Shifting Perspectives on the Great Rebellion

Austin Woolrych reflects on how historians’ approaches to the events of 1640-60 have been changing over the half century that he has been working on the period.

When the editor heard that I had recently completed a blockbuster which attempts to tell the general reader what the commotions in England, Scotland and Ireland between 1637 and 1660 were all about, and how they interacted, he suggested that I might write a piece about some of the themes that had preoccupied me during my book’s long gestation. I gladly accepted, and I thought it might be interesting to consider how historians’ assumptions about the period had changed since I began to work on it fifty-odd years ago, and how the focus of their attention has shifted. What follows is a broad-brushed sketch; so it will inevitably fail to name many scholars who have contributed importantly to the great enlargement of knowledge.

The academic world of the mid-twentieth century was largely dominated by ‘historical materialism’, and the prevailing form that it took was Marxist. The key to the historical process, it taught, lay in the forces of production, and in any community the social class that controlled them would sooner or later wield political power. All true revolutions (so it went) are social revolutions, and they occur when there is a mismatch between the class that has achieved economic dominance and the class that controls the machinery of government. In England in 1642, as in France in 1789 and in Russia in 1917, a monarchy identified with a decayed aristocracy was challenged and overthrown by a rising bourgeoisie, for it was argued that the greater part of the English gentry had become entrepreneurial and formed a single class with the big merchants of London and other important towns. Not all historians who accepted this broad pattern were professing Marxists, or aimed at a Communist regime in contemporary England; R.H. Tawney, for instance, the most famous expositor of a ‘rise of the gentry’, was a Christian Socialist. But one can see why the Marxist interpretation of history had so much appeal after the Second World War, especially when its exponents wrote as persuasively as Christopher Hill. It was elegant, comprehensive and it claimed to be scientific. It stood at the opposite ideological pole from Fascism. Russia had made the largest single contribution to the defeat of Hitler and paid the heaviest price; the horrors of the purges and the gulags were as yet unknown. Hopes were bright for the liberated lands of Eastern Europe, for the People’s Republic of China, and for Asian and African countries on the brink of throwing off colonial control. The nasty tactics of Senator Joe McCarthy against American Communists, real and supposed, made liberal-minded academics on both sides of the Atlantic more sympathetic to the ideas he attacked. Today, after all that has happened in Russia and eastern Europe, in China, Cambodia and in much of post-colonial Africa, the vision of socialist banners flying over a brave new world is not quite so bright.

But though such experiences have naturally helped to make us view the ‘English Revolution’ afresh, the main changes in our perspectives have come about because historians have been asking fresh questions about it and combing the sources, old and new, for the answers. There was, however, a good deal of ideological baggage to be jettisoned before the work could go forward freely. The presumption that revolutions have a common origin, and once launched follow a more or less predictable course, led to an over-narrow concentration on the causes of the Civil War and a relative neglect of what actually happened during and after it. To the puzzlement of myself, an El Alamein survivor, few historians seemed to remember that wars are commonly won on battlefields. Military history was left to retired professional soldiers (whose contribution deserves recognition) and amateur battlefield buffs. Academics were too preoccupied with what, by the laws of historical materialism, ought to have been happening that they risked losing sight of what was actually going on in Caroline England. Interestingly, the main challenge to the prevailing view of the Civil War as launching a bourgeois revolution merely stood the class-war line of interpretation on its head. Hugh Trevor-Roper (now Lord Dacre) argued that the core of the parliamentary party consisted not of rising but of declining gentry, for ‘mere’ landowners who depended on rents and agricultural production for their living were currently a disadvantaged class. The main dispenser of wealth was the court, in the broadest sense: the crown itself, the swollen royal household, the whole body of office-holders who constituted the government and judiciary, the rich merchants who profited from royal monopolies and membership of exclusive chartered companies, and by extension all those members of the county elites who benefited from the patronage of royal officials and courtiers. The Civil War, therefore, was not in essence a contest between a declining feudal order and a rising bourgeoisie, but between court and country – so the Trevor-Roper thesis went.

