The Bismarck Debate

Bruce Waller looks at recent debate about modern Germany's greatest statesman.

Bruce Waller | Published in History Review

Historians strive to accumulate and record the facts of the past: with diligence they can obtain a high degree of accuracy. They also attempt the more difficult task of interpreting that past; here certainty, if it is more than banal, is an ungrateful and resourceful captive, yearning to escape. We know a great deal about Bismarck, but each of us sees him differently. Our own individuality is important, but so is our place in time, in society or on the globe.

The Bismarck debate

Before the First World War most Germans looked on the founder of their empire with admiration, though not necessarily with love. But there were also those who thought that he had robbed Germans of liberty. After the war the voice of criticism was muted. Germans blamed defeat in World War I on his successors and jealous foreigners. Bismarck's work was seen as 'creative' in the 1860s and as peaceful afterwards. In the late 1930s and early 40s his 19 years of peace embarrassed the authorities who preferred to honour Frederick the Great, a man small in stature but large in warlike endurance. The first breath of criticism therefore occurred under National Socialism. This upsetting fact was to facilitate the post World War II revival of respect and even veneration for Bismarck: if the Nazis did not honour the iron chancellor, then he must have been worthy!

During the 1950s criticism of Bismarck centred rather unrealistically on the problem of deciding whether a German nation-state or a German-dominated Central Europe should have been created. The problems inherent in the second alternative were so apparent that Bismarck's creation assumed the mantle of inevitability. A united Central Europe would have needed to be sufficiently strong to function smoothly at home but too weak to upset its neighbours – an impossible configuration. Most people were therefore prepared to accept Bismarck's creation, warts and all, as necessary and therefore welcome. The flickers of criticism under Nazism cooled until 1955, when something happened to re-ignite them and then to fan the flames as never before.

This was the appearance of an article in a German historical journal, leading to publication of a substantial book by Fritz Fischer on the origins of World War I. Not only was he the first significant German historian to blame Germany for starting the war, but he called it an attempt to gain worldwide power and linked it to Hitler's more ambitious effort – thus labelling the Germans as consistently belligerent. Fischer substantiated this with political, economic, social and cultural evidence. It amounted to a massive attack on Bismarck's creation and initiated a furious debate on the character and consequences of it. The larger-than-life image of the man was not so much questioned as demonised. So Fischer's book, which was not even on Bismarck, made the greatest impact in the debate on the man and his work, His student Helmut Bohme took up the economic argument and in a book published in German in 1966 maintained that economic matters, largely uncontrolled by Bismarck, were in fact much more important than his political manoeuvring. Hans-Ulrich Wehler took this argument further and, in addition, insisted that Bismarck's empire was fatally flawed from birth. So what one might call the Fischer school contended that not so much the chancellor but the iron and rye economy was central; the state apparently created by Bismarck was doomed from the outset and led ultimately but also inexorably to Hitler.

The ‘Fischer controversy’ – the argument between his supporters and his enemies – raged throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Since the Fischer school stood on the political left and its opponents on the right, the dispute was political as well as historical. There was also the generational gap. Fischerites were, as a rule, young men (Fischer himself belonged to the older generation). The dispute was especially bitter, partly because the opponents were separated by age and politics. The left, who believed in critical social history, felt cheated because, although German politics in the 1970s were left of centre, the historical establishment strongly resisted their view and much more critical view of German history.

The conservative 1980s

Around 1980 the political scene in Britain, the United States and then Germany moved to the right. German historians and the population in general began to view the past more reverently. A wave of interest in, and sympathy for, Prussia swept the country. This was documented first by an extremely popular Prussian exhibition in 1981 and then five years later by the occurrence of been called the 'historian’s dispute'. That was a short and immense public quarrel which had two faces. It was an attempt to see Nazi horrors in the perspective of a violent century which has witnessed murder on a grand scale; it also sought to revive the more attractive aspects of German history and so to dwell less on the crimes of National Socialism.

The conservative 1980s influenced historical writing – and not only in Germany. An interpretation of the Preach Revolution favourable to Robespierre had dominated scholarship since the Second World War. Even before the 80s this view was reversed. We can see traces of the same interpretation-swing in the study of British and American history as well. But our appreciation of Bismarck has been altered less by this swing than one might think. There has been no popular or scholarly revival of Bismarck veneration, but interest in him has definitely been enlivened. For Germans at least before World War I the words 'blood and iron' were the cachet of proud and honourable strength. There has been no return to this kind of thoughtless adulation of an undoubtedly great man, although re-unification (1990) has made his work seem suddenly less unattractive.

Since the tidal turn towards conservatism in about 1980 three superb and full biographies have appeared – one by the West German Lothar Gall in 1980, the second by the East German Ernst Engelberg in 1985 and 1990, the third by the American (of German descent) Otto Pflanze in 1990. Each tries to view Bismarck and his work in light and shadow; none is influenced to any appreciable degree by the Fischer school. If the less critical approach to history of the 80s and 90s has apparently not led to a Bismarck cult, it may well have saved him from massive condemnation. Let us now turn to these three important biographies m the order of their appearance.

