Lord Randolph Resigns, December 1886, Part I

“He resigned.” Sir Winston Churchill has written of his father, “at the wrong time, on the wrong issue, and he made no attempt to rally support.” By Robert Rhodes James.

Great quarrels, it has been said, often arise from small occasions, but never from small causes. The Ministerial crisis that was precipitated on December 23rd, 1886, by the announcement of the resignation from Lord Salisbury’s second administration of Lord Randolph Churchill, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the House of Commons, was a logical—indeed inevitable—outcome of the events of the previous four months.

In a longer perspective, it was the culmination of the struggle between Churchill and Salisbury for the leadership of the Tory party that had continued since the former had emerged as the champion of “Tory Democracy” in 1882.

The conflict between the two men had grown increasingly harsh since the accession of the Ministry in the August of 1886, when, relying upon the Parliamentary support of the Liberal Unionists, it had taken office on the morrow of the defeat of the first Gladstonian Home Rule Government at the hands of the electorate.

There was little in common between the Prime Minister and his brilliant but erratic lieutenant save perhaps in background.

On the one hand, there was Lord Randolph, mercurial, deeply sensitive, impetuous and fascinating, whose political genius was mainly intuitive, and who had risen in six years from comparative obscurity to a position in the Tory party second only to Salisbury himself; on the other hand, there was the intensely ambitious, imperturbably polite and shrewd master of real politik, whose strength lay in the accumulated experience of over twenty years of active political life.

The fiery Lord Cranborne of the 1860’s had matured into the calm and influential master of Hatfield, but beneath the facade of the patrician statesman the same fires that had burned so brightly at the time of the controversies over the second Reform Act of 1867 still smouldered.

In retrospect, it would appear that any conflict between the two was bound to have only one result, but in 1886 the name of Lord Randolph Churchill rang through the land, with that of his nominal leader forming a somewhat muted accompaniment in the background.

They had clashed only once before, and on that occasion Salisbury had been happy to cut his losses and come to terms with the terrible young tribune.1 Around Churchill there hung that indefinable air of invincibility which draws allegiance and smothers opposition.

Churchill would not have been human had he not been intoxicated by his spectacular advance, and in this mood he failed completely to appreciate the weight of the sullen jealousy with which he was regarded by an important and influential element in the Tory party.

He was thirty-seven years old; he had concluded a devastatingly successful period of Opposition with marked success in Office; he had engineered the defeat of the first Home Rule Bill; he had achieved the secession from the Liberal ranks of the equally prickly and sensitive Chamberlain; he spoke only to the greatest audiences in the country; his rising in the House of Commons filled the Chamber, and his every word was read with care and interest in the Chancellories of the world; small wonder that “the Grand Young Man” failed to discern the fact that his power was based on shifting and treacherous sands.

Lord Randolph’s interference in the affairs of other departments, his arrogant and hectoring attitude to his colleagues and—perhaps most potent factor of all—the memory of old insults, all combined to increase his isolation in the Cabinet.

Men who had genuinely—if reluctantly—admired him in August were sick of him by December. A not unimportant element in the Cabinet was showing marked signs of restiveness as early as October, and Lord Cranbrook took the extreme step of voicing their discontent at their leader’s indecision and lack of assertiveness with Churchill in a letter to Salisbury.

It is not necessary to examine the incidents that led to this state of affairs, but it is essential to appreciate their consequence. Lord Salisbury observed this process with an unruffled urbanity. After a Guildhall banquet a group of Ministers remonstrated with him, urging that the time had come for taking a strong line with Lord Randolph; “They are wrong,” Salisbury remarked to his wife as he settled into their carriage afterwards; “The time has not yet come.”

Even Salisbury’s extremely able but by no means impartial biographer has admitted that by November he was convinced of the inevitability of a crisis and was planning to ensure that Churchill took no one with him. In this Lord Randolph was his most powerful ally. Lord Rosebery’s famous passage in his monograph on Pitt on the ill-feeling between Fox and Shelburne can be invoked to describe the relationship between Salisbury and Churchill by the December of 1886.

