Domitian and the Dynamics of Terror in Classical Rome
Peter Wiseman offers some intriguing thoughts on the world of the emperor Domitian - its traumas and terrors - to mark the 1900th anniversary of his assassination.
Nineteen hundred years ago this month, on September 18th, AD 96, as the emperor Domitian was going to retire for his midday siesta, Parthenius the chamberlain came to him with an urgent message. Someone had brought evidence of a conspiracy: the emperor must hear it at once. Domitian dismissed his entourage and withdrew into his bedroom with just a few trusted members of the palace staff. The informer was Stephanus, steward of the emperor's niece Domitilla. He had injured his arm, which was bandaged in a sling. Stephanus presented his document, and while Domitian was reading it, drew a concealed weapon and stabbed him in the groin. Domitian was a tall, stout man in his mid-forties. He grappled with his attacker, shouting to slave to give him the dagger from his pillow. But the blade had been removed from the hilt, and those who should have helped him barred the doors and joined in the attack. Seven stab wounds finished him off.
Parthenius had made his preparations carefully. The two Prefects of the Praetorian Guard, whose job it was to protect the emperor, were in the plot and took no action. A replacement emperor Cocceius Nerva - was ready and waiting, and took up office that very day. It was a very efficient assassination.
Why had it been necessary? Three men who were well placed to know provide us with the reason. First, Cornelius Tacitus, a senator aged 39 or 40 at the time of Domitian’s death. In his biography of his father-in-law Agricola, written only a couple of years later, he refers to the reign of terror in Domitian's last years:
Agricola did not live to see the Senate-House under siege, the senators surrounded by a cordon of troops, and that one fell stroke that sent so many consuls to their death, so many noble ladies into banishment or exile ... Before long we senators led Helvidius to prison, etched in shame the sufferings of Mauricus and Rusticus, and stained ourselves with Senecio's innocent blood.
Even Nero used to avert his eyes and, though he ordered abominations, forebore to witness them. The worst of our torments under Domitian was to see him with his eyes land upon us. Every sigh was registered against us; and when we all turned pale he did not scruple to make us marked men by a glance of his savage countenance - that blood-red countenance which saved him from ever being seen to blush with shame.
Second, his friend and slightly younger contemporary C. Plinius Caecilius Secundus, known to us as Pliny. He too knew at first hand what it was like to be a senator in AD 95-6. He held the consulship in 100, and in his speech of thanks to the emperor Trajan (Nero's successor), he says this:
Who dared then to open his mouth or say a word except the poor wretches called on for the first speech? The rest, too terrified to move, endured the forced necessity of giving assent in silence, without rising from their seats, their mental anguish as painful as their physical fears. A solitary senator expressed a single view for all to follow, though none approved, and least of all the speaker.
A few years later, in a letter, he refers to the Senate under Domitian as terrified and speechless, summoned only to be humiliated or to carry out some atrocity. ‘We took part in these evils and continued to witness and endure them for many years.’
Our third witness, C. Suetonius Tranquillus, was a diffident and scholarly young man in his late twenties at the time of the assassination. He later became Hadrian's chief secretary, and the author of The Twelve Caesars. His biography of Domitian, written probably in the 120s AD, identifies arrogance and sadistic cruelty as the emperor's salient characteristics. He lists examples at length, and introduces his narrative of the plot with a clear causal connection: ‘By such conduct he made himself dreaded and hated by all, and at last he was crushed by a conspiracy of his friends and favourite freedmen ...'. Though not a senator himself, Suetonius had been close to men who knew the facts, like his patron Pliny. His testimony is consistent with what Pliny and Tacitus say.
Why is it, then, that modern scholars are eager to whitewash Domitian? His latest biographer, Brian W. Jones, announces in the preface to his book that the traditional portrait of Domitian as a bloodthirsty tyrant has not completely disappeared and still needs emendation'. Dr Jones begins his section on Domitian and the Senate with a reference to Suetonius' list of eleven ex-consuls put to death, and he rightly notes that it represents ‘only the most eminent' of Domitian's senatorial victims. But his conclusion runs: 'So Domitian's attitude to the aristocracy was that of a benevolent despot'. If that is benevolence, what would count as malice?
