Custer's Last Stand
Like other Indian nations before them, the Sioux in 1876 took up arms to defend their traditional way of life and “sold their land dearly.” During this hopeless conflict, a gallant but showy American cavalry officer fought his last battle.

On June 25th, 1876, Lieut. Col. (Brevet Major-General) George Armstrong Custer and the United States Seventh Cavalry attacked a large concentration of hostile Sioux and Cheyenne Indians in the valley of the Little Big Horn River in southern Montana.
The regiment suffered a crushing defeat: Custer and his immediate command of five cavalry troops were killed to a man and the rest of the outfit, after being severely mauled by the enemy, took up a poor defensive position where they, too, would have been annihilated but for the timely arrival of General Gibbon’s relief column. In this fashion, Custer, a man who never shunned the limelight, ensured for himself publicity of a more lasting kind than even he can ever have imagined.
“Custer’s Last Stand” has been the basis of more discussion, more theorizing, more tendentious argument and more downright lying than any other battle in the history of the United States. To Americans the event has an unforgettable emotional impact: like the equally famous siege of the Alamo, it is regarded much as an Englishman might look on the Charge of the Light Brigade had it been combined with the loss of the Titanic.
The character of Custer himself has been responsible for much of the disagreement and he is, depending on your standpoint, either represented as a swashbuckling hero or a blundering and egotistical incompetent.
A colossal weight of evidence can be produced to support either view: Fred Dustin, an archaeologist of note and a spare-time research scholar, has made a forty-year study of the subject and compiled a bibliography that runs to the staggering total of six hundred and forty-one titles. The files of every American newspaper from Los Angeles to Cape Cod are stuffed with reports, interviews, depositions and angry correspondence relating to the event.
Eye-witness accounts, many of them wildly contradictory, exist by the dozen and practically every survivor of the battle on both sides has given his version of what took place. Countless Sioux and Cheyenne warriors have claimed to be the man who killed Custer and quite as many people have pronounced themselves to be the sole survivor of his command.
There are not less than one hundred and five paintings extant, by painters of all qualities, that represent, or rather claim to represent, the scene of the battle. Even poets, notably Longfellow, have found inspiration from this source and, in the cinema, the sight of the buckskin-clad general gaily setting off to join battle with the Sioux is one of the more recurrent clichés.
This mass of Custeriana makes the truth of the matter all the more difficult to determine. Up to the point where Custer split his command, we are on fairly firm ground and most accounts agree on the material points.
We are also reasonably clear about the fate of the detachments commanded by Major Reno, the second in command, and Captain Benteen, the senior regimental troop commander. But the subsequent actions of Custer and his five troops remain open to conjecture, not to say argument. The only certain thing is that they all perished.
Reduced to the bare essentials, these are the known facts. Custer’s Crow and Arikara scouts reported the presence of a hostile village in the valley of the Little Big Horn at first light on the morning of June 25th, 1876. Immediately, the regiment prepared for action and started making its way down Ash Creek, a small tributary that empties into the Little Big Horn. After conferring with his scouts and viewing part of the Sioux village through field glasses, the General split his command into three battalions.
The first, consisting of three troops under Major Reno, was ordered to proceed straight to the river, cross it and charge the enemy camp from the southern end. Although Custer did not inform Reno further of his intentions, other than to say that he would be supported, from the General’s subsequent actions it is clear that he planned to cross the river further north and strike the village from the opposite end. Benteen with three more troops was sent on a wide sweep to the south to cut off the line of retreat of any enemy who slipped past Reno.
The pack train, escorted by the remaining troop, was to follow the main trail at its best speed. Reno’s battalion attacked on schedule; but the Sioux, although completely surprised, very quickly mounted a counter-offensive and the cavalry were driven back across the river with heavy losses. There they entrenched themselves in a defensive position on some bluffs with little to recommend them from a tactical viewpoint.
The time taken over this phase of the operation has been the subject of much debate; but not until Reno’s men were back across the river and effectively pinned down did Custer’s battalion make an appearance at the northern end of the village. They were negotiating a dry gulch known as Medicine Tail Coulee when they were discovered by the enemy, who immediately rushed every available man to the spot leaving a token force to keep Reno occupied.
