Ahmad and the Ahmadiyya

'After the love of God, I am intoxicated with the love of Prophet Mohammad. If you call it infidelity, by God I am the greatest Infidel'. Francis Robinson looks at the nineteenth-century Punjabi whose proclamation of a role as 'promised Messiah' still brings hostility from orthodox Muslims to the movement he spawned.

In 1891 Ghulam Ahmad, from a leading family of the small town of Qadian in India's Punjab province, declared that he was the Promised Messiah. God had revealed to him, he announced, that contrary to Muslim and Christian belief, Jesus Christ was not alive in heaven. In the precise words of the revelation he had been told: 'The Messiah, son of Mary, Prophet of God is dead. It is thou who has appeared in his spirit, according to the promise, And the promise of God is ever fulfilled.'

In books written at the same time, Ghulam Ahrnad described the decay of Islamic life and urged the need for a Messiah. He pointed, moreover, to the similarities 'between India of the nineteenth century and Palestine at the birth of Christ. Indeed, he argued that as Jesus had appeared 1,300 years after the time of Moses so now, 1,300 years after the formation of the Muslim community, the Promised Messiah must appear 'invested with the spirit and power of Jesus son of Mary'. Drawing on beliefs deep in the Islamic tradition that a Messiah and a Mahdi would come to lead Muslims against the unbelievers, he asserted that both roles were realised in him.

Ghulam Ahmad's revelation of his messianic mission came at the end of a decade in which he had emerged as a major and increasingly controversial religious figure. In 1880 he had begun the publication of his major work, Barahin-i Ahmadiyya (The Proofs of the Ahmadiyya), which clearly set forth the principles of Islam. His work was well-received by Muslims who felt oppressed by intense missionary activity from both Christians and Hindus.

Ghulam Ahmad had been receiving revelations for some time. In 1881 he was told of his mission:

One night I was busy writing when a feeling of drowsiness overtook me and I went to sleep. At that time I saw the Holy Prophet Muhammad. His face shone like the full moon. He came close to me and l felt as though he wished to embrace me. I witnessed that rays of light came forth from him and penetrated into me... After the Holy Prophet had embraced me I felt as if I could not say whether or not the Holy Prophet had separated from me following that embrace. Then the doors of Revelation were thrown open to me and my Lord said to me: 'Oh Ahmad, God has blessed thee... Tell the people that you have been called to a Divine Mission and that you are yourself the first to believe in that Mission".

In 1883 Ghulam Ahmad announced his mission to the world: he was the mujaddid, the reformer whom Muslims believe appears in every century to renew their faith. In 1886 he undertook what Muslims term chilla, a period of forty days of solitude, prayer and communication with God. Then on March 23rd, 1889, he inaugurated the Ahmadiyya community by accepting the allegiance of his first followers. Nine out of ten of the terms of allegiance involved standard matters of Islamic belief; with the tenth the prospective follower swore a specific allegiance to Ahmad. He promised

to establish a brotherhood with me [Ahmad] on condition of obeying me in everything good, and maintain it to the day of his death; and this relationship shall be of such a high order that its example shall not be found in any worldly relationship either of blood relations or of servant and master.

Ghulam Ahmad's claims did not cease with the revelation in 1891 that he was the Promised Messiah. In 1899, drawing on many sources, he asserted that Jesus had not died on the cross, but had been taken down alive and had recovered to continue his ministry to the lost tribes of Israel, one of which was believed to be in Afghanistan, He was in Kashmir when he died, and Ghulam Ahmad did much research published in his book Jesus in India to demonstrate that a Jewish grave, in Khan Yar Street, Srinagar, was the tomb of Jesus.

Nor did Ghulam Ahmad's assertions against other religions end here. He also claimed to be an incarnation of Krishna who, in the Bhagavad Gita, the most popular scripture of Hinduism, is the stern upholder of duty as the spiritual teacher of mankind. And with regard to Sikhism he declared that Baba Nanak, the founder of Sikhism, was a Muslim saint. To prove his point he located the cloak of the first Guru in a village in Gurdaspur district and found it to be embroidered with the Muslim creed and the opening chapter of the Quran.