Lothar Gall

Gall's book Bismarck: the White Revolutionary appeared in German in 1980 and in English translation in 1986. It is probably the most searching biography we have. First of all we should note that Gall wrote a 'life'. Germans do not write many biographies – there are almost as many of Bismarck in English as in German. Gall wrote a biography to counter the school of social historians for whom the individual matters little. But in one way he was influenced by them. The book contains many long reflective passages and not much life or action. Crankshaw's dismissive biography (1981) is half as long but twice as lively! Gall's main theme is underlined in the subtitle: he sees Bismarck as a 'white revolutionary', that is as a conservative revolutionary as opposed to a radical or red one. This argument is a rapier thrust at Gall's opponents, who argued that Bismarck was a hide-bound defender of a moribund society and therefore responsible for his country's Jurassic backwardness and for the prolonged ascendancy of the military. Gall points out that the Prussian gentry saw him as subversive and so disowned him: they ought to have known a conservative by sight. He says also that Germany under Bismarck underwent more change than any other European country, and so if he was attempting to preserve a dinosaur in amber he was a colossal failure.

Most historians, but not the majority of students, have now consigned the view of Bismarck as a reactionary to history’s dustbin. Bismarck was of course fond of the society he knew so well, but his aim in life was not to preserve it but to extend his own and Prussia’s power. For this goal he was prepared for heavy sacrifice. Realising that national and liberal feelings were then a powerful current, he sought to row with it and so avoid capsizing the ship of state. He came to terms with the Nationalists who were also Liberals. He neither outwitted them, which is what people said before about 1960, nor did he manipulate them (a post-1960 view) with Machiavellian cynicism. Gall underlines the fact that the Liberals, as Nationalists, backed vigorous foreign policy and, wary that Liberalism could open the door to democracy, requested merely a voice in affairs and not government control. They got what they wanted from Bismarck and would have been more upset had they obtained more! There was therefore no liberal alternative to Bismarck’s empire.

This is an immensely important point. Bismarck was no conservative but a reformer who went as far as his apparent opponents wanted him to go. Gall was puzzled by this, which did not square well with Bismarck's clear attachment to old Prussia. So he developed an idea hinted at in a brief biography by W. N. Medlicott in the 1960s and argued that Bismarck was a ‘sorcerer's apprentice'. This view of Bismarck as an apprentice magician might well be the most devastating criticism of the man yet. Gall argues that the iron chancellor conjured up powers – nationalism, liberalism, economic modernisation – which spun out of control and that therefore what he achieved was not what he had striven for. This chisels Bismarck down to our size. He was a man with imperfect wit, goodwill and ability; his accomplishment was correspondingly imperfect and – to a point – unintended.

Ernst Engelberg

We turn now to the second major biography, by Engelberg, which has not been translated into English. It is especially noteworthy for two reasons. First of all, it is a biography which breathes the spirit of Brandenburg. Bismarck is seen as m originally 'healthy Prussian'. Engelberg was a life-long communist and one of East Germany's leading historians who in the past had insisted on strict Marxist history. His earlier writing naturally reflected scepticism of the role of individuals; he also supported socialist internationalism. This book is Marxist up to a point, bur. it additionally gives full weight to psychological and religious as well as to political and economic factors. It is also Prussian to the extent of disparaging the attitudes and actions of other Germans, especially those who attempted to thwart Bismarck's initiatives. Secondly, that such a book could he written by a member of the communist establishment and published in the former German Democratic Republic is a clear sign that the regime was losing its nerve and so nearing collapse.

Its assessment of Bismarck is a good deal more positive than his earlier works. He is especially good on Bismarck's youth and the society in which he matured. Engelberg's book is twice the length of Gall's and much more detailed, but less philosophical. He follows Gall's views on the fairly limited goals of the Liberals, but is much harsher in condemnation of the bourgeoisie in general. The Liberals were not only weak: they were also bad.

One would expect Engelberg, as a pre-eminent Marxist, to argue that domestic policy was more important than foreign policy. Strangely, he does not. He believes that domestic and foreign affairs were equally important and influenced one another. He sees Bismarck as moving with the current of the day. He was not the tool of the military or of Capital, but accomplished a task - unification - which was somehow coming. His German opponents get poor marks; Austrian statesmen are treated more hardily than by practically any other living historian. Napoleon III is also seen as warlike. The Russians alone of Prussia's neighbours come off well.

Engelberg had previously seen Bismarck's empire as a doomed bastion against democracy. In this book his view is much more favourable: he established a kind of modern Napoleonic rule with the possibility of further reform. Indeed under Bismarck the imperial parliament did gradually gain influence. As one would expect, Engelberg bitterly attacks Bismarck's treatment of the German socialists; but he also objects to his social insurance scheme. It was not wide enough in scope and not sufficiently centralized; worker protection (factory acts) was not even attempted. The whole matter was more an attempt to manipulate the German parties and to increase his own power. His legacy in the domestic sphere was tainted by his enmity for democratic elements. Otherwise the empire had its modern aspects and was capable of progress.

