The Battle of Guise, August 1914

The successful Battle of Guise, fought by the French Fifth Army, among many misunderstandings with their Allies and between their own commanders, was an essential prelude to the Battle of the Marne, on which the fortunes of the First World War so largely turned. By John Terraine.

As soon as the main armies of France and Germany met in 1914, the distinctive qualities of twentieth-century warfare asserted themselves: the dominance of the mechanical element, at that period expressed through the use of the most highly-developed railway systems in the world, with the addition of motor transport, and the introduction of the aeroplane; and the ascendancy of fire-power, which has reached its logical conclusion in nuclear fission, but in 1914 took the forms of massed artillery, with emphasis on the heavy calibres, and the virtual substitution of the automatic weapon, the machine gun, for the infantryman’s individual weapons, the rifle and bayonet.

The study of the craft of war, however, despite the ample warnings given by the American Civil War fifty years earlier, the Boer War, and the Russo-Japanese War, had not only failed to take into account the probable effects of the astonishing material progress in every industrial country, but had deliberately turned its attention to the models of a too-distant past.

Obsessed by the superficial lessons of the Franco-Prussian War, with its sensational results, both France and Germany had permitted themselves to dwell upon mystical factors as the secret of War itself: the search for an infallible formula had taken the German General Staff as far back as Hannibal’s victory at Cannae in 216 BC, and the French to the dangerous example of Napoleon I.

Paradoxically, this very stress upon mystical elements ended by giving to the First World War that brutal, spirit-crushing quality by which it will always be remembered.

For a few weeks, however, in August and early September, the War retained some characteristics that were intelligible to historians and Staff-College students: it was a war of movement on open fields; there was still some panoply; the first great crisis was intellectual, a crisis of generalship, not of matériel.

Between the opening actions and the Battle of the Marne, which began on September 6th and reached its climax on September 8th, the question was whether the vast manoeuvre known as the Schlieffen Plan could be brought to fruition by the German General Staff before the French Staff penetrated its meaning and took the necessary steps to frustrate it.

The Marne decided that question. When the Schlieffen Plan collapsed, Germany was left with no other large solution to the impasse brought about by the assertion of material factors; France remained the prisoner of misconceptions which, by 1917, brought her Army to the verge of ruin; and finally it was the British who, at the price of immense suffering and bloodshed, hammered out empirically a method of victory.

But the Marne was a triumph of generalship in the old style. And the Battle of Guise, on August 29th, which, more than any other single event, created the conditions for the Marne, was a true old-style battle, one of the last to be fought by European Armies.

By August 29th, the Battles of the Frontiers were over. The Schlieffen Plan appeared to have been successful at every point. The French, attempting to operate their own Plan XVII, had sustained a series of defeats without parallel in terms of loss of life and psychological impact.

Their great offensive in Lorraine had been bloodily repulsed at the Battles of Mor-hange and Sarrebourg, and they had almost lost Nancy.

Then, as the German threat to their left wing developed, still deluded by their false assessment of German strength and by their devotion to the spirit of the offensive, they had struck at what they believed to be the weak German centre in the Ardennes—only to sustain further shattering repulses at Virton and the Semoy.

All their armies of the right and centre were in retreat by August 23rd. There remained the left wing, the 5th army, 250,000 strong, under General Lanrezac, and the British Expeditionary Force, 100,000 strong, under Field-Marshal Sir John French. It depended now upon this formidable mass of troops, who had only just come into contact with the enemy, to redress the balance.

The situation, as it appeared to the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre, and his Staff, on the eve of the Battle of Mons, was that the Germans had shown themselves in great strength on the left, and in their centre; they could not be strong everywhere; it should be possible to roll up their right flank.

On the other hand, there was growing evidence that their strength was increasing in that quarter; again, on the assumption that they could not be strong everywhere, they must be drawing troops from another part of the enormous battlefield, probably the centre.

In that case, the Allied Armies of the Left must strike in a north-easterly direction, to cut off the German right wing from the main body of their Army.

