Slave into Soldier

Albert E. Cowdrey records the enlistment of runaway slaves by the North during the American Civil War.

On May 24th, 1861 a revolution whose end is not yet in sight began when three nameless men appeared at the pickets of Fort Monroe, a Federal enclave in secessionist Virginia. The men were black, runaway slaves of a rebel colonel named Mallory.

The new commandant of the fortress was a fat, sly, Shakespearean rogue named Benjamin Butler, and his career to date had not been one to inspire hope in a black fugitive. Behind him lay a long association with the Democratic Party; a political alliance with Jefferson Davis; a record of support for John Breckinridge, the South’s presidential candidate in 1860.

But at the outbreak of rebellion Butler had immediately sought an appointment as brigadier-general of volunteers, and he had already performed a service for the North when he seized Baltimore and secured Washington’s line of communications. His promotion to major-general had come with his transfer to Fort Monroe and, though the transfer had displeased him, he was not blind to the fact that a whole new career was opening for him.

Instead of being sent back to their master—a common practice of Federal commanders in the early days of the war—the fugitives were escorted into Fort Monroe. What was in the wind became apparent next day, when a Confederate officer appeared to demand their return under the fugitive slave laws. Ben Butler himself met the emissary.

‘I mean,’ he said, ‘to abide by the decision of Virginia as expressed in her ordinance of secession. I am under no obligations to a foreign country, which Virginia now claims to be.

‘But you say we can’t secede, and so you can’t consistently detain the Negroes.

‘But you say you have seceded: hence you can’t consistently claim them. I shall hold them as contraband of war. You were using them against the Government: I propose to use them in favour of it. If, however, Colonel Mallory will come in and take the oath of allegiance to the United States, he shall have his Negroes.’

The Confederate officer left the field, and Butler reported his action to Washington. Overnight he became a hero to the Radical Republicans who agreed with an over-enthusiastic officer that Butler ‘had abolished slavery with an epigram.’

Even outside Radical circles there was vast amusement at the way the rebels’ weapons had been turned against them. President Lincoln told a friend that he had not seen General Winfield Scott so merry since he had known him. ‘He called it Butler’s fugitive slave law.’

In fact Butler’s little joke had made it possible to take fugitives as enemy property, since they could not be received as men. This was no small accomplishment in a race-conscious North where any open policy of emancipation would have been distinctly premature.

‘Contraband’ became a national catchword, a sort of minstrel-show mockery of slave and slave-owner alike. In grave, official tones the Secretary of War approved Butler’s policy and, a few months later, Congress wrote it into law as a clause of the first Confiscation Act. Henceforth, by statute, the slaves of disloyal masters were forfeit but not free.

Today emancipation is too obvious. We easily forget what a leap in the dark it was for those who initiated it. No account of the transformation that took black men from the cotton-field to the battlefield would be truthful if it did not remind the reader how unlikely emancipation appeared to most Americans in the early days of the Civil War.

So strange is the ‘peculiar institution’ from our vantage-point that we can hardly imagine just what black slavery meant to the United States of America. Of course, it was the economic foundation of the Southern colonies and the states those colonies brought forth. Above the Mason-Dixon line it died out in the decades after the Revolution.

Below the line, about the beginning of the nineteenth century, it began to fit like one piece of a puzzle with the complex of forces that were making the Industrial Age. Slavery had already ‘founded an empire upon smoke’ in the tobacco colonies during the seventeenth century. It founded another upon steam in the nineteenth. The steam powered the looms of the Englands, Old and New, and the raw material was gathered from the earth by a labour system out of ancient Rome or Egypt.

On the ‘institution’ so oddly made up of race, archaic economics, and the machinery of the textile industry rested a master class whose role in shaping America can hardly be overstated.

For it is only a small exaggeration to say that slave-owners were the political artificers of America. In three astounding generations the planter-class produced most of the great leaders of the Revolution; then in Jackson, Clay and Calhoun the creators of the modern party system; then in the leaders of the Confederacy the masterful generals and less masterful politicians who almost succeeded in wrecking what their predecessors had built.

The master class played about the same role in America as the Junkers played in Germany, using their agricultural wealth, based on unfree labour, to gain the political and military leadership that guided and shaped a nation.

