'Reduced to Cinders': The Impact of the French Religious Wars
David McKinnon-Bell analyses the state of France around 1598 and explains why recovery under Henry IV was so rapid.
The civil wars which tore France apart in the second half of the 16th century had appalling consequences for her economy, society and people. Scholars and contemporaries have frequently emphasised the devastation and ruin which the country faced at the time of Henry IV’s succession. This, in turn, has helped fuel the legend of Henry IV as the man who, by re-establishing peace, brought about prosperity and regeneration. As the Englishman Thomas Overbury observed in 1609: ‘He hath enriched France with a greater proportion of wool and silk, erected goodly buildings, cut passages betwixt river and river … redeemed much of the mortgaged domains of the Crown, better husbanded the money [and] got aforehand in treasure, arms and munition.’
Yet this remarkable revival begs important questions about the state of France in 1598. Henry IV enjoyed a mere decade of peace during the second half of his reign in which to restore the economy, and some historians have questioned the extent of the ‘recovery’. Equally, it is worth re-examining the state of France at the end of the wars and placing her difficulties in a more general, European context. In what senses was France ‘ruined’ in 1598?
The Breakdown of Royal Authority
The social and economic crisis of late sixteenth-century France was closely related to the collapse of monarchical authority. The sudden death of Henry II in 1559 was a painful reminder of the essentially personal nature of monarchy as a form of government and its dependence on the qualities and longevity of one individual. In the century prior to Henry’s death, the power of the monarchy had been steadily extended. The long Habsburg-Valois wars had consolidated the relationship between the monarch and the nobility, strengthening the former at the expense of the latter. However, Henry II’s unexpected death plunged France into a deep political crisis, as his sons were still children and his wife, Catherine de Medici, an inexperienced foreign ‘merchant’s daughter’ reliant, initially, upon the advice of the ambitious Guise family.
The aristocratic struggle for control of a ‘weak’ monarchy was one of the springboards for the civil strife that followed, as a succession of feeble rulers struggled ineffectually to impose their will and resolve the spiralling unrest. High politics in Paris interacted with local clientage networks to spread the conflict into every region of France, with regional elites taking advantage of the absence of a decisive Royal hand to further their own economic and political interests, under the cover of their religious affiliation or their obligations to a high-placed patron.
With the formation after 1572 of the Huguenot ‘Republic of the Midi’ and the Catholic League, local government entirely slipped out of the hands of the King’s servants. Regional governors arbitrarily assumed control over their provinces, for example Damville-Montmorency in Provence. The resultant anarchy is best exemplified by the chaos surrounding the levying, collection and distribution of taxes, and by the wholesale misappropriation of royal revenues by those charged with collecting them.
Tax collectors were waylaid and relieved of their takings by brigands. The taille was diverted to the coffers of one or other faction. Municipalities, faced with the approach of hostile forces, often diverted taxation revenues to buy off the enemy or reinforce their defences. Elsewhere, local generalissimos simply levied, collected and spent taxes arbitrarily, regardless of the Royal writ. Condé introduced wholly new taxes to help defray his military costs, as did Mayenne in Burgundy. Meanwhile, the Estates-General refused to grant the regime the revenues it required to pay for the Royal army. Consequently, by 1589 the King was unable to command the obedience of his people in much of the country beyond the Loire Valley. Even Paris had repudiated the authority of Henry III, when, on the ‘Day of the Barricades’ in 1588, the people of the city, egged on by the extremist ‘Sixteen’, expelled their monarch from his own capital.
Economic Dislocation
Such circumstances inevitably disrupted economic activity. Numerous local studies have in recent years confirmed the contemporary view that the consequences for French economic life of 40 years of civil war were desperate. Even so, we should guard against painting a universally dark picture, for the wars were intensely localised in effect, with some regions (for example Languedoc or Poitou) suffering terribly, whilst others (Provence, for example) escaped the worst of the fighting. After 1584, however, the wars of the League affected virtually every corner of the country. Trade was disrupted over a 40-year period. Bordeaux wine exports fell by 30 per cent and the Norman textiles industry was undermined by military campaigning in the North and by the loss of many Huguenot weavers and hosiers through emigration. Enterprising Dutch merchants seized the opportunity this presented to mop up many of France’s traditional markets. On the other hand, Marseille, although cut off from its hinterland by the Huguenot Republic of the Midi, profited from the Venetians’ problems with the Turks and increased her share of the Levant trade. Economic activity increased at Nantes, La Rochelle, St Malo and, prior to a succession of ruinous sieges in the 1590s, even at Rouen.
