The Tragedy of Force Z

British accounts of the weeks immediately before the outbreak of war with Japan in December 1941 are dominated by the story of Force Z, comprised of the new battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the battle-cruiser HMS Repulse. It is the tale of a futile gesture of late and inadequate deterrence, leading inexorably to disaster. The loss of the force to Japanese air attack on 10 December, just two days into the conflict, was traumatic; the greatest single defeat suffered by the Royal Navy during the Second World War.

Yet historians have given the story more significance than is justified by the loss of a relatively small element of the Royal Navy. It has been portrayed as the inevitable consequence of a flawed ‘Singapore strategy’: the illusion that a two-hemisphere empire could be secured with a one-hemisphere navy ended with the despatch to Singapore of a political token. For those coming of age postwar, the sinking of British battleships by an upstart Asian power symbolised the collapse of imperial and naval power. It encapsulated not just strategic overstretch but a failure of will and capability, mixed with professional arrogance and incompetence.

Force Z fiasco joins the Dardanelles and Norway on the list of military failures of judgement of which Churchill has been accused. In contrast, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound is cast as the weary First Sea Lord, lacking the political shrewdness, intellect, temperament and robustness to face down a dominant premier.

Such is the emphasis placed on the Force Z story that one might assume this was the only occasion between 1939 and 1944 when the British leadership tried to address the naval problem in the eastern theatre. In reality, though, the naval defence of its Far East possessions was never far from British minds. The idea of dispatching major Royal Navy reinforcements to the region did not suddenly emerge in the late summer of 1941. The traditional account of the genesis of Force Z, barely challenged for 60 years, is flawed. The positions ascribed to Churchill and the Admiralty are, in fact, almost the reverse of those they actually adopted.

Anglo-American discussions

To understand how Force Z ended up in Singapore just before the Japanese attack, we must begin with the Anglo-American naval discussions conducted between the fall of France in June 1940 and the first formal staff talks between the two countries, known as ABC-1, in early 1941. When France fell, Britain recognised that it could not provide sufficient naval forces to counter Japanese intervention in South-East Asia without abandoning its crucial role in the eastern Mediterranean. Such a withdrawal would undermine its prosecution of the war by allowing Axis forces access to Middle East oil. Britain hoped, therefore, to persuade the US to help secure its interests in the East from Japanese aggression. The hope proved illusory. The US was determined to prioritise Atlantic security, for fear of Britain’s collapse, and was unwilling to deploy significant naval forces in the western Pacific. At ABC-1 Britain accepted a compromise proposal from the Americans. If the US entered the war, its navy would absorb additional British responsibilities in the Atlantic and the western Mediterranean, releasing Royal Navy forces for an eastern fleet.

Planning for such a force began in February 1941. The Admiralty conveyed the new policy to Commander-in-Chief China, Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton: ‘We have been asked if in the light of the above [US] dispositions we should be prepared to send a capital ship force to the Far East and have replied “Yes”.’ The Admiralty anticipated an immediate ‘Phase 1’ reinforcement in response to Japanese aggression, to protect communications in the Indian Ocean. This would be the Force H Gibraltar task force, comprising a battle-cruiser and aircraft carrier, currently tasked with securing the western end of the Mediterranean. Once the US entered the war, a more substantial ‘Phase 2’ eastern fleet would follow. This would comprise five capital ships released by US navy forces in the Atlantic, ten cruisers, 32 destroyers and ten submarines. This policy revived the Admiralty’s traditional Far East war plan: to secure Singapore and Britain’s territories in the region.

This ‘Atlantic substitution’ was reaffirmed at the ‘Riviera’ Conference of British and US leaders, which took place at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, between 9 and 12 August 1941. The US gave notice that it intended to assume western Atlantic escort responsibilities in peacetime, even if this provoked an early clash with Germany. The creation of an eastern fleet was now primarily subject to the availability of Royal Navy ships under refit or repair. As a consequence, Phases 1 and 2 became blurred. It would be possible for some Indian Ocean reinforcements to deploy in peacetime by the end of the year, while other units would follow incrementally to achieve the Phase 2 total.

