William Blackstone and the Historians
Wilfrid Prest unravels myths perpetrated by historians about the great 18th-century lawyer.
We are often exhorted to break down the barriers between the disciplines. So far as law and history are concerned, such urgings are almost redundant. Historians have long drawn upon legal records and texts as sources of evidence about individual and social experience, and legal argument frequently embodies much historical content.
Yet problems can arise when historians employ legal sources. The great legal historian F.W. Maitland (1850-1906) suggested that historians and lawyers operate on distinct wavelengths, using two different modes of argument which he characterized as ‘the logic of authority and the logic of evidence’. Lawyers, according to Maitland, are primarily interested in finding legal authorities, the more recent the better, with which to support the cases of their clients. Historians, on the other hand, recognize themselves as bound by no authority except evidence bearing on the event or phenomena they study; generally speaking, the closer that evidence in time to their subject, the greater its credibility and utility.
Maitland exaggerated the gap, both formal and psychological, between legal and historical reasoning. But whether or not lawyers are prone to distort or oversimplify historical evidence, historians can and do frequently misinterpret legal sources.
For example, many historians have drawn on the Commentaries on the Laws of England by the mid-eighteenth-century jurist William Blackstone for an authoritative summary of English law and government at the beginning of George III’s reign. Blackstone’s Commentaries were the first successful attempt to provide an outline map of English law, both public and private, at a point when Britain’s imperial destinies were about to be transformed by the loss of her main North American colonies and an expanding imperial presence in Asia, Africa and the Pacific. Yet difficulties can arise when modern scholars seek to appropriate Blackstone’s meticulously-crafted words to their own purposes. I propose to look at three examples: his views on wife-beating; on the right of Indigenous or Aboriginal peoples, and on slavery.
With regard to wife-beating, in a recent volume we may read that:
Eighteenth-century British law canonized a crucial precedent for men’s ‘ownership’ of the conjugal body. Sir William Blackstone judged that the man who physically beat his wife with a stick no thicker than a ‘man’s thumb’ was doing so ‘for her own good’. For, he argued, ‘even the disabilities which the wife lies under are for the most part intended for her protection and benefit’. Blackstone’s rule of thumb legitimated marital abuse of women ... (J. Eveline, in Women as Australian Citizens: Underlying Histories, ed. P. Crawford and P. Maddern (Melbourne, 2001).
But Dr (not yet Sir William) Blackstone had actually written, in 1768-69:
The husband also (by the old law) might give his wife moderate correction. For, as he is to answer for her misbehaviour, the law thought it reasonable to intrust him with this power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his servants or his children; for whom the master or parent is also liable in some cases to answer. But this power of correction was confined within reasonable bounds; and the husband was prohibited to use any violence towards his wife, aliter quam ad virum, ex causa regiminis et castigationis uxoris suae, liciter et rationabilier pertinet [other than licitly and reasonably pertains to a husband for ruling and chastising his wife]. The civil law gave the husband the same, or larger authority over his wife; allowing him, for some misdemeanours flagellis et fustibus acriter verberare uxorem [with whips and rods sharply to beat his wife], for others, only modicam castigionem adhibere [to apply moderate chastisement]. But with us, in the politer reign of Charles the second, this power of correction came to be doubted: and a wife may now have security of the peace against her husband; or in return, a husband against his wife. Yet the lower rank of the people, who were always fond of the old common law, still claim and exert their ancient privilege; and the courts of law will still permit a husband to restrain a wife of her liberty, in case of any gross misbehaviour.
These are the chief legal effects of marriage during the coverture; upon which we may observe, that even the disabilities, which the wife lies under, are for the most part intended for her protection and benefit. So great a favourite is the female sex of the laws of England.
No mention of thumb-sized sticks. In fact Blackstone nowhere asserts the legality of wife-beating in his own day. On the contrary, his readers are informed that this practice, although once permitted under the common law, was ‘doubted of’ after the Restoration of Charles II in 1660, and a legal remedy provided for abused or threatened wives (and husbands). His arch allusion to the continued impolite behaviour of the ‘lower rank of the people’ indicates where his own self-consciously enlightened sympathies lay, besides conceding (or asserting) the law’s practical impotence in this domestic realm. Finally, the reference to the wife’s disabilities under coverture forms part of the conclusion to this entire chapter; its final sentence is perhaps merely a semi-facetious flourish or variation on the Commentaries’ largely positive view of the common law – although we note that Blackstone does not claim a wife’s legal disabilities were all ‘intended for her protection and benefit’.