Nonetheless the general picture is grim. A century of more or less continuous economic growth ground to a halt and rising food prices relentlessly outstripped incomes, resulting in widespread hardship. The mere passage of armies could be devastating to a locality. Passing troops, or soldiers billeted there by their commanders, seized livestock and precious horses, trampled or ate crops, torched buildings and terrorised the local populace, raping and plundering at will. Small wonder, then, that peasants took what they could and fled in advance of the passage of armies or that towns fortunate enough to possess defendable walls closed their gates to prevent the passage of armies through the town. This situation was exacerbated by the nature of much of the fighting, which relied upon local seigneurs raising and supporting their own forces. Not wishing to bankrupt themselves, noble commanders encouraged their men to forage off the land. Furthermore, the soldiery was very often assembled from the ranks of the local banditry and thugs. The regiment commanded by Damville’s brother Meru was described as being little better than thieves, and Haton, observing the soldiers assembled by Anjou for the Flanders campaign of 1578, noted ‘they are all vagabonds, thieves and murderers … the flotsam of war, riddled with the pox and fit only for the gibbet.’]
The consequences of four decades of this were predictable. Father Robert, a Burgundian priest, wrote in the 1580s that ‘the poor were so ruined that their houses were completely empty, so that there was nothing but the four walls … the soldiers, who were everywhere in the vicinity, ate all the grain so that there was nothing left to harvest.’
The Impact on Towns
The wars devastated urban as well as rural France. The sieges of Rouen from 1590 to 1592 and the repeated blockade of Paris from 1589 to 1594 took a heavy toll. Issoire was sacked by noble-led brigands in 1575 and again by Catholic troops in 1577, when de Thou observed that it was ‘reduced to cinders’. According to the anonymous Royal official ‘Nicholas Froumenteau’ who, in 1581, penned a statistical analysis of the ruination of the wars to that date, 252 communes had been destroyed during the conflict. Whilst the precision of his figures can be challenged, his estimate of the scale of the devastation has received guarded approval by some historians.
There were economic costs too. Lyon, the traditional banking capital of South-West France, was ruined by the wars. The Bonvisis were bankrupted, and the Protestant coup of 1562 forced other Catholic banking families to relocate elsewhere. However, some enterprising merchants prospered, especially those who supplied arms and victuals to the respective armies. The Ruiz family in Nantes managed to evade export restrictions and Huguenot corsairs, operating out of La Rochelle, continued to trade profitably with Spain. Nantes indeed experienced population growth during the period, from 17,000 to 25,000 souls, and the population of Marseille, despite its isolation from the rest of Catholic France, expanded by 50 per cent.
Famine and Harvest Failure
Unfortunately for France, the civil wars coincided with inflation and decelerating economic growth after a century-long boom following the end of the Hundred Years War. Furthermore, the late 16th century witnessed the start of a Europe-wide climate change (the ‘little ice age’), during which annual mean temperatures across Europe fell. This resulted in significant falls in agricultural production across the continent, but the dearth and famine which followed were exacerbated by war. The periods 1565-68, 1570-73, 1585 and most of the 1590s have been identified as years of poor harvests, some the worst on record, which resulted in shortages, high prices and even starvation. Yields in Burgundy fell by 75 per cent between 1560 and 1595. It is no coincidence that the incidence of plague was greatest during this period too. Pestilence was never far behind the passage of war and harvest failure in early-modern Europe, and parts of France (for like all else disease was very regional in its effects experienced their worst outbreaks of plague of the century. The plague of 1580, for instance, killed 30,000 Parisians.
A Population Crisis?
Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s study of Romans illustrates the hammering that one medium-sized town received during the wars. Possessed of a substantial population of 8,334 in 1557, the town suffered from plague in the 1560s and 1580s, from the visitations of passing armies during the wars and from revolt and civil strife in 1579-80. By the time the plague of 1586 had cut a swathe through the townsfolk, Romans’ population had shrunk by one-third to less than 6,000. Romans was not untypical. The large Protestant congregation of Rouen (estimated at 16,000, or 1 in 5 of the total population of the city, in 1560) was decimated by massacre, forced conversions and emigration following the events of St Bartholomew’s Day in Paris. This, and a series of ruinous sieges during the 1590s, saw the population of France’s second city drop by around 10-15 per cent to 68,000 in 1600.