But they were less self-conscious and unified among themselves and more complex and skilful builders than the Prussians. Through the great national parties that they had helped to create, their interests fused with those of the businessmen, farmers and mechanics of the free states. The whole ferment of reform and expansion gathered around the figure of Andrew Jackson, slave-holder, of Tennessee.

The traditions of Hamilton were developed and perpetuated by Henry Clay, slave-holder, of Kentucky. The master class produced heroic friends of white men’s freedom—and bitter enemies of black men’s bondage. Jefferson was perhaps their most sensitive and remarkable son. His Notes on Virginia contain bitter denunciations of the system that gave him his wealth.

Yet he did not free his own slaves, even at death. He fathered the North-west Ordinance, which kept slavery out of the Ohio country, preserving it for the small farmers whose sons and grandsons would help to destroy the Confederacy. He set his party on the course of domestic reform and foreign expansion which it has held to our own day.

At the same time he abhorred war and set the style of liberal rhetoric and the enigmatic goal of personal liberation which have both bemused and enlightened his countrymen ever since. He was a very great man.

So the master class was much more than the ‘peculiar institution’. Yet the ‘institution’ was the base of its power, and when that base was threatened, the master class went to war and made a great and terrible rebellion to try to keep it. But this was not the whole story in the relationship of the planters, the slaves, and the liberal capitalist North.

For all their day-to-day quarrels and their ultimate attempt at fratricide, North and South formed a single cultural unit. A thousand identities of feeling and outlook, as well as common institutions and language, bound the country together.

Some of these common feelings concerned the Negro. The long rule of the master class depended in some measure on the fact that slave-owners agreed with millions of their countrymen, North and South, on what the Negro was, and the place he deserved to have in white America.

‘How vulgar and brutal, and yet how fearfully prevalent, is... colorphobia at the North!’ lamented William Lloyd Garrison after the final Emancipation Proclamation had been issued. He and his fellow Abolitionists had often felt the strength of that ‘colorphobia’ in their own, mostly white, skins.

It is fairly easy to understand why some groups—Irish immigrants, for example—should have hated Negroes, why ‘mechanics’ generally should have been susceptible to the Democratic warning that the end of slavery would bring Negroes North to compete for jobs. The struggle for existence of the very poor was even more terrible then than it is today.

The racism that provided so much unacknowledged fuel for the Free Soil programme can similarly be explained on rational grounds: the Negro was a slave, the slave worked for nothing, the small farmer did not care to compete with a man who worked for nothing and wanted to reserve the Territories for himself.

But why, then, did he exclude the individual free black man from voting, from serving on juries, or from testifying against white men—as did the citizens of Lincoln’s Illinois? Why did the coloured leader Frederick Douglass have to record so many abominable experiences in a Jim Crow North? Too clearly, millions of Americans who hated slavery also hated the man who happened to be enslaved. And thereby hangs the grimmest story in the country’s brief history.

In fact the Negro has already for centuries been a symbolic figure in the underworld of the American mind. As Savage, as Sambo, as Stud, he had become an image of needs and impulses which the bustling, above-board, over-conscious white world did not care to admit were its own. Apparently white men had made an equation between the racially stratified society, with its black foundation, and the hierarchically ordered psyche in which conscious reason rules the ‘dark’ and passionate depths.

At the very least, Americans found it all too easy to credit whatever alibis the slave-holder made to excuse his tyranny. And however they felt about slavery, nearly all white Americans could work up a shudder at the prospect of black equality, of social and sexual mingling which the South’s apologists were perpetually warning would follow upon the end of slavery. Any such prospect would touch the innermost springs of fear.

It was under these conditions that the famous ‘sectional conflict’ arose. The nub of the conflict was the inability of a South locked in the slave system to grow at the same rate as the North, and hence to maintain the dominance of the master class in national politics.

The North struggled to break that dominance and fulfil its own destiny, the South to entrench its old power by increasingly artificial means. The issue sundered the unity of white America, and brought with it an increasingly passionate national debate on the Institution of slavery, the power base of the decaying Southern Establishment.