“It does not signify which of the two was to blame for this mutual mistrust; that it existed is sufficient. It would be too much to maintain that all the members of a Cabinet should feel an implicit confidence in each other; humanity—least of all political humanity—could not stand so severe a test.

But between a Prime Minister in the House of Lords and the Leader of the House of Commons such a confidence is indispensible... The voice of Jacob and the hands of Esau may effect a successful imposture but can hardly constitute a durable administration.”

The Irish Secretary, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, was Lord Randolph’s only ally, and he was mainly in Dublin. All the divergent streams of antagonism between Churchill and Salisbury were canalizing; their diametrically opposed concepts of foreign policy—principally in relation to the Middle East and the French alliance—had especially soured their relationship, and in this tense and distrustful atmosphere a comparatively minor issue proved to be the decisive casus belli.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer planned a characteristically dramatic Budget, of which the cornerstone was considerable economy in Government expenditure. Many of his contemporaries—and one or two historians—have alleged that he was “captured” by his officials at the Treasury, who were thoroughly permeated with the Gladstonian doctrine of economy, and whom Churchill himself had once described as “a knot of damned Gladstonians!”

The truth was that although Churchill had adumbrated some extremely curious theories of national economics in the past, he had been consistent on the matter of stringent economies in Government expenditure, and The Times took a malicious pleasure in reminding him of his many remarks on this subject.

Thus the “damned Gladstonians” and the new Chancellor were united on this subject, and the Service Ministers were instructed to draft their estimates with the necessity of marked reductions in their minds. By November it was apparent that the War Office would have great difficulty in effecting the economies desired by the Chancellor, and it was only by ingenious manipulation of figures that Lord George Hamilton at the Admiralty could hold out any promises.

The Secretary for War, W. H. Smith, did his best, and in these circumstances might have expected a reasonable and conciliatory attitude from the Chancellor. But Churchill was becoming embittered by his treatment in the Cabinet, where he saw what he moodily called “the dull men” winning the day, and he treated Smith’s polite protestations as a question of great principle.

The controversy between the two became remarkably acrid, even by Lord Randolph’s standards, and a letter from him to Smith on November 20th heralded the new tone in their relationship:

My dear Smith,

I was flabbergasted this morning at learning that an intimation had been received at the Treasury from the W(ar) O(fflce) that the latter would present a supplementary estimate of 560,000£ ! ! ! !

I never had the smallest idea you contemplated such expenditure, nor if I remember right did you give any notice in Parliament that last year’s estimates were so insufficient.

I can’t go on at this rate. Whether on foreign policy or home policy or expenditure I have no influence at all. Nothing which I say is listened to. The Govt, are proceeding headlong to a smash and I could be connected with it; the worst feature of all is this frantic departmental extravagance.

Yours ever,

Randolph S. C. 2

There was a core of toughness in the outwardly amiable Smith, and he stood his ground, while an unwonted note of acerbity entered his correspondence with the Chancellor.

On December 14th he wrote to Churchill, stating finally that he could not produce the desired economies in his estimates, and Lord Randolph replied on the next day that he, for his part, could not accept the estimates, especially in view of the fact that the Admiralty had been able to meet him on the matter.

“I own I do not look for much assistance in this matter from the Govt, generally or from the First Lord of the Treasury,” his letter concluded truculently, “but nothing will induce me to give way on the matter and if I cannot get my way I shall go.”

Salisbury made it plain to Churchill on the 15th both in a letter and in the course of an interview with him that he sided with Smith, and suggested that it should be left to the Cabinet. This Lord Randolph refused to do, and hinted that he was prepared to carry the matter to the point of resignation.

As Smith was by now also talking in the same terms Salisbury was more than justified in telling the Queen that same evening that “We are not a happy family.” When she protested that “Lord Randolph must not be given way to,” he agreed, and added that “it will be patched up for a time.”

