Crusades: The View from the East

The popular image of crusading is derived almost entirely from western accounts of the victorious First Crusade. Yet when historians examine Byzantine sources about the campaign a very different picture emerges, argues Peter Frankopan.

Imperial bodyguard: Viking mercenaries in a 12th-century Skylitzes manuscript. AKG Images / Biblioteca Nacional, MadridOn June 7th, 1099 the knights of the First Crusade reached the imposing walls of Jerusalem, the holiest city in Christendom. The journey had been long and painful. A vast force had set out for the east nearly three years earlier, roused by a passionate call to arms by Pope Urban II, who spent months criss-crossing France to galvanise support for a massive expedition to liberate the place where Jesus Christ had lived and was crucified.

Numbering as many as 100,000 at the outset, the army had shrunk dramatically on its way to Jerusalem. Some had fallen in battle when a massive Turkish force had attacked as the westerners crossed Asia Minor in the summer of 1097; others had been slaughtered before that, when an ill-advised foray to capture a Turkish fort led to surrender and execution. Desertion, too, reduced the size of the force before it reached the Holy City, as men looked to their own safety and fled home.

It was at Antioch, however, that most of the damage had been done. The Crusaders arrived at the city, one of the largest in the Middle East, just after the harvest had been brought in. They found trees groaning with fruit, vineyards bursting with grapes and store pits filled with corn. One wrote:

To start with we ate only the best cuts, rump and shoulders, scorned brisket and thought nothing of grain and wine. In these good times, only the watchmen along the walls reminded us of our enemies concealed inside Antioch.

Things soon deteriorated. Protected by formidable defences, Antioch proved all but impregnable and the resolve of its inhabitants remained stubborn. For months the Crusaders camped outside its walls, attempting to strangle the city into submission. They made little progress. As their supplies became exhausted morale plummeted. Conditions became so bad that some ate thistles and plant stalks – uncooked for lack of firewood. Horses, asses, camels, dogs and even rats were killed and eaten by the besiegers. As one chronicler wrote: ‘The poorer people ate even the hides of animals and the seeds of grain found in manure.’

It seemed that the expedition was doomed to fail. As disease and starvation took hold it was a matter of time before the westerners bowed to the inevitable: they were sitting targets. Twice they came within an inch of catastrophe, driving off Turkish forces sent to annihilate them when all logic dictated that they would be picked off once and for all. Finally, the day before a third army under the command of Kerbogha of Mosul arrived to seal their fate in June 1098, they got a lucky break. A deal was struck with a commander of one of Antioch’s mighty defensive towers and a small body of westerners scaled a section of the walls under the cover of night, fought their way through the city and flung the gates open, allowing their fellow Crusaders to stream in. Antioch finally fell after a siege lasting more than eight months. When yet another miraculous victory followed soon after there could be no doubt that God was smiling on the men who had set off from western Europe: the expedition enjoyed divine protection.

The men who found themselves standing in front of the walls of Jerusalem several months later were entitled to be impressed by their achievement, though not surprised. When Urban II had stood up at the Council of Clermont to implore knights to march to liberate the Holy City the cry had gone up: ‘Deus vult! Deus vult! Deus vult!’ – ‘God wills it! God wills it! God wills it!’ The knights had faced the darkest of moments on their way east and had repeatedly found solace and strength in their faith. Now they stood on the brink of receiving their rewards.

When Jerusalem fell barely a week after the Crusaders arrived, taken by force following a short siege, it marked the conclusion of one of the most extraordinary military campaigns in history. The objective of marching across Europe and Asia Minor into the heart of hostile territory was astonishingly ambitious. Little wonder then that the ultimate success made household names of those who took part, their collective and individual deeds celebrated in poetry and song, on coins and in churches. The First Crusade had ended in triumph.