True, he expressed a paternalistic acceptance of female dependency in marriage – scarcely a novel doctrine in the mid-eighteenth century, however unpalatable today. But the man whose brother-in-law recorded that he ‘passed near nineteen Years in the Enjoyment of the purest domestic and conjugal Felicity (for which no man was better calculated) and which, he used often to declare, was the Happiest part of his Life’ was scarcely endorsing ‘marital abuse’ of women, let alone ‘judging’ that a man who physically assaulted his wife was ‘doing so for her own good’.
Blackstone’s writings on marital violence have long been misconstrued in England and throughout the common-law world. Henry Ansgar Kelly, whose special interest in ‘legal mythology’ led him to compile a rogues’ gallery of false and misleading ‘authorities’ on the supposed ‘rule of thumb’, concludes that an 1824 case in Mississippi (Bradley v. State) and an 1871 Alabama judgment ‘wrongly assumed that Blackstone was upholding the [wife-beating] privilege claimed by the lower classes as still supported by the common law’. No such data is forthcoming for colonial Australia or New Zealand; we have merely the attribution, or assertion, of a long-term influence (legitimating marital violence, presumably in a domestic as well as juridical context) to Blackstone’s words – albeit words Blackstone never wrote.
Distinguishing between Blackstone’s own words or intended meaning, and readings of those words and meanings by later generations, has proved particularly important in Australia with respect to a different issue, that of Indigenous or Aboriginal land rights. In 1982 Alex Castles’ An Australian Legal History emphasized the profound influence of Blackstone’s writings on decisions by Australian and British courts as to the reception of English law in British colonies. Five years later the Australian historian Henry Reynolds published The Law of the Land, a tract for the times in which he famously argued that English common law (properly understood) had recognized the existence of Aboriginal land rights in Australia as both predating and surviving British settlement. This thesis directly contradicted what Reynolds represented as the lawyers’ ‘traditional view ... that before 1788 Australia was terra nullius ...’, and therefore free for appropriation by the incomers.
Reynolds may have hoped to persuade Australia’s High Court to reverse a long line of judicial authority by accepting the continued existence of Aboriginal rights in land, or native title. For this reason, it has been suggested, he ‘turned the dispossession of Aboriginal people into a legal event’, rather than an act of more or less violent imperial invasion and dispossession. Blackstone inevitably figured in such a judicial scenario, given his prominence in post-1765 English legal culture.
Reynolds relied heavily upon Blackstone in discussing the nature of property, occupancy and possession in relation to the issue of British sovereignty over Australia, and the transfer of English law to British colonies. In his Introduction to Book I of the Commentaries, which deals with ‘Countries subject to the Laws of England’, Blackstone divides colonies into two types. On the one hand were those acquired by conquest or treaty, where existing local laws would continue to prevail unless and until they were changed by the British Crown as incoming sovereign. On the other hand lay colonies of settlement, ‘claimed by right of occupancy only, by finding them desart and uncultivated, and peopling them from the mother country’ – English laws ‘are immediately there in force’. Reynolds asserted that by ‘desart and uncultivated’ Blackstone meant ‘uninhabited’ (because he would otherwise have written, ‘desart or uncultivated’); so, he argued, the Commentaries ‘could have been used to prove that nomadic peoples like the Aborigines were in possession of their land’.
Elsewhere the Commentaries scathingly condemned ‘the seizing of countries already peopled and driving out or massacring the innocent and defenceless natives’. Reynolds saw this as powerful evidence against any attempt to appropriate Blackstone as a ‘de facto apologist for the expropriation of Aboriginal land’.
In line with his Enlightenment principles, Blackstone undoubtedly disapproved of the violent expropriation of indigenous peoples by European, including British colonists. Thus he made a sardonic reference to Britain’s North American plantations as having been obtained ‘by right of conquest and driving out the natives (with what natural justice I shall not at present enquire)’. On the other hand, he also stated that conquered or ceded colonies were ‘already cultivated’. 'These words suggest that Blackstone, following John Locke’s discussion of property, regarded absence of agriculture, not lack of inhabitants, as characterizing a settled colony.