In any event, the left wing must attack. What the French General Staff failed to understand was the essence of the Schlieffen Plan, the deployment of enormous strength at the very outset.

The Germans were strong everywhere, and nowhere stronger than on their right, where the great mass of manoeuvre had been assembled that was designed to carry them round to the west of Paris, and end by pinning the French against their own frontier fortress system by an attack from the rear. Any advance by the 5th Army and the B.E.F. could only thrust those forces into the jaws of the German array.

At this stage, human personality asserted itself, and events on the left flank of the Allied line, the crucial sector, where the Schlieffen Plan was expected to have its decisive effects, ceased progressively to be decided by Plan, and were decided more and more by the interplay of character among six men: Joffre, Lanrezac and French, on one side, and von Moltke, the German Chief of the General Staff, von Kluck, Commander of the First Army, and von Billow, Commander of the Second Army, on the other.

The first to be put to the test was Lanrezac. The enigma of General Lanrezac will probably never be solved; he is a figure of mystery; his period of high command in war was so short that we lack cross-references to judge him by. But during that short period, he seems to have been torn by one of those conflicts between intellect and character the effects of which, certainly in war, are both searing and paralysing.

Lanrezac’s reputation was made at the Ecole de Guerre, where, before the War, his lucid professorial analyses of exercises, the complete facility with which he was able to move pins and symbols on maps, or troops on manoeuvres, had made a profound impression. It has been claimed for him that in regard to contemporary French theory—the doctrine of the offensive at all costs—he was always something of a heretic.

He may well have been; but the fact remains that the Army that he was appointed to command was one designed to play a major part in the offensive prescribed by Plan XVII, and he was selected by Joffre for this command because he gave the impression of being ideally fitted for it.

At the opening of the War, although the role of his Army was changed by the pressure of events, he was still regarded at the Grand-Quartier-Général as a fire-eater. Joffre, certainly, had no doubts about Lanrezac’s offensive intentions in the early stages.

It is not, of course, particularly a criticism of General Lanrezac to say that his optimism and aggressiveness waned as he came closer to the enemy: were it not for the remarkable absence of such symptoms in the other French generals, one would consider that this reaction was merely normal. Only in the overheated condition of French military thinking at the beginning of the War were Lanrezac’s doubts conspicuous; he himself probably felt this more acutely than anyone, and it is the most likely key to his subsequent odd behaviour.

The role of his Army in Plan XVII was to form the left wing of the French offensive, beside the 3rd Army, with the 4th Army held back as a Napoleonic Reserve. From the very opening of hostilities, however, Lanrazec began to feel his position on the extreme left to be disagreeably exposed.

The able Intelligence officers of his Deuxieme Bureau began at once to collect ominous information, suggesting that there were far too many Germans in the vicinity of the 5th Army for comfort, and that the enemy was developing serious threats to the French left. Already, by August nth, Lanrezac was seeking and obtaining permission to move his leading Army Corps to Givet, near the Belgian frontier.

The 4th Army was moved up into line between the 5th and 3rd Armies, and the following days saw a general taking ground to the left along the whole of this part of the French front. On August 15th, Joffre agreed that the 5th Army should complete its concentration in the area between Givet and Mau-beuge, where the British Expeditionary Force would also assemble.

On the following day, the Commander of the B.E.F., Sir John French, met Joffre, and on the 17th he met Lanrezac. These two meetings were of the utmost significance: their results were contradictory, and planted from the very outset that duality of feeling that endured in Anglo-French relations throughout the War. The meeting with Joffre was an unqualified success.

The short, rotund, impulsive British leader took at once to the tall, massive, phlegmatic Frenchman; and Joffre, for his part, formed an impression of an Ally who was entirely eager to help, and to come to grips with the enemy.

The only drawback to this meeting lay in the fact that Joffre had just concluded, the day before, an interview with Lanrezac, at which that officer, despite his well-founded fears, had left his Commander-in-Chief convinced that he still believed unreservedly in the French Plan, and was itching to begin his attack. Joffre, therefore, spoke highly of Lanrezac to French.

