The Right to Choose: Women, Consent and Marriage in Late Medieval England
Jeremy Goldberg examines three stories of disputed marriages and discusses definitions of consent and how they impinged on a medieval woman’s right to marry when and whom she chose.
From the late twelfth century the medieval Church had made consent the central plank of matrimony. This doctrine was codified by the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) and disseminated throughout the Catholic West. To wed, a man and a woman needed neither witnesses, nor a priest, nor a church, though the Church also taught that all three were desirable. Nor did couples require the goodwill of their parents, their lord, or anyone else. So long as they were both of sufficient age to exercise consent and were not otherwise contracted to anyone else, a couple could, like Romeo and Juliet, pledge themselves to one another in binding union merely by uttering the appropriate words.
The canon law – the codification of the Church’s teaching enforceable through the Church courts – distinguished between words of present and of future consent. ‘I would like to marry you’, ‘I will marry you when I finish my apprenticeship’ and many other such formulas constituted future consent. Such contracts were not considered binding unless the couple – as courting couples were wont – subsequently consummated their relationship. Words in the present tense – ‘I take you to be my wife’, ‘John, I plight you my troth’ – were, however, immediately binding. Once uttered, the couple were deemed to be married in the eyes of God and would have to answer for it at the Judgement Day if they reneged on their agreement. If any irate parent or jilted lover tried to obstruct such a union, the Church courts were there to uphold the marriage.
This is in effect was what happened in the well-known, but entirely atypical fifteenth-century case of Margery, a daughter of the socially aspirant Paston family, and her family’s employee Richard Calle. In 1469 the couple secretly exchanged words of present consent and when their marriage was discovered by Margery’s irate parents, stuck by their story. The bishop pressed Margery to remember her duty to her family, but in the face of Margery’s dogged determination, was forced to declare the marriage binding.
Margery was a young adult and plenty old enough to know her own mind. Not all marriages, however, were of adults. Canon law on age of consent was specifically designed to protect children from arranged marriages. The minimum age for consent was understood to be fourteen for boys, but only twelve for girls. These ages were themselves related to Classical understandings of the age of puberty. Age of consent to marriage was thus tied to an understanding of the ages at which young people were deemed capable of having sex and so of conceiving children, the primary justification for marriage. Canon law did, however, permit children as young as seven to be betrothed so long as they were allowed to ratify – and hence theoretically able to turn their back on – such betrothals on achieving their canonical majority.
In the 1450s, another Paston daughter, Elizabeth (c.1429-88), was ‘beaten once in the week or twice, sometimes twice in one day, and her head broken in two or three places’ at the hands of her mother Agnes to get her to marry the widower Stephen Scrope, many years her senior and in his own words ‘disfigured in my person’. The Pastons clearly raised strong-minded women because Elizabeth stood her ground, the marriage never materialized.
Elizabeth’s fortitude illustrates the corollary of the Church’s insistence on consent: without consent, there could be no marriage. Moreover, a marriage made under duress could be annulled. Agnes Paston would likely have known that.
Suits for the annulment of forced marriages are rare, but the Church courts at least provided individuals a degree of protection. It was this that Agnes Grantham of York, one of our three subjects, used to extricate herself from her unwanted marriage to John Dale. Agnes was a comparatively prosperous recent widow who ran a successful brewing business in York. Whilst on her way to dine with William Feryby, the master of the great hospital of St Leonard at his private residence a couple of miles west of York one summer’s day in 1410, she was ambushed by John Dale and two accomplices. Her son and her female servant ran off fearing for their lives. Agnes was thrown across the back of a horse and so taken into the surrounding woodland. There she was forced by her attacker to agree to marry him, which she did using words of present consent. She subsequently claimed that she did so only to preserve her virtue under threat of rape, though it is at least as likely that she was in fact raped.
Within a matter of days of her attack, Agnes was again exchanging words of present consent in the garden of John Thornton, a neighbour’s house, but this time willingly. In the subsequent court action, Agnes looked to have this second contract of marriage enforced on the grounds that her first had been forced upon her and was therefore null. The question of consent, the right to choose, was thus central to Agnes’s case.