One distinguished writer, not an academic, swam against the tide. In The King’s Peace, The King’s War and The Trial of Charles I, C.V. Wedgwood set out to narrate the actual course of events from 1637 onward, and to account for them as closely as possible in terms of what the chief participants believed they were contending for at the time. This was surely as valid an exercise as that of the class-warriors, but academic critics took her to task for merely telling a story (which was not true); as one put it, her ‘refusal to analyse makes it impossible to see below the surface of mere events’. But a foolish undervaluation of narrative history – ‘mere events’ – was widespread in post-war academia, and it stemmed partly from the influence of the so-called Annales school, the contributors to the French journal Annales d’histoire économique et sociale. Men like Fernand Braudel and Marc Bloch deserve to be honoured for broadening of the scope of historical studies, but in relegating what they called histoire événementielle to an inferior status as they charted ‘the great currents of universal history’ they did students of the mid-seventeenth-century upheavals in Britain no favours. When episodes of radical and accelerated change occur, they require close scrutiny if the patterns of the longue durée are to be correctly drawn.

The welter of ill-supported generalisation thrown up by the gentry controversy sent historians to the archives, and the results of their researches proved wonderfully illuminating. They loosened the ideological shackles, and sent us back to the period with open minds. Particularly fruitful were the many close studies of different political groups and local communities. Douglas Brunton and Donald Pennington, for instance, investigated all 800 MPs who sat in the Long Parliament down to 1653, and concluded that the way they split in the Civil Wars had little to do with economic interest or social class. Gerald Aylmer studied the whole body of men who held places of profit under Charles I down to 1642 – the court in its widest sense – and concluded that those who actively supported him in the war were slightly outnumbered by those (combined) who sided with  Parliament or stayed as neutral as they could. Neutralism, Brian Manning showed, was much more widespread than we had realised, and was often based more on principle than expediency. Valerie Pearl’s work on the corporation of the City of London revealed that Parliament won its support only through a forceful Puritan takeover in 1642.

The greatest collective contribution, however, came from a succession of studies of local communities, most of them counties, but also of particular cities or well-defined regions that transcended county boundaries. These demonstrated how widely such communities, even neighbouring counties, could differ in their socio-economic make-up: in the influence wielded over them by titled magnates, in the numbers and wealth of their untitled gentry, in their proportions of arable land and pasture, in the importance to their economies of trade and manufacture, in the survival or decline of manorial institutions, and in much else. These regional studies transformed our knowledge of what determined allegiance in the Civil Wars, for they showed how greatly local issues could affect the choice of sides, and how significantly it could be influenced by social orders below the gentry. Most strikingly, they restored religion to the powerful role from which the historical materialists had temporarily deposed it. John Morrill, a major contributor to regional history, went so far as to declare in 1984 that ‘the English civil war was not the first European revolution: it was the last of the Wars of Religion’.

While the diversity of English provincial history was being thus revealed, our knowledge of Scotland and Ireland in the period was enormously enriched by (among others) James Stevenson and Frances Dow in the case of Scotland and Aidan Clarke, T.C. Barnard and K.S. Bottigheimer in that of Ireland. They have reminded us of what the classic historians from Clarendon to Gardiner always knew: that to focus on England to the exclusion of her neighbour-kingdoms can lead only to distortion, especially down to 1651. Conrad Russell achieved a new level in integrating the history of all three, in great detail, in The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637-1642. For reasons of space, however, the present article must concentrate on England.

With the gradual abandonment of the notion that England was following a pattern of revolution along a more or less predictable course, historians ceased to over-concentrate on ‘the causes of the Civil War’ and shifted the focus of their interest forward in time to what was actually happening in the 1640s and after. So far from Parliament’s victory being a foregone conclusion, thanks to the supposed support of the City of London and the economically superior classes elsewhere, the outcome of the war hung in the balance until the New Model Army took the field in 1645. The political divisions within the wartime Parliament proved quite as fascinating a field of study as those between royalists and parliamentarians, and the New Model soon became a political force in its own right. There was also a growing interest in ‘history from below’. The Levellers and Diggers had already been under keen scrutiny before and during the Second World War, but they received fresh and more critical attention. So did the impact of the wars on the common people who bore so much of their burden, whether they actually fought in them or not. The Clubmen movements, through which local communities sought to protect themselves from the ravages of the armies of both sides, offered a rich vein of exploration. So did the explosion of radical religious sects, from Particular Baptists through Fifth Monarchy men to Quakers. Christopher Hill’s The World Turned Upside Down deservedly became a classic. But close study was showing that the Levellers were not quite the ancestors of modern social democracy that they had seemed, and that the communistic Diggers had many intellectual roots in common with the millenarians who looked forward to Christ’s kingdom on earth and a ‘rule of the saints’. One reason why the cause of manhood suffrage made such limited progress was that many people from much the same social background as most Levellers believed that God had given victory to the Parliament’s armies in order to advance the interest of His People, so that to give equal political rights to saints and sinners would be to fly impiously in the face of providence.