But no sooner had Lanrezac returned to his own Headquarters than he received more ominous news of German movements in front of him. He was still digesting this, and finding it a sour meal, when French visited him the next day.

Lanrezac was one of many Frenchmen at that time—and we have not been short of similar examples since then—who knew little of England, and disliked what they knew. Like many other French officers, he had small regard for the little British Regular Army.

Preoccupied with the grave problems of his own command, he was hasty, inconsiderate, and, indeed, downright rude to his British neighbour. Neither he nor Sir John spoke a word of each other’s language, and yet they spent a short time closeted together without benefit of interpreter; the result was fatal.

When Sir John, peering at a map, and stumbling over schoolboy French, asked Lanrezac whether he thought the Germans were attempting to cross the Meuse at a place with the impossible name of Huy, Lanrezac impatiently replied that they had probably merely gone there to fish.

The slight was obvious and unforgivable—the more so since it was this very German manoeuvre that first exposed the dangers in store for the 5th Army, and for the B.E.F. Sir John left the meeting with entirely un-neighbourly feelings towards Lanrezac, whose talents, he thought, had been much over-rated; Lanrezac concluded that the British Commander was an ass, and wrote off his Army as another of those dubious formations, like Reserve Divisions and Territorials, that could only be a hindrance to the serious work of war. But of one thing he left French, like Joffre, in no doubt—that he meant to attack the enemy.

Yet, that very evening, in a message to Joffre, he mentioned the possibility of a retreat by the 5th Army. This is the enigma of the man: his ideas, in the light of events, seem to have been well formed, more valid, indeed, than those of his superiors; but he lacked the character to stand up for them against the hostility which he knew they would meet, and even went so far as to conceal them from both his Chief and his Ally.

The following days saw the working out of this frame of mind on the field of battle. On the 20th, Lanrezac was issuing orders for an attack to be prepared, but on the 21st he was speaking privately of the folly of attacking, and it was, in fact, his own Army that was attacked on that day.

On the 22nd, he was falling back from positions that he had described as ideal for the defensive, and asking the B.E.F. to help him by attacking his enemies in flank, although he knew that the British were themselves threatened by superior forces.

On the 23 rd, while they were fighting the Battle of Mons in compliance with this request, Lanrezac’s Army was in full retreat. He even forbade Franchet d’Esperey, the commander of his 1st Corps, to carry out a local counterattack that promised excellent results.

On the 24th, when the B.E.F. was disentangling itself with considerable difficulty and skill from its Mons position in the face of a double encircling movement, Lanrezac rejected every plea that he should assist the British, and continued his retreat.

He had undoubtedly been severely shaken by his first experience of contact with the enemy, in which his Army had fared no better than other French Armies all along the line; he had begun to doubt the qualities of his own troops, and to talk of fighting the war with Artillery.

His strategy was reduced to a search for “good artillery positions,” where the famous ’75s could dominate the field. He became increasingly vocal in his criticism of his own High Command.

The effect of this behaviour on Sir John French, a choleric man at the best of times, scarcely needs to be described. He conceived a powerful sense of having been let down, of having exposed his Army—of having risked, in fact, Britain’s only Army—for the sake of an Ally who did not keep his word, who made no attempt to carry out agreed operations, who made insensate demands, and was, besides, personally unpleasant.

Seriously threatened on his left, his Lines of Communication with his Base and with the Channel endangered, he now found that he could depend upon no support on his right.

The temperamental swing from the high optimism with which the British Staff had entered the War (“all over by Christmas”) was violent; Sir John French was drawn into a gloom and despondency as unreal as his earlier hopes. On August 26th, this feeling seemed to be confirmed by the most serious turn of events.

The day began with bad news from the right flank, where Haig reported heavy attacks on the British I Corps, separated from the rest of the Army by a gap of many miles. Shortly afterwards, General Smith-Dorrien announced that the II Corps was incapable of further retreat and must stand its ground at Le Cateau.