Nonetheless, despite the dreadful impact of subsistence crises, historians cannot agree on whether the population of the country as a whole fell during the wars. Goubert argues that, the 1590s aside, the growth of the first half of the century continued, albeit more slowly, but Knecht has questioned this, citing the evidence of recent local studies. The population of France in 1550 stood at around 18-20 million, but the 1600 figure can only be estimated at between 16 and 20 million. Even so, France remained the most populous European state, and, in an era when a state’s power was measured in part by the number of souls encompassed by its borders, this suggests that we perhaps sometimes overstress the long-term damage done by the wars.
The Collapse of Social Order
From the 1570s onwards a series of popular revolts dramatically emphasised the anger of the ordinary people in the face of a civil war inflicted upon them by their ‘social betters’. First to rise up were the peasants of the Vivarais. In this remote region, Protestant and Catholic captains almost seemed to collaborate to exploit the anarchy for profit. The local chronicler Lafaisse complained that ‘the countryside was despoiled by the treachery of the soldiers of both religions. They co-operated with each other in betraying wealthy citizens and in committing atrocities, thefts and all kinds of evils’. Consequently the uprising began as a protest against the depredations of the regional nobility and their rapacious warbands, and ‘the ruin, extortion and oppression that they [the peasantry] have been made to suffer’, although heavy increases in taxes imposed by the regional estates helped to push the peasants over the edge into revolt in 1576 and 1579. Clearly the war undermined the established social relations of the Vivarais countryside.
The unrest in the Vivarais may have helped to precipitate the uprising in nearby Vienne, which culminated in the famous ‘carnival’ at Romans in 1579-80. Le Roy Ladurie emphasises that the Romans unrest was a social conflict ‘between the upper crust of the merchant-landowner society and the bourgeois patricians, on the one hand, and, on the other, the small property-owner sector … of common craftsmen’, over the control of the town government. The civil wars provided the moment for an ongoing struggle to erupt into violence, because increased taxation (both ‘legal’ by the Crown and ‘extra-legal’ by the warring parties), heavy-handed noble demands for increased rents and the wanton pillaging of the countryside by noble bandits had set off an unorganised peasant rebellion in the neighbouring Vivarais. This, coinciding with the social tension between craftsmen and patricians and the temporary division amongst the nobility over religion, weakened the bonds cementing early-modern French society.
The most spectacular period of social unrest coincided with the last, furious decade of the conflict, a period of harvest failures, plague and almost continuous fighting over large areas of the country, beginning with peasant uprisings in Normandy and Brittany in 1589. These protests were directed above all at the nobility, perceived to be taking advantage of the anarchy to oppress the peasants with new taxes and dues. Chateaux were stormed and burned by armed peasant mobs; at Roscanou in 1590 a noble wedding was attacked and the entire wedding party slaughtered; and a Huguenot force was ambushed and wiped out by peasants at Vitre, before finally the peasants were cornered and crushed at Cahaix in 1590. In Burgundy the ‘Bonnets Rouges’ organised themselves in resistance to ‘foreign’ soldiers during 1592-4, with villages conducting mutual defence agreements and dispatching elected representatives to lobby Henry IV for peace.
Most dramatic of all was the rising in the South West between 1593 and 1595 by the ‘Croquants’ or ‘Tard-Avises’. Highly organised and led by articulate ‘tribunes’, the commons of the ‘plat pays’ assembled at la Boule in 1594 to place their demands before the King. The explicitly anti-seigneurial tone of their demands has led some historians, notably recently Henry Heller, to characterise this as a ‘class war’, and certainly frightened noblemen claimed that the peasants were ‘making war on the nobility’.