The Indians, who outnumbered Custer by ten to one, quickly surrounded him, split the force into isolated pockets of resistance, stampeded the horses and, in a series of massed assaults, completely obliterated the command. In the meantime, Benteen, encountering no opposition to the south, made to rejoin the main body and, finding Reno in desperate straits, reinforced him on the bluffs where they were later joined by the pack train.
There the remnants of the Seventh Cavalry remained for the night and all next day, the 26th. Late on the 26th the enemy decamped, having got wind of the approach of further troops under Generals Terry and Gibbon, and the besieged cavalrymen were relieved on the morning of the 27th.
This ferocious battle was the last great gesture of defiance by the Sioux. Afterwards their most famous leader, Sitting Bull, is reputed to have said, “Now they will never leave us alone.” He was right, of course. American self-esteem had received a severe jolt and the Sioux had to be shown who were the masters.
More troops were called in, and the war was prosecuted with renewed vigour; but the Sioux, despite their brief hour of victory in the field, were already a conquered people; their complete subjection was only a matter of time. For a little while, one or two of the more restless spirits kept a jump ahead of the soldiers; but finally Sitting Bull was captured and shot “while resisting arrest”; and, with their greatest leader gone, Sioux resistance collapsed and the war petered out.
The Sioux war of 1876 was in the nature of a punitive expedition. The Sioux had never taken the warpath against the whites much before 1850; they were far too busy raiding their Indian neighbours. Originally from southern Minnesota, they were pushed southwards and westwards by the better armed Chippewas1 into the plains country, where they quickly obtained horses and mastered the plains culture.
Here they raided every tribe within reach and became the implacable enemies of the Crows, the Arikaras, the Pawnees, the Assiniboins, the Snakes and the Blackfeet. In this fashion, the Sioux happily followed their traditional pursuits of horse-stealing and scalp-lifting for the best part of a hundred years. But the frontier was steadily pushing westwards and, by the 1850’s, a clash with the white man was inevitable.
There followed a series of conferences, agreements, treaties and boundary commissions, most of which were subsequently dishonoured in one way or another by the whites. Disillusioned and embittered, like all other tribes unfortunate enough to lie across the path of America’s “Manifest Destiny,” the Sioux retaliated in the only way they knew: they went on the warpath. The next twenty years saw a succession of bloody insurrections, separated by temporary and uneasy truces.
In 1862, the Santee Sioux, who had stayed behind in the great migration, turned on the settlers in the valley of the Minnesota River and massacred every white they could lay hands on. Emboldened by this example, the Teton Sioux under their great leader, Red Cloud, fought a bitter war in the Powder River country, giving a good account of themselves until they were finally beaten by the’Army’s superior organization and equipment and were herded on to a reservation in Dakota Territory.
For a few years, the Sioux were at peace; but the humdrum routine of existence at the agencies was no life for young men brought up to the wild freedom of the plains, and soon “hostiles” were illegally slipping away in hundreds to hunt the buffalo and indulge in a little banditry among the neighbouring tribes. By the beginning of 1876, things were serious enough for the Indian Department to call for help, and the Army was given the job of bringing the truants back on to the reservation.
The operation was begun under the direction of Lieutenant-General Phil Sheridan in Chicago, who opened the campaign in the winter by moving his forces against the two hostile leaders, Sitting Bull on the Little Missouri River in Dakota and Crazy Horse on the Powder River in Wyoming.
Custer’s troops, who were to engage Sitting Bull, were unable to move owing to bad weather; but General Crook made contact with Crazy Horse and was so soundly drubbed that he was obliged to return to base, where he sat waiting for the weather to moderate. This inauspicious start to the campaign gave the Indians renewed confidence, and the hostiles were reinforced by hundreds more braves slipping away from the agencies.
In the spring, Sheridan resumed the offensive with a force of 2,500 men. He drove in towards the hostiles from three directions: General Gibbon with 400 troops from the west, Crook with over 1,000 from the south, and General Terry with a further 1,000 including the Seventh Cavalry from the east.
The Indians remained undaunted. On June 17th Crook once more encountered Crazy Horse’s band, this time on the Rosebud River; he took another beating and again returned to base, “considering himself too weak to make any movement until additional troops reached him.” One down and two to go!
Within the next few days, Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull joined forces and pitched camp on the Little Big Horn. Their combined strength totalled somewhere between 8,000 and 10,000 men, women and children including 2,500 to 3,000 warriors. The Indians now had gathered together representatives from all seven bands of the Teton Sioux,2 a large contingent of Northern Cheyennes and, just for the record, a job lot of strays including Santee and Yankton Sioux, Gros Ventres and Arapahoes.