It is true, of course, that once the tyrant was dead it was in everybody's interest to emphasize his tyranny. But that is not to say that our witnesses have just made up their accounts of life under Domitian. The same assumptions appear in Anthony Barrett's biography of another emperor who was consistently depicted as a bloodthirsty autocrat:
The hostility between Caligula and the Senate was no doubt highly exaggerated in those senatorial sources that dealt with the topic after Caligula's death. The senators had to face the embarrassing fact that not only did the majority of them survive unscathed, but many collaborated against the principled few who had taken a stand, and as a body they were prepared, time after time, not only to condone but even to applaud some of Caligula's outrageous actions. They saw fit later to pretend that they had lived under autocratic repression ... The great majority had no reason to fear for their lives from the arbitrary exercise of his power, despite the impression that they tried desperately to create later.
If we assume that our contemporary sources – Seneca in Caligula’s case, Tacitus and Pliny in Domitian’s - are systematically tendentious, we can feel free to recreate the 'real' emperor a priori, independently of the evidence. Professor Barrett relies on a 'no doubt' to justify his charge of exaggeration, and not even that for his assumption that what the senators reported was all pretence. Dr Jones is more cautious: rightly observing that Domitian left no heir to deify him, and was thus ‘not able to “guide” the literary tradition to the “correct'' interpretation of events', he leaves his readers to infer the falsity of the accounts that do survive.
Good historians though they are, Jones and Barrett seem to me a little lacking in imaginative sympathy. What was it like to be a senior senator under an emperor who did not bother to conceal the reality of his total power? How did it feel to be ‘protected' by Praetorian guardsmen who looked on you as a potential threat to their lord and master?
The Senate had existed long before there were emperors; like the magistracies, it was an institution of the Republic that had survived into the autocracy of the Principate. Even now, it represented experience and authority. Its senior members had governed provinces and commanded armies. Some of them were potential emperors themselves - capaces imperii, in Tacitus' phrase.
Julius Caesar treated the Senate as an irrelevance, and was murdered for it by men who sought to restore the Republic in 44 BC. Augustus (27 BC-AD 14) was much more diplomatic; he claimed he had restored the Republic, and the Senate was a major part of his constitutional facade. Tiberius (AD 14-37) acted like the old-fashioned aristocrat he was, and vainly tried to get the Senate to share real responsibility with him. Caligula (AD 37-41) was different. He acted as a totally self-willed autocrat, and took pleasure in humiliating the Senate collectively and individually. He too was assassinated, but the Praetorian Guard prevented a return to the Republic.
Claudius (AD 41-54), the emperor imposed by the Guard, had no senatorial experience himself, and relations between him and the Senate were always uneasy; he preferred to trust his personal staff for support and advice. Nero on the other hand (AD 54-68) guided by Seneca, announced a return to constitutional propriety with due respect to the Senate. But after the great fire of AD 64, which lost him his popularity, Nero too restored to the simpler line of openly autocratic rule. He was deposed by Galba (AD 68-9) who first challenged him in the name of the Republic; but Galba, and pretenders of Otho and Vitellius, died in the civil war of AD 69, and it was left to Vespasian (AD 69-79), Domitian’s father, to re-establish an unpretentious and undespotic style of government. That did not last either: with Domitian, who liked to be called ‘Master and God', the pendulum swung back to open autocracy, with the effect on the Senate that Tacitus and Pliny record.
Once elected to the qualifying office, usually in your mid-to-late 20s, you were a senator for life. So senior senators, including the high flyers with substantial administrative and military experience, had usually seen several siesta pence, had usually seen several emperors come and go. They knew how much depended on the temperament of the individual. Every new emperor was an unknown quantity, every new reign required an anxious assessment of what was permitted and what was not. Get it wrong, and the Praetorians could drag you away in chains, or supervise your suicide. No wonder they were jumpy.
The relationship was inherently unstable, and for good reason. Augustus’ brilliant achievement had been to superimpose himself on the republican political system as a ‘first citizen' (Princeps), whose powers were bestowed by the Senate and People and whose authority was essentially informal, quite unlike that of a dictator or a king. But the just citizen used that authority to control the armies and the finances of the empire, and arranged for it to be handed on to a successor within his own family. The rhetoric was of a restored republican freedom, the reality is of a ruler who would have his way. Both the rhetoric and the reality had somehow to be lived with.