Our second case concerns Alice Brathwell, a Doncaster shoemaker’s widow who supplemented her livelihood by taking in lodgers. In the spring of 1391 one of her guests, a visitor to the town by the name of William Dowson, asked her hand in marriage. Dowson, who was accompanied by two other men, one of whom was his swordbearer, presented himself as a man of substance and authority in his own community and thus a good prospect for a craftsman’s widow. Alice was not so sure. She knew nothing of this man and her husband had not been dead a year; custom dictated that a widow should not remarry before a year’s mourning had elapsed. Alice prevaricated. She would give him an answer later, indeed soon after the anniversary of her husband’s death. She made no promises. Dowson, however, claimed that Alice had in fact agreed to his proposal and that her words of present consent had been witnessed by his two followers. This was the case brought to the Court of York. Again the court was asked to rule whether Alice had in fact consented or whether she had exercised her right to say no, or at least not to say yes. In the end the court ruled against Dowson.
The third case is the longest, reflecting the more elevated social rank of the key players and the fact that, unlike for the two urban widows, the control of landed property depended on the outcome. The case concerns the marriage between John Marrays, who was almost certainly the illegitimate son of Dom William Marrays, abbot of St Mary’s York (d.1382), the wealthiest abbey in the North of England, and Alice de Rouclif, a minor gentry heiress not yet in her teens. Towards the end of 1364 Alice went with her mother to the gatehouse of St Mary’s Abbey, a couple of miles from her family home in the hamlet of Rawcliffe, and there in the steward’s chamber she betrothed herself to John Marrays. The next day she was taken to live at the country home some miles away of her fiancé’s married sister, Anabilla Wascelyne, husband, and her two daughters by an earlier marriage, the younger of whom, Joan de Rolleston, Alice was to share a bed with. Not long after and only a few nights before Christmas her fiancé arrived and spent the night with Alice, displacing her bedfellow to another part of the room. John then went back to London, but continued to send Alice gifts – a blue cloth, a furred robe, tunics, kerchiefs, a knife. Alice grew impatient. She wanted to be properly married, but when she confronted John on a subsequent visit, he told her firmly that she must wait. Wait she did, until one feast day the following summer armed men came to her home and took her away. These men, it transpired, were working for Sir Brian de Rouclif, her (unrelated) feudal superior who, in the absence of her father, asserted wardship over Alice. John Marrays then brought an action within the Court of York, technically for restitution of conjugal rights, but in effect to enforce his marriage to his under-age bride. Alice nominally contested the action, but in fact it was Sir Brian pulling all the strings. This alternative narrative asserted that Alice had betrothed John against her will and, more importantly, by the time of her abduction, was still too young to have lawfully consented. The case became not so much a question of Alice’s consent, but rather of her age. The court ruled that John and Alice were lawfully married.
The three cases are linked by the common theme of consent. The two urban widows, Agnes Grantham and Alice Brathwell, seem to have expected to exercise an actual right to choose in a meaningful way. Both were prepared to fight their corner in court. Alice de Rouclif, on the other hand, was of gentle birth – albeit what modern scholars term ‘mere’ or ‘parish’ gentry – and was legally a minor, too young to administer her lands in her own right and so subject to wardship by a guardian. In feudal law her ‘marriage’ was a commodity, a potential source of profit that could be bought and sold. An heiress offered a prospective husband control of her inheritance. Her marriage was too valuable to be left to her own choosing. There was thus a tension between feudal and canonical conventions and we see this played out in Alice’s case.
That she was betrothed unwillingly to John Marray is not something we can know since all the witnesses who testified sided with him. Inevitably they claimed there was nothing untoward about Alice’s appearance or behaviour – no hint of the sad face and the tears alleged by Sir Brian’s legal team. More problematic is the consummation of this contract shortly after. In canon law a future contract could be rendered immediately binding if the couple consummated their relationship. In this sense, the betrothal represents a future contract, whereas the act of consummation is an expression of present consent. It follows that demonstrating that the couple had consummated their betrothal was an essential part of John Marray’s case. To prove this had indeed occurred was no easy matter since canon legal procedure demanded that anything asserted by one or other party be supported by evidence in the form of testimony by witnesses. In this case there was a witness, Joan de Rolleston, the girl with whom Alice had shared her bed. Her graphic testimony of hearing Alice ‘silently’ complaining at what John was doing to her is troubling to a modern audience:
... she saw John and Alice lying together in the same bed and heard a noise from them like they were knowing one another carnally, and how two or three times Alice silently complained at the force on account of John’s labour as if she had been hurt then as a result of this labour.