On December 18th Churchill presented the details of his Budget to the Cabinet, and the rift between himself and his colleagues widened. At first there was no opposition, and Lord Randolph confided to Lord Cranbrook at lunch time at the Carlton that he was amazed at this silent approval, but reactions of a less favourable nature began to arrive at the Treasury shortly afterwards.

Hamilton asked for certain figures about the incidence of taxation, Smith requested a printed memorandum on the details of his proposals (a not unreasonable demand, in view of the fact that Chamberlain had already received the full details of the Budget), and from the Prime Minister came ominous complaints about the unfavourable treatment of “the ordinary country gentlemen.”

Lord Randolph discovered that silence had been occasioned by astonishment rather than by admiration; he was not in a compromising frame of mind, and both Smith and Salisbury received barely civil letters in reply, that to the former being quite unforgivably offensive.

“...Really, considering your frightful extravagance at the War Office you might at least give me a free hand for ‘ ways & means.’ If the Cabinet want further information on the proposed budget I am ready to be cross examined, but I could not possibly produce the document you demand...”

There was much more in the same vein, and Smith’s resolution hardened; on the 20th there was a final unhappy interview between them in which it was evident that neither was prepared to budge an inch. Churchill loved his plans greatly, and he had set his heart on a Budget that would reduce the standard rate of income tax, alter the law of succession duties, and give other sizeable reductions in the prices of necessities for the poor.

Now this “daring conception”—to quote Cranbrook’s own comment—was being imperilled by a member of the “old gang”; for weeks he had been talking of resigning, and on the afternoon of December 20th he travelled down to Windsor with Hamilton in obedience to a Royal Summons, to him revealed that he intended to leave the Government, and in his presence wrote to Salisbury that very evening from Windsor in the same sense.

Months of mounting exasperation lay behind this action, months that had seen the emasculation of his most cherished schemes of foreign policy and local government reform, months that had placed an intolerable strain upon his already unrobust physique. The vital passage of the letter to Salisbury reads as follows:

“...I know that on this subject I cannot look for any sympathy or effective support from you. I am certain that I shall find no supporters in the cabinet. I do not want to be wrangling and quarrelling in the cabinet: and therefore must request to be allowed to give up my office and retire from the government.

I am pledged up to my eyes to large reductions of expenditure, and I cannot change my mind on this matter. If the foreign policy of the country is conducted with skill and judgment our present huge and increasing armaments are quite unnecessary and the taxation which they involve perfectly unjustifiable...

I am sure you will agree that I am right in being perfectly frank and straightforward on this question, to which I attach the very utmost importance and after all what I have written is only a repetition of what I endeavoured to convey to you in conversation the other day...”

Churchill never intended this letter to be a definitive resignation; he was threatening to play his trump card, the one that had never failed to win the trick before. He told Rosebery afterwards that it was not “a resignation letter,” and added, “Of course, I intended eventually to send an ultimatum.”

But the unfortunate wording of the letter placed all initiative in the hands of the Prime Minister, and Smith, who was particularly incensed by Churchill’s action, sent him a hurried note on the 21st after he had been told by Hamilton of the situation. “It comes to this; is he to be the Government?” Salisbury spent that day in informing his colleagues of the not altogether unforeseen crisis.3

The future of the Ministry hinged upon the attitude of Hicks-Beach. If the loss of Churchill would be a severe shock to the Government, that of Beach as well would be calamitous. Beach was a man of unimpeachable integrity, greatly admired and respected in the party, and especially by the “moderates” in the Cabinet, men like Hamilton, Smith, and Cran-brook.

Their consternation when he was forced to resign not long afterwards, as a result of a temporary failure in eyesight, gives some idea of their reactions had he left on a matter of principle with Lord Randolph. Despite their disparity in age, Beach adored Churchill; no other word is fully applicable.

Their relationship had not been without its unhappy moments, but these had been quickly forgotten and forgiven; whenever they had made common cause—as on the question of Sir Stafford Northcote’s future in June 1885—they had formed the most powerful coalition in the Tory party.