In 1901 Ghulam Ahmad made a claim which offended Muslims more deeply than anything he had said before. He declared that, although he regarded Muhammad as the seal of the prophets, that is the last bringer of guidance from God to man before the Day of Judgement, he too was a prophet. He was so deeply immersed in love of the Prophet that he had come to reflect him. The Quran declared that Muhammad would have two manifestations: one of majesty in the name Muhammad and a second of beauty though a reflection of him in the name of Ahmad. Ghulam Ahmad further elaborated his claim by drawing a distinction, as leading Muslim Sufi thinkers had done, between the Prophet as the law-giving prophet, but prophets as revivers of religion would continue to appear, indeed, it was one of the glories of Islam and its Prophet that they should do so. They would, of course, work within the framework of law established by the Prophet.

By the time of his death in 1908, four of Ghulam Ahmad's claims set him apart from the main body of the Muslim community. Three we have already mentioned, to these we should add a fourth, which was a denial of the Muslim doctrine of jihad (holy war) as traditionally understood. He insisted that the Muslim's sacred duty 'to struggle in the way of the Lord' should be understood only in a peaceful sense. Muslims had no right to be aggressive, to spread disorder, or to shed blood in the name of Islam. 'I have appeared,' he declared, 'in order to open, in the manner of the first Messiah, the doors of peace.'

Unlike many messianic movements the community founded by Ghulam Ahmad, and known as the Ahmadiyya, far from withering away after the death of its founder both spread and grew steadily in numbers. Indeed, opponents as well as supporters testify to the dedication and the success of its missionary work. By the census of 1921 followers of the community numbered 28,000 in the Punjab alone, and there were further supporters in Bengal, South India and Afghanistan. Missions, moreover, had been established in Ceylon, Mauritius, the USA, West Africa and, most important, Britain. Special attention was paid to the ruling country where the imposing lawyer, Khwaja Kamaluddin, established himself as the first missionary in 1912 and as the imam of Dr Leitner's Woking Mosque. Early British converts included Lord Headley (the fifth Baron), who was regarded as a great catch, and one Mr G. Sparrow who joined the movement in 1914 after chatting to Mufti Muhammad Sadiq in a London park.

Now the movement has a presence in 120 countries and missionaries at work in forty-eight. It claims ten mil- lion followers worldwide. A notable area of successful proselytisation outside Pakistan has been in West Africa, which the current head of the community visited in 1988 in quasi-papal style. In Britain the community has roughly 10,000 members with forty- five branch associations in the larger towns and cities. At the heart of its activities is the London Mosque in Wandsworth, which was built in the 1920s almost entirely from the donations of lady members of the community in India. Recently a second major centre has come to be developed on a twenty-five-acre site at Tilford, near Guildford (Surrey). It is called Islamabad.

One reason for the continuing success of the community was that it solved the problems of who should take the place of the Promised Messiah after his death and of what powers that man should have. For six years from 1908 there was a growing struggle between, on the one hand, a small group of highly-educated men amongst whom was Khwaja Kamaluddin of the Woking Mosque, and, on the other, the first successor of the Promised Messiah, Hakim Nuruddin, the family of Ghulam Ahmad, and the bulk of the movement's supporters – middling landowners and civil servants from the Punjab. The former argued that once Ghulam Ahmad died there was no longer a divinely appointed leader of the community and therefore no longer any obligation to pledge allegiance to his successor, who was not infallible and could not issue binding instructions. From now on all community matters should be decided by the Supreme Council which as an institution was the successor of the Promised Messiah. The latter argued that Ghulam Ahmad had clearly indicated in his will of 1905 that his successors would have the gift of prophecy. Nuruddin endorsed this, insisting that his own position was by divine appointment and not by human choice. This group intended that the successors of the Promised Messiah should retain much of his authority.

