The History-Thieves: Stealing the Muslim past?
Akbar Ahmed warns that fundamentalism is misappropriating history as sectarianism strengthens in the Indian sub-continent.
At the heart of the Muslim problem in India lies their dramatic history and its ironic twists and turns. The Muslims who once ruled India from Delhi are now slowly but surely sinking into an under-class, lacking economic, political or media power. They only have memories of the past to remind them of their dignity, identity and achievements, their sense of self and worth. This, too, is under threat by those who would steal their history.
Of the many historical monuments created by the Muslims probably the most famous are the Taj Mahal in Agra and, in Delhi, the Qutub Minar, the Red Fort and the Jamia Masjid. The Muslim inspiration and source of their creation have never been in doubt. But extremist groups are claiming the first two, with a long list of other Muslim monuments, as of Hindu origin (of our four examples the first three are administered by the Government of India, while Muslims retain the mosque for worship). The Muslims, these Hindu groups say, forcefully appropriated them, adding Quranic verses and calligraphy to give them an Islamic character; it is time to restore them to their Hindu character.
Although few serious Indian historians – whether Hindu or not – give credit to these arguments they are beginning to gather a popular bazaar following. On a recent visit to India last year I saw evidence of how the process works.
At the Taj Mahal Hindu priests, skull-shaven and in loin- cloths, placed a flame on the grave of Shah Jahan and began to chant Sanskritic verses in my presence. This may have been the famous cultural synthesis of India, the blurring of religious boundaries, it may have been, as the Muslim guide with Ayodhya on his mind claimed, the declaration that this was a Hindu temple and it would once again be a place of Hindu worship. In the blurring of reality and rumour in South Asia it was difficult to tell.
Last year an unruly mob of 30,000 Hindus had burst into the Taj Mahal wishing to 'capture' and 'convert' it. Fire was exchanged. Armed soldiers with rapid-fire guns testify to the tension. It is ironic to see the symbols of violence and force in this monument of love and peace.
Although some Hindu scholars have tried to prove that the Taj Mahal was a pre-Islamic Hindu monument few established ones have taken this seriously. None-the-less small, cheap, plastic replicas of the Taj Mahal are now on sale with the trishul, the Hindu trident of divinity, replacing the crescent on top of the dome, indicating its conversion to a Hindu temple. There are ominous contemporary political resonances here. In view of the tensions in Ayodhya, only a few miles away, generated by the claims of millions of Hindus that Muslims destroyed the temple of Lord Rama and built a mosque on the site, and the deaths that have resulted all across India, the argument assumes significance.
At the Qutub Minar I bought a guide book which looked like an official one but was not. It had two pages explaining the Hindu origins of the Qutub and how the original Hindu temple was converted. The official plaque placed by the Archaeological Department contradicted this point of view.
Why should Hindu extremists wish to take this path? There are numerous reasons which are inter-linked: to continue to focus on Muslims as the 'enemy' and thereby maintain the momentum of national support for the extremists built up over the last few years which has generally united Hindu society as never before over caste, language and regional differences; to put Muslims in their place; to reinforce the image of Muslims as an alien and destructive force who built their monuments on the site of, and after destroying, Hindu ones and, above all, to deny them their historical role as great builders, artists and rulers, which would not fit into the perception of Muslims as a poor and illiterate under-class.
History is never far from the surface in contemporary India. Newspaper articles and letters constantly cite Aurangzeb, the last great Mughal emperor, as a hero among some Muslims but a villain for most Hindus. He is portrayed as a narrow-minded bigot and Muslims are often called 'the children of Aurangzeb' by the extremists. Few mention that on the whole Muslims were sensitive to their Hindu compatriots. From the start Babar, the first Mughal emperor, abolished cow-slaughter; and up to the time of the last Mughal emperor in 1857 it was banned in Delhi as a gesture towards the Hindus. Sir Sayyed did the same in the college he started in Aligarh.
In an earlier book (Discovering Islam: Making Sense of Muslim History and Society, Routledge, 1988) I had talked of the Andalusian syndrome, inspired by the fate of the Muslims of Spain; the fear of total extinction among Muslims after living in a country for centuries. We see it in India being played out in slow motion. The Muslims are being marginalised as they sink into pockets of poverty. The stories of conversions, of shudi or purification ceremonies, back to Hinduism, back to the caste that individuals once belonged to, are in the air. The few success stories of some Muslims should not distract from the despair and bewilderment of the community.