Yet the first edition of the Commentaries was published before Captain Cook returned from his first Pacific voyage in 1771; and Blackstone died in 1780. When discussing colonies he plainly had in mind those of Classical times, and Britain’s American plantations. We can only guess whether he would have classified post-1788 Australia as a settled or a conquered colony (or indeed something else again).
Whatever Blackstone’s personal convictions, and however unsatisfactory his distinction between settled and conquered colonies, the dominant legal view in 1987, when Reynolds published Law of the Land, was indeed that Blackstone’s expression ‘desart and uncultivated’ must be taken to include any non-European ‘territory in which live uncivilized people in a primitive state of society’. This was the longstanding legal interpretation – or fiction – which Reynolds sought to overturn. Precisely what role Reynolds’ book played in bringing about the Australian High Court’s acceptance of native title in its 1992 Mabo judgment remains a matter of lively dispute.
But even in the nineteenth century some lawyers had taken a different view. Thus in 1836 counsel defending an Aboriginal charged with murder had argued before NSW Supreme Court that
It was laid down in First Blackstone, 102, and in fact in every other work upon the subject, that land obtained like the present were not desart or uncultivated, or peopled from the mother country, they having a population of [their] own more numerous than those who have since arrived from the other country ... therefore in point of strictness and analogy to our law, we were bound to obey their laws, not they to obey ours. R. v. Murrell and Bummaree (1836)
Needless to say, the bench rejected this plea. In so doing the judges relied on other pronouncements of Blackstone – which support the doctrine of undivided Crown sovereignty. But had they wished to recognize Aboriginal customary practices as part of the common law of New South Wales, they might equally have followed Blackstone.
Establishing exactly what Blackstone originally wrote or meant on a particular issue can also be complicated. The Commentaries appeared in four volumes from 1765 to 1769, the end-product of a course of Oxford lectures given and revised over a thirteen-year span from 1753 onwards. The book went through eight editions during its author’s lifetime; a ninth appeared in 1783 ‘with the last corrections of the author’, although some minor changes may have been the work of its editor, Richard Burn. Obvious difficulties of interpretation arise: when a passage of his text has been heavily reworked, how can we hope to know which variant represents Blackstone’s authentic views, as distinct from, say, second thoughts to which he might have been persuaded by others?
In 1974 the African historian Folarin Shyllon sharply criticized Blackstone’s pronouncements on the institution of slavery, and set out to show that successive editions of the Commentaries diluted an initial outright condemnation of slavery, in pusillanimous deference to the more cautious position of William Murray, Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of King’s Bench 1756-88.
This was not a novel accusation. In 1820 P. Hoare, the first biographer of Granville Sharp (1735-1813), the campaigner who in 1772 had effectively secured the judicial outlawing of slavery in England by sponsoring the momentous Somerset test case, asserted that Blackstone had ‘corrected’ the text of his first edition during the course of Sharp’s litigation. Indeed Sharp himself had claimed that Blackstone was ‘induced (as it was said) by the sentiments of the Chief Justice of the King’s Bench to withdraw’ his former opinion.
Blackstone and Granville Sharp had corresponded about the rewording of a passage on slavery in the first chapter of Book I of the Commentaries. Here, at the end of a paragraph eulogizing British liberty, Blackstone wrote, in the first edition of 1765, that this spirit of liberty is so deeply implanted in our constitution, and rooted even in our very soil, that a slave or a negro, the moment he lands in England, falls under the protection of the laws, and with regard to all natural rights becomes eo instanti [from that point] a freeman.
But the second edition, which appeared next year, changed the sentence following the word ‘laws’ to read ‘and so far becomes a freeman; though the master’s right to his service may probably still continue’. The same qualification appears in the third (1768) edition; from the fourth edition of 1770 onwards the word ‘probably’ was replaced by ‘possibly’.
