War and the Past

David G. Chandler completes his series with a look at drill books and tactics.

Victory on the battlefield has always been the product of many interconnected influences and factors. Contrasting standards of leadership and military ability amongst senior commanders, of staying-power and courage in battle amongst their men, and of competence in solving logistical problems on the part of the staff are all major contributory factors, but developments in tactical doctrine and practice have also played a significant part. However brilliant the strategic concepts or battlefield planning, in the final analysis it is at the level of minor tactics that battles are won or lost, but it is often difficult for the historian delving into the past to discover accurate information on the details of the fighting methods actually employed at a particular period by, for instance, infantry battalions.

All too often the development of new tactics has lagged behind technological improvements in basic weaponry – with dire results in terms of casualty rates for the fighting troops. Paradoxically, the urge to rethink and reform military ideas is often far stronger in an army recently subjected to heavy defeats and humiliations than in one enjoying an established record of victory. Success tends to reinforce military conservatism, economy-mindedness and a reluctance to accept far-reaching change. It would seem that just as 'necessity is the mother of invention' so it can be argued that 'tribulation is the inspiration of military reform'. This can be illustrated by a study of the transition from the matchlock musket and pike combination of the late seventeenth century to the flintlock musket fitted with socket bayonet of the early eighteenth- century armies. The flintlock was a lighter, more reliable and – at two rounds a minute – a faster firing weapon than its predecessor, whilst the socket bayonet (which fitted around the muzzle of the musket and did not prevent firing or reloading) made it possible for every infantryman to look to his own defence and by superseding the 'ancient and puissant pike' increased by up to a fifth the number of men who could be equipped with the musket in the regimental line of battle. Rates and weight of fire-power were thus greatly increased (although accuracy at even the habitual sixty-yards fighting range remained abysmal).

The change-over in weaponry was in large measure completed by 1703 in most European armies, but the implications for the tactical handling of the 'poor foot' in order to make the most of the improved musket and bayonet combination was grasped far more readily by the English and Dutch commanders than by the French 'bullies of Europe', basking in the prestige of almost fifty years of military predominance.

The modern historian has to compare contemporary drill-books to gain an idea of the tactical methods in use, but the evidence is often conflicting and needs careful handling. There was little standardisation of either weaponry or tactical practice to be found within armies in the Spanish Succession or earlier wars, each regimental colonel following his own whims as regards detail to a marked degree. Even more potentially misleading, the considerable numbers of contemporary publications tended to reflect the methods of the previous generation rather than those actually in use at the date of their appearance. The authors plundered their predecessors' ideas mercilessly, and tried to pass them off as their own up-to-date concepts. The Chevalier Folard, for example, discovered in the French Royal Library an early seventeenth-century German drill-book which was subsequently copied word for word in translation by the revered French authority Lostelneau, whose work, Le Maréchal de Bataille , was regarded as the epitome of modern tactical practice from 1647 until almost 1690. Where English sources are concerned, however, there is strong evidence that native practice developed significantly, if slowly, between 1688 and 1701, in the end leading to the adoption of the 'platoon firing system' which played no small part in gaining Marlborough's red-coated regiments a high degree of battlefield tactical dominance during the War of the Spanish Succession.

The improved methods did not materialise over-night. Between 1660 and 1688 it is evident that French methods – as described in Le Major Parfait by F. Demorinet – were much in vogue with English regiments of foot, and were closely reflected in English publications into the 1690s. These sources enjoined firing by whole ranks or files in various combinations – methods that remained standard French practice until 1711 if Puységur's statements in L'Art de la Guerre ... are to be credited. Although well suited for battalions equipped with matchlocks and pikes in a proportion of 5:1, these tactical drills did little to exploit the superior fire-power potential of units newly equipped with the next generation of infantry weapons, as most of them were by the early years of the eighteenth century. A qualitative credibility gap was developed in tactical practice that would cost the French dear at Blenheim, Ramillies and Oudenarde.