To the contemporary audience, it was inadmissible as Joan was too young to testify in person. At this point John’s team played their trump card. Joan’s words were ventriloquized by Dom William Marrays, the mitred abbot of St Mary’s and one of the senior ecclesiastics of the Northen Province.
Dom William had spoken privately with Joan when visiting her home and so was able to lend his considerable authority to words that, if proffered by Joan herself, would have carried no weight. What his testimony deftly sidesteps is the question of how he came to be having such an intimate conversation with a little girl while out in the country a day’s journey from his abbey and his official lodgings. Witnesses were almost invariably asked their relation, if any, to the party for whom they testified. In Dom William’s case, no such question is recorded. The suspicion must be that this was a diplomatic omission that allowed the abbot, a man vowed to chastity, to avoid either stating publicly that John Marrays was his own child and hence that Anabilla was his daughter and Joan his grand-daughter, or to perjure himself by denying any relationship to John Marrays.
To add circumstantial weight to this crucial testimony, evidence was presented by Anabilla and her older daughter that Alice had told them she had spent the night with John, that she showed him affection when he visited, and she repeatedly asked when they were to be properly married. Several times she complained, ‘I am old enough and mature enough to be his wife, but not his mistress’. The force of this testimony was to show that Alice had indeed consummated her betrothal, that she had done so willingly, and that at the time she was ‘mature enough’. This was a crucial point. If Alice were under the canonical age of consent at the time of her betrothal, then she would still have been days later when she shared her bed with John. No legal marriage could thus have been effected. This is implicitly the position taken by Sir Brian’s team who brought witness after witness – interestingly mostly mothers who remembered Alice’s birth by reference to their own experiences of childbirth – to show that Alice was under age; there was no need to question whether the consummation had in fact occurred or that Alice had agreed to it as this would be immaterial were Alice too young to consent. But canon law offered one significant qualification of its rules regarding age of consent.
Though the canon-legal understanding of age of consent was related to Classical traditions that girls achieved puberty from about twelve years (specifically, the law allowed that a girl in her twelfth year could marry) and boys from fourteen, provision was made that if a child achieved puberty somewhat sooner, then the age of consent could be lowered accordingly. John’s team thus countered Sir Brian by bringing a similarly large number of witnesses, including Alice’s own mother, to show that Alice was at least eleven at the time of her betrothal and the ensuing consummation. In addition a few key witnesses tried to make the case that Alice was pubescent. Anabilla claimed that from her physical appearance she looked fourteen. Dom William likewise asserted her physical maturity ‘as anyone examining her can clearly see’. The case thus shifted focus from Alice’s alleged consent to her age and her physical development. Witnesses freely talked about what she had done and what she had supposedly said, but the court procedure effectively silenced Alice herself.
To return to the case of Alice Brathwell, when she was pressed by William Dowson to marry him, she did not feel able to say no. Allegedly she offered a more diplomatic answer, requesting time to consider the proposal. In so doing she took advantage of the custom that allowed a widow a year of mourning. She also declared that ‘the matrons of the town of Doncaster and other of her neighbours would roundly criticize her about it if she were to contract marriage so hastily with an outsider of whom she had never before had knowledge’. Her response reminds us that, regardless of the Church’s insistence on the centrality of consent, marriage always concerned more that just the couple contracting. Women in particular had to be mindful of their reputations. Alice also presents Dowson here as ‘an outsider’. As a widow living on her own, however, she was perceived to be vulnerable and so in need of protection. A few days after Alice had tried to make Dowson back off, a group of leading burgesses turned up at her home and demanded that Dowson leave and lodge elsewhere. Even as a widow, Alice Brathwell needed to harness custom, appeal to her reputation, and solicit (or have solicited for her) the support of a group of influential men in order to effect her right to choose.
Agnes Grantham was denied this right. John Dale used physical violence and the threat of it to cow Agnes into agreeing to marry him. Agnes claimed that she yielded under threat of rape in order to preserve her chastity and hence her honour or reputation. This claim would lend Agnes moral authority in the eyes of the court and accords with the image of the devout widow that Agnes was at pains to construct for herself. One witness told of how Agnes was regularly to be found in church on ordinary days as much as holy days. An-other described her charity to her poor neighbours. In fact it is likely that Dale did rape her, but that Agnes concealed this specifically to protect her honour.