Salisbury did not have to be reminded by Arthur Balfour —whose advice flowed almost daily to Hatfield—that “Beach will hardly consent to serve under any one else than Randolph (even if “any one else” is forthcoming)...” To the unsuspecting Irish Secretary Salisbury penned a most remarkable letter on December 21st which has never been published before.

Private

My dear Beach,

I send you a copy of a letter from R.C. this morning. I have also a letter from Smith informing me that he had discussed the estimates with R.C. yesterday morning: but that they could not come to an agreement. Smith expresses himself very decidedly to the effect that these are the lowest he can offer, consistently with the safety of the country; & that he declines to be responsible for any others. I have not heard from Hamilton; but I believe he takes a similar view.

In my opinion they are right: and even if I had no opinion upon the point I should decline to be a party to forcing upon these two men, who are not extravagant, estimates which they say are incompatible with the safety of the country. In view of the present state of Europe, it is absurd to say that estimates which are somewhat smaller than those of last year, are extravagant.

But, if R.C. persists, as he may probably do, we shall have to consider our position. My view is that somehow or other we must meet Parliament. We have taken too much responsibility upon us, especially in Ireland, to retire from office before Parliament has had an opportunity of pronouncing on our course. But I sorely need some talk with you on the subject. Is there any possibility of your coming over next week? or the week after?

...Yours very truly,

Salisbury 4

The great interest of this letter lies in what it does not say. There is no hint of urgency, no intimation that Salisbury might accept the offer of resignation, and at least one error of fact, although it is possible that it was unintentional.

There was no dispute between Churchill and Hamilton which was beyond a compromise, as the latter had been able to make some economies, and Churchill had been making pointed allusion to this fact in his correspondence with Smith for some time.

Beach was completely misled by the tone of Salisbury’s letter, and it would take an unusual degree of ingenuousness to suppose that this was purely fortuitous. In his reply he said that he did not regard the dispute over the estimates as being of any great moment, but that the references to foreign policy and other matters made the situation more serious.

He promised to see Churchill when he came over for his annual Christmas visit to his old friend Fitz-Gibbon at Howth, and said that he would do “all in my power to bring him straight by the beginning of the week of the 2nd January.”

It is interesting to record that Beach himself thought that he had been unfairly treated by Salisbury. In the course of a letter to Smith on the 26th he complained about the fact that he had been kept in the dark about the true seriousness of the crisis, and added that “the announcement (of the resignation) came absolutely without previous warning, to me,” and his unwillingness to rejoin the Ministry after his health had recovered was to some extent occasioned by the distrust he felt for Salisbury as a result of this incident.

For two days Lord Randolph had waited for Salisbury’s reply with growing uneasiness. Drummond Wolff, his old colleague of the Fourth Party days, was his only confidant. At lunch at the Carlton on the 22nd he spoke to Smith, who told him that Salisbury had decided to accept his offer to resign. The afternoon dragged on, and no message arrived at Connaught Place.

Lady Randolph was involved in the details of an important reception due to be held at the Foreign Office, and she asked him some trivial question on the arrangements. “Oh, I shouldn’t worry about that,” he replied. “It will probably never take place”; when taxed, he refused to elaborate, and she forgot the incident. At last, while Churchill and Wolff were dining together at the Carlton, the long-awaited letter arrived.

It must be realized that Lord Randolph read Salisbury’s letter in the light of Smith’s remarks to him earlier in the day. The Prime Minister reiterated his arguments of the 15th, expressed his great regret, and made no suggestion for a further meeting.’ The door was not slammed in Churchill’s face; but it was none the less firmly closed.

Lord Randolph was faced with the alternative of beating an ignominious retreat or continuing as he had begun. He was not of a retreating disposition, and so he sat down at once at a desk and replied to the Prime Minister, acknowledging the receipt of his letter “accepting my resignation of the Chancellorship of the Exchequer,” and this was dispatched to Hatfield by special messenger; Churchill and Wolff then returned to Connaught Place to pick up Lady Randolph for the theatre.

Thus we have the situation laid before us on the evening of December 22nd. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had threatened to resign if he could not get his way; the Prime Minister had expressed his regret but had declined to make any move in the direction of a compromise; the Chancellor had chosen to interpret this as an acceptance of his offer.

