Paris Peace Discord

Hugh Purcell looks at how, 90 years ago, the British Empire rejected the principle of racial equality on which the Commonwealth is now based.

The Commonwealth, which celebrates its 60th anniversary this year, is dedicated to the principle of racial equality. The Singapore Declaration of 1971 proclaims: 'We believe in equal rights for all citizens regardless of race ... We recognise racial prejudice as a dangerous sickness ... and racial discrimination as an unmitigated evil of society.' Yet it was the British Empire Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 that effectively prevented the so-called 'racial equality clause' from inclusion in the Covenant of the League of Nations, which was signed 90 years ago.

The presence of the delegation in Paris was due to Prime Minister Lloyd George who two years before had heeded the call of a previous prime minister of Canada - 'if you want our aid, call us to your councils' - by summoning an Imperial War Cabinet. The so-called 'White Dominions' of Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand sent their prime ministers and India was represented too. Although India was not a self-governing Dominion, its commitment of one million men to the Allied armies, of whom nearly 80,000 lost their lives, was considered justification enough for inclusion.

Three Imperial War Cabinets were held from 1917 to 1918 and at them the prime ministers of Canada and Australia, in particular, became increasingly outspoken. Sir Robert Borden of Canada referred to the 'incompetence and blundering stupidity of the whisky and soda British HQ staff while 'Billy' Hughes of Australia opined that had he been consulted he would never have agreed to Third Ypres, the terrible failed offensive called Passchendaele. So when they discovered that they were expected to tag along to the Peace Conference as part of the British delegation they were furious. Borden threatened to 'pack his trunks, return to Canada, summon parliament and put the whole thing before them'.

The truth was that the White Dominions and India, too, saw the Peace Conference as the ideal forum at which to assert their growing independence. Borden said candidly: 'Canada is a nation that is not a nation and it is about time we altered it.' They demanded their own representation. One British diplomat whined: 'It is all very inconvenient but what was the Foreign Office to do?' In the end Lloyd George gave in and persuaded the other two members of the 'Big Three' in the Supreme Council, President Wilson of the US and Prime Minister Clemenceau of France, to allow Canada, Australia, South Africa and India two 'plenipotentiaries' (ambassadors) each and New Zealand one. Together with the British members of the British Empire Delegation they formed a formidable power block of about a dozen votes.

In mid-January 1919 they all met at the Hotel Majestic in Paris. In her book Peacemakers Margaret MacMillan compared the scene to arriving at boarding school for a new term:

If the British were the masters and the matrons, the Canadians were the senior prefects, a little bit serious perhaps, but reliable, the South Africans were the new boys, good at games and much admired for their sporting instincts, the Australians the cheeky ones, always ready to break bounds, and then, of course, the Indians, nice chaps in spite of the colour of their skin, but whose parents were threatening to pull them out and send them to a progressive school.

The two Indian plenipotentiaries, the Maharaja of Bikaner and Lord Sinha, were Anglophiles who had been chosen without reference to the Congress Party which was just beginning to demand swaraj or complete home rule instead of autonomy within the Empire.

President Wilson insisted that the first major task of the Peace Conference was to set up an assembly of the world's nations to try to make further war impossible, an ideal to which most international statesmen aspired. As the British diplomat Harold Nicolson put it: 'We journeyed to Paris not merely to liquidate the war but to found a new order in Europe. We were preparing not Peace only, but Eternal Peace.'

This was to become the League of Nations and from the beginning the Dominions aimed to join the League as independent nations, with the right to vote against Britain if necessary. Hughes said: 'It will be one of those questions at the Conference which would most vitally concern the Dominions.' This they achieved, including India, although membership was supposedly confined to 'self-governing States, Dominions or Colonies'.

On January 25th the Plenary Conference approved a Covenant Committee to draw up a framework for the League. The two members on the Committee from the British Empire Delegation were General Jan Smuts of South Africa and Lord Robert Cecil of Britain. They shared much in common. Both thin and austere-looking but passionate beneath the surface, they genuinely wanted to make the world a better place. Both were moralistic lawyers with a commitment to public service, both had already discussed their principles for a new world order with Wilson, a man after their own hearts. It is ironic, therefore, that the blame for rejecting any clause in the Covenant on racial equality, the 'self-evident truth that all men are created equal', according to the American Declaration of Independence of 1776, must lie with them.

It was the Japanese plenipotentiary, Baron Makino, who first proposed a racial equality clause in the Covenant Committee on February 13th. He did so most tactfully, assuring his colleagues that he only wished to establish the principle of racial equality and each nation could be left to work out its own policy in practice. He simply wanted an extension to the proposed Article 21, the so-called 'religion clause':

The High Contracting parties agree that they will not prohibit the free exercise of any creed, religion or belief whose practices are not inconsistent with public order and no person shall be molested in life or liberty by reason of his adherence to such creed, religion or belief.

Why not, said Makino, apply this principle to race? Was not the League itself a family of nations? Specifically, he proposed that:

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all alien nationals of states members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or fact, on account of their race or nationality.

Makino presented this as an obvious truth, at least when statesmen were gathered together to voice noble platitudes, but in fact he had his own agenda. The Japanese were furious that they were not allowed to settle freely on the west coast of the US and that they were kept out of Australia altogether, even though they had been allies in the war just two months before. 'Billy' Hughes put it around Paris that the real aim of the Japanese proposal, however Makino might frame it, was to enable his over-populated nation to settle anywhere round the Pacific. If it was accepted, he raged: 'Our White Australia policy would be a pricked bladder. Our control of immigration laws would be so much waste paper.' It was an early demonstration of the 'yellow peril' phobia.

