Taxation 1688-1914

Patrick O'Brian evaluates the costs and benefits of Hanoverian and Victorian government.

Taking a cue from Hume and quotations from Adam Smith, liberal historians have represented British taxpayers as 'afflicted' between 1688 and 1815 from the depredations of a Military Fiscal State.' Thereafter, and with the 'waning of old corruption', they are said to have prospered from the lighter burdens imposed on their incomes by Victoria's laisser faire cabinets. Do these depictions capture any-thing illuminating about the costs and benefit of the Hanoverian and Victorian governments who ran the kingdom between 1688 and 1914?

States without income are without power. Thus records of total taxes collected from the population can be used to represent not merely the burdens imposed on taxpayers but the evolving capacity of the state to fund the policies of kings and their ministers.

For centuries revenues emanated from three sources: from land, including mines, buildings and other property owned by monarchs; taxes sanctioned by Parliament, which granted sovereigns legally enforceable rights to impose levies upon the wealth, incomes or expenditures of their subjects; and loans that monarchs raised provided they could convince their creditors that they possessed sufficient wealth or could guarantee to find taxes to repay royal debts and to service outstanding loans by meeting their interest bills.

Before the Glorious Revolution

Between the reigns of' Henry VII and William III, the incomes of English monarchs consisted overwhelmingly of taxes, levied with the consent of Parliament on their loyal but (when it came to paying up) not so loyal subjects. Throughout these centuries income from the crown estate declined in relative terms from around 35% of the total before the Civil War to less than 10% by the late 17th century. Henry VIII jacked up his 'take' by expropriating church property and debasing the coinage in the 1540s. Nevertheless, English kings never 'lived off their own', nor financed more than small fractions of their expenditures from the forcible expropriation of ecclesiastical or private property. In short they depended upon taxation.

For most of the Tudor and Stuart periods, taxes showed no discernable tendency to rise when measured in constant price terms. Furthermore, the 'real' amounts of tax revenue transferred to the state, per head of population, declined from a high point in the mid-16th century and remained roughly constant down to the time of the Restoration. Shares of national income spent by royal governments probably rose up into the 4%-6% range during wars but fell back to 2%-3% in times of peace. Measured in terms of 'capacity' to appropriate taxes the Tudor and Stuart states look vulnerable to attack by hostile European powers. By the standards of the 18th and 20th centuries, they seem underfunded. Structural change occurred only in the wake of the Glorious Revolution, which in outcome marks a revolution in English fiscal history.

The rise of an imperial power 1688-1815

That measurable discontinuity was the product of two wars fought by William and Anne, supported by their Parliaments against Louis XIV and his allies from 1689-97, and again from 1702-13. Both turned out to be extremely costly but resulted in a permanent enlargement of the fiscal capacity of the state to levy taxes upon a population that had for centuries displayed recalcitrance towards demands for money from ministers of the crown. On behalf of taxpayers, had not Parliament engaged in civil war with Charles I in order to resist, amongst other things, his demands for Ship Money, a direct tax, sensibly ear-marked for investment in the royal navy?

After centuries of dispute between monarchs and their Parliaments over money, between 1689 and 1713 a dramatic upswing occurred in the taxes collected and loans raised by the 'King in Parliament'. For example, just before he fled to France, the last Stuart appropriated roughly 3% to 4% of England's national income as taxes, spent about £2 million on the army and navy and carried a royal debt of roughly the same amount. Shortly after the accession of George I, the Hanoverian regime commanded taxes equal to 9% of the nation's income. Peace time expenditures on the army and navy had gone up three times and Parliament legislated for taxes to service a national debt that had risen to a nominal capital of £36 million. After a brief interregnum of peace under Walpole, loans, taxes and military expenditures climbed from plateau to plateau to reach a peak, after nearly a quarter of a century of warfare against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, that would have seemed inconceivable to James II. Thus by the 1820s taxes had multiplied by a factor of 15 compared to his brief reign and Lord Liverpool's administration found itself committed to servicing a debt that amounted to more than double the nation's entire annual income.

Nearly all the money obtained by the 'Hanoverians' in the form of taxes and loans between 1688 and 1815 was allocated to defend the realm, to subsidise allied forces and when necessary to commit British troops to wage war in Europe, to protect the kingdom's trade and to acquire territories, bases and populations overseas in order to enforce access to foreign markets and resources in Africa, Asia and the Americas. How did the government of a small island economy raise the taxes required to consolidate a regime, integrate a kingdom and acquire such an enormous territorial and maritime empire in the space of 127 years?