The Princeps might reasonably expect the burden of responsibility for the empire to be shared. The Senate had always debated and decided; let it do so now. But it refused to take the risk. It is reliably reported of Tiberius that he left the Senate-House exclaiming in exasperation ‘Men fit to be slaves!'. A speech of Claudius survives on papyrus, which concludes:
It is most unfitting to the majesty of this House, gentlemen, that the consul-designate should just give his opinion word for word from the text of the motion, and the rest utter the one word ‘Agreed', and then when they go out say ‘We decided'
The reason why the senators were so unwilling to take responsibility is vividly shown in a passage of Tacitus' Annals, possibly taken from the Senate's minutes. In a debate in AD 15, Tiberius called for a vote. A senior ex-consul, a man noted for his independent views, then asked: 'Caesar, will you vote first or last? If first, I shall have your lead to follow; if last, I am afraid of inadvertently voting against you.’ The rhetoric of the restored Republic required a free debate in the Senate; the reality of the emperor's power meant that no senator could afford to risk offending him.
The suspicion and anxiety might work the other way too. Every emperor, even Augustus, had to deal with plots – or alleged plots – against his life. Domitian himself remarked that emperors were never believed on the subject of conspiracies until one succeeded. The fiction that the Princeps was first citizen in a restored Republic carried with it the corollary that someone else might aspire to that position. Who would have the means? An imperial legate in command of a legionary army - on the Rhine, say, or the Danube - had to be a senior senator of consular rank. He might want to turn his legions on Rome. His friends in the Senate might be conspiring with him? Senators were always competing with each other for position and promotion, and one way of doing a rival down was to accuse him of treason. If a warning came to the emperor's ears, how could he tell if it was merely malicious?
In fact, the danger often came from unexpected quarters. Caligula, in a swift pre-emptive strike, destroyed a powerful legate of Upper Germany who he believed was plotting treason; but little more than a year later he was killed by a group of his own Praetorian Guard officers, who happened to have republican ideals. When a legate of Dalmatia attempted rebellion against Claudius, the emperor reacted with savage reprisals against alleged accomplices; but what killed him in the end was a poison plot by his wife, to bring her seventeen-year-old son more quickly to the succession. Domitian himself had to fight a civil war against his legate of Upper Germany in 88-9, and again a reign of terror followed; but it was his own trusted courtiers who planned and carried out his assassination.
Emperors were jumpy too, and sometimes they were paranoid. Both Caligula and Nero made threats of vengeance and mass executions against the Senate. Domitian was less histrionic, but no less deadly. His style was to seclude himself, either in his grand new palace on the Palatine or in the citadel, as it was called, of his heavily-guarded country house at Alba. Suspicious and implacable, with a manner deliberately calculated to emphasize the supremacy of his power, he picked out and destroyed his victims with what seemed to contemporaries a gratuitous and sadistic cruelty. How many of them were genuine threats to his security, we cannot know. The way Pliny and Tacitus saw it, to be denounced was itself a sentence of death. Are we really in a position to say that they were wrong?
The main reason I think, why modern biographers are predisposed to minimise the despotism of emperors is that they live in liberal democracies. Dr Jones is Australian, Professor Barrett Canadian. In their countries, as in Britain and the United States, unfettered autocracy has become something practically inconceivable, especially to we academics, who lead the obscure and blameless lives appropriate to our station. People just do not do such things. If our sources say they did, then our sources must be systematically unreliable.
It would look deferent to a Russian who had lived under Stalin, an East German who had lived under Honeker, a Romanian who had lived under Ceaucescu. And that is to restrict oneself to Europe; what about Marcos, Bokassa, Pol Pot? Our age has seen examples enough of the effects of irresponsible total power, and it is a mere failure of the imagination to assume that such things did not happen in Imperial Rome. ‘Just remember', Caligula is reported to have said to his grandmother, ‘I can do anything to anybody.' It seems to me to be a kind of treachery to the dead to disbelieve Tacitus and Pliny on merely a priori grounds. Are we to doubt their word just because they survived the experience they describe? It may well be that their conduct in Domitian's Senate was less than heroic, but would you or I have done any better?
Some historians avoid the issue by the strategy of dismissing Imperial biography altogether. They prefer to deal in abstractions, ‘the emperor' and ‘the Senate' being parts of a system which can be studied synchronically, without the need to consider anything so messy as an individual personality. The assumption is that the system was always essentially the same, no matter who was at the top, so the dates of an emperor's accession and death are of no historical significance. What Tacitus and Pliny report can thus be no more than a trivial difference in political style, affecting only a few members of a merely decorative elite.
But that will not do either. The ‘system’ of the Principate was evolving all the time, with a succession of firsts continuously altering the perceptions of the players in the game. AD 14, the first deliberate execution of a rival for the succession; AD 41, the first military coup d'etat by the Praetorians; AD 68, the first successful bid for power by an imperial legate; and so forth. These things happened because of the particular motivations and opportunities of individuals, and the deaths and accessions of emperors were their normal outcome. Political history is as valid as any other kind, and Imperial biography is the way of approaching it.