It is the success of the First Crusade that underpins much of the enduring popularity of the Crusades as a whole. In fact almost all the many expeditions to the east that followed the capture of Jerusalem ended in failure. Later Crusades were racked by in-fighting, lack of discipline and poorly defined strategic objectives. In several cases campaigns aiming to bolster the precarious position in the Holy Land did not even get within striking distance. Popular images of the Crusade – the brave knight, the devout soldier driven by his faith, the struggle against adversity – owe much to that first, extraordinary adventure that saw men from western Europe break through the defences of the Holy City in July 1099. When politicians, social campaigners and demonstrators use the word ‘crusade’ to contextualise and explain their views, what they are talking about is not the Crusades as a whole, but specifically the successful and dramatic expedition unleashed at the end of the 11th century.

Perhaps not surprisingly the First Crusade has received enormous attention from scholars, not least over recent decades. An outstanding group of commentators, many of them British-trained, have made great advances in our understanding of the motivations, intentions and aims of those who took part in the call to arms famously issued by Urban II at Clermont in November 1095. So meticulous has been the scholarship, so thorough the research on the primary sources, that Jonathan Sumption recently wrote of a new volume on the First Crusade that while there was ‘nothing wrong with retelling a great story, even if one has little to add to the facts’, the fact of the matter is that ‘real originality is probably unattainable in this crowded field’.

The story of the expedition to Jerusalem is well-known and has been well-told over the centuries. However, while the archives of churches in France have been diligently trawled through and the many narrative accounts in Latin of the First Crusade looked at in detail, almost nothing has been done to examine the plentiful primary material relating to the eastern Mediterranean – from the Muslim world, from the Caucasus and, above all, from the Byzantine Empire.

Although much of this evidence is widely available it is often simply put to one side, discarded or left untouched. Material culture – coins, lead seals, inscriptions and the like – are routinely ignored, even though, in the case of many parts of the east, these are both plentiful and often illuminating for the later 11th century. Textual evidence is hardly treated better: passages from texts that refer to the Crusade are lifted and cited out of context, with no thought or consideration given to the significance or reliability of the authors’ material, their intention, or the wider context for their writing.

A case in point comes from the treatment of the Alexiad, a text written in Constantinople in the 12th century. Despite drawing extensively on imperial archives, official documents, military campaign notes, letters and information from the court, the text has been consistently misunderstood and misused. Gibbon fatuously labelled the text as ‘betraying in every page the vanity of a female author’ – a comment that, apart from begging a thorny set of questions as to what he actually meant, betrays the fact that he cannot have read the whole text. Modern scholars are no more forgiving. The blanket dismissal of the Alexiad as a work written long after the events ‘by an old lady living in exile’ is typical of the attitudes of Crusades historians. This highly crafted, subtle and erudite Byzantine source has been chronically underused, undervalued and misunderstood for centuries.

This has served not only to distort interpretation of the First Crusade, but to obscure its origins. In fact, when properly handled, the Alexiad – taken together with the other material from the eastern Mediterranean that has long gathered dust, glanced over in passing or in silence – does not so much open up new perspectives on the First Crusade as turn common conceptions about the expedition on their head. For it was not at Clermont in 1095 that the expedition to liberate Jerusalem took shape, but in Constantinople. Nor was it the pope who lay behind the plans for a massive campaign to the east, but another figure altogether: the Byzantine Emperor Alexios I Komnenos.

When the picture of the Crusade is re-jigged, pieces of the puzzle finally fall into place. For example, the question of why there was such concern with the situation in the east in the 1090s finally finds an answer. So, too, is it possible to resolve the conundrum of why the Crusaders endured such pain at Antioch and did not simply march past the city directly on to Jerusalem: it was Alexios I who was setting the agenda. In the place, then, of a story where all the facts are known and there is nothing new to be said a hidden story of the expedition finally emerges, one of personal ambitions and broken promises, of recrimination and accusation. The story of the expedition as we know it turns out to be a classic case of history being written by the winners.

Byzantium is the name now given to the eastern half of the Roman Empire, which not only survived but flourished after the decline of Rome itself. Its centre was the magnificent city re-founded by the Emperor Constantine in the fourth century on the banks of the Bosphorus – known to its inhabitants as the Queen of Cities, the city of Constantine (Constantinople), or simply, New Rome – and its ruler, the Emperor of the Romans. This was not a version of the Roman Empire, or a claimant to its legacy; this was the Roman empire.