For a time it seemed to French that his whole Army would be lost. With this dreadful fear in mind, French attended his second, and last, meeting with Lanrezac, at British G.H.Q. at St. Quentin, with Joffre also present.

Joffre was deeply disturbed by the change in French, who seemed to him to have lost his balance. Belatedly aware now of where the real German threat lay, on his extreme left, he had already decided that he must meet it with new formations directly under his own control, in other words, a new French Army on the left of the B.E.F. His intention was to co-ordinate into this new plan the actions of French and Lanrezac.

But now he found that his Ally, as well as being outside his command, was apparently incapable of further serious fighting. He was also developing grave doubts about Lanrezac, who seemed to have a rooted aversion to offensive action of any kind; and he discovered that the relations between these two key men had deteriorated to an extent that could only spell extreme peril to his whole left wing.

It was essential to his purpose that they should delay the enemy as much as possible by local attacks and stubborn resistance, to give time for his new Army to assemble; yet both of them seemed to be sunk in the deepest gloom and to have no other idea than further retreat.

Joffre left the meeting very despondent; but it was not without its value, for from this moment onwards he became more and more clear in his mind that General Lanrezac was a liability that he could not afford.

Ironically, none of the three generals perceived then, nor for some time afterwards, that the troops of the B.E.F. were, in fact, doing that day just what was needed of them, despite the gloom of their Commander. Haig’s Corps had not been seriously attacked after all, and was now withdrawing in good order, while Smith-Dorrien was in the act of inflicting a sharp reverse on the enemy, before skilfully extracting his Corps from von Kluck’s attempt to encircle it.

The next two days were crucial. And at this stage it will be well to turn to the German side, and consider what was going on there. For behind the fa9ade of apparent universal victory, fatal hesitations and compromises were at work.

The truth was that the Chief of the General Staff Generaloberst Helmuth von Moltke, nephew of the great von Moltke of the Franco-Prussian War, was not the man to carry out a scheme so grandiose and venturesome as the Schlieffen Plan.

Even before the War began, he had struck at the very fundamentals of the Plan by his redisposition of German forces, drastically reducing the proportion of superiority of his right wing to his left. He permitted himself to dream of a double encirclement of the French, or a victory in Lorraine as well as the great sweep through Belgium and Northern France.

On August 20th, his two left-wing Armies, the Sixth and Seventh, had attacked in Lorraine and inflicted sharp reverses on the French. They had been maintaining their pressure ever since. At the same time, the First Army, just beginning its swing to the south, had to detach two Army Corps to mask the Belgians in Antwerp. On the 25th, as bad news came in from the Eastern Front, von Moltke detached two more Corps, again from his right wing, for the Russian front.

And as the First and Second Armies swept past the fortress of Maubeuge, more troops had to be diverted for the investment of that place. It was thus a very reduced Schlieffen Plan that was being put into operation by August 27th. And to make matters worse, on that day, von Moltke freed von Kluck from the control of his senior neighbour, von Biilow, thereby weakening any chance of maintaining a cohesion that his own Headquarters, far away in Coblenz, could never exercise.

The contrasting personalities of the two German commanders on the spot now came into play. Von Biilow was a cautious, even timid man, a firm believer in “shoulder-to-shoulder” strategy, only happy when his flanks were secured by other formations. Despite his continuous success to date, his advances were slow and deliberate, and he seemed to fear traps everywhere.

The younger von Kluck, however, sniffed victory in the air, even when it was a delusion. He was convinced that the British were routed and falling back towards the Channel ports, and accordingly sent off his large cavalry force to the West to head them off.

Astonishing though it seems, after the Battle of Le Cateau, which should have seen the destruction of Smith-Dorrien’s II Corps, not only did the Corps escape from the battlefield in broad daylight, but von Kluck then immediately lost it completely, swinging his whole Army south-westwards towards Amiens while the British retired southwards towards St. Quentin.