Three other issues discussed at Riviera influenced Britain’s Far East strategy. First, the consensus that the survival of the Soviet Union was critical to the security of both Britain and the US. Second, the perception that Japan now posed a global as well as a regional risk because of the damage it could inflict on wider British and Soviet war efforts. As a result, the US leadership sought to deter Japanese aggression with air power based in the Philippines alongside economic sanctions. The third issue was British concern over the vulnerability of communications in the Indian Ocean, including those of the Middle East theatre, to attack from Japanese raiders, especially heavy cruisers. Admiralty planners recognised that the US navy could not protect these critical British interests. The Japanese threat required a Royal Navy force at Singapore or Ceylon sufficient to deter them. Churchill was prepared to devote resources, including a King George V-class battleship, despite his long-standing reluctance to reinforce Malaya.

This was the context for the prime minister’s exchange on Far East naval reinforcement with Pound at the end of August following their return from Riviera. The catalyst was not just the need to counter an early attack from Japan, which Churchill thought unlikely. It was also that the long-desired naval reinforcements in the Indian Ocean were becoming available. Churchill knew that Admiralty plans envisaged the deployment of Force H as a fast ‘hunting group’ to deter Japanese raiders and the US was making this possible earlier than expected. Churchill’s proposal for a ‘deterrent squadron in the Indian Ocean’ comprising Force H plus a King George V fast battleship was his variant on existing Admiralty plans.

The raider threat

The official history insisted that the Admiralty’s proposed Indian Ocean force was a ‘defensive’ one, positioned strategically in the Indian Ocean, the centre of a crucial theatre. The prime minister’s plan was ‘potentially offensive’, based far forward in Singapore. This was not, however, Churchill’s intention in August, when his focus was on the Japanese raider threat. Any claim that his intervention triggered deployment of an inappropriate force to Singapore is not justified. The only reference to the deployment of capital units at Singapore to enhance ‘deterrence’ came from Pound. He suggested that such a symbolic force might be desirable in peacetime, though in case of war, ships could then be withdrawn to Ceylon.

Some historians insist that the August exchange between Churchill and Pound ended in stand-off. There was then a hiatus until mid-October when Churchill raised the issue of capital ship reinforcement at the Defence Committee. But they are wrong in two respects. Their picture of the August exchange as a fundamental clash over Far East naval strategy overstates a reasonable debate about the composition of a force that was unachievable for some months. More important, having pursued a defensive policy, the Admiralty fundamentally changed its Far East plans during the following six weeks.

The trigger for this rethink was the continuing effort to produce a joint US-British-Dutch Far East war plan based on ABC-1 principles. Throughout the summer the British resisted promising significant forces for the forward defence of the Malay Barrier – a notional line running down the Malayan peninsula, through Singapore and the Dutch East Indies – pending full ‘Atlantic substitution’ by the Americans, who still refused to carry the burden of defending British interests in the East. The result was impasse. However, the new US Navy deployments in the Atlantic allowed earlier, more forward British reinforcement. Some now favoured a more offensive strategy towards Japan earlier than had been thought feasible. Attitudes within some parts of the naval staff bordered on madness. Rear Admiral Sir Henry Harwood, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Foreign), for example, believing that the Japanese would attack suddenly, argued that the Eastern Fleet should operate offensively from Singapore from the outbreak of hostilities. Four R-class battleships would be an adequate initial force. Harwood also suggested that the fleet’s strike force of cruisers should deploy to the coast of Japan, where a tiny Royal Navy force would be exposed to the full might of the Japanese fleet.

On 30 September, Vice-Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, Vice Chief of Naval Staff, chaired a meeting of senior Admiralty personnel. This confirmed that the Royal Navy favoured a combined Allied Fleet in the Far East theatre, consisting of the two Royal Navy forces based in Singapore, the US Asiatic Fleet based in the Philippines and Dutch ships. Pound and the First Lord, A.V. Alexander, gave approval by mid-October. The Admiralty had now committed both to defend the Malay Barrier, as the US navy had urged, and to deploy a battle fleet to its north. In just four weeks Pound’s defensive strategy for the Indian Ocean had become an offensive one based at Singapore and, ultimately, Manila, to be implemented by old R-class battleships. Air cover relied on optimistic projections of Japanese strike capability and whatever fighter cover the RAF in Malaya and the USAAF in the Philippines could provide. The Royal Navy eastern fleet would be smaller than any anticipated prewar, but have a more forward, aggressive role. Plans depended on significant US support, though US intentions remained uncertain.

