The Army in Modern France
In modern French politics, writes John Terraine, the Army and its champions — “still treading the long road back from Sedan” — have sometimes played a dangerous part.
“The 25th we halted and His pottle belly Majesty, Louis 18th, marched A into the loyal town of Cambray. His Majesty was met by a deputation of his beloved subjects who received their father and their king with tears of joy...The Loyal and faithfull soldiers of the Great Napoleon followed their example and surrendered the citadel to their beloved master Old Bungy Louis.”1
It would be difficult to find anywhere a more harshly accurate summing-up of the emotional impact on France of the collapse of the First Empire and the Restoration of the Bourbons than this, by a sardonic Yorkshire soldier, Sergeant Wheeler of the 51st Foot. For fourteen years, the shadow of the Corsican had lain over France and Europe, and beside it the shadow of the Grand Army.
Emperor and Army together had performed an astonishing feat of reunification in post-Revolutionary France; intransigents at both ends of the political spectrum remained, certainly; but the long-sustained burst of militant French nationalism, fostered and manipulated by Napoleon, had performed little less than a miracle in a country that had seemed doomed to fall apart under the stresses of Terror and counter-Terror.
And now, in July 1815, in the month after Waterloo, Emperor and Army were shattered and dispersed. The national spirit of France, exhausted by its long-drawn-out effort, was, as one might say, “in suspension ”; should it revive, a new symbol would be required to replace the Imperial eagle. But the only one that offered itself was “Old Bungy Louis.”
Setting aside the romantic myths—it would be a life’s work, but fascinating, to trace all their origins—it is the focussing of the many-sided talents of the French nation upon conquest and martial glory that is the most unforgivable thing about Napoleon. No one with the smallest awareness of what this has cost France over the years can visit Paris and regard the place-names of the capital without ironical private thoughts.
No Parisian can fail to be affected by this permanent barrage of military propaganda; the Arc de Triomphe, like a huge altar of sacrifice on the top of its hill, seems still to be calling for its victims. In the events of the attempted Army coup in Algeria in April 1961, and the embittered violence of the Bizerta incident in July, it is not difficult to detect the active residue of Napoleon’s work.
Nor is it difficult to see in General de Gaulle himself a living embodiment of a part of the myth. There is, in other words, an astounding anachronism at the heart of a nation that in so many other ways is making long strides into the future.
In the climate of the nineteenth century, it was unreal to expect that French nationalism would accept defeat and relegation for ever. The most truly remarkable feature of French history has always been, not the ability to win military victories, but the capacity to recover from huge defeats. The toughness of the French peasant, and the resilience of the French economy that is still largely based upon him, are the real strength of France.
After 1815, recovery began immediately; with it, the national spirit revived, and started to seek new outlets. The Bourbons were unable to match the aspirations of a nation that felt its muscles developing again; the Orleans monarchy, the reign of the top-hat and frock coat, was scarcely less inept. The eyes of the nationalist romantics began to turn away from the institutions that embodied the civil power; they turned again towards the Army.
But after what Napoleon had done, there could be no more military adventures in Europe; if there was anything that could bring unity into European politics in the first decades of the nineteenth century, it was the spectacle of large French armies on the march again.
There were, however, other fields that did not cause France’s neighbours such alarm. The French conquest of Algeria began in 1831; Europe was not dissatisfied to see her energies drawn into an arena that showed every sign of giving them full occupation for a long time to come.
If North Africa should, in the second part of the twentieth century, mark the final resting-place of the French military spirit, the tomb of La Gloire, this will not be inappropriate. It was in North Africa that the French Army began to find again the professional justifications that had been denied to it since the fall of Napoleon.
When the Gardes Republicaines and the Spahis trot together down the Champs Elysees, as they do on state occasions, they represent the fusion of two traditions: the Gardes, in their cockaded helmets with flowing horse-hair plumes, are the sartorial descendants of Napoleon’s Cuirassiers and Dragoons; the Spahis are survivors of the French Empire whose core was North Africa.