Thus a gap arose between the two German Armies which made von Biilow very nervous indeed, while his flamboyant colleague went off in search of an illusory Cannae in the West.

Here at last was an opportunity of exactly the kind for which Joffre had been waiting—a chance to dislocate the enemy’s encircling right wing while he built up his new 6th Army on its outer flank. The first man to perceive the opportunity was Sir Douglas Haig, who, on the 28th, became aware of considerable German formations passing across his front, offering an excellent opening for a stroke by his Corps and the 5th Army.

He immediately suggested such a stroke to General Lanrezac. At the same time Joffre visited that officer’s Headquarters, confirmed his misgivings about Lanrezac’s frame of mind, and attempted to stiffen him by the issue of what is now known as a “rocket,” verbally, and by categorical instructions to counter-attack, which he set down on paper.

His idea was to strike towards St. Quentin, at the flank and rear of the First Army, not with any hope of crushing it, but to check it and delay its advance; this had now become all the more necessary because von Kluck was already in contact with the forward units of the 6th Army. There was a danger that that Army might be devoured piecemeal as it assembled, which would have meant the end of all Joffre’s hopes.

On the next day, August 29th, the whole complex of confusion and misunderstanding on both sides came to a head. It began with Sir John French. He and his whole Headquarters were now sunk in a despondency that almost passes belief when one compares it with the attitude of the Corps Commanders who were in actual contact with the enemy.

French had come to the remarkable conclusion that it was of imperative importance that his whole Army should be removed from the line of battle for at least nine or ten days, in order to refit. Drawing his inspiration from the prevalent mood at G.H.Q., the French liaison officer there reported to Joffre: “Conditions are such that for the moment the British Army no longer exists.”

There was even talk among the Staff officers of transferring the British base to St. Nazaire, in Brittany. Casualties, it was believed, had been ruinous; among other things, the entire Cavalry Division was thought to have been totally lost.

Most of this was completely untrue, but, since it was believed, it is not hard to understand that Sir John French promptly forbade Haig to join in the offensive action which he had himself suggested, and rebuked him for having offered to do so.

To Haig’s disgust, he had to continue his retreat, and so the day began with the French being left alone. Yet now, at last, they were about to do the very thing that the British blamed them for not having done throughout the campaign.

At Lanrezac’s Headquarters there was intense activity. The task set the 5th Army, even with British co-operation, would have been difficult enough. Without it, the thing became vastly more hazardous, but Joffre was determined that it should be done.

He was, indeed, so determined, that he took the rare step of going personally to Lanrezac’s H.Q. early that morning, and remaining there, saying little, making no attempt to run the battle, but watching Lanrezac’s every move.

If Lanrezac had faltered, Joffre would have removed him then and there. But, although he had one eye cocked distractingly over his shoulder at his Chief, Lanrezac did not falter.

He had, to begin with, to swing his whole Army round to face northwestwards, instead of north-north-east. On paper, with coloured pins, this is easy; on the ground, with tired, disorganized, in some cases demoralized formations, it is anything but that. But by a prodigy of the staff work at which he excelled, General Lanrezac pulled the bulk of his Army round to face towards St. Quentin, and pushed his left and centre across the Oise in the early hours of the morning.

For a time they made slow though definite progress. Joffre was pleased to note the firmness and crispness' of Lanrezac’s handling of events, the spirit with which he checked any tendency to delay. And then the whole situation altered: as a French writer has said, “there was a battle as willed by Joffre, and not by Lanrezac, but as Lanrezac and not Joffre had foreseen, it turned out to be far more a battle of Guise than a batde of St. Quentin.”

What happened was this: against the flank and rearguards of the German First Army, not in great strength, the French made progress towards the north-west. But shortly before noon their 3rd and 10th Corps, on the right of their advance, were checked by the arrival of new German formations from the north. These belonged to the Second Army, which was now well placed to take the French 5th Army in flank.