The principal chiefs were Crazy Horse and Gall of the Oglalas and Little Wolf of the Cheyennes. These were the fighting commanders; but the paramount chief, the field marshal of the outfit, was Sitting Bull of the Hunkpapas, chief medicine man of all the Teton Sioux. A concentration of this size was most unusual; Indians were not gregarious by nature, preferring to move about in loosely organized bands, even when on the warpath.
Certainly, no one among the American forces expected to encounter such a large number of hostiles in one place. General Sherman himself noted in his report for 1876 that, “up to the moment of Custer’s defeat there was nothing, official or private, to justify an officer to expect that any detachment would encounter more than 500 or 800 warriors.”
All this time, Custer and the Seventh Cavalry, sent on ahead by General Terry, had been making their way from Fort Abraham Lincoln towards the Yellowstone River. They had crossed the Powder and Tongue Rivers, when a strong scouting party under Major Reno came in with the information that a fresh hostile trail had been found on the Rosebud. Without hesitation, Custer turned his command in that direction and sent his Crow and Arikara scouts ahead to try and locate the hostile camp.
The Crows knew this country well—it had been their own homeland before the Sioux moved in—and they had no difficulty in locating the enemy. At dawn, they reported the presence of the Sioux village on the Little Big Horn; and Custer personally rode up to their vantage point, a high bluff called the Crow’s Nest, to see for himself.
For the General’s reactions at the first sight of the enemy we have only the evidence of a number of his Indian scouts, who were later seconded to Reno’s command and thereby survived the battle: their testimony suggests that, although they could not see the entire encampment from the bluff, they were well aware that the Seventh Cavalry was heavily outnumbered and that an attack would be suicidal. They maintain that Custer brusquely dismissed this information when it was pointed out to him, and told Mitch Boyer, his half-Sioux Chief of Scouts, to “get on with the scouting and leave the fighting to me.
Custer discussed his course of action with no one, as far as we can tell; but his original plan appears to have been to move the regiment into position and attack the village that night. Later on, however, reports of a considerable disturbance down in the encampment led him to believe that his approach had been discovered and that the hostiles were dispersing.
Custer was an old hand at Indian fighting. From long experience he knew their reluctance to fight a pitched battle: they were superb guerillas, but they had not the discipline or the organization for conventional warfare. Worried that the enemy might be slipping through his fingers, Custer changed his battle tactics and decided to attack at once.
Reconnaissance and preparation for action had taken time; and it was noon before Custer’s adjutant trotted over to Reno and gave him his orders. He was to take his battalion straight down Ash Creek to the Little Big Horn and bring his men into action as soon as possible, the messenger adding that the General would “support him with the whole outfit.”
Reno asked no questions—perhaps he knew better than to do so—and set off at a sharp trot, with Custer’s command following at a more leisurely pace on the other bank of the creek. Immediately afterwards, Benteen, with three further troops, swung off on a detour to the left, to work his way round and take up a position where he could bar any escape route to the south.
Reno’s men reached the Little Big Horn at about 2 p.m., crossed it and formed up facing down stream. There are many accounts of this attack: the quotations in the following passage are from the narrative of 1st Sgt. John M. Ryan written in 1923.
To begin with, the manoeuvre went well enough:
“We started down on a trot and then on a slow gallop... Lieut. Varnum, a very brave young officer in command of the scouts,3 rode ahead... He swung his hat around in the air and sung out to the men ‘Thirty days’ furlough to the man who gets the first scalp.’ We were very anxious for the furlough, but not so particular about the scalp!”
As they continued down the valley, they came in sight of the Hunkpapa lodges which lay at the southernmost point of the camp. The Sioux were quick to re-act. A hastily gathered force opened fire on the troopers and emptied several saddles. At this point, Reno first realized the full extent of the enemy strength. Swarms of hostiles were racing towards him from the main camp down stream; and, within minutes, he was under a withering fire from more than five hundred warriors.
Alarmed at encountering such stiff opposition, Reno changed his tactics and dismounted the men, attempting to make a stand in a belt of timber fringing the river. But the hostiles were infiltrating his position on all sides, and the situation deteriorated rapidly. The enemy were being continually reinforced; the troopers were suffering heavy casualties; the battalion was outflanked, then surrounded.
