The Official History of the Falklands War

Lawrence Freedman describes how he came to write the official history of the Falklands campaign and tells us what he learned from the experience.

I became a Professor of War Studies on April 1st, 1982. On April 2nd I had a war. Like most people, including the government, I was taken by surprise by the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands and was unsure how to respond. At first I reckoned I had enough basic military knowledge to comment sensibly on events but quite soon I realized that I did not. My expertise was in the rarefied and, in this case, essentially irrelevant world of nuclear strategy. My grasp of the technicalities of warship design or the nuances of army tactics was poor. With little hard news coming back from the South Atlantic I drew the salutary conclusion that I had little to contribute to public discussion on the conflict’s course and likely outcome. My first thought was that if I was going to be a Professor of War Studies I should make an effort to understand the wars that were actually being fought rather than those that existed only in the fevered imagination of nuclear strategists.

I therefore followed events avidly, and by the end of the decade I had written two books on the Falklands. The first was a brief overview. The second was written in collaboration with an Argentine analyst, Virginia Gamba, and brought together material from both sides. It demonstrated the interaction between the calculations of the two sides that led to the war and the failure of diplomatic efforts to prevent its escalation. It also told, for the first time, the full story of the sequence of events that led to what was seen as the major act of escalation – the sinking of the Argentine cruiser, the General Belgrano. I had decided to return to the story again on the eve of my retirement in 2012, when the full archives would be released as a result of the application of the thirty-year rule. This plan had to be brought forward when I was asked in 1996 if I would like to write the official history of the Falklands campaign.

The opportunity was irresistible. It would be a chance to check against the government papers what I had found out earlier through trawling secondary sources and conducting a number of interviews with key players. By July 1997 the terms had been agreed with the Cabinet Office and the appointment was announced by the Prime Minister. Eight years later two volumes are at last to be published. The first deals with the origins of the war, ending as the government prepares itself for the Argentine invasion. The second takes the story through the war and beyond, concluding with the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1990. For such a little war I seem to have written a lot of words.

An official history can easily be presented as a sort of Faustian bargain. The historian gains privileged access to every conceivable primary source, including briefing notes, official submissions, diplomatic telegrams, boxes of military signals and raw intelligence reports. In return the soul must be sold, for the output must be a sanitized account that confirms the official line. It would be foolish to pretend that there is not an issue here. The discipline of official clearance means accepting knowledge of many things that must not be divulged and also not picking on individual officials. This can at times be extremely frustrating, yet it is also part of the challenge of writing an official history. Not only can the definition of secrets be questioned (often by showing what is already in the public domain) but also it is possible to engage in negotiations with the various government agencies when they worry about particular disclosures. Subtlety of language is normally an acceptable alternative to censorship. There were many difficult editorial decisions to make in that grey area of material that is extremely interesting but not really essential. My basic rule was not to exclude any factor, including intelligence reports, that had a material affect on the conduct of the campaign, nor duck any issue that a knowledgeable reader would expect to see covered. The Head of the Cabinet Office Histories, Openness and Records Unit, for whom I worked, never seemed to find this concept difficult and fully understood that the credibility of the final product depended on it being clearly my own, independent view. The account is official therefore only to the extent that it has been built up from primary sources. It is not an officially sanctioned history, so that only safe or agreed opinions are expressed.

My ability to follow this rule was helped by the vast amount of material already published on the Falklands campaign. Many participants wrote up their own accounts, including the prime minister of the time, her secretary of defence and many of the senior commanders and key diplomats. They and others also gave interviews to those who wrote the earlier histories. In addition, individual soldiers, sailors and airmen have told their stories. An official inquiry into why the country was caught unprepared by Argentina provided the first open discussion ever of the role of the Joint Intelligence Committee. There were also a number of parliamentary inquiries into the conduct of the war, including the role of the media, the performance of weapons and whether, as many still suspect, the General Belgrano had been sunk for non-military reasons. So, even if I had been inclined to provide an approved governmental interpretation of the conflict, and had been able to identify the form it might take, the existence of so many other independent histories of the campaign would soon test the credibility of any account that diverged markedly from the ample evidence already in the public domain.

The fact that so much has already been published on the Falklands campaign raises a different sort of question. Given that it passes over very familiar ground and tells a story that, in broad terms, is already well known, what exactly can an official history add? As an account grounded in the documentary record, it provides an opportunity to explore with the best possible information the lingering controversies left over from the Falklands. It also opens a window on the decision-making process, which identifies not only why the British acted in the way that they did, but also why they did not act in other ways – the options that were discussed but not pursued. It reveals the expectations and anxieties, and the pressures weighing down upon those responsible for advising upon and reaching decisions, as they appeared at the time, rather than as they were remembered later. In addition, an unofficial historian might feel able to ignore many of the discussions of logistics or economic measures or international law that were highly relevant but may appear tedious. An official history must aim to be reasonably complete and so the author must accept the risk of being, at times, at least to some readers, boring.

Diplomatic history, for example, is an acquired taste because there is so little action and so many apparently endless deliberations about how best to draft paragraphs, the meaning of which become steadily more obscure the longer the drafting goes on. The challenge in writing about the diplomacy is to explain the stakes behind the competing forms of language. For example, from the first attempted negotiations between Britain and Argentina in the late 1960s, efforts foundered on whether the ‘wishes’ of the islanders should be paramount or their ‘interests’ merely taken into account. The first formulation gives the islanders a veto; the second allows them to be overruled on the grounds that they are not necessarily the best judges of their own interests. The failure to resolve this problem gave a ritualistic quality to many of the actual negotiations. In the late 1970s the Argentine side grumbled that they were appearing to their own public opinion as ‘one of those delegations sent to the imperial court of Byzantium and which stayed there years consuming its energies in discussing methodological problems and semantics, while real negotiations made no progress at all.’