By the beginning of the 11th century the empire was in rude health, sitting across territories that spread through the Balkans, southern Italy, the Aegean and extended across Asia Minor deep into the Caucasus and northern Syria. A long period of stability underpinned a major economic and demographic boom across the empire, in turn paving the way for increasing social mobility and the emergence of a vibrant intellectual, cultural and commercial scene.

The capital became a magnet for talented individuals like Michael Psellos, one of the most brilliant and prolific scholars of the early middle ages, or John Xiphilinos, an outstanding writer and cleric, and for large numbers from outside the empire, too. Men from Scandinavia travelled to Constantinople to take service as Varangians, who made up the imperial bodyguard. Anglo-Saxon nobles fleeing the Norman Conquest of England made their way to Byzantium, looking to rebuild their lives and to find new opportunities. Knights from across Europe were also drawn east, joining the army and finding no barrier to promotion: some were appointed to the highest positions in the imperial army and navy.

Constantinople was astonishingly cosmopolitan by the later part of the 11th century. As documents from this period show, there were countless nationalities living in the city, including Danes, Russians, Amalfitans, Pisans, Venetians, Alans, Armenians, Normans, Jews, Arabs, Englishmen and Scotsmen, to name just a few. Nor was the presence of so many foreigners coincidental: as seals found recently in London show, there were recruitment bureaux in London and elsewhere in Europe, where agents sought to attract men looking for fame and fortune to Byzantium.
The problem was that the empire’s neighbours also found themselves drawn in by the riches on offer. Dealing with them one at a time did not necessarily present a threat to Byzantium, but when the north, west and east all came under assault at the same time, it did not take long before the empire found itself teetering. Expenditure rose dramatically, while revenues collapsed as men were taken off the land, away from market places and seconded into the army. It did not take long for the empire’s finances to crumple, made worse by one military defeat after another. Southern Italy was lost to the Normans with barely a whimper, while little was done to stop the Pecheneg steppe nomads of Central Asia from rampaging in the Balkans. In Asia Minor an ambitious attempt to deal with the Turks ended in disaster: the major part of the army was decisively defeated after being lured into battle on unfavourable terrain near Manzikert in August 1071, when the emperor, Romanos IV, was captured.

In the wake of this disaster, a new ruler in Constantinople seized the throne and made an approach to Pope Gregory VII, requesting military assistance against the Turks – who had advanced, he said, up to the walls of the imperial capital itself. Keen to rebuild relations with the Orthodox Church following a vicious spat that resulted in the excommunication of the patriarch in 1054, Gregory obliged, sending a stream of letters out across Europe. Yet no expedition materialised – in sharp contrast to what happened two decades later when the floodgates opened. Historians have long struggled to explain why. While the pope made great efforts to galvanise support in the south, some have suggested that the lack of response was because his predecessor did not do the same 20 years earlier; others have argued that the rewards on offer to those who took part at the end of the 11th century were clearer – in terms of absolution and penance – and that this helps explain the staggeringly different reactions. In fact there is another answer.

The standard and long-accepted view of Byzantium in this period is that things reached a nadir around the time of the battle of Manzikert, before stabilising under a dynamic new emperor, a tough, young general named Alexios Komnenos, who took power in 1081. Alexios, so it seemed, led the empire back from the brink and by the time of the First Crusade was contemplating making a triumphant re-conquest of Asia Minor. This was why, apparently, he sent envoys to find Urban II at the Council of Piacenza in the spring of 1095.

This picture, however, is wrong and is based on erratic handling of the plentiful primary material. For example, although the Alexiad talks of chaos in the east at the start of Alexios’ reign, reporting bands of Turks advancing to the Bosphorus itself and taking control of most of Asia Minor, the reality was very different. As coin finds and lead seals from this period attest, the civil and military administration of the empire’s eastern provinces continued to function properly well after 1081. Moreover, far from facing a bleak position in the east, the new emperor took several bold steps in the first months after taking power to strengthen his hand in Anatolia.