As the news of this untoward development came in, General Lanrezac displayed great nerve. He had in hand the whole of his large and relatively undamaged 1st Corps, under General Franchet d’Esperey. He was in the process of swinging this force across his line of battle from right to left, to make the final thrust towards St. Quentin. When news came in of serious reverses on the front of the 10th Corps, with pleas for help, Lanrezac replied:

“Le ioe Corps doit tenir coûte que coûte sur ses positions... Le 1er Corps doit continuer sa marche vers l'Oise et n'intervenir du côté du 10e Corps qu'en cas d’absolue nécessité.”1 He issued an order to Franchet d’Esperey in this sense. But no sooner had the order gone than it became apparent that the 10th Corps, much tried in the earlier fighting of the campaign, would not hold.

Lanrezac made up his mind instantly, and countermanded his order to d’Esperey, instructing him now to assist the 10th Corps in the direction of Guise. This swinging of units about on the battlefield was what pre-1914 generals had been trained to do; it was an exercise in the Napoleonic style which they understood; it was something that the conditions of the rest of the war would make impossible. But at Guise it worked.

General Franchet d’Esperey was a dynamic, aggressive and skilful officer. He was thirsting for a chance to attack the enemy, who had seen the backs of his troops too often for his liking. He threw himself into this attack, swinging his Army Corps in on both sides of the shattered 10th Corps, and facing it due north towards Guise, where the Germans were streaming across the River Oise.

When he was satisfied that all was in order, he put himself, on horseback, with his Staff, at the head of one of his brigades, and gave the order to attack. As they went forward, d’Esperey called out to General Petain, once a Staff College lecturer, and now commanding a brigade: “Eh bien, Monsieur le Professeur à l’Ecole de Guerre, que pensez-vous de ce mouvement?”2

Petain’s reply is not recorded: probably he made none, for he was a taciturn man. But the “mouvement” itself was all that could be asked for. The long lines of French infantry, in their dark-blue great-coats and red trousers, swept forward with fixed bayonets, drums and bugles playing, the colours unfurled at the heads of the regiments.

A Napoleonic gesture, it was carried out in the Napoleonic manner, and for perhaps the last time in the War—in history—the manner was successful. The Germans were caught off balance, and thrown back into Guise.

The cautious von Biilow fell back, and the 5th Army saw the Germans in retreat for the first time. The Battle of St. Quentin had come to nothing, but the Battle of Guise was France’s first offensive success.

It was not, of course, a success that could be followed up. The true Lanrezac reasserted himself the following day, with a surly refusal to withdraw unless he received categorical orders to do so. He had dissociated himself in advance from his victory, making it clear that he fought only under instruction; now he dissociated himself from the consequences.

An error in the postal department of G.Q.G., which delayed his orders to retreat, almost brought about the destruction of his Army. He extracted it only in the nick of time. His whole performance, despite its tactical brilliance, had exposed the weakness of his character, and on September 3rd, the eve of the Battle of the Marne, Joffre replaced him by Franchet d’Esperey.

But Lanrezac’s unwilling victory had done its work. For von Kluck, going full tilt towards Amiens and beyond, now swung his Army back in a 90-degree turn to the southeast in response to von Billow’s appeals for help. This turn marked the final abandonment of the Schlieffen Plan.

It gave the 6th Army just the breathing-space it needed to become an effective force; it brought the Germans back into bewildering contact with the British, whom they thought they had destroyed, and made French’s ideas of complete withdrawal impossible as well as ridiculous; finally, it brought the outer flank of the German right wing inside the net that Joffre had devised.

The result was the Marne, one of the true decisive battles of history; but the Marne would have been impossible without the Battle of Guise. And the Battle of Guise owed everything to General Lanrezac, who had never believed in it at all.

1 “The 10th Corps must hold its positions at all costs... The 1st Corps must continue its march to the Oise, and only intervene on the 10th Corps front in the case of absolute necessity.”

2 “Well, Mr. Staff College Professor, what do you think of this movement?”