This planning coincided with changing British perceptions of the risk from Japan. Intelligence assessments argued that, following its move into southern Indochina in July, Japan could rapidly occupy Thailand, which would, in turn, facilitate an attack on Malaya. However, the dramatic German successes in Russia had made a Japanese attack on Siberia an attractive option, though it would leave Japan with insufficient forces for an attack on Malaya. It was thought that Japan would hold back until the Soviet Union’s situation resolved itself, although it was also believed that Allied sanctions would force Japan ultimately to choose between concessions or war.

The conclusion that the threat to Malaya was not imminent was a convenient one. The chiefs of staff could again defer promised air reinforcements in order to meet demands in the Middle East and the Soviet Union. The foreign secretary Anthony Eden also argued that Japanese anxiety to avoid simultaneous war with Britain, the US, the Soviet Union and the Netherlands meant that a firm approach would deter rather than provoke. He and Churchill favoured increasing the pressure on Japan with a deterrent force of one or more modern capital ships and a carrier at Singapore. This was the Force H plus advocated by Churchill in his earlier exchange with Pound, a view endorsed by Far East commanders. New US bombers and submarines based in the Philippines would reduce the risk to Malaya, though British ships at Singapore were essential if Japan turned south: even two capital ships would have an effect. The chiefs of staff confirmed on 9 October that movement of heavy ships to the Indian Ocean was underway. Reflecting recent Admiralty discussions, they added that the naval build-up in the East allowed a more forward policy in war, using Manila as a base.

Such judgments underestimated the pressures in Japan to resort to force early. Following the Allied oil embargo, implemented from early August, the Japanese military produced an integrated plan to seize oil supplies in the Dutch East Indies. It would counter British and US intervention through simultaneous attacks on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines and Malaya. Planning for such operations was complete by October.

Two British themes now ran in parallel. The Admiralty favoured an offensive strategy, because it thought that it had the necessary resources, that it aligned with long-standing strategic principles and that it reinforced US commitment to Far East naval defence. Meanwhile, there was a political conviction that Allied solidarity would dissuade a wavering Japan from southern adventures. This reflected Washington’s new commitment to the defence of the Philippines and a determination to resist Japanese aggression. The fall in mid-October of Japan’s moderate government led by Prince Konoye triggered a more formal discussion of British naval reinforcement at the Defence Committee.

Hunting force

Churchill, his deputy Clement Attlee and Eden felt a modern battleship would be the best deterrent against Japan. For Churchill, deterrence, both political and military, still fitted neatly with his requirement for a hunting force to tackle raiders in the Indian Ocean. His immediate worry remained an attack on communications rather than on Malaya. A force could deploy initially to Singapore for political effect but operate primarily in the Indian Ocean. The Admiralty’s offensive ambitions now exerted crucial influence. Pound and Phillips insisted that the R-class and the heavy battleships HMS Rodney and HMS Nelson should be based at Singapore. It followed that, if Prince of Wales deployed, she should also be based at Singapore. The argument reduced to a trade-off between Rodney and Prince of Wales, since Nelson was damaged. The political and operational value of Prince of Wales was compelling and, apart from the R-class, she was the only battleship available before spring 1942. The Admiralty underlined their offensive intent by insisting that numbers would also impress the Japanese and that the R-class were comparable to older Japanese battleships. Had Pound maintained his August defensive strategy, he could have insisted Prince of Wales be based at Ceylon until the full eastern fleet became available. Eden would have accepted this, believing that the ‘deterrent effect’ of Prince of Wales began once she got as far as Cape Town: the Japanese would be aware of the potential threat from reinforcements so close to the Indian Ocean. So would Churchill.

The claim that Churchill insisted, against professional advice, on a small inappropriate force in place of a ‘balanced fleet’ is wrong. Churchill wanted a small, powerful force to double as a high profile deterrent and raider-hunter in the Indian Ocean. Singapore was necessary as a base only if it facilitated this dual objective. It was the Admiralty that wanted a battle fleet at Singapore operating forward in the South China Sea, obliging Japan to deploy a major fleet to cover any southern operation. It pushed this policy even though their fleet would be comprised of slow, obsolete vessels that were no match for Japanese units. Pound’s new position undercut his previous argument that ‘we could do nothing effective against Japan’ without a ‘properly balanced fleet’, a position unachievable until 1942. Prince of Wales became part of a fleet the Admiralty were now determined to deploy to Singapore.