Reno dithered, uncertain of his next move; he gave the order to mount and immediately changed his mind. Finally, he took the only course left to him and cut his way through the enemy to re-cross the river. There was some vicious hand-to-hand fighting.
“It was death to any man who fell from his horse, or was wounded and was not able to keep up with the command... Before we crossed the river the fighting was desperate and at close quarters.
In many instances the soldiers would empty their revolvers right into the breasts of the Indians, and, after these were empty, some were seen to throw them away and grab their carbines, not having time to return their revolvers to their holsters. In my opinion, if Reno had remained in the timber a short time longer not a man would have made his escape as the Indians outnumbered us ten to one.”
Having gained the bluffs across the river, the survivors of t|ie battalion dug in and prepared as best they could for an overwhelming attack.
Meanwhile, Custer had been manoeuvring his own detachment of five troops into its attack position. Bearing off to the right from Reno’s line of advance, he travelled northwards on the high ground to the east of the Little Big Horn looking for a suitable approach to the river.
At the head of the Medicine Tail Coulee he found what he wanted—a mile-long slope down to a ford across the river. From a nearby observation point Custer got his first glimpse of the entire sprawl of the hostile village.
According to Trumpeter John Martin, who was with him at the time, he appeared very elated and shouted to his men, “Hurrah boys we’ve got them! We’ll finish them up and then go home to our station.”
While the men were making last-minute checks of their equipment before the attack, Custer gave Martin instructions to ride as hard as he could after Captain Benteen with orders to bring up his troops in support.
Lieutenant Cooke, the Adjutant, wrote down the order on a leaf torn from his notebook and the famous last message has survived. It read “Benteen. Come on. Big village. Be quick, bring packs. (P. S. Bring packs.).”
Trumpeter Martin was the last white man to see Custer alive. As he (Martin) galloped off along the back trail, the battalion was already clattering down the coulee towards the enemy.
From now on the only versions we have of Custer’s movement are those of hostile Indians interrogated after the battle, sometimes long after. The evidence of Indians, hostile or friendly, has to be treated with great caution. They were not good witnesses, frequently getting bored with the everlasting questions, and were quite likely to make up any tale that they thought would satisfy the enquirer. A large number of Sioux and Cheyenne warriors, however, have made depositions on the subject of “Custer’s Last Stand and the following account seems to be a reasonable reconstruction of what took place.
Medicine Tail Coulee entered the Little Big Horn just opposite the Cheyenne lodges, the northernmost point of the hostile village. Before Custer could reach the river, his force was seen by the Indians and, with remarkable speed, Sitting Bull switched his main attack from Reno to meet the new threat.
At once Custer was in trouble. The gulley was too narrow to bring any useful fire-power to bear on the enemy, and there was rough broken ground on both sides of him. Attempting to deploy on to a wider front, the troops were obliged to dismount and take cover from the increasing hostile fire. By this time, the full enemy strength was concentrated on Custer’s command. Their braves swarmed everywhere and soon the force was surrounded. This is how the scene appeared to the Cheyenne chief “Two Moon,” who was interviewed by a reporter in 1898.
“The Sioux rode up the ridge on all sides, riding very fast. The Cheyennes went up the left way. Then the shooting was quick, quick. Pop-pop-pop very fast. Some of the soldiers were down on their knees, some standing. Officers all in front. The smoke was like a great cloud, and everywhere the Sioux went, the dust rose like smoke. We circled all round them—swirling like water round a stone.
We shoot, we ride fast, we shoot again. Soldiers drop, and horses fall on them. Soldiers in line drop, but one man rides up and down the line—all the time shouting. He rode a sorrel horse with white face and white forelegs, I don’t know who he was. He was a brave man... Once in a while some man would break out and run toward the river, but he would fall... All along the bugler kept blowing his commands. He was very brave too.
Then a chief was killed. I hear it was Long Hair;4 and then a bunch of men, may be so forty, started toward the river. The man on the sorrel horse5 led them, shouting all the time. He wore a buckskin shirt, and had long black hair and mustache. He fought hard with a big knife. His men were all covered with white dust... One man all alone ran far down toward the river, then round up over the hill. I thought he was going to escape but a Sioux fired and hit him in the head. He was the last man.”