In the Army of Napoleon III, this fusion reached completion; it remained intact throughout the Third Republic—indeed, it provided much of the military strength of the Republic. Only in the aftermath of the Second World War has it begun to break up.
Such is the submission to fashion of the profession of arms that we find, during the last century, echoes of French exploits in North Africa in the most unexpected places: the State of New York raising regiments of “Zouaves” during the Civil War; the Italians of the Risorgimento looking at times decidedly French; even the British Army loosening its jackets and adopting Frenchified hats.
And in France itself we find a whole new line of regiments helping to recapture the glamour of the Imperial Guard and the Reserve Cavalry, whose uniforms and courage gave to Napoleon’s battles their specially glamorous quality: Chasseurs d’Afrique, Tirailleurs Algeriens (Turcos), Zouaves (Frenchmen of North Africa in Turkish dress), Spahis, the Legion Etrangere.
It was inevitable that the revival of the Army during the 1830’s and’40’s should be linked to, and ultimately identified with Bona-partist agitation. Nowhere in France would Louis Napoleon find more firm and reliable support than in the military circles that looked back nostalgically to the “great days” of his uncle.
It has become reasonably clear that the second Emperor was far from being, by personal inclination, a militarist; there is substantial evidence that the “Liberal” period of his reign was the most personally satisfying to him, and that he was genuinely disappointed when he found that he could not, because of his past, rally those sections of French opinion that it was designed to placate. He was the prisoner of his name, and of his predecessor’s exploits.
From his family, from his entourage, from the leaders of the Army itself, there emanated a steady moral pressure upon him to repeat those exploits, to send the eagles forth again. In the Crimea and against Austria in 1859, he was able to make a show of Napoleonic vigour and address.
Those who supported him in France, and even those who did not support him, but nevertheless desired to see a revival of the form of national greatness that is synonymous with victory in war, were lulled into the supposition that the French Army was once again the superb instrument that it had been in the heyday of Napoleon I.
More objective observers, particularly across the Rhine, were sceptical; Napoleon III himself was unconvinced. He also knew his own heart, and how little suited it was to the alarms of war. The debacle in Mexico certainly shook him, and should have been accepted as a dangerous symptom far more widely than it was.
But Sebastopol, Solferino and Magenta were exalted to the status of Austerlitz, Jena and Wagram; the Army, it was confidently supposed, was itself again, and even those whose main object was to undermine the Emperor believed that they were free to do so behind the shield of revived military prowess that he had provided.
Such delusions are rarely permitted to persist for long. Within five years of the humiliation in Mexico, and just over half a century after Waterloo, the whole French nation found itself involved in utter defeat.
The Imperial Army, with all its Napoleonic associations, was smashed in a few weeks of the late summer of 1870; much has been made of the national resurgence that followed the collapse of the Empire, but the unalterable fact is that it was ineffective against the triumphant might of Germany. In a straight fight—for this time there was no Coalition marching against France—the Grande Nation herself was defeated, not merely Napoleon III, or a part of his policy, as might have been said of the Mexican affair.
The manner of this defeat was crucial: limited to the overthrow of the unpopular Empire, it might have put an end to military aspiration in France, and broken the hypnotism of victory in battle: extending, as it did, to the nation itself, and resulting in the German seizure of Alsace and Lorraine, it established an influence that persisted throughout the days of the Third Republic.
The relations between the Republic and the Army provide an important key to the understanding of French policy. The steadily growing strength of the Left in politics throughout the period of the Republic, and the vociferous pacifism that accompanied it, have disguised significant truths. These are better understood when one recalls that the first act of the Republic, after the signature of peace at Versailles, was to use the Army to recapture Paris from the insurgent Communards.
The first President of the Republic was a soldier, Marshal Macmahon, whose army had endured the capitulation at Sedan. The last act of the Republic was to surrender its powers into the hands of another soldier, Marshal Petain, under the shadow of a national defeat even greater and more tragic than that of 1870.