So many turns of events hung on human decisions rather than inexorable forces. The New Model Army would have seen Charles I back to his throne if he had accepted its not ungenerous ‘Heads of Proposals’ in 1647, instead of launching the Second Civil War – an entirely avoidable conflict. Was his fate inevitable after he lost it? Probably, I believe, but even as I write Sean Kelsey has work in the press which argues that neither Charles’s prosecutors nor himself desired or expected that his trial would lead to his death.

Any lingering notion that the regicide inaugurated any kind of revolutionary regime was killed by two landmark studies in the early 1970s, David Underdown’s Pride’s Purge and Blair Worden’s The Rump Parliament. There were still revolutionary elements afoot, but they were firmly kept out of the seats of power. Briefly, there was a prospect that the Levellers might influence the settlement of the constitution through a modified Agreement of the People that their leaders put before the General Council of the Army just before the King’s trial, but they blew their chances by going into seditious opposition to the government as soon as the General Council presented the Agreement to Parliament as the agreed programme of the army, on the grounds that the officers had modified (not very damagingly) its sacred text. The Rump – what was left of the Long Parliament after the army had forcibly excluded the overt monarchists in Pride’s Purge – was only too glad to shelve the Agreement and forget it. The House became increasingly conservative as more and more members who had had no part in the regicide returned to their seats. It had proclaimed the principle that supreme power should lie in the chosen representatives of the sovereign people, but its problem was that most of that minority of the people who had the vote did not want a republic at all. Before putting the King on trial, it had promised early general elections, but the promise was still unfulfilled four years later, largely because it feared that any really free elections would return a majority in favour of restoring the monarchy.

This increasingly angered the army, when it had completed its work of subduing Scotland and Ireland. It had justifiably claimed that it was ‘not a mere mercenary army, hired to serve any arbitrary power of a state’, and equally justifiably it felt that the Rump had done all too little in the way of reformation, especially in the spheres of the law and social justice. Yet when Cromwell finally expelled the Rump in April 1653, his motives for doing so are still a matter for disagreement among historians – though controversies are conducted in much more civil terms than was typical fifty years ago, and they do not break friendships. One thing we agree on is that Cromwell, far from seeking a personal dictatorship, had little idea what to do next, and his officers were divided on the matter. What he and they decided was to nominate 140 men, drawn from all the English counties and from Scotland, Ireland and Wales, to act as a sort of surrogate parliament until the Commonwealth was sufficiently settled for elections to be held with safety. My contribution to the work of revision was to show that ‘Barebone’s Parliament’, as some called it after a quaintly named member, was not the pack of socially obscure fanatics of royalist legend, but a serious, gentry-dominated body whose legislative achievement outshone that of the Rump. It foundered long before its appointed sixteen-month term because an aggressive minority within it tried to steer it towards an over-radical reform of the law and a millenarian rule of the saints. In response, the moderate majority staged a walk-out and resigned its power back into Cromwell’s hands.

This time, the leading army officers were not unprepared. A small group of them had agreed on a written constitution called the Instrument of Government, devised mainly by Major-General Lambert but deriving strongly from the army’s earlier Heads of Proposals. In its original version it named Cromwell as king, but he would not hear of the title and became Lord Protector. It set quite strict limits on his personal political authority, and that he welcomed. It certainly did not make him a dictator, and in this regard the popular view of him required major revision, and probably still does. From the 1930s, English and American perceptions of the Protectorate were distorted by the shadows of dictatorships that then hung over Europe, and by false analogies with Napoleon and Stalin. We have seen the focus of historians’ interest moving forward in time into the 1650s (without abandoning the 1640s), but regarding Cromwell’s period as head of state, which began in December 1653, and there is still some reassessment to be done.

The tag of ‘military dictatorship’ still clings to Cromwell’s rule, but he never ceased to be a convinced constitutionalist. The one phase in which military power was undoubtedly excessive was that in which England was divided into eleven districts, each presided over by a major-general. But the full operation of this regime was quite short and Christopher Durston’s recent Cromwell’s Major-Generals: Godly Government during the English Revolution (2001) has demonstrated that the major-generals were neither the ‘bashaws’ of royalist propaganda nor universally unpopular. They represented an understandable over-reaction to the one serious attempt at royalist rebellion in the 1650s, Penruddock’s Rising. David Underdown has shown us in Royalist Conspiracy of England, 1649-1660, how reluctant most of the King’s friends were to risk their necks in his cause, but Cromwell could not have been expected to know it in 1655.