If we resist the temptations of facile ‘source-criticism' on the one hand, and inappropriate devotion to the longue duree on the other, we may be able to get the feel of Roman autocracy if the developing Principate by comparing it with a modern epilogue, the rule of Saddam Hussein. Of course there are very wide differences in the two historical situations, but there are some striking parallels too: the importance of the family, with the concomitant necessity sometimes to execute close relatives (in Domitian’s case, his cousins Sabinus and Clemens); the importance of military success, with grandiose triumphal monuments to commemorate it (Saddam's twin-scimitar arch is worthy of an emperor); the importance of the personality cult, with images of the leader everywhere (Domitian’s great equestrian statue dominated the Roman Forum); and of course the importance of a totally loyal and ruthlessly efficient security machine (though Domitian's failed his in the end).
Saddam Hussein took over the Presidency of Iraq from Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr in July 1979. Two weeks later he called a meeting of the Baath Party Regional Congress to announce that a plot to overthrow the regime had been uncovered. Not only that, but the guilty men were present in the hall. Muhyi Abd al-Hussein al Mashadi was called to the podium to confess. Saddam sat calmly smoking a cigar. In horrified silence the audience listened as Mashadi named a long list of fellow-conspirators. Each man in turn was made to stand up, and led out of the hall by armed guards. When it was all over Saddam spoke of the need for loyalty. The survivors stood and fervently applauded.
The entire proceedings were recorded on videotape for the benefit of the party faithful. Copies were sent to friendly governments, and thus eventually became available in the West. The film was shown on television in Britain at the time of the invasion of Kuwait, and I am sure no ancient historian could have seen it without thinking immediately of Tacitus and Pliny on Domitian's reign of terror.
There was a sequel to the death of Domitian. The Praetorian Guard mutinied, and compelled Nerva to surrender the men responsible for the assassination. Their ex-prefect, who had done nothing about it, was killed quickly, but Parthenius, the chamberlain, was foully mutilated before they strangled him. Nerva was forced to announce to the Roman people his gratitude to the soldiers for their punishment of wicked criminals. That took place in the year 97, when one of the consuls was Tacitus the historian. As Sir Ronald Syme put it, he had heard the Praetorians baying for blood along the Roman streets: ‘it may be taken that Cornelius Tacitus was adequately informed.’
But the adequacy of his information is only half the story. Tacitus was heir to a long tradition of Roman historians who both witnessed great events at first hand and gave them their classic form for posterity. Asinius Pollio, for example, who was present when Caesar crossed the Rubicon (his narrative is preserved by Plutarch: ‘at last, impatiently abandoning rational calculation as if rushing into the abyss, he cried ‘Let the die be cast!' and hurried across the bridge like a man possessed), or Cluvius Rufus, who was in the theatre audience on the day Caligula was assassinated (his narrative of that event is preserved by the Jewish historian, Josephus). Tacitus' friend Pliny, who never wrote a history himself, did provide for him a brilliant eye-witness account of the eruption of Vesuvius in AD 79, which survives in his Letters.
Pollio, Cluvius, Pliny and Tacitus were all well-known orators, masters of the spoken word and the art of persuasion. Of course they wrote superb dramatic narrative, designed to make the events real and vivid for their readers. (The archaic term for it in the rhetorical school was sub oculus subiectio, ‘putting it before their eyes.) That is what Pliny and Tacitus did when they recalled the terror of the senators in Domitian's last years. To dismiss it as rhetorical exaggeration or tendentious apologia is a quite inadequate response. They were there, they lived through it. We should not disbelieve them just because they wanted to put it before our eyes.
Further reading:
Tacitus, The Agricola and the Germania, translated by Harold Mattingly (Penguin Classics, revised ed. 1970); Pliny, Letters and Panegyricus, translated by Betty Radice (Loeb Classical Library, 1969). Brian W. Jones, The Emperor Domitian (Routledge, 1992); Anthony A. Barrett, Caligula: the Corruption of Power (Batsford, 1989); Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: a Political Biography (Brassy, 1991); Elaine Sciolino, Outlaw State (Wiley, 1991); Ronald Syme, Tacitus (Oxford University Press, 1958); A.J. Woodman. Rhetoric in Classical Historiography (Croom Helm, 1988).
- Peter Wiseman is Professor of Classics and Ancient History at the University of Exeter.