When the new Conservative government tried to find a way to resolve the problem in 1980 the effort backfired, merely convincing the Argentine government that the British had no policy other than procrastination. Buenos Aires took matters into their own hands in April 1982 by invading the Falklands (or the Malvinas as they called them), and international attempts were made to find a means, other than armed force, of removing them. First US Secretary of State Alexander Haig and then the UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar tried to find a way out of the impasse. Fortunately the two key ambassadors in Britain’s diplomatic effort, Sir Nicholas Henderson in Washington and Sir Anthony Parsons at the UN, wrote full, lucid and often entertaining reports of their conversations. This means that the material on the diplomacy surrounding the Falklands campaign is very full. I suspect there will be interest in how far the government was prepared to go in order to get a settlement, or at least to demonstrate sufficient flexibility in order to make a decent case that any failure was Argentina’s fault. Another important sub-text is the real tension that developed in American-British relations over this period, despite the extraordinary efforts by the Pentagon on Britain’s behalf in terms of the supply of weapons and materiel, and despite Margaret Thatcher’s good personal relations with President Reagan. It was particularly galling for Thatcher, who as prime minister had embraced the special relationship so naturally, to find her closest ally acting as an even-handed intermediary between the aggressor and the aggrieved.

For different reasons the material on the military operations is also quite full. Veterans have written extensively, often recreating, as I do not attempt to do, the sounds, sights, smells and pain of battle. These events, by their nature, generate fallible records, suspect memories and partial perceptions, leaving aside any deliberate distortion and myth-making. So the accounts are often contradictory. It is therefore frustrating, and contrary to what is often claimed to be the arbitrative role of an official historian, to be unable to settle authoritatively many of the disagreements, particularly those concerning the land battles. When so much disparate and often disconnected activity is compressed in time and space, unpacking the story is bound to require more words than can realistically be made available. In addition, the detail also gets confused and it can be surprising how many differences still persist on questions of timings and casualties. The problem, however, goes deeper. Precisely because of the intensity and confusion of battle there is rarely an agreed account. Some records of some signals are kept. Others are discarded almost immediately. Owing to the lack of secure communication means, most situation reports (Sitreps) went back and forth along the command structure by word of mouth. Only in exceptional circumstances were messages sent by radio, and they were recorded even more rarely due to a lack of administrative backup. During the Battle of Mount Tumbledown, for example, a long Sitrep was sent by radio but no paper record of it was kept. So while I have had access to materials unavailable to earlier historians, as often as not I have had to draw on those who got to the participants while their memories were still fresh and uncluttered.

The battles matter because this was a war fought with a small margin of error. That was why the campaign, let alone the individual military engagements that composed it, could be turned by a moment of heroism or a loss of nerve, by an act of will or a tactical error. More so than those not directly involved at the time perhaps realised, final success could by no means be taken for granted. The Argentines might have made different choices – kept their navy at sea after the sinking of theBelgrano, for example. After the British landing, they might have attacked the ships carrying troops, equipment and material rather than the warships escorting them, or patrolled more aggressively while the British moved across the island towards the capital, Stanley. If they had done any of these things, the result could have been different. The loss of one of the two British carriers would have forced the government to reconsider its position.

The Argentines’ major success was the sinking of the converted container ship, Atlantic Conveyor, with the loss of a number of helicopters, including three Chinooks. This had an immediate effect on British options, and every movement of troops and equipment thereafter became extremely difficult. The commander of 3 Commando Brigade, Julian Thompson, was inclined to wait until he was joined by 5 Infantry Brigade, but the War Cabinet in London wanted to regain the military initiative after a number of ship losses; moreover, it was nervous that international pressure to bring about a ceasefire would leave the British with just a toehold on the Falklands. Out of this argument came the battle for Goose Green. The competition for scarce assets was the cause of the confused movement of 5 Brigade towards Bluff Cove, which culminated in tragedy when Argentine aircraft bombed the Sir Galahad before the Welsh Guards had disembarked.

The sinking of the Belgrano was also a reflection of weakness rather than strength, a fear that the task force was vulnerable to an audacious Argentine naval attack. My conclusion may disappoint those who remain convinced that the prime minister wanted the cruiser sunk in order to prevent peace breaking out because she wanted to fight and win a war. The British government created a problem for itself because its initial description of the attack was inaccurate in several material respects, and it was not corrected when better information became available, but the key claim, that the attack was ordered for military reasons, remains valid. As part of my consideration of the aftermath of the war I have looked at the development of the Belgrano ‘scandal’. Whereas the government files on the actual event are very thin, those on how to deal with public and Parliamentary inquiries are voluminous.

The story of the Falklands after the war is far less familiar than the story of the war itself. Before the war successive governments followed the islanders’ wishes when it came to possible diplomatic settlements but not when it came to spending money on the economic and social development of the islands. The population was declining and, if Argentina had shown restraint, this decline would probably have continued until the situation eventually became untenable. Instead, Argentina’s lack of restraint led the British government, after the war, to strengthen the garrison and build an airport that allowed for reinforcement in a crisis but also provided much greater communication with the outside world. The economy has boomed, largely as a result of fishing licenses, and the population has increased. Whether the suffering involved in any war – and a thousand died in this one – is worth the political gain is an inevitable question. All that can be said of the Falklands campaign is that the islanders gained an economic and political stability that they had hitherto lacked, and at least the Argentines got rid of their military junta and began a period of democratic government.

Sir Lawrence Freedman is Professor of War Studies, King's College, London. His Official History of the Falklands Campaign is published in two volumes by Frank Cass Ltd.