Was Stalin’s Foreign Policy a Failure?
Martin McCauley reviews Stalin's foreign policy, paying special attention to his covert involvement in the Korean war. He shows that, despite short-term successes, his record can be seen as one of long-term failure.
In Russia at present there is growing support for the view that the Stalin years (1929-53) were the best experienced by Russia in the 20th century. The present Russian government has had to ask the US and the EU for food aid, while the western world feared the expansion of communist power during the last years of Stalin. The Korean war (1950-3) appeared to add credence to this view. The Soviet Union was only a regional power when Stalin became leader in 1929 but, when he died in 1953, it had become a world power, soon to be a superpower. Does this mean that Stalin was brilliantly successful in foreign affairs'? Yet the state he built up collapsed in 1991 and today Russia is again only a regional power. So Russia has gone full circle. May one trace this fiasco back to Stalin, or is it the fault of his inept successors? To answer these questions, we need to examine the purpose of foreign policy and criteria for its success or failure.
Soviet foreign policy, 1928-39
In general, foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy and its major task is to ensure the security of the state. Soviet foreign policy was different from that of capitalist countries. It consisted of two tracks: enhancing the security of the Soviet state and promoting world socialist revolution. There was an international organisation, the Communist International or Comintern. It became an instrument of Stalin's foreign policy from the late 1920s onwards. The Comintern was dissolved in 1943, to allay suspicions that Soviet foreign policy was expansionist, and its duties passed to the newly established International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Soviet foreign policy was always global but, of course, particular countries and areas assumed paramount importance at various times.
Stalin's experience of foreign affairs in the 1920s was not very felicitous. A major blunder was the tactical alliance struck, on Soviet advice, by the Communist Party of China, led by Mao Zedong, with the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party), headed by Chiang Kai-shek. When the combined forces took Shanghai in April 1927, the Kuomintang turned on the communists and massacred them. So sure were the Soviets that they had Chiang in their pockets that they had made him an honorary member of the executive committee of the Comintern shortly before! After Shanghai, Stalin knew he had to be extra cautious in foreign affairs. He did not break with Chiang Kai-shek but cultivated him, playing him off against the communists. The undeclared war between China and Japan saw the latter make rapid advances and this led Chiang Kai-shek to appeal to Stalin, in February 1938, to declare war on Japan. Stalin declined. In May 1938, however, he was ready to provide the Kuomintang with weapons and a multi-million dollar loan. This was Stalin's preferred way of conducting foreign affairs, by way of secret talks and deals. Stalin believed that socialism would gradually prove victorious. This would occur by states leaving the 'imperialist' camp and coming over to the socialist. When this happened the Soviet Union would become a base for the further development of the world revolution and a 'lever for the further dislocation of imperialism'.
In the 1930s the Soviet Union was a weak state, so Stalin's key objective was to ensure that his country did not become involved in any wars. This led the Soviet Union to seek to sign non-aggression pacts with as many states as possible. Between January and March 1932, pacts were signed with Finland, Latvia and Estonia and then with Poland in July 1932, with France in November 1932 and with Italy in September 1933. The goal of these pacts was to secure agreement on the non-use of force, refusal to participate in economic boycotts or to permit hostile propaganda, and to observe neutrality in conflicts involving third parties. The pacts prepared the way for the admission of the Soviet Union to the League of Nations and the policy of collective security.' Japanese expansion in the Far East in 1931-2 and the appointment of Hitler as German Chancellor, in January 1933, added urgency to the search for collective security. Stalin advocated the formation of Popular Front governments (coalitions of all anti-fascist parties, including the communists), but although there was a Popular Front government in France the concept never gained momentum due to the lack of trust of the communists and varying interpretations of the German threat.
Despite Stalin's efforts the Soviet Union was forced to fight the Japanese. The battle of Khaikhin-Gol, in Mongolia, in May-August 1939, obliged the Japanese to rethink their policy of moving east- wards. The Red Army, under General (later Marshal) Zhukov launched 'tanks, artillery, aircraft and men in an integrated offensive for the first time in modern war'.' The signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, in August 1939, convinced the Japanese that the Soviet-Japanese balance of power had shifted against the Japanese. Tokyo then signed the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of June 1941. Fortunately for Moscow, a majority of civilian and military leaders, in July 1941, decided not to join in the attack on the Soviet Union but to wait on events. When Japan attacked the US in December 1941, Washington requested air bases in the Soviet Far East but was rebuffed. Stalin only came into the war against Japan, on 8 August 1945, after the defeat of Germany.
