Algeria: Thirty Years On

Algeria is the eighth largest country in the world with a population of nearly 26 million. On July 5rd, 1962, it achieved independence from France after a long and bloody conflict which had lasted eight years and left a million Algerians dead.

The war against French colonialism was led by the National Liberation Front (FLN'). By 1962 the FLN had come to embody the spirit of the Algerian people in struggle, and in newly independent Algeria the FLN became an instant focus of myth and legend. The enormous prestige it enjoyed meant that few questioned the fact that the FLN was the only party allowed to operate. The FLN had defeated French colonialism, it was argued, now it represented the political force necessary to transform and modernise Algeria.

Thirty years later and the FLN has become a universal target of hatred amongst Algerians. At the general election in December 1991, the first of its kind in Algeria, the FLN could only manage a derisory sixteen seats out of 430. In a brutal manner this confirmed the complete marginalisation of the FLN on the Algerian political scene.

The French invaded Algeria in 1830 and in 1848 the Second French Republic annexed Algeria as an integral part of France, declaring it to be three French departments. Algerian resistance was not finally snuffed out until 1871. However from the late 1920s onwards voices within the Algerian community again began to clamour for complete independence. Gradually a small number of Algerian nationalists became convinced that the only answer was armed struggle and the FLN was formed, launching a war of national liberation against France on November 1st, 1954. In terms of strategy the FLN set out to bring the issue of Algerian independence to world attention through a campaign of terrorist bombings which began in 1956. To put down the rebellion the French resorted to extreme methods, including torture. In the short term this ensured military victory; but in the long term torture was counter-productive because it discredited France in the eyes of the world. Eventually France was forced to the negotiating table and in March 1962 talks began with the FLN which led to formal Algerian independence in July.

With independence the FLN moved from being a clandestine resistance movement to a party of government. The first government was headed by Ahmed Ben Bella and the economic, administrative and political problems he inherited from eight years of war were overwhelming. From 1962-65 Algeria tottered from crisis to crisis and such was the instability that in June 1965 Ben Bella was overthrown and imprisoned in a coup led by the head of the armed forces, Hourai Boumedienne. The dominant role within Algerian politics which had come to see itself as the custodian of the revolution, was now made plain.

Under Boumedienne Algeria was a success story. A concerted effort was made to industrialise and from 1969 to 19 73 Algeria achieved an annual growth of 9 per cent, financing this ambitious investment programme through oil and gas exports. Indeed Algeria became very much the pace setter in the Third World. However by the time of Boumedienne's death in 19 78 Algeria was confronted by rapidly growing economic problems. As the world economy stagnated and oil and gas prices fell sharply the economic strategy which worked under Boumedienne fell apart. Living standards deteriorated badly and unemployment and inflation soared; there were food shortages and electricity and water cuts. The new government, headed by another army officer, Chadli Benjedid, tried to solve the crisis through the introduction of free market reforms but these served only to exacerbate problems. In 1990 the economy shrank by 2.5 per cent while in 1991 three quarters of all export earnings went on paying interest on foreign debt. On top of this Algeria has the fastest growing population in the world and by 1991 unemployment amongst fifteen to twenty-nine year-olds had reached 5 million.

Amongst this mass of young unemployed, disenchantment with the one party state, characterised by growing corruption, became widespread. This simmering hatred and hostility finally erupted in a wave of strikes and food riots in October 1988. To restore order the FLN called in the army. The army used torture; thousands were arrested; and anything up to 500 people may have been killed. This violent response was the last straw for many Algerians, damaging the already tarnished reputation of the FLN beyond repair.

One incident particularly illustrates the depth of resentment felt on the part of the younger generation towards the FLN. During the riots one of the wartime leaders of the FLN arrived to confront the young Algerians who were destroying his furniture shop in the centre of Algiers. Through waving his FLN card at them and recounting what sacrifices he had made during the war of liberation he hoped to reason with the crowd and calm the situation down. His actions achieved nothing of the sort. To his borrow the rioters ignored his pleas and continued to ransack the shop.

The riots of October 1988 represent a turning point in the history of independent Algeria. In their wake Benjedid understood the necessity for political reforms to save the regime and in February 1989 other parties were allowed to form and multi-party elections promised. With such reforms Benjedid hoped to galvanise the political process and preserve the dominance of the FLN. Instead, however, they have precipitated, on the one hand the rapid demise of the FLN, and on the other, the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism as the major force in Algerian politics.

Islam arrived in the area of North Africa which includes modern Algeria with the Arab invasion at the end of the seventh century and quickly established itself as the dominant religion in the region thus becoming a central element of Algerian culture. Under colonialism it represented a separate space within which Algerians maintained a personal identity over and against the French settlers. After independence the new Algerian state declared itself to be Islamic socialist – based on a combination of Islamic principles and those of a socialist planned economy.

The 1980s saw the emergence of a radical religious movement, influenced by the Islamic revolution in Iran, which wanted to run Algeria entirely according to Islamic rules and was opposed to the FLN regime. The introduction of a multi-party system allowed this opposition to take shape in the form of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The FIS, which is organised from the mosques and led by preachers, blames the ills the people are suffering on the 'Westernisation' of society and sees the return to Muslim values as the way ahead. In this respect the FIS has made it clear that upon attaining power it would do away with democracy which is stigmatised as a foreign import totally unsuited to the needs of Algeria. Using the Quran as its starting point the FIS talks of social justice, better living standards and full employment and this has succeeded in mobilising the support of large sections of the poor and dispossessed. Significantly too through the mosques the FIS has real. roots within the community. After the earthquake just outside Algiers in November 1990 it was the FIS, rather than the authorities, that organised the relief work.

In Algeria's first multi-party elections, in June 199D, the FIS gained control of 856 local councils; then on December 26th, 1991, the FIS won the first round of the country's multi-party general elections gaining 188 out of 450 National Assembly seats. However the FIS victory was not unqualified. A low electoral turnout meant that the FIS won with less than a quarter of the eligible votes.

Fearful that they were going to lose power to the FIS the authorities, backed by the army, cancelled the second round of elections. Tanks rolled onto the streets of Algiers, and Benjedid, suspected of doing a deal with the FIS, was forced to resign. On January 16th a five-person council of state was set up to run the country headed by Mohammed Boudiaf, one of the wartime leaders of the FLN, who returned from exile in Morocco. Immediately Boudiaf emphasised that the council of state was merely an interim regime needed to protect the democratic process from the FIS.

Strong measures were now taken to break the FIS indefinitely. The FIS was outlawed and thousands of the party's members imprisoned as many Algerians believed that their country was about to be plunged into a bloody and bitter civil war. In fact this did not materialise to the relief of many, and since January the situation has stabilised. Nevertheless for large numbers of Algerians the council of state, brought to power by a military coup, has no legitimacy. Bridging this divide may yet prove to be an insurmountable problem for the new regime. Moreover the council of state must do something to overcome the grave economic problems which are at the root of the present crisis. Unless it does the spectre of an Islamic Algeria still looms large on the horizon.

Martin Evans has lecturered at Portsmouth Polytechnic