Whose fault is it? Both the Hindu majority and the Muslim minority accuse each other. Both are partly to blame: the Hindu majority for not understanding the deep sense of insecurity among the Muslims and the Muslims for failing to come to terms with their identity and place in modern India. Both sides must make their peace: the present state of tension and. rupture cannot last. That is the lesson history teaches us; even to those who would steal it from under our very noses.
Unless the central government is prepared to take vigorous steps, unless the majority parties are prepared to reach out, unless the Indians of vision and courage speak out, unless the Muslim community itself is aware of how far it has fallen behind in education, economic development and public esteem and is prepared to completely change its attitudes and spirit, the gaps will continue to widen. As a result the Muslims will continue to sink deeper into the pools of ghetto-like existence which will make integration unlikely and eventual reconciliation difficult.
Bazaar sociology does not stop with the past; it feeds into the writing and perception of modern history also. In India, if Muslim rulers are depicted in the stereotype as alien invaders, mainly drunk and destroying temples; in Pakistan the Hindu past simply does not exist. Hindus are also dismissed as stereotypes, as cowardly and mean. History only begins in the seventh century after the advent of Islam and the Muslim invasion of Sind shortly afterwards; the impressive and pre-Islamic civilisations of Moenjodaro, Harrapa and Taxila are hastily brushed over or altogether ignored.
Contemporary history does not fare much better. In India the aspirations of the Muslims, the struggle for identity and independence, starting from the last century, are dismissed. The focus is kept on Mr Jinnah who is portrayed as a Westernised opportunist, a British stooge. Pakistan, it is taught, was the creation of the feudal lords and a greedy middle class who wished to preserve their privileges and their power. In Pakistan this is reversed. Mr Jinnah takes centre stage and the others are depicted as caricatures: Nehru as a shallow playboy, Gandhi as a religious hypocrite and Mountbatten as a lying imperialist.
In India, in spite of its well-developed critical mass of intellectuals and academics, the tendency is to take the well-trodden and easy path. Indeed some established writers of the post-1947 generation appear to reiterate the prejudices of the past based on a dubious and one-sided understanding of history with the zeal of the under-graduate (see Arun Shourie's account 'The man who broke up India', on the role of Jinnah and the events of 1947, in Illustrated Weekly of India, October-November, 1985). In Pakistan, authors attempting to be objective and scholarly about Mr Jinnah land in trouble and foreign books suggesting that he was anything but a formal, orthodox Muslim all his life are banned (as is one of the very few sympathetic portrayals of Jinnah by a non-Pakistani, Stanley Wolpert's biography, Jinnah of Pakistan, Oxford University Press, 1984).
Until very recently the violent events of partition ensured that this bazaar history was generally accepted; few people were prepared to explore the other position with empathy and clarity. It was easier to blame everything on the other side. Recent scholarship suggests that this kind of history is being challenged. One of the most significant books of this kind, Partition of India: Legend and Reality, was written by Mr H.M. Seervai, an eminent Indian lawyer based in Bombay (Emmenem Publications, Bombay, 1990). He reverses the stereotypes. Mr Jinnah is proved to be more wronged than wronging, often prepared to compromise and be reasonable. Pakistan, Mr Seervai concludes, was clearly a result of Congress arrogance and bungling. Similarly Rajmohan Gandhi's book on the Muslims of India challenges many stereotypes and is a clear and sympathetic account of eight South Asian Muslim leaders, including Jinnah (Eight Lives: A Study of the Hindu-Muslim Encounter, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1986). As a grandson of Mahatma Gandhi, who was often politically opposed to Mr Jinnah, Rajmohan Gandhi is to be especially commended, for he has risen magnificently above communal and national prejudices.
History in South Asia, not withstanding the efforts of a Rajmohan Gandhi or a Seervai, is firmly caught in the web of the recent events and passions; it is either hagiography or polemics but rarely a dispassionate record of the past. Unless both Hindus and Muslims are able to confront the past they cannot hope to negotiate the future in a spirit of mutual understanding.
In the communal hatred something has been lost, something has been destroyed, something valuable and precious; something characteristically South Asian. And that something is the sense of tolerance and harmony, a tradition as old as Indian history. Modernism and the modern state are unwittingly trampling on and destroying one of the most attractive features of South Asian culture and society.
- Akbar Ahmed is Iqbal Fellow and Fellow of Selwyn College, Cambridge, chief consultant for the forthcoming BBC TV Series, Living Islam, and author of Post-modernism and Islam: Predicament and Promise (Routledge, 1992).