Cromwell’s dilemma lay in the inconsistency between, on the one hand, his sincere belief in constitutional restraints and the rule of law, and on the other his conviction that God’s purpose in blessing his arms was to promote the propagation of true religion and the moral regeneration of the nation through ‘a reformation of manners’. Most MPs and JPs, however, were much less interested in moral crusading than in reducing the cost of his army. Yet serving officers were a minority in the Council of State, which wielded more influence in political decision-making than used to be realised, and a small minority in local government. By other common criteria of dictatorship, such as the forcing of consciences and the number of political prisoners, the Protectorate had an almost clean record. It  rarely interfered with the due process of law in the civil courts, and the only people who suffered death for political offences were those who practised or plotted rebellion against the state or conspired to assassinate its head.

There is some danger of underestimating the promise held forth by the new constitution, known as the Humble Petition and Advice, that Cromwell negotiated with his second parliament. Only its renewed offer of the crown really stuck with him, for he believed that providence had condemned the title itself as well as its last holder. In other respects, it consolidated the best of what the Long Parliament had fought for, and anticipated much that would be enshrined in the Revolutionary Settlement from 1689 onward, except that its broad toleration did not extend to ‘popery or prelacy’. Unhappily, Cromwell’s health was failing when the Petition and Advice was promulgated, and he died in September 1658. If he had had two or three more years in full possession of his powers and a more adequate successor than his son Richard, the course of history might have been very different. England might have been spared such stains on the post-Restoration record as the Clarendon Code, the secret treaty of Dover, the Exclusion Crisis and the Bloody Assize. As it was, Richard Cromwell was betrayed by such over-ambitious officers as Desborough, Fleetwood and Lambert, who were smarting from Oliver’s success in cutting them down to political size. They forced him to dissolve his only parliament and recall the Rump to supreme power. When they quarrelled with the Rump in turn and put it out of doors again, General Monck, whose loyalty to the house of Cromwell had been impeccable, began to think that the only way back to ordered, lawful government might lie through the recall of the king.

So how stands today the concept of the English Revolution, as it was widely received sixty and more years ago? Certainly there was nothing like the social revolution then imagined. Lawrence Stone, once a pupil and disciple of Tawney, showed in The Crisis of the Aristocracy that the titled nobility were not a particularly feudal class by 1641, and were on the whole making a good recovery from their economic difficulties of a generation earlier. They still had a long political future ahead of them. There was no major change in the composition of the gentry, for the majority of royalist landlords who lost their estates showed a striking degree of success in recovering them. There is no denying the extent of political upheaval in the 1640s and 1650s, but should these two decades be seen as a self-contained episode that ended with the Restoration? My new book portrays them rather as the violent initiation of a process of political change that was to suffer a temporary setback in 1660, but would reach fruition in such measures as the Bill of Rights of 1689, the Toleration Act of 1694, the Act of Settlement of 1701 and the Act of Union of 1707.

What I can say most confidently is that it is more fun to write about the events of the mid-seventeenth century now than it would have been fifty years ago, because there is no pressure to force them into the mould of a preconceived model. Today one need not be ashamed of telling a story, so long as it is as true as one can make it. One feels free to speculate as to how things might have gone if a crucial decision had been taken differently, or if the fortunes of war had swung the other way in a key battle, or if this man had lived longer or that one died earlier. One can give due (but not undue) weight to human choice and human error, and to sheer contingency. Above all, the devoted work of scores of scholars in national and local and family archives, and among the 20,000-odd pamphlets and newspapers published between 1640 and 1660, has taken us further than ever before into the experiences and ideas and emotions of the men and women who lived through those troubled years.

For Further Reading:

R.C. Richardson, The Debate on the English Revolution Revisited (1988); Alastair MacLachlan, The Rise and Fall of Revolutionary England; John Morrill, Revolt in the Provinces (1999); David Underdown,A Freeborn People (1996); G.E. Aylmer, Rebellion or Revolution? England 1640-1660 (1986); Blair Worden, Roundhead Reputations: the English Civil Wars and the Passions of Posterity (2001).

  • Austin Woolrych was the first professor of history at the University of Lancaster. His Britain in Revolution, 1625-1660 has just been published by Oxford University Press.