As the Second World War concluded, conflict between the victorious Allies began. Anglo-American operations in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union started in the late 1940s with the aim of subverting, even overthrowing, the continent’s new Moscow-oriented states. Stephen Long’s book examines their first joint project: BGFiend/Valuable in Albania.
From 1949 the CIA (codenamed ‘BGFiend’) and MI6 (‘Valuable’) worked in tandem to find viable recruits, make contact with deposed national leaders – Albania’s King Zog, for example, whose exile took him through Europe, to the US, Egypt, and, finally, France – and gather intelligence on life behind the ‘iron curtain’. In the case of Albania, under the autocratic leadership of Enver Hoxha, most of the recruited agents were émigrés who had escaped westward during the war. However, these refugees were a motley crew: they included Zog’s supporters, wartime collaborators, as well as those who had resisted both the fascists and the communists.
The first agents were dispatched into Albania in 1951. Trained in Malta – and later in Germany and Greece – they were initially parachuted in, but later arrived by sea and over land through Greece. Almost all of their missions ended in failure, with both intelligence and supplies lacking. By 1952 those involved in BGFiend/Valuable felt that they had learned from the mistakes of the previous year, and operations ramped up. Plans were made to install a permanent wireless radio presence in the country and foment a domestic resistance that would thrive without foreign stimulation. The Albanians involved were told that the missions aimed to overthrow Hoxha.
However, by 1952, the Sigurimi, Albania’s state security apparatus, had become adept at counter-insurgency measures. Agents were captured and imprisoned, and many died. This was embarrassing for Western intelligence services, which took far too long to realise that their missions had been compromised. Long’s work, based on declassified intelligence documents and the personal papers of some of those involved in the mission, suggests various reasons for this failure. Miscalculations were common; agents were dropped miles from their intended entry points and their disparate political allegiances meant that many were unable to work together. There was distrust between the émigrés and Western intelligence services, but also, increasingly, between MI6 and the CIA, whose partnership simmered to an end by 1954. Long considers the impact – or lack thereof – of Kim Philby, who has often been suspected of assisting Albanian counter-insurgency successes, and offers good arguments against inflating Philby’s importance.
There are many extraordinary actors in this story: intelligence services, clandestine agents, exiled monarchs. But some of the most important people are largely missing from the book. It was the locals on the ground in towns, villages, and the Albanian countryside who were the agents’ first point of contact, usually friends and family members, in order to procure food or other supplies. It was also those locals who could identify the agents to the Sigurimi. Without them, neither covert missions nor counter-insurgency efforts could succeed. Western intelligence services engaged in a battle for hearts and minds by dropping propaganda leaflets and food provisions, as well as broadcasting Voice of Free Albania from a black site just outside Athens. Ultimately, it was to no avail. Hoxha – who would serve as the longest-living leader in the communist bloc – led Albania until 1985 with ruthless domestic repression.
Aleksandra Pomiecko is Lecturer in Modern History at King’s College London.