An early form of the 'platoon firing system' was probably employed by the Swedes in the days of pike and matchlock during the 1630s, but it is evident that the United Provinces had borrowed or independently developed the method by 1690 when several Dutch infantry regiments, equipped only with muskets, distinguished themselves at the Battle of Fleurus. The previous year the system may have first been introduced into the English army, for a letter from John Churchill survives asking for King William III's ruling '.... whether he will have the Regiments of Foot learn the Dutch exercise, or else to continue the English, for if he will I must have it translated into English'. Evidently the processes of modernising the English infantry date from the Glorious Revolution, although three drill-books published in London in 1689 – despite flowery references to the inspiration provided by 'his Highness the Prince of Orange' – still reflect older French concepts of drill and exercise. From such evidence it would seem that fire by platoons evolved in a typically haphazard fashion; but from the date of Marlborough's appointment as Captain-General in the next war and reign there is considerable evidence that the system was encouraged for use by all English and by most Dutch battalions.

The platoon firing system took a variety of forms which cannot be described here, but conferred standard advantages of superior fire-control (hence greater accuracy and killing power), psychological impact and improved readiness. As only one-third of a regiment discharged during each of the three firings, an approximation to continuous fire was achievable, whereas wild inaccurate volleys by whole ranks or series of ranks in the continuing French fashion were interspersed with half-minute reloading pauses. The superior effectiveness of the British method is well illustrated by the encounter between the Royal Regiment of Foot of Ireland and a regiment of 'Wild Geese' in the French service in a clearing of the Wood of Sart at Nalplaquet in 1709. Captain Robert Parker's account describes the action in detail and analyses the underlying reasons for success. Besides providing a test-case, he also reveals the relative inaccuracy of the King William Land Musket: his regiment inflicted forty casualties (apart from 'walking-wounded' presumably) in routing its adversary at close range, but suffered only ten itself. The disproportion in losses is significant.

The French were slow to react in terms of reordering their tactics. Although the repute of the English battalions from Blenheim, 1704, onwards is well reflected in Louis XIV's specific instruction to Marshal Villeroi two years later '... to pay special attention to that part of the line which will endure the first shock of the English troops', it was not until 1712 that we find Puységur advocating 'par division un feu continuel ', although Villars may have introduced something of the sort by Malplaquet in 1709. But it took the French a considerable tirne to recognise the need to adapt their well-tried systems to the improved ones used against them.

English drill-books from 1708 onwards invariably refer to 'fire by platoons' in considerable detail – for example those by Brigadier-General Richard Kane (posthumously published in 1745 but certainly written much earlier) or Captain John Foster, 1712. Here was one – of several – reasons for English superiority under Marlborough in the regiment-against-regiment linear firefights, which time and again helped clinch victories in the field. This was only a single factor, but it is of not inconsiderable importance and interest. But it is, alas, necessary to record that the British Army subsequently fell into the same trap as the French regiments of Louis XIV. The 'platoon firing system' became immutable. The Exercise for the Horse, Dragoons and Foot Forces , 1739, still lays down the same tactical forms as were in use in 1704, and General Wolfe's Instruction to Young Officers , etc. shows few advances in tactical doctrine. It was not until the lessons of the staggering reverses suffered by General Braddock at the hands of Indians and French colons at Honogahela in 1755, and by later commanders at the hands of the American rebels, that a fresh look was taken at tactical method. Just as the French 'fire-by-line' tactics of La Grande Siècle had become stereotyped, so had the superior English tactics become inflexible in their turn. Here, surely, lies one of the major lessons that military history has to teach: namely the crucial necessity of continually adopting military methods to meet new circumstances.

Further Reading

  • M Lostelnau, Le Maréchal de Bataille (Paris, 1647)
  • F Demorinet, Le Major Parfait (1686)
  • M le Marechal de Puységles , two volumes (Paris, 1748)
  • Captain R. Parker, Memoirs of the most remarkable military transactions 1683-1718  (London, 1744)
  • Brigadier General R Kane, Discipline for a Regiment of Foot Upon Action (London, 1745)
  • Peter Kemp, Weapons and Equipment of the Malborough Wars , Blandford (Poole, 1980)
  • D.G. Chandler, The Art of War in the Age of Marlborough , Batsford (London, 1977)