Between the Army and the Republic, during the seventy years of its life, there had existed a curious love-affair, disfigured by the very qualities of passion and possessiveness that mar so many private amours. It was under the Third Republic that the perilous doctrine of the sanctity of the Army reached its apogee, while the inevitable disillusionment that was bound to follow this produced its worst effects.
One of the most striking passages in the whole history of France is her recovery from the disaster of 1870. As early as 1875, the economic consequences were no longer of importance; the war indemnity was paid, the national economy was expanding with astonishing vigour; it was Bismarck who was beginning to tremble again.
But the memory of the German fanfares in Paris and other cities could not be effaced; the “lost provinces” provided a constant reminder of the bitter effects of defeat. Whether secretly longing for revenge, or merely desiring to ensure themselves against a recurrence of catastrophe, Frenchmen of all parties were sure of one thing: that France must have a much larger, better equipped and better organized Army than ever before.
The creation of this Army, also in a matter of a few years, is as remarkable a fact as the economic advance that went with it. But apart from being “larger” and “better,” what sort of an Army was it to be? Clearly, not one that was identified with any prince or dynasty; the Republic demanded a National Army, and it got one, but at a price. As the Left continued to make advances, inherent contradictions made the price steeper.
An army born out of defeat is a delicate instrument; its attitudes are bound to be self-conscious, an inferiority complex is certain to exist. To overcome this, exaggerated respect and often irrational admiration provide tempting solutions. For the very reason that the Army had sustained a demoralizing defeat, it appeared necessary to pay reverence to it, to harass it as little as possible, to refrain from asking awkward questions.
But for the politicians of the Left, much as they too desired the Army to be strong again, this was impossible. An army is what its officers make it. The constitution of the Officer Corps alarmed and irritated the doctrinaire Republicans. They saw only danger to the State in those elements that had been, and might still actively be, Royalist or Bonapartist, or who belonged to the body of opinion broadly called “Clericals.”
Political Clericalism might take a number of forms, but at the base of it was the Roman Catholic faith which continued to be a strong force in French life. A series of decrees excluded people of all these persuasions from holding office in the Civil Service or the judiciary; the Army was the only State institution left open to them.
To Republican eyes, it was the most dangerous for them to be in. It may appear now, with the record of history open to us, that the danger was exaggerated; in 1898 less than a quarter of the names on the General Officers’ List of the French Army could be identified with aristocratic—and therefore presumably Royalist—connections. But at the time this seemed to be a sinister proportion, viewed by staunch Republicans with alarm.
Their attacks on the Army produced a corresponding effect; to be seen reading a left-wing newspaper or periodical such as Le Figaro was, during the nineties, likely to blight the career of any officer. To his superiors, it meant that he was “disloyal” to the Army. It was partly the depth of these feelings that gave to the Dreyfus affair its viciously spiteful quality. But partly it was the fact that the Army was emerging from defeat in the field, that it had no victory on which to rest its case.
The Dreyfus Affair dragged on for twelve years, from 1894 to 1906; what emerged as a key issue, out of all the violence of its disputation, was the whole question of the relationship of a democratic state to its Army. In the twenty-four years of the existence of the Third Republic, nothing had so far posed this issue with such force.
Neither the agitation that ended in the exclusion of the Orleanist princes from the Army in 1883, nor the Boulanger crisis that reached its peak in 1889, was in any way comparable: at no point during either of those episodes was there any question of the State and the Army being ranged against each other; but from the moment that doubt was cast upon the verdict of the military court that had sentenced Dreyfus, the schism became manifest.
The straight question of the guilt or innocence of the Jewish Captain Dreyfus, convicted of espionage, was translated into a matter of the “honour of the Army.” It is to be noted that never, during the twelve years that the dispute continued, was there any hint of direct military action against the State, of any coup d’etat.
