Japan: Isolationism & Internationalism

In 1970 the run-away best-seller in Japan was a book entitled The Japanese and the Jews appearing under the nom-de-plume Isaiah Benda-san. At first sight the title seems odd: the Jews are widely dispersed in the Diaspora while the 116 million Japanese are highly concentrated in their own narrow territory. There is, however, a certain similarity in the outlook shared by Jews and Japanese in regard to outsiders – the gentile and the gaijin (Japanese for foreigners) are perceived as distinct species. While there may be a similarity in nature between the views of the Jews and the Japanese the actual degree of exclusivism is perhaps greater among the Japanese. No nation, no people are as much a tribe or a tight-knit clan as the Japanese. There is also another possible parallel to be drawn between Jews and Japanese, namely that both see themselves as being highly vulnerable. In 1973, before the oil shock and at a time when everything seemed to be going in Japan's favour, two great best-sellers and concurrently box-office hits were Nihon Chinbotsu (The Submersion of Japan ) and Dai Hyogen (The Great Prophecy ), both of which portrayed, in apocalyptic terms, the end of Japan. The perception of acute vulnerability, that a major calamity is invariably in the offing – an earthquake or an economic crisis – reinforces the bonds of national solidarity and hence of Japan's position somewhat on the periphery of the rest of the world.

To account for this sense of aloofness a number of factors must be borne in mind. Japan's geographic position is an obvious one. The linguistic, ethnic and religious homogeneity of the people is another. Until September 1945 Japan never experienced in recorded history a successful military invasion from a foreign power and consequently, with the brief exception of the years 1945 to 1952, Japan was not subjected to foreign rule. There is another phenomenon peculiar to the Japanese, namely that their entrepreneurs have operated almost exclusively from their home base. In other words, there has been virtually no export of entrepreneurial talent who have made a mark abroad, as was the case at one time or another (or indeed persists to this day) with the Chinese, the British, the Indians, the Swedes, the Arabs, the Armenians, etc. Nor has the world, even during the militaristic totalitarianism of the late 1930s and early 1940s, been flooded by Japanese political refugees.

The sense of national solidarity and aloofness from the world has not, however, been accompanied by national narcissism. Throughout most periods of Japanese history, the mood has generally been favourable to receiving and adapting ideas and techniques from abroad. There is a degree of paradox, still perceptible today, however, between, on the one hand, curiosity, admiration, even envy of the outside world and, on the other, suspicion and apprehension. The Japanese world-view remains composed of conflicting forces of isolationism and internationalism.

What is the reason for the development of this national psychology? In the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Japan became a considerable maritime power. Japanese traders, pirates and mercenaries roamed the Chinese seas and travelled throughout Southeast Asia. It was also in the second half of the sixteenth century that the Japanese came into contact with Europeans and with Europe – two Japanese missions set sail for Europe and called upon, among others, the Pope and the King of Spain. Concurrently, however, Japan was in the midst of incessant civil war.

Peace was imposed by the Tokugawa dynasty of Shoguns in the early seventeenth century and as a means of preserving this peace the regime decided upon a policy of virtual total isolation from the outside world: this policy was known assakoku , 'closed country'. The Japanese believed that the European missionaries and merchants were undermining national cohesion; the importation of the Christian faith was ideologically divisive while the sale of arms to certain feudal lords carried severe risks of renewed warfare.

Sakoku lasted for over two centuries. There were, it is true, a few chinks in the armour of isolation. The Dutch maintained a small factory on an islet (Dejima) in the bay of Nagasaki. A degree of trade with China continued. But although there has been a tendency among a number of historians to stress certain important, mainly intellectual, areas in which Japan remained 'opened' in spite of being 'closed', this opened it must be emphasised – and paradoxical as it may seem today – was in terms of importation, not exports. Sakoku came to an end in the mid-nineteenth century as Japan became more or less forcefully absorbed into the world economy. This long period of seclusion, however, had significantly reinforced the bonds of national solidarity. While in the early phase of transition from isolation internal politics centred round the two options of joi (expel the barbarians) andkaikoku (open the country), by the latter decades of the nineteenth century, Japanese policies were strongly motivated by a spirit of modern nationalism. In fact it can be said that Japan at this time was the only nation outside the West which developed its own, clearly articulated and vigorously pursued nationalistic policy. Nationalism served as a powerful force in the process of industrialisation and in the country's military and foreign policies. This nationalism, it should be added, was fuelled to a significant extent by Western policies which appeared provocative to the Japanese and which led them to believe that they were discriminated against, hence heightening their sense of vulnerability. That Japan became a major industrial power" that she proved a formidable military power (the defeat of Russia in 1905), and an astute force in the realm of international diplomacy (the twenty year Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902-22) all attest to the success of the country's transition from sakoku to kaikoku .