Other hostile accounts emphasize the manner in which the various companies were cut off from each other and annihilated one by one, also the Indian method of running off the enemy horses: every fourth trooper held the horses of the other three together with his own, and so became a priority target for Indian snipers—once they were killed the horses were stampeded by wild yelling and flapping of blankets.
The time taken over this phase of the battle has been the source of a great deal of conjecture, and there is even more uncertainty over the extent of the Indian casualties. Hostile accounts, as always, are contradictory and in any case, so far as the time factor is concerned, Indians had no conception of time as the white man tells it—they would speak of so many sleeps or so many moons.
From a study of all the evidence and ignoring the palpably inaccurate account, of which there is a considerable quantity, there seems to be no doubt that Custer’s command was despatched in a very short time—an hour at the most—and furthermore, considering the superior fire-power6 of the cavalry, the Indians suffered remarkably few casualties: the number killed outright seems to have been as few as thirty or forty, although a number of wounded undoubtedly died later.
After annihilating Custer and his men, the victors stripped the dead for valuable clothing, arms and equipment and raced off to the other end of the valley to reinforce the attack on Reno’s position, leaving their squaws to attend to the routine business of mutilation of the bodies.
Reno, as we have seen, had meanwhile been joined by Benteen’s three companies and the pack train with precious ammunition reserves; but his situation was still precarious in the extreme. The enemy fire, now bolstered up with captured Springfields, was kept up with deadly effect.
Food and ammunition supplies were available in reasonable quantities; but shortage of water soon became an acute problem, particularly because of the large number of wounded to be cared for. The only available water was immediately to their front in the Little Big Horn itself; and a number of further casualties occurred when the more daring soldiers attempted to dash out and bring in filled canteens.
Benteen led one of these sorties, hurling his troop down the slope, each of them “yelling as if provided with a thousand throats.” The troop smashed its way through the enemy forward line to the surprise of “the unsuspecting savages who were amusing themselves by throwing clods of dirt, arrows by hand, and otherwise, for simply pure cussedness among us.” In the brief moments before the Sioux recovered, Benteen’s men filled a number of camp kettles and scrambled back up the bluffs.
They suffered some wounded, but returned the compliment; and Benteen had “serene satisfaction at putting one of Uncle Sam’s 45s thro’ as noble a specimen of the Dakotas7 as ever fluttered an eagle feather in his scalp lock.” He added that he was normally “rather fond of Indians than otherwise,” but in the present circumstances was pleased “to plump him through the spinal, there being so many of them around, that one wouldn’t be missed.” Benteen was a lion-hearted officer, with a long record of bravery in the Civil War; and he undoubtedly put some stiffening into the resistance on the bluffs.
Reno’s defensive position, although tenuous, was a good deal better than Custer’s had been, and the Sioux made no serious attempt at an attack in strength, evidently preferring to starve them out. Indian accounts generally suggest that the Sioux had no wish to kill any more soldiers, and that their investment of the bluffs was purely a defensive measure.
But this view has to be treated with reserve. Indians fought by their own rules and took no pride in a costly victory: they were no strangers to the waiting game, and there are plenty of cases on record where the normal business of an entire village would be postponed for days on the offchance of taking a single white scalp.
The siege lasted all next day until suddenly, late on the 26th, the Indians quietly and quickly withdrew. Puzzled, watchful, suspecting a trap, the remnants of the Seventh Cavalry waited, hardly daring to believe their good fortune, until a relief column under Generals Terry and Gibbon wound into view on the morning of the 27th.
Fourteen officers and two hundred and thirty-three enlisted men died at the Little Big Horn and, in doing so, gave birth to the Custer myth that thrives as strongly today as it ever did in the ’seventies. Scholars and soldiers, historians and military experts, reporters, politicians, Indian agents and the Indians themselves have all contributed to the wealth of Custeriana now available to the research student.
There has been sharp controversy over practically every incident in the battle, and some strongly partisan attitudes have been taken regarding the personalities involved; but an impartial study of the evidence does not reflect great credit on either Custer or Reno. Custer was a strong personality with a talent for making powerful enemies—one of them was the President, Ulysses S. Grant—and he has suffered heavily at the hands of the critics. The principal charges levelled at him are overconfidence, stupidity, stubbornness and disobedience of orders.