Even at its height, in 1899, the year of the second court-martial which reaffirmed the verdict of the first, the year also of Fashoda, when French nationalist sentiment was further inflamed by the Rebuff to its aspirations in the Sudan, the extremist Dérouléde was unable to persuade any commanding officer to lead his troops against the Elysée.
But although open violence was ruled out, the rift between the Army and the State became profound. The proposition that Army justice and civilian justice were two separate things, whose standards were not interchangeable, was upheld with the passion of hysteria. The very fact that such a doctrine could hold sway for five years, while a possibly innocent man languished in a tropical penal settlement, and then be reaffirmed, indicates the seriousness of the mental troubles that had gripped the Army.
Inevitably, one extreme brought forth another. In 1900 the Republican General André became Minister of War, and inaugurated certain long-overdue Army reforms. It was in keeping with the over-heated sentiment of the times that he should try to carry these out in a context of general “republicanization.”
Promotions, under André, became subject to political allegiances; Deputies, Prefects, private individuals and even Masonic Lodges were invited to make reports on the suitability of senior officers for further advancement; those who were known to belong to the Right, or who were active Catholics, soon saw that they could expect nothing in their profession.
Among those affected in this way was Colonel Foch, labelled a “doubtful republican.” His career made no further progress until, seven years later, he was able to win over Clemenceau to his support by sheer personality and persistence. Others were less lucky; many resigned; between 1897 and 1910, entrances to the Saint-Cyr Military Academy were reduced by more than half. The Army had sustained a severe blow, and there was no consolation in the fact that it had largely brought this on itself.
Clearly, this state of affairs could not go on. The first decade of the twentieth century was the period of successive crises arising out of the provocative and expansionist policies of Germany, with all the danger that these implied for France. A weakened Army, a dissatisfied Officer Corps, political interference in professional matters sapping all authority, these were in direct conflict with the stark needs of national safety.
André did not last long, nor did his successors; there ensued what has been called “a veritable ‘massacre’ of War Ministers.” This ended, and the whole trend of Army policy was reversed, in 1911, when Messimy became Minister of War; but once again—and here lies the true tragedy of this story—what occurred was not a return to sanity, but only another swing to counter-extremes. Messimy’s declared aim was to nurse the Army, to restore its self-confidence, to revive its prestige.
Joffre, a “safe republican,” but by no means a fanatic, became Chief of Stalf, and thus Commander-in-Chief designate in time of war. In return for the assurance of the Army’s complete loyalty and increasing efficiency, he and his Staff were given an entirely free hand in composing strategic plans; any soldier who disagreed with them was promptly and sternly dealt with.
Both Messimy and his successor Millerand elevated the policy of non-interference into a sacred dogma. It was Millerand who pronounced, after the outbreak of war, when all was in doubt and confusion, the amazing text: “We must not encumber our generals with suggestions.”
From hero-worship to bitter anger; from political meddling to extravagant insulation, such were the swings of French Army policy during the troubled years of the Dreyfus Case and its aftermath; but in the last resort, the test of an army is not to be found in its adherence to this or that political idea. The test is its aptitude for war. Its justification is victory.
What happened to the French Army in 1914 is well known; the total collapse of the war Plan, the palpable tactical weaknesses of an Army that had been taught only one manoeuvre—headlong attack—the frightful losses (200,000 in August alone) that desperate courage only succeeded in increasing, all these are part of history. There was a moment, a long and agonising moment, when all the signs suggested that 1870 had come again.
The French General Headquarters, Grand Quartier Général, enjoyed the fullest support of the Government, and above all of the Ministers of War; in the battle zone, which covered a huge area of north-eastern France, its authority was supreme.
Even Deputies who held military rank were forced to surrender their political, civilian character, and submit to a discipline that permitted no challenge to G.Q.G. The mobilization of the nation was complete, and even with the terrible losses in life and territory that France sustained in the first months of the War, she was able to stage another of those miraculous revivals that distinguish her history. Yet
By 1917, the Army was capable of only one more great effort. That effort was expended in Nivelle’s disastrous attack in Champagne—disastrous not because it incurred larger casualties than earlier attempts, nor because it failed more conspicuously to capture prisoners, guns and ground. It was disastrous psychologically, because it was meant to be the supreme stroke of the War, the elixir of a victory that had been indispensable since 1870.