That the ‘sectional issue’ could only be resolved by the ruin of the master class in a great war was foreseen by very few. That its solution would involve the freeing of the slaves only a handful of impractical persons could dream. That it must mean the beginning of an act of self-liberation by millions of white men—a liberation from delusions of which they were not even conscious—nobody imagined at all. These things could only be uncovered by the rush of events, could only be lighted up by the fires of war.

From very early in the war Lincoln foresaw that his crusade for the Union might incidentally work to abridge the domain of slavery. But he was very reluctant to say so. When the historian George Bancroft suggested the idea in a letter, late in 1861, the President replied that ‘The main thought in the closing paragraph of your letter is one which does not escape my attention, and with which I must deal in all due caution, and with the best judgement I can bring to it.’

He seemed unwilling to let the word ‘slavery’ escape the nib of his pen. He was similarly Delphic in his final message of 1861, when he expressed the hope that he might ‘keep the integrity of the Union prominent as the primary object of the contest’, lest the war ‘degenerate into a violent and remorseless revolutionary struggle.’

He had good reasons for caution. With gentle words and marching armies he was engaged in ‘pacifying’ the famous and dubious Border—the slave states of Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky and Missouri—without whose help, as he frankly admitted, the ‘job is too large for us’.

He still hoped for a peaceful return of at least a few of the seceding states, a hope which any threat to slavery would clearly destroy. He shrank, like nearly all white Americans, from the vision of a slave uprising on the Haitian model. And he knew his own people, the men of the North and especially of the North-west.

The Northern masses, and particularly the soldiers in the field, had pretty definite ideas about the Negro and his place in the conflict. ‘The Southern Peopel are rebels to the government but they are White and God never intended a niger to put white people Down,’ a Pennsylvanian wrote home from the field.

‘If some of the niger lovers want to know what the most of the Solgers think of them,’ said an Ohio soldier, ‘they think about as much as they do a reble, they think they are Shit asses.’ So far as mass opinion can be estimated at the distance of a century, that would appear to have been overwhelmingly the opinion of the armies of freedom, and it was one no President could dare to ignore.

The debates of Congress were carried on, generally, in more sophisticated language and the emphasis was somewhat different. Slavery was blamed by the Republicans for the war and the large Republican majorities that had been created by the withdrawal of the Southerners carried through a succession of measures that discriminated against the ‘institution’.

Yet—in public debate at least—even leading Abolitionists attacked slavery almost solely on the ground that it had been bad for the masters. Specifically, that it had so impaired them morally as to make them capable of the crime of rebellion against a free government. Perhaps it is not too far from a complex truth to say that in the first year of the war the leading party in the North officially blamed slavery for all the trouble and in a gingerly way sought to cripple and contain it, while the masses robustly blamed the Negro slave and, all too often, treated him accordingly.

And all this time, the Contraband—with his wife, and his child, and his aged mother—had been steadily imposing himself, and his unanswered question, upon the armies of the North. Neither the Contraband nor the Question was always admitted. Northern officers, especially the West Pointers, often sent runaways back to their masters, so often that in March, 1862 Congress was obliged to enact an Article of War cashiering anyone who did so.

The white soldiers were often casually brutal, like those who took ‘two niger wenches, turned them upon their heads, and put tobacco, chips, sticks, lighted cigars and sand into their behinds.’ At best the runaways were fed Army rations and set to building fortifications and doing all the million nasty jobs of camp life that the Army calls ‘police’. Yet—so unpleasant was life with Massa on the Ole Plantation—that by early 1862 Fort Monroe was sheltering 1,508 ‘Contrabands’. And Fort Monroe was not unique.

‘Although the war has not been waged against slavery,’ wrote Secretary of State Seward, ‘yet the Army acts... as an emancipating crusade.’ Their own peculiar helplessness to prevent the crusade from happening drove white Americans to explosions of anger, to querulous complaints, or to wry laughter. The halls of Congress resounded with the complaints of loyal slave-holders from the Border as their human property took to its heels.

Democrats and Conservative Republicans alike deplored the Eternal Negro, whose presence was distracting the Congress from its true aim of restoring the grand old Union, just as it had been before the unpleasantness started. A member of the House who combined activist tendencies with a sense of humour mocked his colleagues.