The issue came to a head over the succession to Nuruddin in 1914. The bulk of the community opted for Ghulam Ahmad's twenty-four year old son, Mahmud Ahmad. The smaller group refused to pledge allegiance to him, and edged their way back towards the mainstream of Islam. Mahmud Ahmad, quickly asserted absolute authority over the community, and in the fifty-one years of his leadership gave it a high level of organisation. In 1965 he was succeeded by his son, Nasir Ahmad who had been educated at Balliol College, Oxford, and in 1982 Nasir Ahmad was succeeded by his brother, Tahir Ahmad, who had been educated at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London,

A second reason for the continuing success of the community has been its unusual levels of organisation. Indeed, as an Islamic group in this respect it is probably matched only by the Ismaili Khojas, a community of roughly similar size, which offers absolute allegiance to the Aga Khan. Even under Ghulam Ahmad there were signs of unusual levels of organisation: from the early 1890s the community met at the end of every December in conference at Qadian; ten years later it published several newspapers; and before Ghulam Ahmad died a Supreme Council had been founded to publish books, appoint preachers and manage missionary work.

Under Mahmud Ahmad the community increasingly came to resemble a great multi-national concern. The Khalifa (the successor of the Promised Messiah) was chairman, whose every wish was the command of the believers; headquarters were at Qadian. He was served by eight administrative departments and advised by a council which was in large part elected from branch associations. These latter replicated the organisation of Qadian at the local level. All members of the community paid a tithe of 6.25 per cent of their income per annum; some paid much more. When the partition of India in 1947 threatened Qadian, which fell just on the Indian side of the boundary drawn by the Radcliffe Commission, the community moved its headquarters to a desert site ninety-five miles west of Lahore. This was named Rabwa, which means in Arabic 'hill' and is the term used in the Quran for the place where Jesus and his mother were given shelter, thus emphasising their founder's likeness to Christ. A new city devoted entirely to the purposes of the community was built, and organisation here and elsewhere continued to develop. In the 1980s the community supported twenty-six hospitals and thirty-six secondary schools in West Africa and ten missionary colleges scattered throughout the world. A new publishing plant established at Islamabad (Surrey) has facilities for computer typesetting in thirty languages.

A third element, which certainly plays a part in its success, is its unusually high levels of education. The Ahmadiyya took with high seriousness the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad: 'The search for knowledge is compulsory on every Muslim male and every Muslim female'. In Pakistan, which contains large numbers of the community, high literacy rates are achieved. In Rahwa itself the community claims 100 per cent literacy amongst women and 70 with not much more than 20 per cent over the age of five in society as a whole. Ahmadi men and women have an outstanding record in university examinations. It is wholly fitting that the only Pakistani Nobel prize-winner is a member of the community, Professor Abdus Salam of Imperial College, London, who won the award in 1979 for his theoretical unification of the fundamental forces of nature.

Finally the community has been forged and reforged in the fires of the continual hostility it has attracted. By 1947 the Ahmadiyya counted eighteen martyrs and the demand had been raised for their exclusion from the body of Islam. Soon after they settled into Pakistan this demand was redoubled with the support of the country's religious pressure groups. There was also a demand for the community's most distinguished lay figure, Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan, the foreign minister, to be dismissed from office. Matters came to a head in 1953 when widespread anti-Ahmadi riots broke out in the Punjab. Martial law had to be declared, the leaders of the agitation were sentenced to death (later commuted), and the anti-Ahmadi movement was for the time being quelled. Zafrullah Khan continued in post to become Pakistan's longest serving foreign minister.

Persecution did not, of course, come to an end. In the 1970s, as Mr Bhutto's government became increasingly dependent on the Islamic regimes of the Middle East, Pakistan's Islamic parties raised the Ahmadi issue once more. In May 1974 there were violent clashes at Rabwa. In these and subsequent incidents over twenty Ahmadis were killed, ten mosques were destroyed and many Ahmadi houses' and businesses burned. In September 1974 Mr Bhutto's government, apparently against his will, amended Pakistan's constitution to exclude the Ahmadiyya from the definition of Muslim. A few months later high-ranking Ahmadiyya officers were dismissed from the army; the following year Ahmadis were forbidden to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca. At the same time the Saudi- based World Muslim League was calling on Muslim governments world- wide to take action, and it found responses both in the Middle East and in West Africa.