The disappointment was too much. In May 1917, the larger part of the French Army— only two divisions were unaffected—fell into varying degrees of mutiny, ranging from marches upon Paris under the red flag to plain disobedience. By understanding, tact and, on the whole, astonishing leniency, General Petain brought the Army back to a state of obedience. But this was, in truth, the moment when what is known as the Fall of France began.
For the rest of the 1914-1918 War, the French Army had to be carefully protected against further mishap. This meant no more large offensives, no more big battles; above all, it meant handing over the military conduct of the War to France’s allies, Britain in particular, and then later, when their strength became effective, also to the United States of America.
Nevertheless, there could be no open admission that this was what was happening. For political reasons, so that France’s decline should not be taken for granted when the Peace Treaties were being drawn up, a gigantic confidence trick had to be perpetrated.
It was Petain’s achievement that he was able to keep the French Army in being, stage spectacular small coups, guide it through the ordeal of the great German offensives of 1918 that again brought them in sight of Paris, and lead it forward once more in the final Allied offensive, without more than a handful of people understanding what its true plight was.
It was the achievement of successive French inter-War politicians that they were able to perpetuate the bluff—much helped, indeed, by that strain of thought in Britain which preferred to delude itself once more that France would be able to carry the main burden of land warfare against Germany, should the occasion arise.
Only a few people knew that the “victory” of 1918 was the most “damned close-run thing” that it could possibly be, and how much of it was myth. It was a myth that was sedulously fostered: the scene in the railway carriage at Compiegne, the triumphant parades, everything that the French instinct for show and drama could do was lavishly done. But at the root of all was the grim truth that French military power had been severely shaken; the real victory was missing; once again, the test of battle would shortly expose the myth.
In so far as France’s position after 1918 was based upon a pretence, and the widespread, illusory belief that she still possessed the “best army in the world,” the collapse of the Third Republic in 1940 was predictable. What was not predictable was the phenomenon that accompanied the collapse: the emergence of an almost unknown “two-star” general, on foreign soil, in defiance of the constituted authority of the nation, proclaiming that France had lost a battle but might yet win the war, and calling on the French people to rally to him personally—“Moi, Général de Gaulle.”
The British in particular were never able to grasp the revolutionary nature of this gesture; to them it seemed only right and natural that a patriotic Frenchman should wish to keep his country in the war beside an ally who never seriously contemplated the alternative to fighting on. To the French, and to the Army above all, de Gaulle’s action had a totally different look. Strictly speaking, it was mutiny.
There were extenuating circumstances, certainly, but they did not alter the fact that this man had abandoned Metropolitan France in her hour of sorrow, and was defying the venerable soldier who was not only his military superior but also the Head of the State. The crisis of conscience that this deed posed for all who wore the uniform of a French officer did not make him any more popular. By some it has never been forgiven; by none has it been forgotten. The echo of 1940 rang loud and clear to the distracted men who attempted the Algiers coup of April 1961.
The rebirth of France symbolized by de Gaulle, then, was founded upon an act of military indiscipline. Begun in defeat, once again its ultimate sanction would have to be victory in war. But by the very nature of the struggle, by the fact that giant powers were drawn into it, so that even Britain was forced into a secondary position before the end, there could never be a clear-cut French victory.
Heroic small actions such as Bir Hacheim, the French contribution in Italy, the diversion (contrary to Eisenhower’s overall plan) of Leclerc’s Division to liberate Paris, de Lattre’s campaign in the Vosges, all these were valuable contributions to the Allied war-effort, but above all they were steps in the rebuilding of French morale. They could not, however, do more than marginally assist the deployment of massive Russian, American and British strength that alone would procure the final defeat of Nazi Germany.