‘Why,’ said Samuel Fessenden of Maine, ‘the Negro thrusts himself in here, and you cannot thrust him out until you do him justice. You might as well undertake to thrust out Satan, who is always here to aid gentlemen who insist that slaves are property, and ought to be held as property by white men.’

It was under these pressures that Lincoln began to work out the plan which J. G. Randall has called his ‘Grand Design’ for solving the riddle of American slavery. From late in 1861 until almost the day of his death Lincoln was to present his plan for compensated emancipation in many guises; to urge it upon many different groups, and to blazon it with unforgettable eloquence.

Basically he wanted the loyal states—and these included any in rebellion which might return to their allegiance—to adopt plans for freeing their slaves at a fixed price per head. The Federal government would pick up the bill, issuing six cent bonds to cover the cost.

As many Negroes as possible would be persuaded and helped to emigrate—to tropical America, perhaps to Africa—and those who remained would be included in plans of apprenticeship and education that would gradually fit them for freedom. As Lincoln said, he wanted to see the races live themselves out of their old relationship and into a new one.

The trouble with the plan was that nobody except Lincoln really seemed to want it to work. The Border didn’t want compensation, it wanted its slaves. Negroes, when anybody thought to ask them, did not want to emigrate, they wanted to be free at home. The Congress appropriated money for buying out the slave-owners of the District of Columbia, but nowhere else.

Meantime the war took, first an ominous, then a desperate turn. While human wisdom and policy were in deadlock, events took over. By mid-year Lincoln was to see a whole new policy grow up under the pell-mell urging of the war. A revolutionary policy, as little wanted as a weed, and just about as thrusting and importunate.

For a few months in early 1862 the Confederacy seemed about to become a statistic in infant mortality. The fall of Island Number Ten and the capture of Fort Donelson, with a whole rebel army inside, were followed by the fall of New Orleans, the largest city in the South.

General George McClellan landed his huge army on the Virginia coast and advanced to within fourteen miles of Richmond. When General Joseph E. Johnston was wounded at Seven Pines and General Robert E. Lee replaced him, the matter seemed at first only a commonplace change of command.

The Confederate counter-attack—Lee at Richmond and Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley—changed all that. By July 1st most of the Federal army was back in Washington. A week of hideous slaughter had brought neither victory nor defeat, but a bloody draw and an abandoned field. The trouble was, of course, that the South had only to draw in order to win. So long as there were two Americas the Richmond experiment had succeeded.

The meaning of victory and defeat for the slaves had already been clearly seen by Thomas Wentworth Higginson, a Boston Abolitionist and friend of the executed John Brown. ‘Now there is such a glare of victory,’ he wrote after Fort Donelson, ‘that we only count the months or perhaps weeks until New Orleans and Richmond shall have submitted.

The difficulty is, that with [our anxiety] goes our sense of responsibility to the slaves.’ In a letter to his mother he remarked that ‘the less success on our part, the more likelihood of an emancipatory policy—and so the other way’. In the Seven Days’ Battles the Confederacy and not the Union decided that the ‘other way’ was to prevail.

Of course there were other forces working in the same direction. Britain, France and Spain had sent armed forces into Mexico in October, 1861. In November the Trent affair had brought the United States and England to the verge of war.

Opposition to the Union’s war effort was strong in England, and as late as October, 1862 Gladstone, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, declared that ‘Jefferson Davis and the other leaders of the South... have made a nation.’ In the diplomatic poker game that Union and Confederate emissaries were playing at Whitehall, an emancipation policy would be a high card indeed—if only the North dared to play it.

At home there were other forces at work. Powerful men in the Republican Party were Abolitionists by conviction, and day by day Charles Sumner and others urged on the President the advantages of freeing the blacks suddenly and dramatically, as an act of war. Even some conservative former Whigs favoured the policy. Perhaps mass desertions from the Confederacy’s labour corps could be brought about.

A War for Freedom might give a new impetus to the War for Union that was growing stale amid blood, drawn battles, and disillusionment over the staying power of the rebellion. Most daring of all, black men might be armed and used to garrison forts—or even to storm them. And while months were to pass before Lincoln could bring himself to this last revolutionary idea, he did, little by little, come to feel that the blacks were ‘the great available and yet unavailed force for restoring the Union.’

