War and the Past - The Pen in Support of the Sword

D.G. Chandler continues our series, looking at the relevance of military history in contemporary training for the armed forces.

The place of military history in the training and education of the soldier is a subject that deserves close attention. Many notable commanders of past, near-present and contemporary times - Napoleon, Wavell, Rommel, Montgomery, Generals Hackett and Farrar-Hockley among them - have stressed the need for the professional soldier to, in the words of le petit caporal, 'read and meditate upon the wars of the greatest captains'. Despite this sage advice - and the impressive examples of USMA West Point, Coetiquidian-St Cyr, or for the matter of that, of the Soviet military colleges, to mention but three-the British attitude has been ambivalent in recent years.

Sir Edward Creasey and Sir William Napier provided the first kindling for the development of military history in the mid-nineteenth century, and it was that fine group of soldiers and scholars that included General Hamley, Colonels Maude and Phipps, F. Lorraine Petre, Professors Spenser Wilkinson, Fortescue, and Oman and above all perhaps Colonel G.F.R. Henderson of 'Stonewall Jackson' fame, who fanned the spark into a blaze and earned military history at least a tenuous place in British academic life, and inter alia, in officer training. Following the Boer War, written examinations were introduced for promotion from Lieutenant-to-Captain, and the study of selected campaigns was required. RMC Sandhurst and RMA Woolwich also included some military history in their curricula, as did The Staff College )where Henderson had served on the Directing Staff) - the study of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862 being a particularly favourite subject. It was after the merging of Sandhurst and Woolwich after the Second World War, however, that a new start was made under Professor Boswell and then Brigadier Peter Young, his successor as Reader in Military History. Since then Sandhurst has been subjected to considerable evolutionary changes as a result of pressures both from inside the Academy and from the Ministry of Defence; Military History became War Studies (effectively starting for study purposes from 1914), which in turn was transformed (following the merging of the two disciplines of War Studies and International Affairs into a single Department in late 1974) into the present course entitled, somewhat grandiosely, Strategic Studies (effectively commencing from 1945). A little Military History per se is retained in a series of mainly evening lectures and films given to newly-joined Officer-Cadets in the hope of inculcating a little esprit d'armee and general knowledge of the historical background of their espoused profession, but there is perhaps some danger that the charge laid against Sandhurst's door in the l930s - that it ‘... produces excellent generals but lousy sobalterns' - may again be heard.

The Staff College at Camberley has on the whole pursued a steadier course than Sandhurst where the study of military history is concerned. Until the early 1970s Military History was one of several papers set for the promotion Captain-to-Major and entrance to Staff College Examinations. This was replaced by a paper on War Studies in 1971 but students at Camberley were - and still are - required to study at least a modicum of Military History and War Studies, and the Department of War Studies and International Affairs at Sandhurst is being drawn in to assist on an increasing scale. Institutions of higher military instruction such as Latimer and the National Defence College naturally concentrate more on current problems of defence policy, but the study of the past as a means of illuminating modern principles has always been accepted. It was only at the foundation and up to Staff College levels of an officer's career that the value of military history as a component was seriously questioned. As articles in military journals of the early 1970s told us military history was now déclassé and irrelevant; it was sterile as a subject, being largely based upon rote-learning and the perpetuation of myths especially at regimental level); it involved inaccurate and incomplete value judgements, and had no conceivable hearing on preparation for or against the possibility of nuclear war in Europe.

Today, fortunately, there is a change of mood and opinion detectable where the official attitude to military history is concerned. Many have decided that the subject has an important supportive role to play not only in the education of young officers but also in the consideration of modern doctrine and its further evolution. It is not before time, perhaps, that it has become appreciated that one vital ingredient for understanding the present and for making educated guesses at the future should be the study of the past. Young soldiers need lobe encouraged to think around their problems - be they tactical or strategic. The study of the 'simpler' days of the military past is not irrelevant to the problems of contemplating the subject of nuclear war, 'thinking the unthinkable', as some critics of the relevance of military history have claimed. Many times in the past mankind in general, and civilised societies in particular, have believed themselves on the verge of irretrievable disaster - whether at the hands of the Mongol hordes of Genghis Khan, or faced by the armour-piercing properties of the cross-bow bolt, or through the dire effects of toxic gases and strategic bombing. But somehow we have come through.