The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, August 1939
This pact was signed because the policy of collective security was perceived to have failed. After Great Britain had guaranteed Poland's security in March 1939, London sought (together with France) a military alliance with the Soviet Union. Stalin was wary because he did not wish to be drawn into a war with Germany, with, possibly, Britain and France standing on the side- lines. The pact that he did sign, with Hitler, shortened the odds against a war in Europe. The pact included the clauses of the Berlin treaty of April 1926 which committed both parties to desist from aggression and observe neutrality in conflicts involving third parties. A secret protocol (the existence of which was denied until 1991 by the Soviet Union) defined future spheres of influence, with Estonia, Latvia and Bessarabia passing to the Soviet Union, as well as part of east Poland. The Red Army moved into eastern Poland in September 1939, and a German-Soviet friendship and frontier treaty laid down the new frontiers in the east, Moscow was now free to force the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) to sign treaties in September and October 1939 which permitted the stationing of Soviet troops on their territories, while in June 1940 Romania conceded Bessarabia and north Bukovina to the USSR. A Soviet-German economic agreement was signed in January 1941; and, for not taking a part of Lithuania, as had been originally agreed, Germany received Soviet written assurance of compensation of 31.5 million German gold marks. The Finns rejected the Soviet demand that they should cede territory to the Soviet Union, and the Winter War of 1939-40 ensued, followed by the continuation war of 1941-4. The pact with Hitler had produced a rich crop very quickly.
Stalin used the breathing space the pact afforded him to strengthen the Red Army. On 5 May 1941 he stated: to 'carry out the defence of our country, we are obliged to act in an offensive way. [We have] to move from defence to a military policy of attack. We must restructure our training, our propaganda and agitation, and our press in an offensive spirit. The Red Army is a modern army, and a modern army is an offensive army'.' Does this mean that Stalin was preparing to invade Germany, as Viktor Suvorov in various publications has claimed? No document has come to light which would support this claim, Indeed front commanders were ordered, by 20 May 1941, to work out a 'detailed plan of defence of the state frontier'. If Stalin was contemplating a pre-emptive strike against Germany it would have happened much later.
The German attack on 22 June 1941 was a terrible blow to Stalin, sending him into shock. He chose to ignore the message from the German spy Richard Sorge, in Tokyo, on 15 May that Hitler would attack on 22 June. On this message, Stalin scribbled: 'German disinformation'. His comment on a report from the NKVD (secret police), that preparations to attack were complete, was: 'You can tell your "source" in German air force headquarters to go f*** himself. He's not a "source", he's a disinformer.'
Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe fell into Stalin's lap as war booty at the end of the Second World War. Even Churchill, the supreme master of Realpolitik, conceded that ir 1944. An added bonus was that the Soviets occupied a third of Germany and almost half of Berlin. The only problem was that the Americans were not playing the imperialist game and did not regard the Yalta agreement as transferring the region to Soviet control indefinitely, Stalin was in his element in the region as the various communist leaders fell over themselves to please him. Even Tito, in Yugoslavia, was like a pet poodle wagging his tail at every bon mot which flowed from the master's mouth. Moscow was the chic, radical capital of the world where Stalin held court, usually after midnight. He seated his guests and then proceeded to meander round the room, smoking his pipe, while he held forth. He instructed them on how to consolidate their power and rewarded them with goods, weapons and money. He was not too greedy. He kept to the agreement with Churchill that Greece would remain in the western camp. However, he made one fatal mistake: he misread Tito. In May 1946, in Moscow, Tito and he talked about the Yugoslav Federation. Would it include Albania and even Bulgaria? Stalin was keen for a large federation which would dominate the Balkans. However, a year later they were at daggers drawn. Stalin had thought that Tito would do his bidding but the Yugoslav leader had no intention of being a tinpot Stalinist. In June 1948 Yugoslavia was drummed out of the Cominform, the communist European league. Stalin thought he could manipulate Yugoslav politics to get rid of Tito. When this failed, he ordered Beria, the head of the NKVD, to dispose of him. However, the latter was too crafty for him and all assassination attempts failed.