Two sorts of explanation can be offered. First, economic growth, accompanied by the diversification of consumption and the reorganisation and concentration of production, helped to bring both a larger volume and a greater variety of goods and services into the 'net' for taxes. But between 1688 and 1815 tax revenues increased more rapidly than the fiscal base at large – by a multiplier of 18 compared to a factor of 3 for national income. Thus the impressive success of the Hanoverians must have been due more to political and institutional innovation. After the settlement of 1688, supply passed under the control of Parliament. Taxation was certainly debated but thereafter demands from ministers of the crown were never actually refused. In constitutional terms the Glorious Revolution appears as a victory for the executive over the legislature, which had for centuries contained the predatory intentions of those absolutist Tudor and Stuart monarchs. Perhaps the acquiescence of Parliament to proposals to tax and to spend more came about because honourable members encouraged their monarchs to take a more bellicose stance in strategic, foreign and imperial policies and because they knew that successful aggression against the country's Catholic enemies and economic competitors would be popular with all true Britons.

Everyone complained about the taxes they paid for the security of the realm and to fund the massive investment in naval power required to obtain extraordinary shares of world trade and a maritime empire overseas. Modern historians now observe that British culture was somehow 'reordered' over the 18th century to embody more patriotic, nationalistic and imperialistic tendencies. Economic historians prefer to see cultural reorderings as proclivities that helped governments to secure compliance towards taxation and which reinforced the outward thrust of strategic, commercial and imperial policies that were widely accepted (especially amongst merchants, aristocrats and industrialists) as profitable for them and for the nation as a whole.

Nevertheless, to collect more taxes ministers and their advisers, working within the constraints of pressure group politics, had to and ways through major institutional and administrative constraints in order to widen and deepen the base for taxation. They made one very costly error when Parliament attempted, after the Seven Years War, to extend taxation to include the populations of thirteen colonies in North America, and the West Indies. Within the kingdom, governments tolerated rather blatant levels of underpayment by the Scots and the Irish for defence and for access to English and to imperial markets. Realistically, ministers also ignored demands for reform to the anomalous valuations of land and other types of wealth assessed for taxation in different counties of the realm. Indeed for several decades direct taxes moved off the political agenda. At the same time the possibilities for raising more revenue from duties on trade became constrained by smuggling, and by the web of regulations that enveloped economic relations between Britain and her colonies, and by tariff treaties with other powers. In these circumstances, Chancellors of the Exchequer turned more and more to the imposition of excises on domestic production to find effective solutions to the problem of servicing the debt and to funding Britain's expanding military and naval commitments overseas. Excise duties, which had first appeared in the statute book during the Civil War, made the greatest contribution towards increasing flows of taxes into the Exchequer between 1688 and 1815.

Compassion, or perhaps a prudential anticipation of potential outbreaks of disorder, restrained Chancellors from pushing the incidence of indirect taxes on production and consumption too far. Taxes on salt, candles, beer, cider, soap, starch, or leather, clearly offended the moral sensitivities of many Members of Parliament. Their opposition could be placated, however, by calibrating rates of tax to fall less onerously on necessities consumed by the poor. Most indirect taxes, customs certainly but also excise duties, fell upon expenditures that ministers could present as luxurious or superfluous, so that the payment of taxes on consumption was perceived to be voluntary. Taxation became widely spread across society and less concentrated on those with property than had been the case in the late seventeenth century. No minister pretended that the burdens of paying for the state should be levied 'progressively' upon those best able to carry the mounting costs of imperialism and an aggressive stance in great power politics. However, the incidence of taxation shifted in a more equitable direction after Pitt introduced Britain's first income tax in 1799.

As Adam Smith and the premature lobby for free trade observed, taxes held back the growth of the economy. Yet rather impressive rates of economic development continued despite taxation, perhaps because many of the more technologically progressive sectors of British industry (cottons, linens, wollens and metals) resisted the imposition of excise duties. With the exception of coal, salt and timber, industry's raw materials also remained exempt from internal duties. Furthermore, the system of indirect taxation displayed a discernable bias in favour of import substitution and export promotion. After centuries of liberal and anachronistic attacks on mercantilism, it looks as if the fiscal policies pursued before 1846 may not have done much to re- strain the evolution of the most efficient market economy in Europe, particularly when the benefits to trade and industrialization that flowed from naval and military expenditures are taken into an account of benefits as well as costs.

