some of the central formulae of the modern age are reflected in Ibn Khaldun's theories: Karl Marx's stages of human history which provide the dynamics for dialectics of conflict between groups; Max Weber's typology of leadership; Vilfredo Pareto's circulation of elites; Ernest Gellner's pendulum swing theory of Islam, oscillating from an urban, formal, literate tradition to a rural informal and mystical one.

Ibn Khaldun's life is important as it forms a bridge, a transition, between two distinct phases of Muslim history: the Arab dynasties in the tail-end of which – as in Umayyad Spain – he lived, and the great Muslim empires which would develop by the end of the century in which he died. His life also teaches us many things for our own period: the uncertainty of politics; the fickleness of rulers; the abrupt changes of fortune, in jail one day, honoured the next; and finally, the supremacy of the ideal in the constant, unceasing, search for ilm, knowledge, and therefore the ultimate triumph, of the human will and intellect against all odds.

Clear signs suggest that dramatic changes are in the offing l in the Muslim world. The very leaders who symbolised Islam in the 1980s, like Khomeini and Zia-ul-Haq, are gone. Gone, too, are the most active and respected scholars like Ismail al-Faruqi and Fazlur Rahman. Others have changed, like Arafat, and now talk of peace, of settlement. Yet others, notably Benazir Bhutto, have emerged suggesting moderation.

Change and re-interpretation are embedded in Islamic history and text. The following discourse between the Prophet and Muadh ibn Jabal, a judge, on his way to the Yaman clearly indicates the principle:

Prophet: How will you decide a problem?
Muadh: According to the Quran.
Prophet: If it is not in it?
Muadh: According to the sunna [Islamic custom].
Prophet: If it is not in that either?
Muadh: Then I will use my own reasoning.

The Islamic principles which encourage adaptability and rational choice based on ijtihad, independent judgment, shura, consultation, and ijma, consensus, are reflected in the exchange. Clearly, rationality, and man's own judgment play a part in arriving at decisions.

Post-war philosophy disposes us to view the world as a set of divisions, ranked in a hierarchical order of merit: First World, Second, Third and so on. But the world in the next decade will continue to form into two distinct and increasingly different civilisations. The first, which we have characterised as Western will he known by democracy, high standards of living, of education, of economic growth, and of income per capita. The other will exhibit the opposite characteristics: political instability, corruption and inefficiency. Muslim civilisation will find itself in the second category. The only hope of its emergence is the awakening of its leaders to the crisis facing their societies and an awareness of their own Islamic destiny, lack of which would push Muslim groups further away from the rest of the world, making global harmony difficult.

A great deal would depend on those who can build bridges between the two civilisations. Unfortunately intellectuals appear to have abandoned the role of transcending positions in order to move towards explanation and rationality. Into the vacuum have stepped the prejudices and stereotypes of the media.

Historians and social scientists, as Edward Said has so forcefully reminded us, have themselves fallen victim to the stereotypes. Perhaps novelists could play their historical role of explaining and hence bringing people together. E.M. Forster's humanist credo 'Only connect' is now more relevant than ever in the context of the argument in this paper. But as Salman Rushdie – another Kings' man, though of another generation – has shown, the novelist can also disconnect, creating hatred and division.

  • Akbar S. Ahmed is Iqbal Fellow (Chair in Pakistan Studies) and Fellow of Selwyn College at the University of Cambridge, and author of Discovering Islam: Making Sense of Muslim History and Society (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988).