Moreover, the Border was losing its importance, for the most ironic of reasons: its loyalty was now assured. True, in the first days of July Lincoln turned down Sumner’s suggestion for an Emancipation Proclamation on the Fourth by saying that he feared ‘half the officers would fling down their arms and three more states would rise.’

Yet it is quite possible that Lincoln had already decided upon just that course; at any rate, he knew quite well which way events were tending. ‘Every day increases their Union feeling,’ he said of the Border troops in August. ‘They are also getting their pride enlisted, and want to beat the rebels.’

In fact, Confederate victories, fleeing Contrabands, British sentiment, the generalship of George Brinton McClellan, the peculiar make-up of the Republican Party, and a thousand other apparently unrelated factors were tending in a single direction. A change of course impended; the Man of the Hour was, for the first time in American history, a black man.

The poorest, the most helpless, the outcasts of the earth were, by a magical turn of events, becoming a decisive power in the land. Lincoln indicated that he viewed the transformation as an Act of God. But when he talked about the earthly occasion of the new policy no man was ever blunter or more pragmatic.

‘I felt,’ he told the painter Thomas Carpenter in 1864, ‘that we had reached the end of our rope on the plan of operations we had been pursuing; that we had about played our last card, and must change tactics or lose the game!’ That was why the slaves had to be freed, and in the early days of July Lincoln began to change his tactics, in the hope at last of winning the game.

It was his secret and he worked it out alone. He wrote the draft of his proclamation in the telegraph room at the War Department, always a favourite retreat. Sentence by sentence, in his slow, cool-blooded, reflective way; a line of prose, a glance out of the window, a casual joke with one of the young operators, another line of prose. It was a pragmatic document he was working on, one that would leave slavery alive in all the loyal and occupied areas, and give the rebellious states a period of grace to return to their allegiance. It was a steely liberty, to be shot off at the enemy like any other shell.

As its enemies were to say, the proclamation ‘freed’ slaves wherever Lincoln could not touch them while leaving them enslaved wherever he could. But it committed the Executive and his vast armies to move with, not against, the current of events; it did not shrink from the ‘remorseless revolutionary struggle’ that Lincoln had once sought to avoid. He was slowly forming (as he would tell Carpenter) ‘the central act of my administration, and the great event of the nineteenth century.’ He knew perfectly well what he was up to, and he took his time.

On July 13th he talked the matter over with Seward and Navy Secretary Welles during the course of a carriage ride, and on July 22nd he presented the draft proclamation to his cabinet. Of several objections that were made, he was struck only by Seward’s. The Secretary of State had had a week to think the matter over, and he advised holding up the new policy until a victory had been won in the field.

Otherwise, as Lincoln later recalled his uncomfortably accurate words, ‘It may be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted government, as a cry for help; the government stretching forth her hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to the government’. Nothing so near the truth could be admitted, of course. Lincoln put away his paper and waited for his new general, John Pope, to give him a victory.

What he got was Second Bull Run. At any rate there was nothing ambiguous about Pope’s way of getting beaten. ‘Things were darker than ever,’ Lincoln was to recall. On the morrow of the battle he wrote down for his own eyes a brief meditation on the Divine Will.

‘In the present civil war it is quite possible that God’s purpose is something different from the purpose of either party—and yet the human instrumentalities, working just as they do, are of the best adaption to effect His purposes.’ (Here was the first clumsy draft of the Second Inaugural’s ‘The Almighty has His own purposes.’) If God’s aim was to free the slaves, He could have picked no better way, under the circumstances, than the repeated disasters. The necessary public support, without which emancipation could not have succeeded, was apparently strengthened with every defeat.

At the back of this change there was not, of course, any suddenly discovered sympathy for the slave. Indeed, the historian of the war’s common soldier has charted a peak of anti-Negro feeling in the Northern army following the defeats of 1862. The driving force was an increased hatred of the master class and a deep revolutionary determination to destroy the base on which its power rested—a resolve to sack Carthage and salt its fields forever.

A prime spokesman of the new mood was Horace Greeley. The New York Tribune’s editor was a weathercock of popular passions. In the days before Sumter, when the North had sought to avoid the war, he had cried to the cotton states, ‘Erring sisters, depart in peace’. When the North had burned with the hope of instant triumph he had cried, ‘On to Richmond!’ Shortly before Second Bull Run he had printed an editorial ‘Prayer of Twenty Millions’ demanding the extinction of slavery.