There is a belief that the new carrier, Indomitable, was directed to join Prince of Wales after the meeting of the Defence Committee on 20 October, but was prevented by running aground in Jamaica. Yet Indomitable never received orders to deploy to the East prior to her grounding and she could never have reached Singapore by early December, given her planned work-up period. No Admiralty or Cabinet papers from early October to mid-December show Indomitable allocated to the eastern fleet. Speculation on the difference she might have made is, therefore, pointless.

Churchill believed Prince of Wales was bound for Cape Town, the compromise destination agreed on 20 October, yet the Admiralty already intended her to go to Singapore, where the eastern fleet would be concentrated. Churchill had neither understood the Admiralty’s new offensive intent nor the implications arising from their negotiations with the US. This divergence between Churchill’s focus on the Indian Ocean and the Admiralty’s emerging offensive strategy did not matter initially. Debate about the R-class and their deployment north of the Malay Barrier was hypothetical until they arrived in theatre. Much would then depend on US and Japanese moves. Singapore, with its new dry dock, was a logical choice to base a fleet so long as peace prevailed.

The evolution of Admiralty strategy did not stop, however, with the despatch of Prince of Wales. In late October, the US reiterated that British commitment to defence of the Malay Barrier remained inadequate. Pound proposed a fresh start. Thanks to Atlantic reinforcement by the US, the Royal Navy now planned to base six capital ships at Singapore by the end of January 1942. They would operate northwards and Pound underlined the desirability of basing in the Philippines, where the air threat ‘may not be quite so serious as previously thought’. He sought help with destroyers which still constrained Royal Navy deployment and suggested Phillips should agree new joint plans on arrival in Singapore as Commander in Chief Eastern Fleet. US chiefs responded favourably. They hoped Britain could strengthen its Malaya air group to match US Philippines air reinforcements and add a carrier to the Singapore battle fleet. British reinforcements would discourage a Japanese move south. Manila remained poorly defended.

Containing Japan

The British chiefs of staff endorsed Pound’s naval plans but rejected early air reinforcements, emphasising the need to supply the Soviet Union, preserve adequate strength at home against invasion and build up Bomber Command. By the end of November the British war leadership knew about the Royal Navy’s build-up in the Far East, the arguments regarding Manila and US determination to contain Japan from the Philippines. British planners did not acknowledge that refusal to provide air reinforcements would compromise forward deployment of a fleet. If they expected the US to provide air cover, the feasibility of extending it across the South China Sea and the approaches to Singapore was not considered.

The US General Marshall underlined the ambition for the Philippines forces in a briefing on 15 November. The US was reinforcing the Philippines to conduct an offensive war against Japan and ‘we’ll fight mercilessly’. B-17 Flying Fortresses and longer range B-24s would set the paper cities of Japan ablaze. Aviation fuel and bombs were being positioned throughout the region. The strategy failed, as Marshall acknowledged, due to delay in aircraft deliveries, inadequate airfields, overestimation of aircraft range and under-estimation of the difficulty of targeting ships.

The Admiralty’s offensive planning exploited the resources that were available rather than those that were needed – above all, aircraft carriers. The Royal Navy never deployed an unprotected battle fleet in the central Mediterranean in range of Italian strike aircraft and certainly not against the numbers they knew the Japanese could deploy in the South China Sea. Nor would Home or Mediterranean Fleet commanders deploy R-class battleships, with limited gun power, poor protection and low speed, in a surface engagement against modern opponents or under prolonged air attack.

The risks might have been defensible, if the British leadership had carefully assessed the impact on Japanese intentions of their eastern fleet, US air power in the Philippines and the US Pacific Fleet. During November, the US Chiefs of Staff embraced a policy for containing Japan based on these elements and saw British reinforcements as important to its credibility. Roosevelt also linked US and British reinforcements and deterrence, telling Churchill in November that strengthening ‘our defences in the Philippine Islands’ with ‘similar efforts by you in the Singapore area’ would ‘increase Japan’s hesitation’.