Sharp had sent Blackstone in October 1768 a manuscript draft of his A Representation of the Injustice and Dangerous Tendency of Tolerating Slavery in England. In the course of their subsequent correspondence Blackstone claimed in February 1769 that his first alteration had merely brought his text into line with a subsequent discussion in the same volume. There, after condemning slavery as repugnant to both reason and natural law, and affirming that ‘the law of England abhors, and will not endure the existence of, slavery in this nation’, Blackstone had nevertheless noted that although a slave automatically became a freeman on arrival in England, yet with regard to any right which the master may have acquired, [‘lawfully acquired’ and ‘by general not by local law’ from the fifth edition of 1773 onwards] by contract or the like, to the perpetual service of John or Thomas, this will remain exactly in the same state as before; for this is no more than the same state of subjection for life, which every apprentice submits to for the space of seven years...’.
According to Shyllon, Blackstone’s letter to Sharp ‘merely repeated what he had said’ in the second edition of the Commentaries; his attempted defence of his changes ‘though apparently ingenious, is downright contradictory... lamentable and unworthy’. For to Shyllon, ‘on a matter of life or death, freedom or slavery, there is not and never can be a half-way house.’ That stance is incontrovertible from a late twentieth-century vantage point, but the issue would hardly have appeared so straightforward to English lawyers in the 1760s and early 1770s.
Some of the complexity is conveyed by the concluding paragraph of Blackstone’s February 1769 letter, in which he had assured Sharp that
You want no assistance with regard to the nature of Villenage; a thing totally distinct from that of Negro Slaving; except that it may be Collected from the Law of Villenage, how little a matter will serve (in the humanity of the English Law) for an Evidence of Manumission. The only Argument that can be drawn from it against you, is, that as Villenage was allowed by the Common Law; it cannot be argued that a state of Servitude is absolutely unknown to and inconsistent therewith.
When in May 1769 Sharp sent him a copy of his published tract, Blackstone’s note of thanks for this ‘Valuable present’ added a wish of ‘Success on his humane undertaking’. But Shyllon claims that while Blackstone may have been ‘polite and affable’ to Sharp – as when the latter had earlier sought Blackstone’s assistance in his suit with the West Indian slave owner David Lisle – Blackstone’s real loyalty and ‘personal esteem’ lay with the more equivocally-minded Lord Mansfield.
The extent and significance of the personal bond between Blackstone and Mansfield is nevertheless difficult to establish. In 1797, after both men were dead, Mansfield’s biographer suggested that their relationship was one of client and mentor. More recently the distinguished historian Lucy Sutherland asserted that the two enjoyed ‘a long friendship’. Yet corroborative evidence is thin on the ground. No letters between Blackstone and Mansfield appear to have survived, nor indeed other contemporary indications of a close relationship between the two. The Gentleman’s Magazine of 1793 represented Blackstone as unaware of Mansfield’s Scottish antecedents, which hardly points to a close personal relationship.
After Volume I of the Commentaries appeared, Mansfield and his judicial colleague Sir John Eardley Wilmot supplied Blackstone with suggested corrections and revisions for a second edition. This editorial assistance may explain the changed passage on slavery in terms of a correction in the interests of internal consistency, without either imputing any wish on Mansfield’s part to make Blackstone toe the former’s judicial line, or accusing Blackstone of undue timidity in maintaining his own position.
No evidence exists for Simon Schama’s recent claim that ‘Mansfield, in all likelihood, had prevailed upon William Blackstone to excise the embarrassing passages concerning the illegitimacy of slaveholding under the Common Law from the later editions of his Commentaries’. Moreover Blackstone continued fiddling with his text even after the Somerset verdict, so that the fifth (1773) and later editions further problematized the supposed property rights of masters over negro servants bought as captives.
Indeed, Blackstone frequently showed singular independence of mind, sometimes at the expense of his personal career prospects. Not for nothing did he choose for his professional motto the Latin tag secundus dubiisque recte [‘whatever the circumstances, he is upright’].
Blackstone holds out the promise of providing an authoritative account of pre-1800 English law and politico-legal institutions. Yet many topics which interest modern historians, including the legal status of women and minority groups, receive only passing attention in his Commentaries. For early modern English law itself did not address all aspects of human life in equal detail; nor was the law which the Commentaries expounded altogether fixed and certain. But law books like the Commentaries hardly differ from other forms of evidence, in that they will most amply repay careful, direct and contextualized reading.
Wilfrid Prest holds an Australian Research Council Professorial Fellowship in History and Law at the University of Adelaide; he is currently writing a biography of Blackstone.