Greeley’s nose for the national mood was as sharp as ever. The aftermath of the defeat saw a steady rise in petitions and memorials from most parts of the North demanding the same drastic remedy. Delegations harassed the President with advice, including a large group of clergymen claiming to represent the Christians of Chicago, with whom Lincoln engaged in a long debate over the merits of an emancipation policy.

To the ministers Lincoln said in perfect sincerity that he would not ‘issue a document that the whole world will see must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope’s bull against the comet!’ To Greeley (and through him, the country at large) he spoke in double Greek, Delphic and Laconic. ‘If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving the others alone I would also do that.’ Which, again, was all quite true. The fact that a policy already existed, worked out even to the phraseology, was something that the President chose to conceal as yet.

In fact Lincoln’s capacity for deception reached almost the status of an art-form during these days. A profoundly secretive man, he suffered from something of a mental block against outright lying, and so he had developed early in his career a mastery of patter and misdirection that would have sufficed to earn the livelihood of two or three conjurers.

‘Lincoln,’ said his friend Leonard Swett, ‘always told enough only of his plans and purposes to induce the belief that he had communicated all, yet he reserved enough to have communicated nothing. He told all that was unimportant with a gushing frankness...’

Waiting on news from the field, he maintained the appearance of a national debate on a policy he had already determined to adopt. Meanwhile public opinion had full opportunity to ripen, and Abolitionist groups expended prodigies of activity in hopes of forcing the President to go exactly where he intended to go anyway.

Not that there were no signs of the change that impended, if anybody had been able to read them. For one thing, the President—like his countrymen—broke out in uncommon displays of anger against both slave-owners and Negroes. In occupied Louisiana an Abolitionist general named John Wolcott Phelps had enraged the friends of slavery by trying to recruit Negroes.

Prominent men of that state brought their complaints before the President. ‘If they can conceive of anything worse than General Phelps, within my power, would they not better be looking out for it?’ was the unsympathetic reply. ‘I distrust the wisdom if not the sincerity of friends, who would hold my hands while my enemies stab me... it may as well be understood, once for all, that I shall not surrender this game leaving any available card unplayed. Yours truly A. Lincoln.’

Meanwhile he was speaking to free Negroes with renewed urgency—even brutality—about his scheme of emigration, the scheme that formed so important a part of his well beloved and dying Grand Design. It was arranged that a deputation of free blacks should visit him at the White House, and Lincoln delivered a prepared address urging them to leave the country. They were, he said, the unwitting cause of all the country’s woes, and, though a ‘greater injustice’ had been done them than to any people, he wanted them out.

The tone of the speech was such that Frederick Douglass, the acknowledged leader of the country’s free blacks, declared that it reminded him of the way ‘a man might try to bow out of his house some troublesome creditor or the witness of some old guilt.’ On the very eve of becoming the Great Emancipator, Lincoln’s credit among Northern Negroes probably hit an all-time low.

And yet—knowing now about that proclamation reposing in a locked drawer in the cabinet room—quite another set of meanings can be read into the speech. ‘Even when you cease to be slaves,’ Lincoln warned, ‘you are yet far removed from being placed on an equality with the white race. You are cut off from many of the advantages which the other race enjoy.

Go where you are treated the best, and the ban is still upon you’. The President was warning that freedom would come but would bring no equality, and that freedom without equality would satisfy no man for long. In this light, the emigration policy becomes comprehensible for a man who must have known that the mere logistics of the matter would render it impossible.

So the time went between the writing of the proclamation and its issuance. A time of Lincoln’s life as fascinating, as dark, and as deeply human as any poet could ask to dramatize: the frankness and deception, the anger and irony, the inner questing against a background of reiterated disaster. Not such a time as any man would want to endure for very long.

But events were moving swiftly now. After Second Bull Run Lee turned North, and by September 7th he had moved his whole army across the Potomac and occupied Frederick, Maryland. South Mountain was fought on the 14th and McClellan—restored to command—gained a rare victory in the field. The next day, by way of repayment, Jackson took Harper’s Ferry and 12,000 Northern prisoners. ‘Finally,’ said Lincoln, ‘came the week of Antietam.’