China and Korea
Stalin regarded himself as a dab hand at Chinese affairs, even though he had never visited the country. In 1946 the Soviet government recognised the government of Chiang Kai-shek as the legitimate government of China. However, Mao Zedong and his followers were made of sterner stuff, On 1 October 1949 the People's Republic of China was proclaimed. Victory had come with minimal Soviet support. When Mao arrived in Moscow, in December 1949, Stalin kept him waiting, the normal procedure with foreign guests. When they met, Mao stressed that China needed three to five years of peace. Stalin told Mao there were no direct threats to China at that time. 'Japan hasn't yet got back on its feet. America shouts about war but is afraid of it ... in Europe they're scared of war ... No one wants to fight China.' China got a loan, among other things, but had to pay interest on it. There was no real meeting of minds, as Mao spoke in aphorisms and was steeped in Chinese poetry and Confucian thought, Stalin was hard- headed and regarded himself as the leading authority on any subject which came up. However, the Soviet leader was aware of Mao's vanity and that he saw himself as a great statesman. Since he had captured power by his own efforts, he did not come to Moscow with an inferiority complex. Could he turn out to be another Tito?
Kim ll-sung, the leader of north Korea, was hewn from a totally different stone. He was a Soviet creation and arrived on his first visit as leader in March 1949. Stalin supervised the regular transfer of arms and other military equipment to north Korea throughout 1949. The north Koreans could probe and infiltrate the south but only under Soviet guidance. In January 1950 Kim asked Stalin for permission to attack the south in order to liberate it and unify Korea. Stalin discussed the matter with Mao, who was in Moscow. He then informed Kim that it would be a major undertaking and that it had to be organised in such a way as to ensure there was no big risk. After further consultations with Beijing, Stalin, in February 1950, authorised the beginning of massive preparations.
Soviet deliveries of tanks, artillery and other equipment increased rapidly. In return Moscow requested lead, silver and gold. In April l 950 Kim saw Stalin again in Moscow. The Soviet leader then informed Mao that the go-ahead had been given to move towards the reunification of Korea. Stalin covered himself by saying that the final decision had to be taken by the Chinese and Korean comrades jointly. Beijing agreed. Stalin's man in Pyongyang reported that Kim would be ready by late- June and urgently needed petrol and medical supplies. Stalin ordered these dispatched, signing himself Gromyko, then deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. When Kim asked for Soviet advisers on ships which would participate in the attack, Stalin refused, He was obsessed with camouflaging from the Americans that he had agreed to the invasion.
Stalin's original order had been that Kim could only attack if the south attacked first. This fell by the wayside and the north attacked on 25 June 1950. Again Soviet advisers were not to be involved, except as Pravda correspondents, in civilian clothes! Under no circumstances was one to be captured. That would have given the game away! Stalin provided all the war materiel Kim needed. Defeat of the south was only averted by LIS involvement from September, and on 1 October Kim begged Stalin for direct military help from the Soviet Union – otherwise the north would be defeated and occupied. Stalin contacted Mao and talked of a joint Soviet- Chinese intervention against the Americans. He even contemplated the beginning of the third world war. Mao also saw this as a possibility. The Soviets did not want to intervene until the last moment to save Kim. Stalin was immensely relieved when the Chinese revealed their willingness to fight. On 25 October 1950 the Chinese launched a great counter-offensive along the whole front. Stalin now knew that north Korea could not be defeated militarily. In November the Soviets provided the Chinese with air cover. Soviet aircraft sported Chinese markings and aircrew wore Chinese or Korean uniforms. Stalin's bluff was never called because not a single serviceman was ever captured by the Americans. Exasperated by the unwittingness of many north Korean commanders to carry out his orders, Stalin transferred command of the ground force to the Chinese. Neither Stalin nor Mao was keen to end the war as it was one the Americans could not win.