It was a flawed vision. More time was required to deploy the forces and make them operationally effective. The links between air power in the Philippines, Pacific Fleet offensive operations and British reinforcements at Singapore remained aspirational rather than real. The US assumed air reinforcements that the British were not willing to make. The Royal Navy made unrealistic assumptions about Manila. Both countries underestimated the ambition of Japanese operations. Nevertheless, emerging US policy explains why, in British minds, both deterrence and basing a battle fleet in Singapore looked more credible in November 1941 than in hindsight. Furthermore, the mid-1942 eastern fleet had a Force H-plus task force at its core. Given enhanced land-based Allied air power, undertaking limited forays north of Singapore to secure Malaya, the wider barrier and maintaining communications with the Americans was a plausible goal. Embarking on reinforcement with this as the implicit endpoint was reasonable, if the risks in the interim were managed.

None of the British decisions to create an eastern fleet at Singapore were irrevocable. If war looked imminent, plans could have been revised. The Admiralty knew by early November that only two R-class could join Prince of Wales and Repulse at Singapore before late January. The strength Pound judged necessary to meet a Japanese attack south could not be achieved until February. The initial force would be exposed to air attack in harbour and air or submarine attack north of the Malay Barrier. This demanded plans to hold ships in the Indian Ocean or withdraw them from Singapore in good time. Operational caution was in conflict here with the political need for a visible deterrent. But deterrence rested on Japanese awareness that significant reinforcements were in eastern waters, not a specific location in Singapore, as both Eden and Churchill recognised.

The Defence Committee agreed to review the deployment of Prince of Wales at Cape Town. Some historians insist that this review was abandoned under pressure from Churchill to rush her eastward. In fact it was Pound who pushed for Prince of Wales to move quickly on to Singapore. The review lapsed due to the Admiralty’s new offensive ambitions and, specifically, Pound’s further exchanges with the Americans in early November. He wanted Phillips in Singapore to consolidate his new joint strategy. Through November, therefore, as intelligence warned of imminent Japanese action, nobody in London counselled caution over potential exposure in Singapore. It was sensible to have Prince of Wales in the Indian Ocean with Repulse and Revenge as an immediate Phase 1 force to protect vital communications. It was not necessary to base them forward in Singapore. The logical outcome of the abandoned Cape Town review would have been agreement to concentrate in Ceylon and then review options.

The Admiralty deliberately brought the arrival of Prince of Wales at Cape Town and her likely Singapore destination to the attention of Japan. They knew Tokyo was alerted. By the time Prince of Wales met Repulse in Ceylon on 28 November, the situation had deteriorated sharply. War now seemed likely. It made sense to hold what was now Force Z in Ceylon while Japanese intentions clarified. Deterrence applied as much there as in Singapore. Prewar and more recent contingency planning envisaged concentrating eastern reinforcements in  safe waters. Once in Singapore, Force Z would be exposed, while political and military circumstances would make withdrawal harder. Pound later insisted that Force Z was a raiding force that was not ‘sufficiently powerful to disrupt enemy communications in the South China Sea’. The situation equated with that postulated to Churchill in August when Pound favoured withdrawal from Singapore prior to war. The premier’s attitude during Prince of Wales’ eastward passage shows he would have endorsed holding Force Z in Ceylon.

Pound did not hold Force Z back. Perhaps he judged that an attack on Malaya was not imminent and expected that he would have time to review options at Singapore. He also later admitted a second deterrence objective: if the Japanese ‘decided to take the plunge’, two ships at Singapore with the American forces on their flank might cause ‘sufficient anxiety’ to prevent an immediate expedition against Malaya. Given the Admiralty intent to operate offensively north of Singapore, it was logical to place this additional objective on Force Z. Personal factors were influential, too. Pound was reluctant to dictate to Phillips, who was steeped in war planning in the Far East. He knew Phillips would hardly relish arriving in Singapore without a fleet. By creating an eastern fleet and a commander-in-chief prior to war, the Admiralty had inspired a momentum that was now hard to check.

Force Z reached Singapore on 2 December. War was barely a week away and withdrawal difficult, politically and militarily. Deployment north to contest the Japanese landing was by then virtually obligatory. Phillips’ options were limited and other admirals are unlikely to have acted differently. The real charge against him is his role in placing an inadequate force in Singapore in the first place. The Admiralty decision in October to deploy a battle fleet forward at Singapore was taken in isolation. It was influenced by the US but not coordinated with them. The composition of the Admiralty force was unsuited to the Japanese threat. It pre-empted the other British reinforcements required to make a credible deterrent. It was a classic failure of risk management.

Andy Boyd is author of The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters: Linchpin of Victory 1935–1942 (Seaforth, 2017).