The end of the War found France on the winning side again, but once more cheated of the sense of being victorious in her own right. Indeed, in so far as that sense existed at all, it was attributable to the mainly civilian Resistance, rather than to men in uniform. The Resistance Movement had been fighting in Paris for a week, at a cost of over 1,000 dead and seven times as many wounded, before Leclerc’s tanks arrived to break up the remains of the German garrison.
After the War, General de Gaulle’s Army policy played an important part in the process that took precedence over all other needs: the re-unification of France. His intention was to draw together, in the Army, and with the passage of time to fuse, the three conflicting elements of French military power: the mass of honest men who had remained loyal to Petain and the Vichy regime, not because they liked it, still less because they were pro-German, but because it represented “legitimacy his own followers of the Free French Movement, who had risked all; and the Resistance, with its strong factor of Communist inspiration.
Only the Army, with its old traditions of service, could weld together the new traditions that these three constituents had now created. The colonial wars that followed the World War, the upsurge of nationalism in the territories of the old empires, provided a delusive testing-ground for the reborn Army of France, itself the expression of a resurgent nationalism subject to compulsions as powerful as the desire for freedom.
Therein lies the key to the intransigence of successive French Governments in face of the wind of change. It is this compulsion that has robbed French policy and diplomacy of the suppleness and address that have so often been their outstanding characteristic. It is this compulsion, also, that has thrust the Army into roles for which it cannot, by nature, be suited.
The need to win an obvious victory, before making the obviously essential concessions, is the reason why desperate and disappointed men speak of themselves as having been at war for twenty years, and ask themselves: “For what?” If, in the course of the continuous wars that France has been waging in Indo-China, Korea, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, some of the original factions in the Army disappeared, others came in their stead.
French military writers now distinguish three widely different components in the Army: the “armée traditionelle,” professionals by upbringing, die-hard by instinct, who levitate gently into key positions at the top by the sheer force of the bureaucratic impulse; there is no political problem associated with these men as a type, but a profound professional one, through the blockage of promotion that they cause.
Then there is the “armée des techniciens,” more scientists than soldiers, who are concerned with the warfare of the future, and who talk what is practically a different language from that of their colleagues; no problem here, beyond the universal problem of the danger of letting “experts” take charge.
Finally, there is the “armée militante,” the men who have been actually fighting the colonial wars on classic “conventional” patterns, at a cost of approximately 300 officers dead each year since 1945. It is these men who brought de Gaulle back in 1958; it is they who, in a paroxysm of mortification, rebelled against him in 1961. It is they who are dangerous.
In the journal Candide in May, three remarkable letters (naturally unsigned) by serving officers exposed the dilemma of these men. “In effect,” wrote the author of one of the letters, “they have been fighting for twenty years. Their wars have cut them off from Metropolitan France, from their families, from their friends. They have the sense of having been made use of, duped, often betrayed by the forces of civilian politics.
Their own consciences are clear because they feel themselves, I do not hesitate to say, the paladins of the Western world.” In these few terse words lies the tragedy. Time and again these men have felt victory to be within their grasp; but always it has proved to be only a little victory within a large defeat. They have fought unending rearguard actions—but where is the counterattack?
Still treading the long road back from Sedan, they are beginning to perceive that it may not have any goal that they are capable of recognizing. And in the process of devoting their whole lives to the service of their country, they have found that the country itself has moved away from them.
What stopped them in April 1961 was the passive resistance of their own soldiers—the conscripts of France who have ceased to believe in the virtue of colonial wars—and, possibly, in the virtue of military victory. If General de Gaulle has reached the same conclusion—the political provisions of the Rome Treaty suggest that he has—there is hope for France; but little hope for the dedicated soldiers who have conceived her future in quite different terms.
1 This quotation will be familiar to readers in a different context; see “Armies of Occupation: 1: The British in France, 1815-18,” June issue, page 397.