In foreign policy Bismarck gets very much better marks. Engelberg stresses his adherence to the territorial status quo. He rather naively claims that Bismarck aimed mainly at preserving the peace by keeping the European power balance steady: he sought to obtain the trust of states large and small. His successors departed from this modest policy and disregarded his repeated warnings. A man who visited him in 1891 put it this way: 'He offered us young Germans the life of a political pensioner…our creative urge was disregarded'. In retirement Bismarck pleaded for political moderation. Younger men sought to continue his great deeds; they failed to realise that further advance might shatter on granite. So far as foreign policy is concerned, Engelberg does not subscribe to Fischer's continuity thesis. He thinks that German belligerence owes little to Bismarck and much to his successors. After 1890 the former chancellor was honoured but unheeded: his moderation was cast aside.

Otto Pflanze

Finally, we look at the third and most accessible full biography by the German American Otto Pflanze. His three volume study Bismarck and the Development of Germany will surely long remain the English-language standard biography, full, accurate and sound. More than Gall, or even Engelberg who has much more on Bismarck's youth, Pflanze uses psychological insight and works with Freudian concepts. We see a human Bismarck struggling with the outside world and himself, trying to overcome self-doubt and displaying hesitancy as often as strong action. Following Gall, he sees a pilot with imperfect eyesight. More than Engelberg and Gall, Pflanze stresses Bismarck's pugnacity and need to shine, but not necessarily need for applause - this is what separates him from William II.

If for Gall Bismarck is the 'sorcerer's apprentice' and for Engelberg the ‘healthy Prussian', Pflanze sees him as a 'dyke captain'. His first job was captain of the dykes; he became later captain of the Prussian dyke, trying to shore up an outmoded society; he dug new channels to alleviate pressure on the dyke and so backed necessary reform, but only to preserve what he could of existing society. Pflanze sees the dyke captain's creation - the German empire - as the last of a series of Hohenzollern reforms from above. Bismarck's work therefore fits into an historical pattern: its individuality and modernity can be exaggerated. In essentials Pfianze follows in Gall's footsteps. He sees the Liberals as weak and malleable. The national movement was also weak before 1870 and so Bismarck could guide it into his channels. He was no nationalist: his policy was oriented much more to the state, but through his creation of a German nation-state he unintentionally gave nationalism a large boost.

Pflanze stresses Bismarck's flexibility, his concern to keep options open and not to be run into a cul-de-sac. Paradoxically he created an empire incapable of important further reform: the empire was anything but inevitable but once created was doomed. In the 1860s Bismarck seemed in complete control. He planned and started the wars of 1866 and 1870 (Engelberg would disagree strongly on this point), but afterwards his control vanished and by i890 he was at the end of his political tether and left behind a rope with which, his successors hanged themselves. One might expect the communist Engelberg to argue along these determinist lines, but he regards the empire as reformable. Pflanze, otherwise keen to argue that history is open-ended, takes a more rigidly negative stance. Of these three biographies, his assessment of Bismarck's legacy is the most severe.

A dyke captain's duty is to prevent catastrophe, not to reform. So Pflanze sees Bismarck losing control and losing his bearings after the creation, of the empire. In foreign policy he could merely prevent the inevitably undesirable results of his policies and actions from occurring during his term of office. That things went wrong afterwards was to a large extent his fault: his successors were in a 'no win' situation.

On the domestic scene Pflanze believes that Bismarck harmed the Germans' political sense and ability to govern themselves, which were greater when he took office than when he stepped from power. The German establishment which Bismarck helped to forge was broadened from the old landed aristocrats to include commercial and industrial leaders. It was still too narrow and rigid to function well.

Most of these sweeping statements are either dubious or wrong, Bismarck may well have sponsored reform to preserve the familiar. It is much less likely that the swiftly and radically reformed society he left behind was incapable of further movement, or that the international situation after 1890 had been so disturbed by him as to lead necessarily to disaster. The fault lay surely with the pygmies who succeeded him in high office. It borders on the absurd to argue that Germans were more capable of self-government before he came to power than after he retired. Pflanze is at his best when unravelling and explaining events. But when he looks for underlying meaning, as he does at the end of his three volume work, he goes badly wrong. Gail is much better at philosophy. Engelberg, who resorts to it less, is closer to the truth than Pflanze.

Of the three recent biographers, Gall is clearly the most profound and influential. Engelberg's German book is a wonderful monument to what communist scholarship can achieve al eventide. Pflanze is balanced, detailed and just, but his pessimistic musings on the domestic and international viability of Bismarck's empire are too gloomy. Surprisingly perhaps, of the three biographies his is, owing to his views on Bismarck's successful manipulation, closest to the heroic interpretation - although of a rather negative variety.

Books on Bismarck

  • W. Carr, A History of Germany 1815-1890 (1991) - the best introduction to German history
  • M. Fulbrook (ed.), German History since 1800 (1997)
  • W. Medlicott, Bismarck and Modern Germany (1965) - the best brief biography
  • G. Kent, Bismarck and his Times (1978) - a sound introduction to facts and problems
  • B. Waller, Bismarck (2nd edition 1997) - an introduction to the historical problems surrounding him

Bruce Waller is a senior lecturer in History at the University of Wales in Swansea and the author of Themes in Modern European History 1830-90 (London 1990).