Every social group, particularly the middling sort (who felt discriminated against) disliked the rise and diffusion of taxes on their expenditures. Nevertheless, such levies, dominated by excises, seem to have been administered in ways that headed off any serious opposition to fiscal policies. Somehow the economy remained on course. Over the long run the achievement of the Hanoverian 'fiscal state' was to have raised enough money to carry the realm, its industry, its trade and its empire to the pinnacle of security from external aggression and to the hegemony in global commerce that Britain enjoyed for something like a century after 1815.

Victorian parsimony 1815-1914

At the end of the 'mercantilist era' (which dawned after Britain achieved hegemony at sea at Trafalgar and preserved a balance of power in Europe on the battlefield at Waterloo) the whole fiscal enterprise had turned out to be successful but extremely costly. Tax burdens had gone up and up. After no less than nine conflicts with other European powers, which left Britain with the largest occidental empire since Rome and extraordinary shares of world trade, successive administrations who assumed responsibility for the country's finances after 1815 inherited what must have been the largest debt-servicing problem of any state in the world. At that point 60% of all taxes coming into the Exchequer were transferred as interest and amortization payments to the government's creditors. The rest of the revenue went basically to maintain the fleet and the army, now charged with defending the coastlines, frontiers, populations and assets of an empire that had grown enormously, not merely in size but in ethnic, social, political and strategic complexity. For decades after Napoleon's final defeat, debt servicing and the defence of imperial borders became the central preoccupation of successive governments. Both priorities absorbed such high shares of the tax revenues at their disposal that very little money seemed to be left for all other objectives that required help from central government.

For the welfare of the British people this constraint mattered because the generations alive during and after the wars with France (1793-1815), lived through the upheavals that flowed from unprecedented rates of technological change, population growth and urbanisation. The First Industrial Revolution also subjected an increasing share of the workforce to the instability of trade and business cycles that remained endemic to all industrial societies thereafter. Victorian governments lacked the means to ameliorate the social miseries associated with the early stages of social and economic change. With so much revenue mortgaged to service an enormous debt and to defend an empire, aristocratic statesmen abandoned the vestigial paternalism of their class, made a virtue of necessity and espoused laisser faire.

Under pressure from taxpayers for relief from burdens that had risen three times between 1785 and 1815, their rhetoric hardened into dogma and the radical programme to dismantle the corrupt and profligate Hanoverian state became steadily more popular even before, but discernably after, the extension of the franchise in 1832. Few members of Parliament and certainly no political party could propose anything that involved raising taxes. Victorian governments of all persuasions became ideologically committed to reducing that burden and to reforming the structure of taxation inherited from their Hanoverian predecessors. Taxes never actually went down. They multiplied eight times in real terms between the interregnum of peace in the 1780s and the period of mobilisation immediately before the Great War. Nevertheless, the rate of increase in taxation slowed up considerably, compared to the same time span between 1688 and 1815, when tax revenues had grown by a factor of 18. On a per capita basis, taxes on the kingdom's population declined steadily from a high point of £3.52 per person circa 1815 to a low point of £1.89 per head circa 1870; then they began to rise, slowly before 1900 but rapidly thereafter to reach £3.43 per capita during the phase of rearmament before the First World War. In contrast to the Hanoverian era, national income grew more rapidly than taxes and their share declined steadily from a pinnacle of around 18% during the closing years of the war to defeat Napoleon, to a low point of between 5% to 6% from 1880-1900.

Clearly these numbers suggest that the Victorian statesmen checked the proclivities of central government to burden British taxpayers with ever increasing demands for money. On a per capita basis and within a macro economic context, they had rolled back the fiscal state. Had they not also realised at long last the aspirations of 1688 for Parliamentary control over supply? Could it not be argued that the arrogant and misconceived policies of monarchs and their aristocratic advisers had been finally brought under control by the laisser faire assumptions that dominated the reactions of most Victorian Parliaments to any proposed extension of government?

Certainly politicians and ministers never ceased to congratulate themselves on their parsimony towards public expenditure. They, and generations of historians who have uncritically espoused the same liberal rhetoric, rarely hesitated to contrast the Victorian regime's propriety and fiscal rectitude with the profligate ways of governments that ran the public finances between 1688 and 1832.

On examination this liberal approach to fiscal history turns out to be selective, misplaced and myopic. Namierite critics of a 'corrupt' Hanoverian regime have no idea about the overall proportion of taxpayers' money that might have been misspent between 1688 and 1815. A reasonable assumption must be that the great bulk of revenues raised during that era was allocated for naval and military purposes designed to preserve the security of the realm, to integrate the kingdom, to acquire an empire and to use force to obtain extraordinary shares of world trade for British industry and commerce.