On September 17th the armies collided in force over the little creek that flows near Sharps-ville, Maryland. A single day left 26,000 men dead and wounded, and another bloody draw for the record books: Lee withdrew, and McClellan was careful not to follow too fast. Nevertheless,

‘I now determined to wait no longer,’ Lincoln was to recall during his talks with Carpenter. ‘The news came, I think on Wednesday, that the advantage was on our side. I was then staying at the Soldier’s Home, three miles from Washington. Here I finished writing the second draft of the preliminary proclamation; came up on Saturday; called the Cabinet together to hear it, and had it published the following Monday.’

The trivia of that Monday cabinet meeting have passed into legend: how Lincoln started things off by reading his ministers a chapter of Artemus Ward called ‘High-Handed Outrage at Utica’; how the Postmaster-General gloomily (and correctly) forecast that the administration would lose the fall elections; how, by a singular chance, exactly one hundred days were found to intervene between the date of the proclamation and January ist, 1863 when the period of grace was to expire. (No one, Lincoln told Carpenter, had calculated the time beforehand.)

The proclamation was published and the predictable Washington crowd assembled to serenade the President. From the White House they went to Treasury Secretary Chase’s, and Chase made them a little speech about the dawn of a new era. The crowd cheered like the good office-holders they probably were, and moved on ‘in glorious humour’ to make Attorney General Bates say something too. Meanwhile a little party formed spontaneously in the house they had left.

‘After the crowd went away,’ Lincoln’s secretary John Hay wrote to his alter ego Nicolay, ‘...a few old fogies staid at [Chase’s] and drank wine... They all seemed to feel a sort of new and exhilarated life; they breathed freer; the Prests Procn had freed them as well as the slaves. They gleefully and merrily called each other and themselves abolitionists, and seemed to enjoy the novel sensation of appropriating that horrible name.’

The policy of emancipation worked or did not work according to the standard applied to measure it. Probably it made the South fight more desperately, but the South was fighting so desperately anyway that the fact would be hard to prove. In England emancipation demonstrably brought the North wide public support at a critical moment. In the North the desertion rate stayed high, volunteer enlistments low, and the Republicans lost the fall elections. Lincoln remarked that his own section ‘responds sufficiently in words, but words alone kill no rebels’.

The clearest success that the new policy brought at home—as well as the most startling experience for white America—resulted from the appearance of black troops in the Union Army. As the committee of clergymen had told Lincoln in September, the slaves, once freed, must ‘be made to labour and fight for their freedom’ since ‘half measures would never work’.

Before the war’s end 186,000 black men would wear the uniform of the United States. In less than a year they would have won Lincoln’s praise, these ‘black men who, with silent tongue, and clenched teeth, and steady eye, and well-poised bayonet... helped mankind on to this great consummation’.

But in the beginning there were only the Contrabands and a few white officers, among them the Abolitionist Thomas Wentworth Higginson. He was serving with the Fifty-first Massachusetts when, on a November day in 1862, he received a letter from General Rufus Saxton, commanding officer at Beaufort, South Carolina—Beaufort was another of those enclaves which Northern sea-power had established around the rim of the Confederacy.

It was an invitation to come South and take command of the First Regiment of South Carolina Volunteers, a unit which had to be formed almost entirely of runaway slaves. ‘Had an invitation reached me to take command of a regiment of Kalmuck Tartars,’ he said, ‘it could hardly have been more unexpected’.

Or more welcome—if only it were serious. Higginson was no theoretician of freedom. In 1854 he had helped a Boston mob storm the jail where Anthony Burns, a victim of the Fugitive Slave Act, was being held prisoner. ‘I had always looked for the arming of the blacks,’ he wrote, ‘and had always felt a wish to be associated with them.’

It was his suspicion of the government—especially in view of Lincoln’s failure to support a similar effort by David Hunter, Saxton’s predecessor—that made him hesitate. ‘It would be intolerable to go to South Carolina, and find myself, after all, at the head of a mere plantation-guard or a day-school in uniform.’

A visit to Beaufort quickly convinced him that the government really meant to find out whether black men would fight. No more was needed, and Higginson became commander of the first slave regiment officially mustered into the service of the United States. ‘Scarcely a free man, not one mulatto in ten, and a far smaller proportion who could read or write when enlisted,’ he described them.