In fact things worked out well for the emperor and his empire until 1092. But then suddenly and dramatically the situation changed. For the best part of a decade Alexios had co-operated regularly and productively with the ruler of Baghdad, Sultan Malik-Shah. When the latter died in 1092 a power struggle broke out among those hoping to succeed him, which in turn presented opportunities to ambitious local warlords on the periphery of the Turkish world, in Asia Minor above all. Byzantium found itself confronted by a series of hostile threats, losing control over the lush and strategically vital western coastline as well as the eastern Aegean. The crucial town of Nicaea, which had been ceded earlier in Alexios’ reign, became a thorn in the emperor’s side, used as a platform to knock out other important towns dangerously close to Constantinople.

Repeated and desperate attempts were made to recover Nicaea, all to no avail. It was not long before reports of rising Turkish violence and the empire’s desperate position in Asia Minor began to reach western Europe, both through official channels and through those who had seen for themselves how precarious Byzantium’s position was. With raids in the Balkans continuing unabated it seemed by the mid-1090s that the great eastern empire of Rome was at death’s door.

This was not lost on those closest to the emperor. Although Alexios has always been presumed to have centred his power and authority on his family, monastery foundation documents, letters and speeches – usually overlooked – reveal a much darker picture, one not of family unity, but quite the opposite: fracture, rivalry and ruthlessness.

Byzantium descended into anarchy. Plot after plot was uncovered, implicating many of those closest to the emperor. By 1094 things reached breaking point. With Asia Minor in flames and the Balkans in chaos, Alexios was forced to face down his rivals, including his brother, who was baying for his blood. In a moment of high drama the emperor assembled the senior officers in the army, together with leading figures in the empire and addressed them, knowing there was a good chance he would be hacked to death on the spot.

At that crucial moment the plotters’ nerve failed them and Alexios reacted immediately. He undertook a root and branch purge of the military, replacing a swathe of senior figures with a new generation of men of whose loyalty he felt assured. He brokered quick agreements with local leaders in the Balkans and then acted decisively. To staunch the haemorrhage in the empire he needed above all to recover Nicaea, the key to western Asia Minor, and, if possible, Antioch too. He had one last ace to play.

Alexios was a devout man, brought up by his mother to have a ‘deeply implanted fear of the Lord’. He had worked hard to build bridges with Rome, sending a string of conciliatory messages to Urban II in which he played down differences between the Latin and the Greek rites in the liturgy (a major area of dispute) and offering to resolve once and for all the problems that had simmered under the surface for generations.

His appeal to the pope for military help was well-timed, for Urban had his own problems with the church in western Europe, where divisions resulting from the investiture crisis, which saw the installation of an antipope, meant that he could barely even enter Rome in the first years of his pontificate. Alexios’ problems and need for assistance were a godsend: here was the chance to unite the Christian church once and for all. No wonder, then, that the pope spent much of the next year canvassing, cajoling and insisting that men make the journey east.

In fact it is Alexios’ spectre, long painted out of the picture, that looms over the logistics of much of the Crusade. The fact that the vast armies experienced no problems of supply as they crossed imperial territory is testimony to first-class organisation on the part of the Byzantines; so, too, were the exemplary preparations that had been made to receive the main leaders of the expedition. Camps had been readied, quarters prepared and officials appointed to ensure things went smoothly.

Perhaps most important, though, were the mechanics to ensure that Alexios retained control over the campaign. Oaths were demanded – and given – in Constantinople, sworn in western customary fashion, that bound the senior figures to the person of the emperor. Commitments were given whereby all towns, forts and territories recovered by the westerners that had previously been under Byzantine control would be restored to the empire. Alexios himself made clear that he could not take part personally in the expedition, but appointed one of the few senior officers who had survived the purge – the son of a Turkish captive who had grown up with him – to lead the imperial forces.