In 1945 Japan experienced a crushing, humiliating defeat. The subsequent rise of the Japanese phoenix from the ashes is undoubtedly one of the more spectacular events in modern history. Today, for primarily economic reasons, Japan is very much the centre of international attention. There is a sense of expectation both abroad and in Japan that the country should play a political role commensurate with her economic might. The recognition and reaction in Japan to what is – albeit perhaps somewhat dimly – perceived as the dawn of a new era can be illustrated by the catch-word of the day, kokusaika , internationalisation.

There are, however, many obstacles to Japan's internationalisation. So far as the legacy of the past is concerned, neither the isolationism of the Edo era nor the nationalism of the late nineteenth century and the twentieth century up to 1945 – in spite of occasional half-hearted flirtations with Pan-Asianism – corresponded to ideologies with universal appeal. Other world powers are armed with universal ideologies which derive from their own historical experiences – Marxism- Leninism in the case of the Soviet Union, principles of democracy in that of the United States and the nations of Western Europe. Other obstacles to Japan's internationalisation include the consideration that there are practically no non-Japanese in Japan. The 116 million inhabitants of the country are Japanese – with the exception of a few thousand foreigners in temporary residence and a handful of more permanent but hardly assimilated Koreans. They are united linguistically, ethnically and by a common system of education to such an extent that Japanese educated abroad have little chance of being successfully integrated into their own society. Nor, however, will a foreigner educated in Japan be successfully integrated into Japanese society. The problem is compounded by the fact that whereas the Japanese have shown themselves so remarkably able in many fields, their general achievement in foreign languages remains mediocre – a situation for which the education system is responsible to a considerable degree. Also, there are very few people apart from the Japanese themselves capable of speaking their language, and Japanese is not an international language as, for example, are Chinese or Arabic, English or French.

In industrial terms internationalism also presents problems. Both foreign observers and the Japanese agree that the major factor lying behind the country's post-war economic success has been the combined quality of management and of the workforce, and that the two – managers and employees – are united by a common purpose which in turn is pursued with determination on the basis of a strong esprit de corps . There are a number of foreign observers, notably in the United States, who believe that Japanese managerial systems are exportable. The Japanese, on the whole, remain sceptical. There is a fairly widespread belief that things work well in Japan because the operators are Japanese. Thus, while a number of Western governments eagerly seek to attract Japanese investment, there is a marked degree of reticence on the part of Japanese corporations because of the strong belief that their comparative advantage lies in conditions that exist in Japan, but are absent among Westerners. Their desire to become more internationalist is confronted by the strong continuing sense of both national solidarity and of vulnerability.

When Sakoku came to an end in the mid-nineteenth century the Japanese then embarked on an ambitious programme of modernisation in order not only to resist the predatory Western imperialist powers but indeed also to project their country as one of the leading nations in the modern world.

The success was rapid and certainly remarkable. To a very great extent the success is due to the careful, incisive and sustained study of the West which they have now been carrying out for over a century. In that respect, therefore, the Japanese did internationalise but with the objective of internalising the lessons they learnt. There can be no doubt that Japan was revitalised by the Western models they emulated. Today Japan has a great deal to contribute to the world. But the reaction, especially in the West, towards Japan has too often been negative, in fact frequently hostile; for example the hysterical and often hypocritical Western obsession with bilateral trade issues, the derogatory, insulting anti-Japanese jibes in the Western press result in a reaction on the part of the Japanese to retreat back to the comfortable confines of isolationism rather than subject themselves to the trials and tribulations of internationalism. Yet in the contemporary era, the West stands to benefit from a careful, incisive and sustained study of Japan. On both sides every effort should be directed towards achieving a more dynamic, collaborative and thereby ultimately fruitful relationship.

It is in this sense that the internationalisation of Japan poses certain problems but at the same time a most exciting and invigorating challenge.

• Jean-Pierre Lehmann is Director of the Centre for Japanese Studies at the University of Stirling.