Except for a troop gathered unofficially by Jim Lane in Kansas, these were in fact the first coloured troops of any kind to serve the Union— outside New Orleans, that is, where the military commandant, Major General Benjamin Butler, had enlisted a Corps d’Afrique from the free coloured population of the city. But those had been men of education and property, in many cases, and in line with the traditions of the Creole city so nearly white that Butler had remarked, ‘The darkest of them were about the complexion of the late Mr Webster’.

Naturally such men were few in America, and the number of free blacks in the North was likewise small. The success of the experiment with black soldiers really depended on the Contraband, the runaway, the slave-soldier whose enlistment, as Higginson noted, seemed to everyone ‘the most daring of innovations’.

A steady stream of visitors to his camp looked on in astonishment, in horror, or in hope, as this new and unexpected weight was prepared for the balances of war. The trivia of camp life became the subject of scare headlines in the newspapers, and Higginson found distorted accounts of the most minor incidents coming back to him in letters from every part of the North. ‘I felt,’ he said, ‘as if we were a plant trying to take root, but constantly pulled up to see if we were growing’.

He found comfort in the earnestness of his men, their humour under stress, and their rapid mastery of the art of soldiering. For most of his life Higginson had been maintaining that black men were men, and to find his belief working out in practice under his own hands raised him on occasion to a state approaching bliss.

His Army Life in a Black Regiment should be read by anyone who thinks there are no joyful wars. He not only recorded, he shared the feeling of Sergeant Prince Rivers after a successful parade: ‘And when dat band wheel in before us, and march on—my God! I quit dis world altogeder.’

The New Year came. In Washington, his hand trembling from the rigours of a long reception line, the President signed with a gold pen the final Emancipation Proclamation. Far off in South Carolina, Higginson remembered a different January: the winter flowers, the pale sunlight on the palmetto scrub, the sandy walks of the campground swept and strewn by the wind.

Toward the end of the month he took his men up the St Mary’s River to commandeer lumber and blood the troops. The first night a skirmish was fought in a ghostly world of dark woods, moonlit fields, and plunging and hallooing rebel cavalry. Next morning Dr Rogers, the regimental surgeon, reported:

‘One man killed instantly by ball through the heart, and seven wounded, one of whom will die. Braver men never lived.’

Higginson visited a lovely plantation where Corporal Robert Sutton had been a slave. ‘Ah,’ said the lady of the house. ‘We called him Bob!’ Sutton turned away, touched his cap, and asked if the Colonel would like to see the slave jail. In a small outbuilding ‘like a northern corn-barn’ Higginson found a large staple with a rusty chain ‘like an ox-chain, for fastening the victim down,’ and a collection of manacles.

Close by he found something more complicated, ‘perfectly unintelligible to me until the men explained all its parts: a machine so contrived that a person once imprisoned in it could neither sit, nor lie, but must support the body half raised, in a position scarcely endurable.’

Back at Beaufort, Higginson reported the good conduct of his men and presented General Saxton with the keys and shackles of the slave prison. ‘As Dr Rogers remarked, a message from heaven and another from hell.’

The capture of Jacksonville brought Higginson some bad moments when white Connecticut and Maine troops were landed to reinforce the blacks. ‘The first twelve hours of this mixed command were to me a more anxious period than any outward alarms had created,’ he confessed.

After all, this was the first time in the war that black and white troops had served together. But discipline held, and by the time the troops moved out to skirmish with the enemy Higginson’s spirits were buoyant again.

As long as he lived he would remember the joy of ‘that march through the open pine-barren, with occasional patches of uncertain swamp. The Eighth Maine, under Lieutenant-Colonel Twitched, was on the right, the Sixth Connecticut, under Major Meeker, on the left, and my own men, under Major Strong, in the centre, having in charge the cannon to which they had been trained.

The mounted Rebel pickets retired before us through the woods, keeping usually beyond the range of the skirmishers, who in a long line—white, black, white—were deployed transversely. For the first time I saw the two colours fairly alternate on the military chessboard; it had been the object of much labour and many dreams, and I liked the pattern at last’.