Perhaps it is not surprising that Makino's proposal was met with silence. Then, according to David Hunter Miller, a professional drafter attached to the American Delegation who was at the meeting, the Acting Chairman Robert Cecil (President Wilson was away) replied, in para- phrase, that 'it was a ques- tion which had raised extremely serious prob- lems within the British Empire Delegation. In spite of the nobility of thought which inspired Baron Makino, he thought it would be wiser for the moment to post- pone its examination.' There was scarcely any dissent and Article 21 was dropped altogether. But Baron Makino said he had no intention of leaving the matter; he would raise it again.

The truth was that the White Dominions were almost by definition racist. Could they claim to regard their indigenous peoples as equal: the Inuit in Canada, the Bantu in South Africa, the Aborigine in Australia, the Maori in New Zealand? The Europeans took a more sophisticated view that nevertheless reflected the prejudice of the age. The British Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour murmured on a previous occasion that he found the proposition of equality interesting but he did not really believe it - you could scarcely say a man living in central Africa was equal to a European!

Makino's next opportunity came during the 15th meeting of the Covenant Committee on April 11th. By now he had carefully toned down his proposal. There was no mention of race. Makino merely wanted to insert in the preamble to the Covenant the words '... by the endorsement of the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of nationals ...'. Today this proposition seems uncontroversial. However, according to 'Billy' Hughes's autobiography Policies and Potentates, he had been involved in a row with Makino the night before, followed by several hours of scheming behind-thescenes. The result of this was to put Wilson in a difficult position. Apparently the Japanese plenipotentiary had come to see him 'beslobbering me with genuflexions and obsequious deference' to say that he had persuaded both Smuts and Cecil to vote for the racial equality clause the next day. Hughes had seen the danger. His main aim in Paris was to ban the Japanese not just from Australia but also from all the Pacific islands south of the equator and Prime Minister Massey of New Zealand supported him. Aware that Wilson needed votes from the west coast of California to get the overall League package through Congress, Hughes had worked on the hostile American press through the night by telephone, stirring up its xenophobic fears.

Hence the stage was set for the inglorious act that ditched the 'self-evident truth' of racial equality from the Covenant of the League of Nations. Makino made his proposal late in the evening when everyone was tired and fractious. He made a good impression and the delegates from France, Italy, China and Greece spoke in his favour. Then it was the turn of Lord Cecil. He refused to accept the amendment, saying he was acting under instructions from his government. According to Hunter Miller:

It seemed to me at the time that Cecil felt he was performing a disagreeable duty. After making his statement he sat with his eyes fixed on the table, and took no part in the subsequent debate.

Smuts, perhaps significantly, did not attend the meeting. Then Woodrow Wilson's closest adviser, Colonel House, passed the President a note: 'The trouble is that if the Commission [the Covenant Committee] should pass it [the amendment], it would surely raise the race issue throughout the world.'

Wilson took the point and addressed the meeting in his headmasterly way, frank but firm. He said that the League was Obviously based on the principle of the equality of nations' but once you spelt it out you invited 'embarrassments'. It was his own interest 'to quieten discussion that raises national differences and racial prejudices'.

It must have taken courage to defy the Chairman and Deputy Chairman who represented the two most important power blocks in the world, but defy them they did. The delegates demanded a vote. When the affirmative votes were counted they came to 11 out of the 17 present. Then, to dismay and indignation, Wilson refused to accept the amendment. He said that on such a contentious issue a unanimous vote was needed and there were 'serious objections on the part of some of us'. According to Hunter Miller, this was a clear reference to Cecil and the British Empire Delegation; it was they who prevented the adoption. In vain did delegate Larnaude of France protest that Wilson was out of order; there was nothing in the constitution that required unanimity. The meeting ended and Hunter Miller noted:

Although it was known to be the last meeting of the Commission, there were none of the customary closing remarks as there had been a good deal of feeling displayed, particularly by the French and the Japanese were undoubtedly very disappointed.

Baron Makino's final opportunity came on April 28th when the full Plenary Conference was to vote on the revised Covenant. That morning the British Empire Delegation held a meeting to discuss its tactics. Smuts reported that Makino was going to raise the issue of racial equality again. Borden, who often took the lead in these discussions, said that: 'He felt the proposal might be accepted but he had agreed with the other Dominions that if the words went into the Covenant there would need to be another specific amendment to the Covenant recognising that naturalisation and emigration were matters of domestic concern. He knew, however, that the Japanese would not agree with this' [Minutes of meeting].

Lord Sinha, a shy and diminutive Bengali lawyer, said bravely that if there would be a chance in the Plenary Conference to vote then he would vote with the Japanese and George Barnes, a British delegate who was a Labour Minister in Lloyd George's coalition Government, agreed with him.

In the end there was no chance to vote. That afternoon Makino did raise the issue but no one seemed to be listening. He gave up but ended with the warning that the Japanese might well lose faith with the principles that guided the League:

Such a frame of mind, I am afraid, would be most detrimental to that harmony and cooperation upon which foundation alone can the League now be contemplated to be securely built.

He was prophetic. In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria; in 1933 it left the League and so began its aggression that led it into the Second World War.

Now that the Commonwealth is so proud to trumpet its commitment to racial equality, perhaps it is worth remembering Robert Cecil's oracular observation after that inglorious meeting on April 11th, 1919:

It is better that the Covenant be silent on these questions of right. Silence would avoid much discussion.