By the time Nicaea fell, taken by force, some were already muttering about Alexios getting all the benefits of the western force’s power. By the time they reached Antioch and suffered over the winter of 1097-8 mistrust and antagonism had spiralled dangerously out of control. One Crusader was quick to capitalise: Bohemond, the Norman Prince of Taranto in southern Italy. Sensing his chance to seize Antioch for himself, he took the opportunity to undermine the emperor at every instance – including appending a postscript in a letter to the pope accusing Alexios of betraying the western knights at every turn. The emperor, he claimed, had not fulfilled his obligations; the oaths given to him were therefore null and void.

Not all were convinced by Bohemond playing hard and fast with the commitments they had given – and also with his nimble manoeuvring that saw him in pole position to take control of Antioch, one of the great cities of the eastern Mediterranean, for himself. But Bohemond played his poker hand to perfection. Losing patience, the other leaders eventually set off for Jerusalem to complete their journey without him.

Urban II never learnt that the Holy City had fallen. Nor did he live to see that in what later came to be seen as a moment of triumph for the church was in fact the moment where the Latin and Orthodox churches split decisively. For, in the aftermath of the Crusade, a strong story was needed to paint the expedition in a way that suited those who otherwise had awkward questions to answer.

Not surprisingly Bohemond was the most vigorous in revealing the shortcomings of Alexios and of the Byzantines. A text, the Gesta Francorum, was quickly produced and widely disseminated, in which the emperor was vilified, mocked and presented in a deeply unflattering light (in sharp contrast to Bohemond’s own heroism). Worse was to follow: after a series of adventures and mishaps, Bohemond eventually came back to Europe, where his celebrity preceded him. Before long he was seeking support for a military campaign no less ambitious than the conquest of Jerusalem: this Crusade, however, with papal support, was not aimed at a city held by Muslims, but at the Christian metropolis of Constantinople.

In the build-up empire and emperor were vilified in a smear campaign that the most devious spin doctor and master of dark arts would be impressed by. Stories swirled around Europe that Alexios’ mother was a witch; or that he forcibly castrated sons of the aristocracy in Constantinople or forced women into prostitution. He was a coward, a villain and completely untrustworthy. He was lifted, in other words, out of history and cast into the shadows.

He has remained there for centuries, largely because of the careless and thoughtless way that the medieval Greek sources have been handled. Accounts, like the Alexiad, have been read as though they were chronicles, rather than as stylised works of literature which intentionally leave clues to test the reader rather than aim to present a chronological table of facts. There are letters setting out the catastrophic series of setbacks on the eve of the Crusade that have been dismissed as simply being implausible because they do not tally with the received opinion on what was happening in the late 11th century – branded instead as a later forgery. Documents recording the grant of concessions to Venice have had their dates changed arbitrarily and without any basis to better suit a chronology that is itself badly flawed.

The First Crusade was certainly an astonishingly ambitious feat, with many of those who took part driven by genuine devotion, and by an unbending desire to see those places that appear in the Bible. The challenges that were overcome during the long march were almost unimaginable in their magnitude. Equally, the role played by the pope in galvanising the expedition, in making sure large numbers of men took part, cannot be questioned.

But, having said that, the basic framework for one of the greatest military achievements in history was intentionally obscured even before Jerusalem fell in July 1099. This was no campaign to help a triumphant conquest of Asia Minor, but a last-ditch attempt to save the Byzantine Empire. In that sense, the loud voices celebrating the Crusaders’ achievements at the same time as vilifying Byzantium were perhaps a price worth paying for the recovery of Nicaea and the other important gains that followed soon after – at least from Alexios’ point of view. What is perhaps harder to understand, however, is how it has taken so long to see that the western ‘success’ brought other costs. In the first instance those included the breakdown of the churches; but in the long run it sowed the seeds that led to the devastation of Constantinople in 1204 and, ultimately, the death of the eastern Roman Empire.

Peter Frankopan is Senior Research Fellow at Worcester College, Oxford and Director of the Oxford Centre for Byzantine Research. His book The First Crusade: The Call from the East (Bodley Head, 2012) has been shortlised for the Criticos Prize.