The last fatal letter was on its way to Hatfield, where Salisbury was the host at a ball attended by the future Queen Mary and, by a singular coincidence, Lord Randolph’s mother, the Duchess of Marlborough, and his youngest sister; Churchill himself was in a London theatre, glumly watching The School for Scandal with his wife and Drummond Wolff.

A mere handful of people knew of the advanced stage of the crisis; Beach was worried but not unduly pessimistic; the Queen was in complete ignorance of the situation; the members of the House of Commons were scattered up and down the country; London clubland was dispersing for Christmas; Lord Hartington, the leader of the Liberal Unionists, was in Rome. For a moment we have a pause in the drama. And then, on what appears to have been a sudden impulse, Lord Randolph made his irremediable mistake, and the action continues again, this time with an increased momentum.

Both Lady Randolph and Wolff had noted his lack of interest in the play, and neither was surprised when he said that he would go round to his club in the interval. In fact he went to Printing House Square to see G. E. Buckle, the editor of The Times, and authorized him to publish the amazing news on the morrow.

This was not the first time that Churchill had given Buckle a political scoop; barely a month before he had told him of Arthur Balfour’s accession to the Cabinet, but Salisbury—who had summed up his man by now—had sent Buckle a discreet warning about publishing appointments to which the Queen had not given her approval, and the hint had been taken. But on this occasion no word came from Hatfield.

Salisbury was talking to the Duchess of Teck shortly before half-past one in the morning of the 23rd when a dispatch box was brought to him; excusing himself, he opened it, read the one letter that it contained, and then resumed his conversation with unbroken composure.

To no one did be reveal the nature of that single document; he did not communicate with the Queen, he did not warn Buckle, he simply went to bed. He was woken early by his wife, who reminded him that they must get up to see the Duchess of Marlborough off, as she was catching an early train.

“Send for The Times first,” was the sleepy response. “Randolph resigned in the middle of the night, and if I know my man, it will be in The Times this morning.” His instinct was sure, and Lord Randolph’s mother and sister—to their surprise and indignation—were allowed to leave the house without seeing either their host or hostess.

Salisbury did not indulge in unnecessary haste at even this late hour, and it was not until half-past nine that a cypher telegram to the Queen informing her of the news that she had already—to her extreme mortification—digested from The Times, was sent from Hatfield.

The young George Nathaniel Curzon, who was still smarting from being snubbed by Churchill almost a year before, was another guest at Hatfield, and, as he wrote to Arthur Godley some fifteen years later, “I remember the thanksgivings and hosannas that went up.”

The Christmas calm was abruptly terminated. Holiday plans were cancelled; the political world hastened back to London; clubland throbbed as on an election day; the announcement of Churchill’s resignation became the only topic of conversation; the Chancellories of Europe demanded information and assurances.

Lady Randolph Churchill came down to breakfast at Connaught Place on the morning of the 23rd with her copy of The Times in her hand, too numbed to say anything. She found her husband already at the table. “Quite a surprise for you,” he said with a smile.

1 In the struggle for the control of the National Union of Conservative Associations from November 1883 to July 1884. It was after this lengthy controversy that Salisbury told Carnarvon that he could never work with Churchill again; but “never” is a dangerous word in politics.

2 Hambleden MSS. The other letters to Smith quoted elsewhere are also from this extremely interesting and mainly unpublished collection of political documents.

3 Sir Winston Churchill has said (page 574 of Lord Randolph Churchill) that Salisbury wrote out copies of Churchill’s letter in his own hand for the other members of the Cabinet, but the copies that I have seen are not in the Prime Minister’s handwriting.

4 St. Aldwyn MSS.

5 Lord Rosebery, when commenting on Sir Winston Churchill’s Lord Randolph Churchill, said that it would have been very surprising if Salisbury had suggested an interview in view of his dislike of them. But on all other occasions of dispute in the Government Salisbury had suggested a meeting at once.