In 1984 the Pakistani state turned the screw on the Ahmadiyya once more. In the spring of that year there was pressure from the Islamic parties on the weakening government of General Zia ul Haq to take further action against the Ahmadis. In consequence on April 26th the President issued Ordinance XX. This forbad Ahmadis to use for their leaders the titles normally used by Muslims. They were not to call their faithful to prayer as Muslims do, nor to give to their places of prayer the name mosque. They were not to call their faith Islam, or preach it, or in any way offend the religious feelings of Muslims. This legislation, as one commentator put it 'transforms much of the daily life of the community into an offence'. The fourth successor of the Promised Messiah, Tahir Ahmad, saw the implications of the legislation immediately, and two days later fled Pakistan for London, where he remains temporarily based. Those unable to follow his example have suffered badly: many have been arrested for declaring their faith; 155 of their mosques have been damaged or destroyed; by the time of General Zia's death in August 1988 over 3,000 Ahmadis had been charged with offences under Ordinance XX. The return of democracy under Benazir Bhutto has made little difference. 'How can I undo the great service my father did for Islam?', she declared, 'my government will not give any concessions to Qadianis. They will remain as non-Muslims.' At the latest count there have been fifty-three attempts on the lives of Ahmadis since the 1984 Ordinance of which nineteen have been successful. While members of this community profess their faith as Muslims, the Islamic Republic of Pakis- tan has no place for them and can do little to guarantee their security.

Several important questions relating to the Promised Messiah and his reception remain. How, for instance, can we explain his religious vision and the timing of its emergence? Why did he set out to antagonise all the religions in his environment? And why has Muslim hostility to him and his followers been so lasting and so strong?

A crucial part of any explanation of Ghulam Ahmad's vision is that in the late nineteenth century for most of the population of the Punjab, and for Muslims of his background in particular, the times were out of joint. The history of his family was fairly typical of that of his class in the province; it was a noble family fallen on hard times. By the early nineteenth century it controlled the revenues of eighty-five villages. These were lost with the rise of Sikh power under Ranjit Singh. By the time of the British conquest of the Punjab Ghulam Ahmad's father had regained control of the revenues of only five, in the possession of which he was confirmed by the new ruler. Ghulam Ahmad's early adult years (he was born in 1835) were to be dogged by his father's campaign to win back his villages. When the campaign ultimately failed, Ghulam Ahmad's father forced him to take a post as a court clerk in the colonial administration. It was in this post that he had his first substantial contacts both with Christian missionaries and with the attempts of his co-religionists to defend lslam against their arguments.

Muslims in the late nineteenth century Punjab felt particularly threatened by the changes that accompanied British rule. As everywhere else in India, advancement now required proficiency in western knowledge; they had to decide how much of their old world and its ways they must sacrifice in order to succeed in the new. Alongside this, however, they also had to endure the most vigorous activity by Christian missionaries anywhere in India. By the 1880s the province was covered by a network of missions representing tens of thousands of converts. In the same decade there also developed Hindu missionary activity of great vigour which found its strongest response amongst the Punjabi Hindus. In consequence, Muslims found their Hindu neighbours more abrasive in their relations with them as they absorbed the anti-Muslim ideas of the Samaj's leaders. A few years later the Sikhs, too, were infected by the revivalist and missionary spirit and began to organise accordingly. Then, increasingly, the region felt the impact of economic upheaval as the British developed the greatest irrigation scheme in the world of its time in the west of the province, bringing vast tracts of land into cultivation.

Ghulam Ahmad was trying, as several other Muslims of his time were trying, to find a way of meeting the challenges presented to Islam by Western knowledge and colonial rule. He should he seen as striving to provide an answer to these key problems of the era in the same way as Saiyid Ahmad Khan, who showed a way forward over a bridge which united Islam and the post-Enlightenment knowledge of the West, or as the Deobandis, the Ahl-i Hadiths and the Barelvis, who chose a way forward which in large part ignored Western learning altogether.