The Balance Sheet
The first criterion of foreign policy success is whether it protected the country from military attack, The Japanese in Mongolia could not be placated, so Stalin cannot be blamed for that encounter. In September 1939 Stalin attacked eastern Poland and secured a quick victory, In December 1939 the Soviet Union attacked Finland in the Winter War and claimed victory in 1940, but then the Finns joined the war against Moscow in 1941. Stalin certainly miscalculated his timetable for conflict with Germany and paid a heavy price and almost the ultimate price. In 1941-43 his foreign policy seemed an abysmal failure. However, the Soviet Union turned the tables on Hitler and became the leading military power in Europe in 1945. The Soviets claimed an empire in eastern Europe as their prize. Unwillingness to dilute their control of this region led to the Cold War, beginning in earnest in 1947. In 1950 Stalin released the clogs of war in Korea. If necessary, he would have intervened to prevent the defeat of the north, risking conflict with the Americans. Hence one can say that Stalin, following Clausewitz, regarded war as an extension of politics by other means. One will never know if and when he would have attacked Nazi Germany. He never had any intention of launching a military attack against the Americans. He believed to his dying day that communist parties could be used as shock brigades to weaken the structures of the capitalist state. He provided them with millions of dollars in aid to promote his dream of a communist world. Military forces were built up in eastern Europe to provide a cordon sanitaire for the Soviet Union. He instructed the east German communists to build up armed forces at a time when this was forbidden by the Potsdam agreement.
One can judge Stalin's military policy a success if one consider it in great power terms. In 1953 only America was stronger militarily. The west feared Soviet military might and Moscow was also a nuclear power. On this criterion Stalin had succeeded magnificently. Compare the situation with that of the 1920s and 1930s when the Soviet Union had been a weak state.
If one wishes to argue it was a failure how would one proceed? Instead of looking exclusively at the militarily aspect, one would examine security. The latter involves various aspects: political, economic and military. The strength of the Soviet military inevitably provoked counter-measures. This led to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, in 1949, and the beginning of the arms race in earnest. Inevitably the rearming of West Germany followed. The Korean war ensured that the US had to remain in the south to prevent any future attack from the north.
Arguably Soviet security interests would have been better served by reaching an agreement with Britain and France in 1939. This might have prevented Germany launching a European war. By attacking Finland in 1939 Moscow ensured that Finland would come in on the German side in 1941. Eastern Europe was regarded as enhancing security. Yet one can argue that it was a liability. Soviet behaviour led to the Americans being obliged to remain in Europe after 1947, contrary to their plans. Germany was the core of Moscow's European policy. It wanted to prevent Germany ever again becoming a military threat to the Soviet Union. The Berlin blockade, in 1948-9, when the Soviets tried to force the west out of Berlin, increased the perception that Moscow was an aggressive power. It led to the establishment of West Germany and that country's integration in NATO. This was diametrically opposed to Soviet interests. Moscow, and arguably Germany, would have been better off with a neutral, demilitarised Germany.
Politically Stalin sought control of his satellites and to bring other states within his orbit. His first major postwar defeat was in Yugoslavia, in 1948. Mao resented Stalin's behaviour towards him but probably no Soviet leader could have placated the vain Chinese leader.
Economically Stalin’s foreign policy resulted in greater and greater defence spending. Since America was much richer, this meant that the defence burden was proportionately greater.
There was a terrible inevitability about Stalin’s foreign policy. Security was essentially conceived in military terms. His famous quip about how many divisions the Pope had sums him up. Security is based on force. One can also view Stalin as a product of 19th-century European imperialism. The more territory one occupies, the stronger one is.
What was the alternative? Stalin could have concluded an agreement with the Americans after 1945 which would have allowed them to leave Europe. Economically western Europe was exhausted and offered the real prospect of communist parties coming to power. Stalin’s unwillingness to come to terms with Washington forced the Americans into the Cold War. It also led to their financing European economic recovery and providing security against Soviet aggression. In total, Soviet policy after 1945 was a disaster. It set in motion the arms race which eventually contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet empire.
This is being wise after the event. In the short term, Stalin’s foreign policy was highly successful but in the long term a failure. The political and economic system he developed appeared impregnable in 1953 but turned out to be deeply flawed. Every empire produces a counter force which eventually topples it.
Further Reading
- J Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy 1930-33 (1983)
- J Haslam,The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security (1984)
- Michael Lynch, Stalin and Krushchev: The USSR 1924-64 (1990)
- David S. Painter, The Cold War: An International History (1999)
- Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1945-91 (1998)