After Castlereagh signed the Treaty of Vienna, which effectively maintained a balance of power in Europe for several decades, Victorian statesmen could take a relaxed attitude about the security of the kingdom, preach the virtues of laisser faire, extol the advantages of low taxes and enjoy the benefits that flowed in large measure from more than a century of Hanoverian investment in sea power and an aggressive stance in commercial policy.

While they bemoaned the legacy of debt accumulated to pay for it all, they did virtually nothing to rid themselves of that great incubus. On the contrary they rejected David Ricardos's suggestion of 1819 to repay the entire nominal capital of £836 million by levying a once and for all tax on private wealth. Thereafter Victorian chancellors preferred to castigate their predecessors and to live with debt-servicing obligations that continued to absorb more than half of all the taxes they gathered right down to the 1860s.

From time to time debt repayment re-entered the fiscal discourse, but after the abolition of the Sinking Fund in 1829 such discussions never led to the making of serious provision for that purpose. Conversion operations, together with the rise in revenues after the 1870s, gradually eroded the share of taxes transferred to the government's creditors. By 1900 that ratio had fallen to 20%, which in effect lifted a long-standing fiscal constraint on policy initiatives by Victorian and Edwardian governments. Relief from the heritage of debt and the break-out from the liberal dogma that taxation could be nothing but a burden, came too late in the century, however, to do anything for the welfare of previous generations left to fend for themselves in an era of rapid economic and social change.

Among those generations, the poor surely suffered most from the Victorian regime's ideology of fiscal parsimony and social neglect. In 1834 Lord Grey's government, which had just extended the franchise, provided for a harsher framework of nationwide rules for dealing with destitution, sickness, old age, desertion, unemployment and other disabilities. Victorian politicians certainly recognised that a widening range of public goods and services needed to be provided to deal with the needs of an industrial and urban society but persisted with the strategy (embodied in the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834) of devolving not only administrative but also fiscal responsibilities for such things as education, police, sewage, lighting, water supplies, etc. on to councils and other local authorities. In the 1820s something like 14% of total taxation raised to fund all types of governmental activities consisted of local rates. By the second decade of the 20th century that proportion had risen to 34%. Victorian statesmen prescribed, but distanced themselves from, responsibilities for the provision of a uniform standard of good government for the population at large. Above all they preferred to leave to local authorities the difficult and unpopular tasks involved in raising and efficiently apportioning the taxes required for provision of public service.

Instead Victorian cabinets concentrated expenditures as heavily as their Hanoverian predecessors on foreign and strategic policies. After they had serviced the national debt, allocations of taxes for the defence of the realm and the management and security of Britain's far-flung empire and interests overseas absorbed about three quarters of all the tax revenues that carne into the exchequer between 1820 and 1910.

Indictment of a regime

There can be little doubt that Victorian governments discharged their global responsibilities for strategic, imperial and commercial policies on the cheap. Between 1870 and 1914 they spent shares of the nation's income for such central purposes that were below the ratios allocated by France, Russia and Japan but comparable to the proportions allocated by Germany, the Habsburg Empire and Italy for military expenditures.

For something like six decades after Waterloo the regime's surprisingly low levels of expenditure for the defence of the realm and the precarious frontiers of the empire turned out not to matter. After the defeat of Napoleon's pretensions to European and global hegemony, great power politics settled down to an unusually long interlude of stability Victorian governments reaped an enormous peace dividend and lapsed into complacency about the threats to the balance of power that emerged clearly enough after the unification of Germany in 1871.

Thereafter the tradition of fiscal parsimony reinforced the foreign and strategic misperceptions of late Victorian governments, who continued to define themselves as a ruling elite threatened by an expanding and potentially demanding electorate. Hanoverian aristocrats had never ignored potential threats to the realm and its huge stake in global commerce emanating from changes to the balance of power just a short distance away on the mainland. Unless the outbreak of world war in 1914 is regarded as inevitable, unavoidable or simply contingent upon the assassination of an Austrian Archduke, then the failure of Victorian statesmen to raise and to spend more taxes in order to foster a more liberal international economic order and above all to preserve the balance of power in Europe, must be regarded (albeit in retrospect) as a massive indictment of the liberal imagination.

Patrick O’Brien is Director of the Institute of Historical Research & Professor of Economic History in the University of London. His article is not to be cited without permission.