Given that the weight of change brought about by the colonial presence was felt particularly severely in Ghulam Ahmad's region, it is not surprising that he should have drawn on the messianic traditions of medieval Islam. It was widely believed amongst Muslims that bad times and the end of an Islamic century might see the appearance of a mujaddid who would restore the faith. There might even be the appearance of the Mahdi, God's representative in the person of Jesus who was to come at the end of time and who would lead Muslims in war against the unbelievers. When the twelfth Islamic century ended in 1785 and the thirteenth in 1882, there were several Mahdistic claims, not the least of which were those of the Mahdi of the Sudan. That Ghulam Ahmad declared he was the Promised Messiah (and the New Testament and Quranic Jesus the incumbent of a grave in Kashmir), that he claimed he was an incarnation of Krishna, and that he asserted the founder of Sikhism was a Muslim saint, was a reflection of the religious challenges he had to con- front in his environment and which he had to overcome. That he declared jihad could only take place in peace was a sign that Muslims could follow him without threatening either their non-Muslim neighbours or their British rulers. That he declared himself a prophet was a statement that Muslims failed to follow him at their peril.

Ghulam Ahmad attracted universal hostility in his time. Further hostility was derived from his manner of dealing with challenges to his faith. He may have eschewed a jihad of physical aggression, but that did not mean that he felt the need to moderate his language. In the last decades of the nineteenth century religions in the Punjab jockeyed for position, both in the press and in public. Ghulam Ahmad's determination to demonstrate the superiority of Islam often involved prophecies of the public humiliation or the death of those who opposed him, such as the Christian missionary opponent, Abdullah Asim; great was the rejoicing amongst the Christians when the old man survived the fifteen-month period in which the prophecy was supposed to take effect. Ghulam Ahmad then conducted a prayer duel with the American evangelist, John Dowie; soon afterwards Dowie was exposed as a fraud and died. And in 1893 Ghulam Ahmad prophesied the violent death of Pandit Lekh Ram, a virulent anti-Islamist; within four years Lekh Ram was stabbed to death.

After Ghulam Ahmad's death hostility between his followers and those of other faiths died down. Muslim hostility, however, remained intense, and is always likely to be so. Ahmad's assertion of the existence of continuing non-legislative prophecy after Muhammad brought into question the very heart of the Prophet's authority foe mankind. He loved the Prophet no less than other Muslims, but they felt that his claims besmirched the Prophet's honour. Muhammad was no longer the last guide before the Day of Judgement; he was no longer the repository of unqualified perfection. That the Ahmadiyya came to organise their community under the absolute authority of Ghulam Ahmad's successors, in whom prophetic powers are believed still to exist, only added insult to injury. It is, moreover, an insult seen to be com- pounded by Ahmadi insistence that theirs is the true Islam and it is the vast hulk of the Muslim community that in denying the Promised Messiah wanders from the straight path. But what produces the strongest gut reaction in all non-Ahmadi Muslims, as Yohanan Friedmann rightly reminds us, is the lack of respect for Muhammad which they feel is implicit in Ahmadi claims. The Prophet has always been at the centre of Muslim piety. His significance both emotionally and psychologically, moreover, as Muslims have struggled over the past two centuries to find strength in the face of western dominance, has been redoubled. On this score the depth of Muslim feeling in recent years has been well-displayed by the uproar over Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses.

Hostility in the last few decades has meant more active persecution because religion has become more politicised. While the British ruled India, the Ahmadiyya, a determinedly a-political group, were by and large safe, and suffered badly only when they ventured into Afghanistan. But with the emergence of the Islamic state of Pakistan their claims became matters of political import. Islamic pressure groups were bound to raise the issue of whether they could be registered as Muslims or not; their status was a measure of the Islamic purity of the state. While secular elements held the upper hand in Pakistani politics, the Ahmadiyya were reasonably secure. But when these elements became weaker, as they did under Mr Bhutto, or as they now are under his daughter, or even when an Islamically-inclined government became weak as did that of General Zia, the Islamic parties were able to press with success for action against the Ahmadiyya. Such action, moreover, was reinforced when, during the 1970s, worldwide Islamic organisation developed significant proportions and the oil price rise brought the conservative views of this organisation a persuasive weight of resources.