The British Army: At ease with their heritage
Throughout its 350-year history the British army has been vulnerable to economic pressures and political interference. Its strength lies in the loyalty of its soldiers to their regiment or corps, argues Allan Mallinson.
When I was military attaché in Rome an impressive Alpini brigadier asked me who were the ten greatest British generals. I thought for a moment then answered that there wouldn’t be much debate about the top five, but for the rest … He stopped me and with a sigh said: ‘The point is, we don’t have a single one. How do you think that makes an Italian officer feel?’
It was a powerful statement of the importance of ‘operational heritage’. Generalship does indeed breed generalship and fighting reputation inspires fighting spirit. General Sir David Richards, the chief of the defence staff, led NATO forces in Afghanistan during the 2006 Taliban offensive that looked as if it might succeed. Giving evidence to the House of Commons defence committee afterwards, he described how he would retire to his office and ‘have a conversation with Slim and Templer’. Field Marshals ‘Bill’ Slim and Gerald Templer had died in 1970 and 1979 respectively. They had both, however, been singularly successful fighting off the back foot east of Suez and, by extension, had things to say about taking the fight to the enemy in Afghanistan. When good generalship is a tradition it becomes sustaining.
The same is true all the way down, to individual regiments and to the most junior soldier. When asked why the Rifle Brigade had fought so well in the defence of Calais in 1940 their commanding officer, Brigadier Claude Nicholson, replied simply: ‘The regiment had always fought well, and we were among friends.’ The soldiers in Afghanistan defending the ‘platoon houses’ during the 2006 offensive talked of it as being ‘like Rorke’s Drift every day’, resolving to hold on as the defenders of the mission station in the Anglo-Zulu war had done 127 years earlier. Commanders in the Parachute Regiment similarly exhorted their soldiers to tough it out as their forebears had at Arnhem. Veterans of that battle in 1944 now speak to their modern
counterparts before they leave for operations.
When I set out to research a new history of the army it was with this idea of ‘operational heritage’ in mind: what were the events and who were the people that had shaped it? To my mind some histories had overemphasised the influence of certain events, perhaps because those events had been of great moment politically or socially. Conversely they often overlooked events which, though having little or no impact on the wider course of history, nevertheless worked their effect on the collective mind of the army. It is difficult to be empirical about this since what influences soldiers – seen from the outside at least – is perhaps rather haphazard. The soldier lives daily with his heritage: the uniforms, the pictures on the walls, the names of things, the terms people use and how they talk, what they do and how they do it; never more so than on operations. When you live with your history day in, day out, as I did for 35 years, you begin to see it in a different way. I write, so to speak, from the inside out.
For example, some histories cite the importance of army reforms between Waterloo and the Crimean War; yet these had precious little effect on the army because of structures, personalities and the realities of overseas service. The army’s view of the Crimean War is that it could not have been worse fought; that, indeed, the army’s efficiency had been much greater at the end of the Peninsular War. The sustaining message of the Crimea, invaluable in the recent Iraq war, and in Afghanistan too, has been: ‘Don’t despair if the War Office and senior officers get it wrong; we’ve been here before; the regiment can sort it out; keep calm and carry on.’ The Crimean War was one of the founding experiences of what I call operational resilience, a priceless ability to recover after tactical setbacks, a quality which, in its way, is unique to the British army.
But where do you begin the story? How old is the British army? It depends, of course, on what you mean by ‘British’ and ‘army’. It is possible to argue a tradition of arms going back at least as far as the Anglo-Saxon fyrd, to draw lessons from the great medieval adventurers such as Sir John Hawkwood and from Parliament’s New Model Army. But it is really with the Restoration of Charles II that the story begins. From 1660 there have been soldiers in regular pay – a standing army rather than merely men-at-arms, militia or troops raised for specific wars – under the authority of the monarch, although it was not until January 26th, 1661 that Charles issued a royal warrant for the creation of his ‘guards and garrisons’. The British army could, therefore, claim to be 350 years old, de facto, last year, and de jure this year. However, soldiers think not so much of the army but of their corps or regiment. Some regiments claim to be older than the army itself, since their continuous existence can be traced to an earlier date. Perhaps the best claim to be the oldest is that of the Royal Scots (now the 1st Battalion Royal Regiment of Scotland), raised in 1633 for service in France by Sir John Hepburn under a royal warrant from Charles I.
The army was not founded on any comprehensive plan; its periodic expansion was always ad hoc and its frequent reorganisations and reductions more driven by economic pressure than strategic requirements. Indeed, the army has always struggled with an existential problem: the defence of these islands was the business of the Royal Navy and later the Royal Air Force. If soldiers were needed there was the militia, or for campaigns overseas a force could be drummed up ‘for the duration’. That changed with the Restoration, although not initially by design. The king’s and Parliament’s intention was to pay off the 30,000 or so men under arms – unpopular instruments of repression – retaining just a couple of thousand for the Crown’s personal protection and to garrison the major forts, principally the artillery forts guarding the naval anchorages. (Ireland had a separate establishment.) The numbers grew in successive years, however, especially with the acquisition of the ports of Bombay and Tangier in Catherine of Braganza’s marriage dowry, for which garrison troops were raised. But paying for them was a precarious business since no supply was voted by Parliament. For the king it was always a case of ‘creative accounting’: Charles II’s successor, his brother James II, subverted money voted for training the militia and built up numbers secretly. It was not until the Glorious Revolution in 1688-89 that the army was constitutionally established and properly regulated, in large measure because of James’ abuses.
With William of Orange on the throne, the army grew enormously to prosecute his war with Louis XIV. By 1704, the year of the famous victory of Blenheim, the British army had become a serious continental force with structures and systems that have endured in large measure to this day. But as soon as peace came there was wholesale demobilisation and disbandment, a pattern that continued in the following three centuries, often with disastrous results at the outset of the next war (a pattern which threatens to repeat itself today). Soldiers have therefore tended to look to their regiments or corps for continuity and as the focus of loyalty rather than to the institution of the army. The regiment was and still is a self-healing and adaptable unit that cherishes its reputation. In 1954 Colonel Robert Ogilby, whose experiences in the two world wars convinced him that the fighting spirit of the British soldier was rooted in the esprit de corps engendered by the regimental system, set up a trust to encourage the nascent regimental and corps museums. With his own money and dynamism Ogilby steered the trust through its early days of official, if benign, War Office scepticism and it came to play a significant part in the establishment and development of 136 such museums in Britain (see the Ogilby Trust website at www.armymuseums.org.uk).
Nevertheless, the army as a whole has developed an institutional character that is more than merely the sum of its parts, although often it has been the achievement of one or a small number of those parts that has then somehow reinforced the others. It is this process of institutional building that has intrigued me increasingly during my own service and which I continue to examine in my writing.