What does all of this add up to? Notwithstanding Heller’s observation that social conflict and riot were endemic to early-modern society, the second half of the sixteenth century was exceptionally turbulent in France. The spate of uprisings during the 20 years after 1575 were a direct response to the desperate circumstances engendered by civil war, exacerbated by the opportunistic and oppressive activities of many provincial noblemen, who enriched themselves at the heads of warbands ostensibly fighting for one or other cause. Contemporaries were not fooled by the badges worn by these brigands, and described their brutality and rapacity in often graphic terms. As Royal authority gradually withered away, the activities of these local warlords became increasingly intolerable. Froumenteau estimated that two-thirds of the financial costs borne by the provinces took the form of extra-legal levies, ransoms, billeting costs and the confiscations made by passing troops. Thus it was not the official taxation which drove the commons into rebellion but the depredations of their own seigneurs, and this lawlessness was a particular feature of a society embroiled in civil war and lacking stable and effective government. The root cause was evidently the ongoing effects of 40 years of continuous warfare and heavy taxation, official and unofficial. Perigord, the heart of the Croquant revolt, had witnessed appalling famine in the 1580s, and the 1590s were, if anything, worse.
‘The European Crisis of the 1590s’
Under the pressure of near-universal warfare, Europe passed through a decade of crisis at the end of the sixteenth century, of which France’s troubles were but a part, albeit perhaps the most dramatic and painful. There is little doubt that climatic conditions across the continent were difficult during the 1590s. Eustache Piémond, secretary of the small Dauphine town of St Antoine, recorded long winters and damaging frosts in 1587, 1590 and 1595, and particularly wet summers in 1586, 1590, 1591 and 1596. Elsewhere, the Dutch republic experienced a harsh winter in 1595, which caused severe grain shortages the following year, and Spain experienced a disastrous run of wet years in the 1590s which resulted in a series of harvest failures. Spanish finances, under the pressure of a suicidal simultaneous war against England, France and the Dutch rebels, collapsed in 1596, forcing Philip II to declare his third bankruptcy and seek peace with France in 1598. Spain faced rebellion in Aragon, and England in Ireland. Economic crisis, plague and dearth affected every Western European state as the decade advanced.
Probably the disruption of trade, the incidence of mortality crises and the frequency of popular uprisings were worse in France than elsewhere, largely thanks to the long duration of the political crisis through which the country had been passing since 1559, which had progressively worn down the structures of government and society. It is important nonetheless to appreciate that France’s troubles were part of a European pattern, and this calls into question the real depth of the ‘crisis’ in France itself, which looks less exceptional when placed in a European context.
Conclusion: a Society in Crisis?
James I’s ambassador to Henry IV’s France, Sir George Carew, writing in 1609, regarded France as a wealthy land. ‘The fertility of the soil is so great that … they draw into their country greater store of silver and gold than cometh into any region of Christendom ... Their corn and grain alone robbeth all Spain of their silver and gold.’ We can glimpse here the principal reason for the strong French recovery after the end of the wars. The economy of France was inherently buoyant, its resources naturally abundant, its agriculture essentially productive. The ‘recovery’ of the first decade of the 17th century was simply the result of the restoration of peace, which enabled the people to return to productive work in their fields and workshops. Certainly the evidence points to a remarkably rapid recovery which owes little to the specific interventions of the King and his minister Sully. In Amiens cloth production, devastated by the wars, recovered to its 1560 level within a decade of the issuing of the Edict of Nantes. Historians examining the localities of Beaune, Reims and Normandy comment on the rapidity of their recovery after the wars’ conclusion. Of course France had lost 40 years of economic growth, although the evidence from other European states warns us not to over-estimate what might have been.
In short, France bounced back from the devastation of the religious wars as soon as Henry’s re-establishment of strong, effective personal monarchy had brought about peace and a return to normality. The universal ruin described by so many chroniclers in the 1590s was essentially the result of a particular set of circumstances, and the disastrous effects of the religious wars appear to have been largely temporary in nature. Early-modern society was used to periodic mortality crises, outbreaks of plague and harvest failures. Tragic and terrible as they were, they were short-term shocks from which the economy and the birthright always recovered. The civil wars witnessed a prolonged period of these circumstances which took a little more time to heal, but by the end of Henry IV’s reign, France had made a remarkably swift recovery. There were longer-term consequences which augured ill for France, most notably an acceleration of the transfer of land from small-scale peasant farmers, ruined by the wars, to the first and second estate and, to a lesser degree, the bourgeoisie. Nonetheless the country healed spectacularly quickly, enabling France to assume the role of Europe’s foremost power during the next century.