Although Agnes had a fairly compelling case for annulling her ‘marriage’ to Dale on the canonical grounds of force and fear, her immediate response was to contract another marriage with the widower, John Thornton. Because Agnes had been widowed considerably less than a year, it is hardly likely that Dale was attempting to forestall a marriage that had already been arranged, though Agnes and John Thornton must already have known one another. But why the hurry? By marrying Thornton in a ceremony within the arbour of a neighbour’s garden – a setting that was redolent of romance and in contrast to the untamed wilderness of the forest where Agnes had previously been made to utter words of matrimony – Agnes can be seen as gaining a male protector who would help defend her against Dale. A formal church solemnization of the kind that Alice de Rouclif hankered after could follow later; it was not necessary for the validity of the union. Immediately following the ceremony, Agnes went to live, not with her new husband, but with his next-door neighbour!
None of these three stories is exactly typical, but they do accentuate certain points about women’s experience of marriage making in late medieval Yorkshire. Alice de Rouclif, as a legal minor and an heiress of gentry rank, was too valuable a commodity to be allowed any effective voice of her own. Control of her marriage lay outside her hands and was instead contested between her mother and her suzerain, Sir Brian de Rouclif. Her mother wanted her marriage to John Marrays, no doubt because St Mary’s Abbey was the major local landowner and John’s father, the abbot, could prove a valuable connection. Sir Brian, who also had local landed interests, likewise desired control over the lands Alice would inherit and therefore her marriage. Alice would have gone along with the betrothal because she had no choice; she would have been brought up to expect her marriage to be arranged as it offered her the promise of social status as an adult, and because as a child she knew no better. When John intruded himself into her bed and she was carnally known by him, Alice may have rationalized this was how a woman should behave towards her husband – hence her subsequent outward play of affection to John and her insistence that they soon be married in the sense of formal solemnization. To modern eyes her experience looks like child rape.
The marriage of children was primarily an aristocratic phenomenon, and probably not an especially common one. The same may be said of child abduction in order to enforce marriage, for that is how we must read Sir Brian’s actions. Moderately well-to-do townswomen, and perhaps particularly widows, may have expected a greater degree of autonomy. Alice Brathwell asserted her right to reject William Dowson and in so doing asked the court to uphold her marriage to one William Roger. But she could not rely on the authority of her word alone. The group of burgesses who came to her protection were in effect claiming a patriarchal authority over her as a single woman. For them this was a political move in the long-running power struggle between Doncaster’s burgesses and the town’s absentee lord. In protecting a local widow against the unwelcome attentions of a self-styled gentleman outsider, the burgesses were asserting a moral claim to govern which pitted bourgeois virtue against aristocratic depredation.
Agnes Grantham, a capable and apparently successful business woman, experienced a different aspect of patriarchal control in the form of actual violence, assault and probable rape. Agnes’s response is interesting and implies a degree of agency on her part. On the one hand it comprised her seeking male protection in the form of a husband, John Thornton, and also of his neighbour William Pountfret, a prosperous draper, within whose house she ultimately went to live. Pountfret and Thornton were long-established business partners. But they were more than that. When Thornton died he was buried next to William Pountfret, his ‘partner’ – the Latin term is ‘socius’ – and had this recorded on his tomb slab. These were two men bound together in a special friendship of a kind recognized without any censure in late medieval society. It need not have been a homosexual relationship – or at least other than a chaste relationship; both men appear to have been devout – Pountfret indeed shared his home with Dame Christiana, a kinswoman who was sworn to a life of chastity – and would have understood homosexual sex as a mortal sin. What their relationship did provide, however, was a safe haven for Agnes. She could share a room and a bed with Dame Christiana under the roof of William Pountfret, an eminently respectable elderly widower, whilst living next door to her new husband. The marriage in effect bought Agnes security, the ability to continue to manage her business, and, probably, chastity.
The world of the merchant and artisan might be patriarchal, but women like Agnes or Alice Brathwell were able to find ways of negotiating a degree of agency. Within limits, they had the power to choose. For Alice de Rouclif, a legal minor, a girl child and a member of a much less egalitarian level of society, such power was beyond her reach; her coping strategy was to pretend that what happened to her was what she wanted.