All these points can be, and certainly have been, fiercely disputed by the Custer protagonists, who usually put the whole blame on Reno for failing to press home his attack. Poor Reno, who seems to have been a regimental officer of average ability, has been accused of ineptitude, cowardice and even drunkenness; indeed, his reputation came under such heavy fire that in 1879 he requested a Court of Inquiry to investigate his conduct.
The Court was duly convened and, in its findings, stated that “the conduct of the officers throughout was excellent, and while subordinates in some instances did more for the safety of the command by brilliant displays of courage than did Major Reno, there was nothing in his conduct which requires animadversion from this court”—a summing-up that must have been cold comfort.
As for Custer himself, no Court of Inquiry passed judgment on him, and a certain amount of evidence has been put forward in his defence: certainly he did not exceed his orders as has been held by some of his detractors, for they were couched in the widest terms and expressly authorized him to use his own initiative.
But the most ardent Custer supporter would be hard put to explain why he split his command into three relatively small units, and then attacked an enemy of unknown strength, without even giving his subordinate commanders a clear picture of his battle plan.
The only important figure to emerge from the battle with his honour, dignity and courage unquestioned is Sitting Bull. He did not personally engage in combat and, for this reason, has been accused by some rival chiefs of cowardice; but the charge may be safely dismissed as professional jealousy.
Frank Huston has said, “As to Bull’s cowardice: he had about as much place in a battle as General Pershing would have had in a trench raid.” Huston should know; he had lived with the Sioux ever since the Civil War and knew as much about them as anybody.
Sitting Bull was a remarkable man. In October, 1877 he gave an interview to a reporter from the New York Herald at Fort Walsh, whither he had retreated across the Canadian border in an attempt to settle his band on British territory. His remarks are a sad commentary on the causes of the Sioux wars, and clearly indicate how events led up to the tragedy of the Little Big Horn:
“I never taught my people to trust Americans. I have told them the truth—that the Americans are great liars. I have never dealt with the Americans. Why should I? The land belonged to my people. I say never dealt with them—I mean I never treated with them in a way to surrender my people’s rights. I traded with them, but I always gave full value for what I got. I never asked the United States government to make me presents of blankets or cloth or anything of that kind.
The most I did was to ask them to send me an honest trader that I could trade with, and I proposed to give him buffalo robes and elk skins and other hides in exchange for what we wanted. I told every trader that came to our camps that I did not want any favours from him—that I wanted to trade with him fairly and equally, giving him full value for what I got—but the traders wanted me to trade with them on no such terms. They wanted to give little and get much. They told me that if I did not accept what they would give me in trade they would get the government to fight me. I told them I did not want to fight.”
The Interviewer: “But you fought.”
“At last, yes; but not until after I had tried hard to prevent a fight... It did no good. By and by we had to fight.”
It was a hopeless fight, and Sitting Bull knew it; but the Sioux were a proud and warlike race, bred to a tradition that glorified bravery in battle above all other aspects of life. From the first retaliation against the white men who were encroaching on their lands, the old nomadic society was doomed to extinction as surely as the buffalo on which it depended.
Like other nations before them, Shawnees and Delawares in the east, Cherokees and Seminoles in the south and Apaches and Comanches in the south-west, the Sioux took up arms in defence of their way of life and sold their land dearly.
1 Aptly enough “Sioux” is a French corruption of the Chippewa name for the tribe, “nadowessioux” meaning “enemy.” The Chippewas had good reason to feel like this; they had been fighting the Sioux for two hundred years.
2 The sub-tribes of the Teton Sioux were the Oglalas, Minneconjoues, Hunkpapas, Brules, Sans Arcs, Two Kettles and Blackfeet. The last named should not be confused with the Blackfoot Nation, a very active and belligerent tribe who lived further north.
3 The Arikara scouts rode with Reno’s command.
4 The Sioux name for Custer, who habitually wore his hair at shoulder-length in the fashion popular among frontiersmen. He had it cut short before the battle. The Crows, more poetic but less accurate, called him Son of the Morning Star.
5 This was probably Mitch Boyer, Custer’s Chief of Scouts.
6 Each trooper carried a Springfield carbine and a Colt revolver. Custer himself, flamboyant to the last, was equipped with “a Remington sporting rifle, octagonal barrel and two Bulldog self-cocking, English, white handled pistols.” The Indians had a few Winchester and Martini-Henry repeaters but the majority were armed with antique muzzle loaders and bows and arrows.
7 Dakota is the proper ethnological name for the Sioux.

